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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the Skills Strategy for England under New Labour as a contested 
project to govern workplace high(er) skill aspiration and behaviour. It analyses 
differentiated state strategies to promote and (re)produce responsible skills ambitions; 
the engagement of employer and employee representatives with these strategies to 
stretch and reshape, and resist and restate the project; and the implications for skills 
provision. The research involved interpretive analysis of policy documents, and in-depth 
interviews with policy-making elites; strategic representatives of business and 
worker/learner interests; and skills providers.    
To support my empirical focus this thesis is located within theories of the changing 
form and function of the state. Adopting a ‘cultural political economy’ approach, and 
drawing on critical governance studies, to illuminate the interplay between meaning 
production and practice, I challenge the conclusion that mechanisms for skills creation in 
England are premised on a misunderstanding of the skills motivations of employers and 
employees. Instead I expose state work through policy to produce and export a skills logic; 
constituting and positioning governable subjects in relation to their internalisation of 
these logics; and the role of differentiated policies to manoeuvre subjects towards 
preferential skills behaviours. 
The findings highlight that what is presented as a coherent ‘partnership’ approach 
to producing enhanced skills can be better understood as three distinctive state strategies, 
(demand-led; leading demand; circumventing lack of demand) , which are aimed at 
differently imagined and constructed workplaces, (enlightened; inert; or deviant), 
depending on their demonstrable degree of responsible skills ambition. I therefore term 
this project ‘state-steered voluntarism’. However, I also expose the limitations and limits 
of this project. Attempts to present policy coherence lacquers over latent tensions and 
contradictions between the different skills strategies, creating policy ‘opacities’ which 
serve as spaces for the strategic voices of employer/employee representation to talk back; 
disorganising the practices and processes of skills delivery.  
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1. Introduction  
 
“Welcome to the strange land of skills policy […] where contradictory sentences coexist 
happily and words mean the exact opposite of what they seem” (Wolf, 2007) 
 
ontemporary comparative literatures on post-compulsory education and training 
systems define the UK as an archetypal voluntarist model, at least since the late 
1970s and the abolition of the Manpower Services Commission: a  system led by the 
private training decisions of economic actors – negotiated within the ‘black-box’ of the 
firm (Keep, 2002) - and therefore largely directed by the ad hoc demands and preferences 
of employers (King, 1997; Brown et al, 2001; Rubery & Grimshaw, 2003;  Page & Hillage, 
2006; Clarke & Winch, 2007).  
 
Within such a model the role of the state in shaping skills provision and the skills product 
is largely relegated to the realm of managing the supply-side (designing and overseeing 
the implementation of various initiatives and programmes available to be taken up by 
employers should they so wish). The stated aim is one of seeking to ensure the institutions 
of education and training are aligning themselves to the demands and preferences of 
employers and delivering the economically valuable skills they require. Nevertheless, the 
British state exercises this role in the paradoxical context of voluntarism which provides 
no incentive nor ascribes any responsibility on employers to exhibit actual demand for 
skills. Indeed, analysis of workplace training decisions in the UK shows employers to have, 
at best, highly polarised demands for skills, and at worst, low, or no, demand for skills at 
all (Keep & Mayhew, 1996; Brown et al, 2001; Clarke & Winch, 2007).  It is this paradox 
which has preoccupied much of the critical literature concerned with the nature of the UK 
skills system; wherein skills policy scholars and commentators have sought to highlight the 
problems of the combination of demand-side voluntarism and the strong managerialism 
of the supply-side (see for example, Keep & Mayhew, 1996; Keep, 2005; Keep, 2006; Keep 
2007).  
 
C
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With the election of a New Labour government in 1997, however, the locus of paradox in 
skills policy in the UK/England has been subtly shifted. Into the context of voluntarism of 
skills demand and managerialism of skills supply, emerged a new inflection in policy that 
suggested a more interventionist role for the state in ‘leading’ (shaping and directing) the 
nature of skills ambitions amongst private workplace actors (employers and employees); 
directing them towards high(er) skills aspirations. This new inflection instigates a move 
towards what this thesis identifies as ‘state-steered voluntarism’; an approach to the 
governance of skills in the UK/England which exhibits a new paradox of being about 
delivering both a ‘demand-led’ (often treated as synonymous with employer-led) 
approach to skills development, and a state strategy to ‘lead demand’ of employers and 
employees in the context of voluntarism of private decisions to train and utilise skills.  
 
This thesis was motivated to address this new paradox at the heart of skills policy in 
England. It is a paradox that has been acknowledged by skills policy scholars and 
commentators (Brown & Lauder, 1996; Keep, 2002; Wolf, 2007; Payne, 2008), but – this 
thesis argues – has not been satisfactorily accounted for. As stated above, it was a 
paradox particularly and acutely apparent throughout the on-going development of a 
‘Skills Strategy’ – fervently claimed to amount to a ‘Skills Revolution’ (Pring, 2004; DIUS, 
2007a) - during successive New Labour administrations, and that I experienced as a 
perpetual source of confusion and frustration for the five years I worked within the 
Further Education sector in England1.  
 
The tension, between a demand-led and a demand leading strategy for skills, recurs in 
New Labour policy documents (for England) through the frequent juxtaposition of 
inherently contradictory statements (Wolf, 2007); statements that speak to a dual 
intention of both responding to employer and employee demand, and raising employer 
and employee demand for higher skills. For example, the Performance and Innovation 
Unit (PIU) report – ‘In Demand: Adult Skills in the 21st Century’ (2001) – makes this 
                                                  
1 I worked as Project Manager for Bridgwater College in Somerset between 2001 and 2006. In this role my 
specific remit was to develop, implement and ‘mainstream’ project-funded innovations in relation to the 
strategic agendas of both Widening Participation and Employer Engagement. 
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somewhat ambiguous and incomprehensible claim about the ambition of policy in relation 
to the future of workforce development: 
 
“Change must focus on raising the demand for [training and skills]2 from both employers and 
individuals, through the development of a demand-led system based on empowering 
individuals and employees to increase their demand for [training and skills].” (PIU, 2001:5) 
 
A couple of years later the then Department for Education and Skills (DfES) White Paper - 
‘21st Century Skills: Realising Our Potential – Individuals, Employers, Nation’ (2003) – with 
equal clarity of purpose, added: 
 
“We must put employers’ needs for skills centre stage, managing the supply of training, skills 
and qualifications so that it responds directly to those needs. We must raise ambition in the 
demand for skill. We will only achieve increased productivity and competitiveness if more 
employers and more employees are encouraged and supported to make the necessary 
investment in skills” (DfES, 2003:8) 
 
And so it went on, through a rapid succession of consultations, White Papers, and 
Reviews; through assorted policy statements, press releases, Ministerial speeches, and so 
on. In each case policy discourse could be seen to shift seamlessly and fluidly between the 
importance of a “demand-led approach” and the facilitation of a “new culture for learning 
and an appetite for improved skills amongst individuals and employers” (Leitch, 2006, 
emphasis added), and from a vision of “a demand-led system”, to a policy emphasis on 
“stimulating demand” (Strategy Unit, 2002).  
 
Explaining the source and cause of this paradox - the governance dynamics that forged its 
existence in skills policy - provides the analytical starting point of this thesis. 
Understanding the factors that seal its irreconcilability forms the basis of the conclusion.  
To begin however I will set this endeavour in the context of existing analytical and 
                                                  
2 The report uses the term ‘workforce development’ (WfD) rather than skills, but defines WfD as: “a 
relatively new term for training and skills development. It sits between training (which has a narrow focus) 
and education (which is broad), and is firmly grounded in business need” (PIU, 2001:3) 
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evaluative work that has equally had an empirical focus on skill policy, and the paradox it 
contains, in the UK/England. 
 
1.1 The Empirical Context: Dynamics of Skill Policy in UK/England 
 
1.1.1 Policy Paradox: a Chronic Affliction?  
 
As discussed above, for many commentators the paradox at the heart of the New Labour 
Skills Strategy may be explained as reflective of a deeper affliction from which the 
governance of skills in the UK/England suffers; the source and cause of which traces back 
well before (and extends beyond) the New Labour era. For these commentators the 
paradox continues to be a manifestation of the contradiction of a dominant state-led and 
utilitarian ‘new vocationalism’ paradigm, that constructs and arranges education and 
training in service to the putative high(er) skills needs and demands of the economy 
without challenging the voluntarism of private decisions to train, and, therefore, without 
addressing the historical absence of effective social partnership and collective manpower 
planning mechanisms. The issue for these commentators is that effective social 
partnership and collective manpower planning mechanisms are necessary not just to 
articulate high(er) skills demand, but, in the first instance, to build workplace relations 
based on trust such that high(er) skills needs can manifest as ‘demands’ (Avis et al, 1996; 
Brown, 1999; Coffield, 1999; Keep, 1999; Keep & Mayhew, 1999; Gleeson & Keep, 2004; 
Payne, 2008)3.  
 
It is argued that the absence of mechanisms necessary to build trust – to activate, 
actualise, and articulate high(er) skills demand - has produced low skills equilibrium 
conditions in the UK/England; conditions oft bemoaned by employers, Trade Unions and 
                                                  
3 For many (for example, Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Keep et al, 2008) this paradigm – that education and 
training should meet the needs and demands of the economy, or more particularly employers - extend back 
to the ‘Great Debate’ on education and training (initiated by - then Prime Minister – Callaghan’s Ruskin 
College Speech, 1976). Although Keep & Mayhew (1998) highlight that policy concerns regarding the 
relevance of education and training for the economy have a history that extends back well before that. 
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governments alike. The term ‘low skills equilibrium’ was coined in a seminal article by 
Finegold & Soskice (1988) to explain a pattern of iterative interaction between the 
education and training (ET) system and national economic performance, that explains the 
self-reinforcing consequence of firms establishing a historical comparative advantage in 
low cost, low value product market and production strategies, and the implications of 
such a prevalent production and employment regime for the ways in which ET systems 
have developed, are organised and regulated, and continue to produce a low-skills 
workforce in the context of low demand for high skills.  
 
Despite the original and explicit intonation of Finegold & Soskice’s conceptualisation of 
low skills equilibrium as the product and cause of a particular ‘two-way’ relationship 
between demand for, and supply of, skills, periodic resurgence of concern regarding skills 
levels, as a critical economic and social issue in the UK/England, tends to frame the 
problem as an issue of supply (Keep & Mayhew, 1999; Lauder, 1999; Keep, 2002; Keep et 
al, 2008). Indeed, in the dominant political discourse, the historic failures of skills supply 
are widely perceived as the cause of the comparative productivity and competitiveness 
gap, as well as labour market inequalities, insecurities, and ultimately poverty and social 
exclusion (Lloyd & Payne, 2002; Pring, 2004). More recently, the problem of skills supply 
has been seen as the cause of a growing concern with in-work poverty that frames a new 
categorisation and articulation of the ‘deserving poor’. 
 
It is argued that framing the low skills equilibrium and the associated ills as an issue of 
supply has led to a situation where the state has seized and increased managerial control 
over directing education and training provision in putative relation to the (imagined) 
needs of the economy (Avis et al, 1996; Ainley, 2001; Hyland, 2002; Pring, 2004; Keep, 
2006; Wolf, 2007). Furthermore, that this has taken place despite, and in direct contrast to, 
growing scepticism regarding the ability of centralised bureaucracy to anticipate and ‘plan’ 
for complex and dynamic economic need (Pring, 2004), and whilst retaining ideological 
claims for the importance of preserving the voluntarism of employer training decisions.  
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In short, what this brief historical contextualisation of UK skills policy contradiction has 
illuminated is how we can easily explain and account for – indeed expect – high(er) skills 
projects to be conceptualised as a ‘demand-led’ strategy in the context of voluntarism, 
where the principle source and cause of tension is that actual demand for high(er) skills is 
unlikely in the context of low-skills equilibrium maintained by voluntarist training systems, 
and in which case the state attempts to ‘fill in the gaps’ by managing a largely customer-
less supply with an increasingly iron grip. The question however remains as to how we 
properly explain and account for a new inflection in skills policy; that demand is to be led 
by the state? The answer can perhaps be found by considering old afflictions in new 
economic and social contexts; contexts that have once again reinvigorated calls to 
urgently address the problem of low skills from governments and employer and employee 
representatives alike.  
 
1.1.2 The (global) High Skills Rhetoric: Consensus without Convergence 
 
“More and better skills, so the argument goes, and prosperity will follow.” 
(Ashton & Green, 1996:3) 
 
Throughout successive New Labour administrations the urgent need for higher skills 
returned to occupy a pivotal position at the forefront of economic and social policy and 
policy debates. This period of resurgent concern with the workforce skill level was framed 
(as other periods have been) by apprehension regarding the competitive strength of the 
nation (Wolf, 2007). Specifically, policy and policy debates were again preoccupied with 
the economic and social problem of low skills. However, as Gleeson & Keep (2004) argue, 
the particular need for higher skills in this period emanated from perceptions and 
indications of rapidly accelerating and intensifying change to the ‘knowledge-
based’/knowledge-weaponised dimension of national economic success and social 
security in relatively open, technologically advanced4, and dynamic global markets (Avis et 
                                                  
4 In particular the ‘conceptual’ skills of the workforce has become associated with the capacity to adapt to 
and utilise new technologies and adapt to and implement new forms of production, systems of work 
organisation, and ways of working (Rubery & Grimshaw, 2003:106 also Aston & Green, 1996) 
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al, 1996; Brown & Lauder, 1996; Aston & Green, 1996; Brown, 1999; Brown & Lauder, 
2001; Crouch et al, 2004; Brown, 2008).  
 
Indeed, taking the ‘dynamic’ economic conditions of the global economy as their starting 
point and policy linchpin, higher skills were fervently and repeated depicted by New 
Labour governments as singularly fundamental to sustaining business productivity and 
individual employability. Therefore as the critical determining factor in maintaining and 
enhancing national economic competitiveness and ensuring (a particularly defined version 
of) inclusive social justice and prosperity (Lloyd & Payne, 2002; Hodgson et al, 2008: Keep 
et al, 2008). The alternative was equally zealously portrayed as inevitable economic 
decline, deprivation and social desperation in the struggle to ride the ever rising tide of 
global change and uncertainty (Crouch et al, 2004).  
 
Rhetoric regarding the benefits of high skills has not been isolated to the UK/England, or 
to the political project of New Labour. Indeed it is argued that globalisation and global 
processes have been, and are having, a transformative effect on the education and 
training policies of nations around the world; particularly, but by no means exclusively, in 
the advanced and advancing industrial countries increasingly unable to compete 
effectively on price in an open global economy (Crouch et al, 2004; Rizvi & Lingard, 2010; 
Brown & Lauder, 2011). In this context a broad consensus regarding the central 
importance of higher skills to knowledge-based production, productivity and 
competitiveness has emerged (Lloyd & Payne, 2002). This consensus is argued to be 
apparent within countries between groups representing the interests of both capital and 
labour and political parties of differing ideological persuasion; and between countries 
attempting to organise (for example in the case of the Lisbon Strategy for the ‘economy of 
the European Union’) and/or compete for their share of global trade and wealth (Brown & 
Lauder, 1996; Aston & Green, 1996; Crouch et al, 2004; Knell et al, 2007). 
 
However, the assertion that national education and training policies will converge around 
some common approach to the exponential production of ever higher skilled workers for 
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knowledge-based production, has been widely questioned and disputed. In contrast it has 
been suggested, and empirically confirmed, that divergent historical, political and 
social/cultural contexts of skills formation continue to mediate global changes at the 
national level (Ashton & Green, 1996; Brown & Lauder, 1996; Ball, 1998; Brown, 1999; 
Brown et al, 2001; Crouch et al, 2004; Green, 2006; Rizvi & Lingard, 2010). Brown (1999) 
argues that whilst there is a broad rhetorical consensus regarding the importance of 
higher skills for businesses and worker-citizens increasingly operating in conditions of 
global competition, country-specific responses to common challenges will be filtered and 
managed according to the national logic of ‘possibility’ and ‘limitation’. These logics of 
possibility and limitation are considered to be conditioned by the existing institutional 
configurations of the regime and the balances of power that support and maintain them, 
and determine the political economy of skills formation (Brown et al, 2001; Crouch et al, 
2004).  
 
This is an important point for this thesis which similarly takes the perspective that logics of 
possibility and limitation are of critical significance to understanding skills policy under 
New Labour. In light of this point, the question here becomes whether the inflection in the 
New Labour Skills Strategy that demand is to be led by the state represents a new and 
somehow compatible logic of possibility for governing high(er) skills? If so, how do we 
explain it and account for a residual commitment to a ‘demand-led’ strategy in the context 
of voluntarism? To address these questions the chapter will now review how the New 
Labour Skills Strategy for England has been analysed and critically evaluated.  
 
1.1.3 Policy Paradox: Policy Failure? 
 
For some skills policy scholars and commentators there was initial cause for guarded 
optimism regarding the possibility for aspects of the New Labour Skills Strategy to address 
the ‘chronic affliction’ that has historically beset skills policy in the UK/England, and finally 
tackle low demand for skills. Prior to their first electoral victory, New Labour - identified 
and categorised at the time by Brown & Lauder (1996:1) as: “centre-left Modernizers” - 
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were seen to offer something of a favourable contrast to the incumbent New Right 
informed government, in terms of the direction and trajectory of their agenda for 
economic development. For instance their agenda was perceived as incorporating some 
welcome leanings towards a more active enabling role for the state in shaping - 
particularly through strategic investment in education and training - a higher-skills, higher-
value, higher-wage economy/society; better able to secure a fairer distribution of 
prosperity gains.  
 
Although (for those with an informed and prescriptive analysis of the scale of the task 
required to reverse Britain’s historic training failure and meet the challenges of 
globalisation) such guarded optimism did not obscure concern that there was a lot more 
to be done, in particular the need to address deeper causes of economic and social 
inequality (Brown & Lauder, 1996; Keep & Mayhew, 1998; Brown & Lauder, 2001; Gleeson 
& Keep, 2004). Nevertheless the threads of policy particularly apparent through early 
documents such as the PIU report (2001), received as presenting an agenda to take 
seriously and address the demand-side deficit, offered some hope (Keep & Mayhew, 
1998; Keep, 2002; Coffield, 2002; Keep, 2006).  
 
Over time however, much of the initial optimism dissipated as analysis and critical 
evaluation highlighted the rhetoric vs. reality gap (Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Payne, 2008). It 
seemed the persistent ‘tenacity of voluntarism’ (King, 1997) had once again trumped and 
subsequently hollowed-out the rhetoric of tackling the demand-side, and employers 
retained their inherently private management prerogative over workforce training 
decisions (Grugulis et al, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, given the identification by many – termed by Lloyd & Payne (2002) the 
‘knowledge economy sceptics’ - of continuing low employer demand for skills in the 
context of voluntarism  (Aston & Green, 1996; Keep & Mayhew, 1999; Lauder, 1999; 
Brown et al, 2001; Lloyd & Payne, 2002: Lloyd & Payne, 2003; Lloyd & Payne, 2004), it was 
more concerning still that a retained and renewed policy insistence on the need to ensure 
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a ‘demand-led’ system was perceived as allowing employers to extend their claim to 
‘rights’ over the shape and trajectory of skills policy. Rights that were analysed as both 
independent of any reciprocal accountability (Gleeson & Keep, 2004) and as wielded 
without clarity and coherence of objective (Huddleston & Keep, 1999; Gleeson & Keep, 
2004; Payne, 2008). Rights that became a privilege used to further downplay any 
suggestion of the increased responsibility of employers (Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Payne, 
2008; Hodgson et al, 2008), and which arguably came at the considerable cost of other 
stakeholders and wider social considerations. For example, it was noted that as 
employer’s rights were accentuated so was the individualised ‘responsibility’ and risk of 
(potential) employees; specifically the onus to make themselves labour market compatible 
through training and skills (Avis et al, 1996; Coffield, 1999; Keep, 1999; Brown et al, 2001; 
Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Ball, 2008a).   
 
Overall therefore, the inflection in the New Labour skills project that demand is to be led 
by the state was broadly treated as amounting to policy failure. An agenda premised on a 
fundamental misunderstanding on the part of policy-makers about the true motivations of 
employers (even employees) with regard to attaining and utilising skills. Specifically it was 
perceived as fatally flawed and ultimately crowded out as a consequence of embedded 
institutional constraints and a ‘weak’ state (Brown, 1999; Keep & Mayhew, 1999; Coffield, 
2006; Payne, 2008); or more accurately a state seen to be configured in such a way as to 
lack the ability and willingness to intervene too far in the regulation of the market (Lauder, 
1999; Brown et al, 2001; Lloyd & Payne, 2002; Gleeson & Keep, 2004: Keep et al, 2008).  
 
As a result of this misunderstanding about the high(er) skills motivations of employers and 
the inability and unwillingness of the state to intervene in private skills decisions, much of 
the analysis and critical evaluation of the New Labour high(er) skills project pointed to the 
further inflation of central coordination and control of skill supply (Grugulis et al, 2004; 
Keep, 2006; Lloyd & Payne, 2006; Wolf, 2007). Specifically this analysis and evaluation 
highlighted the strong managerial role afforded through policy to a range of government 
departments (with remits and responsibilities in relation to education and training as well 
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as industry and business, work and welfare and, significantly, HM Treasury); their 
agencies; and the (often newly established or refocused) QUANGOs that were ultimately 
accountable to them (Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Pring, 2004; Coffield et al, 2005; Keep, 2006; 
Payne, 2008).  
 
Pring (2004:109) identified this inflated central control as “micro-managing from the 
centre”, and as amounting to a rigid “framework for ‘setting targets’, ‘driving 
implementation’, and ‘reporting on delivery’” (ibid). All of which boiled down to a strong 
state agenda to lead supply but which had little to contribute by way of leading demand. 
In essence the point being made here returns us back to where we started: that a ‘chronic 
affliction’ besets skills policy in the UK/England; an affliction arising from the contradiction 
of constructing and arranging education and training in service to the putative high(er) 
skills needs of the economy without challenging the context of voluntarism as a cause of 
low skills equilibrium and, therefore, the source of low demand for skills.  
 
The limitation of this analysis and evaluation of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England 
is that whilst it offers an explanation of why policy stipulations that appeared to take 
seriously the intention to tackle the demand for skill failed (policy-maker 
misunderstanding about the true motivations of employers, even employees; embedded 
institutional constraints; a weak, unable and unwilling state), this is not the same as 
accounting for the existence of the paradox in the first place.  Indeed, in the last analysis 
such explanations tend to resort to writing-off the paradox and smoothing out the 
contradictions it implies. Furthermore, whilst reading policy intentions back in a relatively 
straight line from outcomes may lead to the conclusion that claims for the need to lead 
demand in the context of UK voluntarism are empty gestures or smoke and mirrors tricks, 
such conclusions don’t account for, and therefore tend to downplay, the implications and 
effects of the tensions that are produced and felt. For example, Payne (2008) points to 
such implications in his research into the dispiriting search for ‘employer engagement’ by 
Sector Skills Councils (SSCs); one of the (re)inventions of the New Labour Skills Strategy 
caught between being demand-led and demand-leading organisations. Payne’s (2008) 
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research highlights the very real tensions SSCs experience between delivering the demand 
of employers and the demand of the state in the context of what appears to be both a 
demand-led and demand-leading strategy for skills.  
 
This thesis therefore fills a gap in current knowledge by asking how can the paradox at the 
heart of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England be accounted for and explained. In 
doing so this thesis seeks to redirect analysis away from accounting for ‘misunderstanding’, 
and towards accounting for ‘understanding’, by identifying what normative and 
meaningful underpinnings (logics) gave the New Labour Skills Strategy its inflection to be 
both demand-led and to lead demand in the context of voluntarism, and how this obvious 
tension was considered to be managed and reconciled within the high(er) skills project. In 
addition this thesis seek to explore how this tension was received and responded to by 
non-state skills actors, and with what implications for the delivery of skills in England?  
 
1.2 The Research Question, Aims and Scope of the Study 
 
This thesis sets out to explain and understand the source and cause of paradox at the 
heart of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England - a ‘demand-led’ strategy, wherein 
demand is to be led by the state, in the context of voluntarism.  
 
This is not a project about how high(er) skills (demand and supply) should be created, or 
why. There is excellent literature on that topic (a selection of which was discussed in part 
above) that offers much to be hoped for in realising the promises of a ‘high skills’ 
society/economy (Brown & Lauder, 1996; Brown, 1999; Brown et al, 2001; Brown & 
Lauder, 2001). This is a study of what was done (under the New Labour administration in 
England) and with what intended and unintended implications for the political ordering 
and organising of social relations within workplaces; and between workplaces, the state, 
and the institutions of skills provision. In other words, this thesis is concerned with the 
governance of skills policy, by which I mean the way in which doing skills was ordered and 
organised, both by the state (policy-makers) - and as a consequence of how this project 
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was interpreted and responded to, and with what implications - by the strategic 
representatives of employers, employee/learners, and the organisations of skills delivery.  
 
In being interested in the governance of skills policy this thesis asks on what logic(s) was 
the case for high(er) skills built? How did these logics inform policy in terms of the 
meaningful construction and positioning of workplace actors; the role of the state; and 
the shape and functions of the skills delivery infrastructure? What were the consequences 
for how policy ordered and organised doing skills for workplace actors, and what 
opportunities existed for the remaking of meanings and practices, to contest and seek to 
reorder the high(er) skills project? In short by being interested in the governance of skills, 
this thesis is interested in the politics of ‘doing skills’.  
 
The thesis is guided by the following overarching research question (RQ) and three 
empirical sub-question (SRQ):  
 
RQ: How can the governance – ordering and organising – of skills policy under New 
Labour be explained and understood? 
 
SRQ1: How did New Labour establish the logic for, and give meaning to, a high(er) skills 
project in England? 
 
SRQ2: How was the logic for a high(er) skills project used to order and organise skills 
policy in England? 
 
SRQ3: How did employer and employee representatives interpret and respond to the 
New Labour high(er) skills project for England, and with what implications for the 
ordering and organising of skills delivery? 
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Notes on the temporal and geographical limits of scope 
 
The scope of this thesis is restricted to the New Labour Skills Strategy for England, up to 
the completion of fieldwork in 2009. The research was restricted to England because skills 
is a devolved issue and the constitutive nations of the UK can, and most do, draft and 
implement separate skills strategies and policies5. Given the nature of the study, a 
comparative element would have compromised the required depth of analysis. Therefore 
I focused on England. However, in some cases policy documents and interview 
conversations refer to broadly common agendas across the UK as a whole. Finally, 
although New Labour defined their Skills Strategy for England as commencing with the 
publication of the ‘21st Century Skills: Realising Our Potential – Individuals, Employers, 
Nation’ White Paper (2003), the review of relevant documents includes important ‘agenda 
setting’ reports published prior to the official start of the Skills Strategy. 
 
1.3 Outline of the Chapters 
 
Having positioned this study in relation to existing analysis and critical evaluation of the 
New Labour Skills Strategy for England, and having presented the research question(s) and 
scope of the enquiry. The remainder of the thesis progresses as follows: 
 
Chapter 2: sets the scene for the empirical focus of this thesis. Since the research question 
aims to understand the governance of skills policy in England under New Labour and 
account for the paradox to which this thesis is addressed, it is first necessary for this 
chapter to review the existing theoretical perspectives that are equally engaged in this 
task of understanding skill governance, and that have sought to explain the history and 
future trajectory of skill policy in this national context. The chapter draws on and contrasts 
two different analytical models. The first offers a functionalist explanation of the 
institutional arrangements of skill governance (Estevez-Abe et al, 2001; Mares, 2001; Hall 
                                                  
5 There are a number of accounts of the differences between these national strategies/policies (see Payne, 
2008; Keep, 2008; Durrant, 2009). 
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& Soskice, 2001).  The second is concerned with the power and politics of skill governance 
and exposes conflicts and struggles over skills between actors with differing abilities to act 
in their own interest (Korpi, 2006). Whilst both offer a strong account of, and justification 
for, the continuation of demand-led strategies in the context of characteristic voluntarism, 
the argument of this chapter is that neither can account for nor explain the inflection in 
New Labour policy for demand to be led by the state.  
 
Chapter 3:  is set in response to the limitations of the approaches to explaining skills 
governance in England under New Labour reviewed in Chapter 2, and develops the 
conceptual approach for this study; an approach that takes meaning-making (associated 
with governmental rationalities) as state work seriously, and explains the relationship 
between policy meanings, practices and processes. The chapter draws on a combination 
of approaches: ‘cultural political economy’; and critical governance studies.  Utilising these 
approaches I argue the importance of discursive meaning-making for the political ordering 
of the social world and therefore the significance of interpreting the discursive meaning 
that policy inscribes on the objects and subjects that it seeks to govern. In particular, the 
creation of governable subject positions which policy seeks to steer subjects towards. 
Beyond this, however, I also argue that it is important to consider the fallibility of 
meaning-making as discursive and material practice. I draw on prominent theorists in the 
field of critical governance studies to highlight both the ambiguity and contestability of 
state projects and policies. Both the conceptual approach taken in general and the focus 
on meaning-making fallibility – its inherent fragility and contestability – pave the way for 
my methodological approach and design.  
 
Chapter 4: presents the methodology adopted in this study. Given the conceptual 
approach to studying policy meanings that I propose in Chapter 3 this thesis adopts an 
ontologically constructivist position and an interpretive approach to policy analysis. In 
particular the methodological design is informed by my attention to the fallibility of 
meaning-making as state work, which informed my decision to capture the meaning-
making activity of employer, employee/learner, and skills delivery representatives, 
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alongside policy-makers, in the original empirical analysis. I conducted both an extensive 
document analysis and semi-structured interviews with skills policy ‘elites’: policy-makers; 
strategic representatives of employers; strategic representatives of employees; and 
strategic representatives of skills delivery. I define ‘elites’ as operating close to 
policymaking, having authorative power to speak and act in relation to policymaking, and 
as having an ascribed role to represent a wider actor group in promotion or defence of 
their interests.  
 
Chapter 5: is the first of four empirical chapters, and directly addresses the first of the 
empirical sub-questions guiding the research. It presents an analysis of policy-makers’ 
narratives that determines how the logic for skills was built by the New Labour 
Administration as related to a powerful discourse of economic and social uncertainty-
based complexity, and a powerful discourse of high(er) skills as able to reconcile multiple 
interests and agendas. As such the chapter argues that the logic for skills was based on the 
need to pursue ‘progress in partnership’. The importance of constructing the logic for 
skills in this way lies in the subject positions that it seeks to create, and invite employers 
and employees (interacting at the site of the workplace) to adopt.  
 
Chapter 6: is the first of two closely linked empirical chapters that explain how the logic 
for skills was used to order and organise skill policy. Taken together the two chapters 
(Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) present the analytical work and contribution of this thesis to 
explicate three distinct strategies for skills from within the so-termed ‘coherent’ policy 
approach that New Labour presented. This chapter describes the first of these three 
distinct skills strategies; which I term the ‘demand-led’ strategy. The demand-led strategy 
represents governance architecture that is premised on an imagined and idealised 
‘responsible workplace’: comprising enlightened employers and motivated employees; that 
meet an empowering state; and a demand-led system for skills delivery organised to 
respond to the ‘voice and choice’ of workplace actors as partner-customers. The chapter 
argues that governing the demand-led strategy involves ‘making-up’ the responsible 
workplace and bringing it into discursive alignment with certain aspects of state economic 
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and social policies – to ‘support’ production and labour market competitiveness and 
better social functioning – to present a bounded version of the skills policy terrain.  
 
Chapter 7: is the second of two closely linked empirical chapters that presents the 
remaining two analytically explicated distinct strategies for skills. These strategies are 
premised on two versions of negatively imagined ‘inert’ or ‘irresponsible’ workplaces: 
these workplaces comprise deficient or deviant employers and/or employees; encounter  
either an ‘enhancing’ or ‘exhorting/emancipating’ state; and therefore either a ‘system to 
lead demand’ for skills, or a ‘system to mitigate and circumvent lack of demand’. The 
chapter illuminates how this thesis builds an explanation for the paradox at the heart of 
the New Labour Skills Strategy, as governing skills involves reimagining and ‘making-up’ 
inert and irresponsible workplaces, bringing them into discursive alignment with different 
aspects of state economic and social policies – to ‘shape’ or ‘emancipate’ production and 
labour market competitiveness and better social functioning – and present differently 
bounded versions of the skills policy terrain. The paradox is hence explained with the 
coexistence of three different skills strategies which target different types of imagined 
workplaces, employer and employees. However, what confuses strategy meaning (and 
obscures the source of paradox), is that the distinctions between the analytically distinct 
strategies are blurred in policy discourse and the narratives of policy-makers, rendering 
the policy opaque.  
 
Chapter 8: is the final empirical chapter and begins by presenting the interpretation and 
response to the New Labour Skills Strategy for England from employer and 
employee/learner representatives. The chapter finds that as a consequence of the 
intricacies, complexities, and ultimately opacities, involved in state work to articulate and 
assemble three distinct strategies for skills governance as a coherent project employer 
and employee representatives are able to utilise the opaque spaces between lines of 
strategy to engage in a second level of strategic selection of discourses. In essence 
employer and employee representatives engage in stretching and reshaping, and resisting 
and restating parts of the project in support of their interests, ultimately disrupting the 
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sequencing of policy meanings, practices and processes for governing skills. The 
remainder of the chapter presents how this second level of strategic selection by 
employer and employee representatives is experienced by skills delivery as disorganising 
and further frustrating the tensions in their role to deliver both demand-led and demand-
leading strategies for high(er) skills.  
 
Chapter 9:  concludes this thesis. Bringing together the discussions in each of the empirical 
chapters to summarise the findings and capture the theoretical and empirical 
contributions, and the policy implications of this thesis.  
o Theoretically: this thesis contributes a conceptual approach to the study of skills 
policy, informed by a commitment to taking meaning-making as state work 
seriously; an approach which is able to account for and explain the paradox in New 
Labour skills project.  
o Empirically: this thesis offers a novel conceptualisation of the way in which (state 
and non-state) actors act within policy in conditions of opacity of policy meaning, 
and develops an account of strategic skills actors as engaged in second order 
strategic selection of meanings and practices for governing skills to explain how 
skills actors act from within policy, and with what implications for delivery.  
o Policy implications: this thesis argues that the problems for governing skills in 
England are problems of policy opacity. The thesis argues that by collapsing the 
distinctions between the different strategies normative policy intentions are 
obscured and lost, with real effects for skills delivery. Therefore the thesis 
effectively demonstrates the limitations and limits of ‘state-steered voluntarism’, 
and showcases frustration over ambiguous policy meaning ‘on the ground’ when 
considering the perspectives of providers.  
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2. Skill Governance in England: Theorising the Policy and Politics of 
Voluntarism 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
“Education is never for its own sake, whatever people often pretend.” (Ainley, 1990:1) 
 
his chapter sets the scene for the empirical focus of this thesis: governance of skills 
policy and politics in England under New Labour. As the above quote indicates, the 
significance of the policy and politics of skill governance – how the ‘doing of skills’ that 
determines the social context and societal capacity for skill formation (Brown, 1999; 
Brown et al, 2001) is ordered and organised - lies in what is at stake for both employers 
and (potential) employees, and the relations between them at the site of the workplace. 
Education and training (ET), particularly vocational education and training (VET), relates to 
and affects the nature of the production regime (i.e. high-skilled or low-skilled), and is 
intrinsically concerned with the social development of labour. Determining who has access 
to, and choices in, what parts of the labour market, and on what terms of ‘being skilled’ 
(Ainley, 1990; Brown et al, 2001; Clarke & Winch, 2007 Lauder et al, 2008).  
 
Since this thesis aims to explain and understand the governance – ordering and organising 
– of skills policy under New Labour, it is necessary for this chapter to first review the 
existing theoretical perspectives that seek to explain the governance of skill - skill policy 
and politics - in the UK/England. The overarching aim of this chapter is to highlight the 
limitations of existing theoretical perspectives of the governance of skill in the UK/England 
in accounting for the paradox at the heart of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England, 
to which this thesis is addressed: the paradox of both a demand-led’ strategy, and a state 
strategy to lead demand in the context of voluntarism.  
 
T 
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I draw on and contrast two different analytical models that provide explanations of skill 
governance – ordering and organising the ‘doing of skills’ - in specific national context. The 
first (section 2.3) offers a functionalist explanation of the institutional arrangements that 
determine actor preferences for skills (skill aspiration and behaviour) and therefore the 
social context and capacity for skill formation (Estevez-Abe et al, 2001; Mares, 2001; Hall 
& Soskice, 2001). The second (section 2.4) is concerned with the power and politics of skill 
governance and skill formation, and exposes conflicts and struggles over skill preferences 
between actors with differing abilities (power resources and degree of authorative state 
support) to act in their own interest (Korpi, 2006). These explanations establish, in their 
different ways, the cultural - political, economic and social - logic of the skill system; 
contextualising its relationship to other aspects of the political economy, and therefore 
setting national skill development and utilisation trajectories apart from one another in 
relation to the institutional configurations and power relations that characterise the 
broader regime.  
 
Although these theories that seek to offer a political economy of skill, and as such explain 
skill governance in different national contexts, differ significantly in their analytical focus 
and approach, they share the conclusion that the UK/England developed conditions – in 
the context of asymmetrical voluntarism - that support the prevalence of ‘low skills 
equilibrium’ (Finegold & Soskice, 1988). The term ‘low skills equilibrium’ was coined to 
express a pattern of iterative interaction between the ET system and national economic 
performance, that explains the self-reinforcing consequence of firms establishing a 
historical comparative advantage in low cost, low value product market and production 
strategies, and the implications of such a prevalent production and employment regime 
for the ways in which ET systems - particularly VET systems - have developed, are 
organised and regulated, and continue to produce a low-skills workforce in the context of 
low demand for high skills. The argument of this chapter however, is that neither can 
account for nor explain the New Labour Skills Strategy for England.  
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Before commencing the review of these different theoretical approaches to explaining the 
governance of skills in the UK/England and problematising their ability to account for the 
paradox at the heart of the New Labour Skills Strategy, the chapter will first contextualise 
the national case – skill governance in England - by defining the ethos and tradition of 
voluntarism.  
 
2.2 Contextualising Skill Governance in England: the Ethos of Voluntarism 
 
Any attempt to contextualise skill governance in UK/England must commence with the 
statement that voluntarism defines the prevailing ethos and tradition of workplace skills 
development (Evans, 1992; Page & Hillage, 2006: Clarke & Winch, 2007; see also 
Introduction). At its most basic voluntarism denotes the absence of state involvement in 
skills decisions taken at the workplace, and the establishment of such investments as a 
private (meaning market) concerns to be negotiated by the employer and employee.  
 
The liberal state notion that training should be left to industry has a long and tenacious 
history in the UK/England (Finegold & Soskice, 1988; Aston & Green; 1996; King, 1997; 
Thelen, 2004). Briefly interrupted by a period of top-down imposed tripartite 
arrangements for planning and coordinating skills - initiated by the 1964 Industrial 
Training Act, which established the Industrial Training Boards (ITBs); later overseen and 
coordinated by the establishment of the Manpower Services Commission (MSC) in 1973; 
and which generated funding through the collection of a highly contested compulsory 
training levy (Evans, 1992; Payne, 2008) - but not interrupted for long or with much lasting 
significance. In the end Britain’s brief and tentative venture into (quasi-) corporatist 
economic planning can be considered as both an exceptional period in the history of 
voluntarist workplace skills development, and as not particularly exceptional. It 
represented a hollow attempt at tripartite coordination in comparison with many other 
European countries (particularly Germany), and suffered from an absence of genuine and 
active commitment from employers to build and maintain a skills consensus and support 
associated training policy (King, 1997).  
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It is argued that, since the abolition of the MSC, successive governments have lacked the 
mandate, mechanisms and motivations to perform manpower planning policy in any 
meaningful way (Finegold & Soskice, 1988; King, 1997). Furthermore the weakening of 
Trade Unions - due in some large part to the sustained attack on the organised labour 
movement that accompanied an ascendant New Right ideology in the UK/England (King, 
1993; King, 1997; Keep, 2006; Payne, 2008) - has reduced the representation of employee 
voice in voluntarist arrangements. Research by Rainbird et al (2003), seeking to identify 
mechanisms that facilitate the engagement of employees and employee representation in 
decisions about training at the workplace, found developed institutions of employee voice 
to be rare across British industry (ibid:8). As a consequence employers have attained an 
exclusive position of privilege in skills decision-making, and voluntarism has largely come 
to mean leaving employers alone with regard to how they develop and utilise skills (Hoque 
et al, 2005; Page & Hillage, 2006).  
 
Given the apparent tenacity of asymmetrical voluntarism (King, 1997; Gleeson & Keep, 
2004), in the UK/England the central questions that guide this chapter are:  
o How can voluntarism in the UK/England be accounted for and explained (how is 
voluntarism ordered and organised, and with what effects for skill formation)? 
o How can the seemingly paradoxical New Labour Skills Strategy – both a demand-
led strategy and a state strategy to lead demand in the context of voluntarism – be 
accounted for and explained?  
 
Drawing on different theoretical perspectives and institutional analysis the chapter 
continues by considering voluntarism as the outcome of functional institutional 
complementarity, and in doing so will particularly consider the contribution of the 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach (Estevez-Abe et al, 2001; Mares, 2001; Hall & 
Soskice, 2001) to the classifying of types of political economy and associated skills 
regimes; and as the consequence of the exercise of power in politics and policy that has 
resulted in a privilege afforded to the interests of employers in education and training 
policy. Whilst both offer an explanation for asymmetrical voluntarism and the existence of 
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low skills equilibrium, it is argued that neither can adequately account for the New Labour 
Skills Strategy. Specifically neither can account for the paradox that skills policy in England 
comprises both a demand-led strategy, and a state strategy to lead demand in the context 
of the voluntarism of private skills decisions.  
 
2.3 Varieties of Capitalist Production and Employment Regimes 
 
In pursuing the objectives of this chapter – to account for and explain skill governance in 
UK/England - it is worth remembering not to fall into the trap of imagining that any 
organisation, outside of the education and training sector, exists for the sole or principle 
purpose of producing and utilising skills (Gleeson & Keep, 2004:45). In capitalist 
economies business motivations to train and use skills are determined by their primary 
aim - which is normally profit-making – and as such skills are a derived demand; valued 
only in relation to the capability and productivity of the employed labour force required 
for profitable production (Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Page & Hillage, 2006). The type and level 
of workforce skill demanded will therefore be related to the product market and 
production strategies of businesses. The dynamics that underpin asymmetrical 
voluntarism are therefore not so much related to how skills – as such - are governed, but 
rather to how business practices and processes are governed and with what implications 
for the production and utilisation of skills.   
 
Comparative research into the diversity of capitalist economic coordination has shown 
that product market and production strategies of businesses vary from country to country. 
Indeed there is an extensive body of new institutionalism and economic sociology 
literature that seeks to explain, often with strikingly similar conclusions (Thelen, 2004), the 
iterative relationship between dominant production and employment regimes (with 
different workplace skills requirements, and therefore influencing different patterns of 
social and cultural skills formation), and the distinct institutional arrangements and 
systemic logic that constitutes and maintains the political economy or national model of 
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capitalism, (for a fuller overview of these literatures see Rubery & Grimshaw, 2003; Thelen, 
2004; Jackson & Deeg, 2006).  
 
2.3.1 A Historical and Sociological Analysis 
 
Thelen (2004) situates her historical and comparative analysis of the complex evolution of 
the political economy of skills at the intersection of the early development of training 
regimes (craft apprenticeships) and forms of labour market relations (see also Aston & 
Green, 19966; King, 1997; Clarke & Winch, 2007). For Thelen (2004) the particular way in 
which these institutions developed with or without substantial state involvement has 
conditioned path-dependent national differences in the nature of the ‘skilled’ labour 
market, and the mechanisms (either collaborative or competitive) of solving labour 
market failures in relation to the creation and utilisation of skills. In other words, 
institutionally distinct national production and employment regimes can be considered a 
consequence of historical legacies, recreated via ‘positive feedback effects’  - a 
phenomenon by which institutions once established reproduce themselves and constrain 
alternative forms of institutional development (Thelen, 2004:27) - and politically sustained 
by the on-going explicit or implicit commitment and compliance of the relevant parties; 
capital, labour, and the political elite (Ashton & Green, 1996:114).    
 
Taking a less historical and more sociological approach to their analysis, Hollingsworth & 
Boyer (1997:2) identify these specific national differences as defining distinctive ‘social 
systems of production’. They argue that these social systems of production are maintained 
by a broad range of relatively coherent, often tightly coupled, and therefore mutually 
reinforcing complementary institutional arrangements. More specifically they argue that 
                                                  
6 Ashton & Green (1996:104-115) also offer a detailed historical-theoretical analysis of the evolution of 
institutions of skill formation that takes into account: 1) the historical process of nation state formation and, 
following Durkheim, considers the role of education in nation-building (Durkheim, 2006);  2) the processes 
of industrialisation and the accessibility of skills during different phases of development, (what becomes 
relevant then is the timing of the development of industry and the development of a national system of 
education, see also Clarke & Winch, 2007); and finally, 3) the extent to which the state intervened, and is 
therefore able to continue to intervene, in industrial relations or ‘class conflict’.  
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these social systems of production emerge from the complex coalescing and integration of 
the institutional logics that govern the collaborative or conflictual industrial relations 
system and forms of work organisation; the system of training for both workers and 
managers; inter-firm, supply chain, and firm-customer relationships (specifically the 
degree of trust and cooperation involved); financial institutions and their modus operandi 
(particularly the nature of the relationship between banks and industry); the form and 
function of the state (manifest in government policies and practices and including non-
intervention); and the broader idiosyncratic values, rules and norms of society.  
 
What Hollingsworth and Boyer’s (1997) account emphasises is the social embeddedness of 
‘whole system’ institutional relationships, and the constraining and conditioning force of 
the structural patterns of interaction they produce. However, their analysis is less focused 
on understanding why these particular institutional configurations – social systems of 
production - came to be arranged in the way that they are, and on what critical 
relationships they centre and therefore either persist or are challenged.  
 
For scholars of skill governance, more recent comparative analysis of diverse forms of 
capitalist economic coordination, equally interested in institutional complementarities, 
has a particular contribution to make as it explicitly places firms and firm strategies at the 
centre of the analysis. Without claiming to be a theory of institutional origin (but drawing 
conclusions that are broadly reconcilable with theories that do make such claims, see 
Thelen, 2004; Hall & Thelen, 2009) this newer ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (VoC) literature 
explains the role of employers in the continuity of specific institutional configurations of 
the political economy.  
 
In particular this literature offers an account of circumstances in which employers support, 
shape, and sustain responsible unionism, and state policies that maintain systems of social 
protection promoting collaborative, high-trust and high skill workplace relations, or not, as 
necessary to their product market and production strategies and the competitiveness of 
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these strategies in international markets7 (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Estevez-Abe et al, 2001; 
Mares, 2001; Höpner, 2005a). As such the VoC literature provides an account of the 
nuances of institutional configuration that underpin high skills and low skills economies, 
that provides a justification and credible cause to problematise, as others have done (see 
Introduction), the prediction of regime convergence on ‘one-size-fits-all’ higher skills 
production and employment models in the context of a global knowledge-based economy 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001).   
 
2.3.2 A Firm-Centred Analysis: The VoC Approach 
 
The central premise of this VoC literature (Hall & Soskice, 2001), is that the institutional 
arrangements of capitalist economies determine, and are determined by, the strategic 
and interactive mechanisms favoured by firms (as pivotal entrepreneurial actors) to build 
the relationships they require in order to overcome a number of specific problems that 
they collectively face, and which they cannot resolve without some form of coordination 
with critical ‘others’ (internally with their workforce, and externally with other firms, 
customers, shareholders, governments etc., Hall & Soskice, 2001:6). The VoC approach 
therefore offers a micro-level analysis (Blyth, 2003; Jackson & Deeg, 2006) of social 
systems of production, by turning the gaze of macro-level analysis of the political 
economy deeper inwards to posit the structural cause and effect of firm strategies. In 
doing so VoC scholars identify the institutional dimensions of the political economy in 
terms of five interrelated ‘spheres’ – industrial relations, vocational education and training, 
inter-firm relationships, corporate governance, and employee relations - in which firms 
face coordination problems and seek solutions (Hall & Soskice, 2001:6-7; see also Blyth, 
2003).  
 
                                                  
7 According to (Höpner, 2005a:340) this firm-centric analysis offers an alternative to the ‘varieties of welfare’ 
literature which has been predominantly concerned with ‘politics against markets’ (see Esping-Anderson, 
1985; Korpi, 1978).  
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One unique aspect of their approach is to consider institutions – such as the ET system 
and state policy in relation to ET - as ‘resources’, (and not just restraints), that firms have 
strategic preferences for and use to their advantage (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Hall & Thelen, 
2009). Furthermore, their logic contends that since the success of the firm is dependent 
upon the degree to which it can effectively exploit wider institutional supports that enable 
coordination to resolve its problems, it is the success of firms that reinforces particular 
modes of coordination. As such, the distinctive mechanisms for coordination which can be 
adopted by firms and utilised to support their product market and production strategies 
become embedded in the institutional shape of the political economy; reproduced 
through repetition and the relative constancy of expectation and outcome (Hall & Soskice, 
2001:9).  
 
Again, what is critical is that institutional solutions to coordination problems found in one 
sphere should have a complementary relationship with institutional solutions to 
coordination problems in other spheres. Boyer (in Crouch et al, 2005:367) defines 
institutional complementarity as “a configuration in which the viability of an institutional 
form is strongly or entirely conditioned by the existence of several other institutional 
forms, such that their conjunction offers greater resilience and better performance 
compared with alternative configurations”. For Hall & Soskice (2001:18), the emergence of 
institutional ‘complementarity’ is a strong probability, and it is this complementarity that 
accounts for stability and continuity of the distinctive institutional configurations that 
determine different, but successful, national models or ‘varieties of capitalism’. 
Furthermore, as per the logic of the argument, where successful institutional 
configurations become embedded, it is expected that actors will rationally adopt 
strategies that continue to capitalise on them (Hall & Soskice, 2001:15), such that the 
institutional arrangements for coordination tend to settle into stable equilibrium that 
reproduce particular comparative advantages for economic actors. 
 
For the purpose of comparative analysis, the VoC literature distinguishes between two 
ideal-types - or varieties of capitalism - that emerge from their analysis: Liberal Market 
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Economies (LMEs); and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs). In LMEs the prime 
mechanisms of coordination mediating the relationships between actors are competitive 
markets, price signals, and the maximisation of short-term returns to financial capital (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001:33). The state form is defined as ‘liberal’ as it takes a non-interventionist 
approach to coordination; except for providing the legislative framework that formally 
locates decision-making power (voluntarism) with the market (Jackson & Deeg, 2006; 
Schmidt, 2007), and in certain circumstances, providing hierarchical forms of conflict 
resolution to mitigate against market failures (Williamson, 1985). In contrast coordination 
within CMEs is dependent upon long-term finance, more collaborative and cooperative 
non-market relationships mediated by negotiation between actors, and facilitated by a 
more active ‘enabling’ state (Schmidt, 2007:5).   
 
Although this is to some extent an empirically simplistic and contested distinction (Blyth, 
2003; Schmidt, 2007) 8 , it offers broad (if crude) constructs of institutional 
complementarity within which to locate particular coordination strategies of firms and 
therefore particular production and employment regimes. Furthermore, despite the 
criticism that VoC scholars oversimplify the distinction between different models of 
capitalism, it should be noted that other comparative capitalism scholars arrive at broadly 
the same, if more nuanced, distinctions between types of capitalist economy, specifically 
distinguishing between the degree of market coordination, actor cooperation, and nature 
of state regulation (Schmidt, 2007); classify and cluster countries into broadly the same 
typologies; and apply broadly the same descriptive labels to the country clusters they 
identify (Jackson & Deeg, 2006).  
 
                                                  
8 Subsequent research and analysis has challenged this binary distinction between ‘varieties’ of capitalist 
political economies as oversimplified and failing to properly account for countries (including France and 
Italy) that don’t fit the model (see Schmidt, 2007). Equally Blyth (2003) has questioned the degree to which 
the ideal-typical cases - particularly Germany and the USA - fit their description, and actually coordinate, 
(whether successfully or not), in accordance with and as s result of the institutionalised mechanisms 
assumed by VoC scholars. For example Blyth (2003) points to the impact criminal justice policy has had on 
employment trends in the USA, and the extent to which the introduction of ‘just-in-time’ production 
techniques has paradoxically augmented the power of labour in Germany whilst fundamentally weakening 
its claims to be a CME. 
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In summary, the approaches to understanding distinctive national production and 
employment regimes (which apply more or less historical/sociological or rational 
choice/functionalist perspectives to their study of institutions) offer compelling accounts 
of the iterative relationship between the structures of the political economy, state policy, 
and firm strategy. However, the VoC approach offers an explicitly micro-level explanation 
of the reproduction of institutional configurations of economic coordination, by placing 
the firm at the heart of the analysis.  
 
This focus on firms is valuable as it explicitly seeks to enable a more robust and detailed 
explanation of micro-level actor preferences (aspirations and behaviours) for particular 
configurations of institutional support, including state policies, that solve coordination 
problems in particular ways and determine, among other things, skill formation. Indeed, 
the VoC approach in general, and in particular the contribution by Estevez-Abe et al (2001), 
offers an analysis that moves beyond describing the broader context of firm strategies, 
and towards a theory - drawing on institutional complementarities - that informs and 
predicts skill governance (the ordering and organising of doing skills), and therefore skill 
formation in LMEs and CMEs. The VoC approach provides an account of circumstances in 
which employers develop, or not, preferences for cooperative, high trust labour market 
relations, including support for particular social policies (producing types of social systems 
of protection such as employment, unemployment and wage protection), that are 
observed to be more able to support conditions for high skills formation (see also Ashton 
& Green, 1996; Brown, 1999; Brown et al, 2001). As such, Estevez-Abe et al (2001) offer an 
explanation of how asymmetrical voluntarism in the UK/England can be accounted for.  
 
2.3.3 Explaining Skills Governance in England: The VoC Approach 
 
As discussed above, the primary distinction between LMEs and CMEs in the VoC approach 
is the extent to which the coordination strategies of firms, adopted in relation to the 
complementary institutional configurations of the political economy, rely on competitive 
market mechanisms or more collaborative (non-market) relationships. As Hall & Soskice 
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(2001) note, collaborative coordination enables particular types of successful firm 
strategies, predicated on high trust labour market relations, that market mechanisms of 
coordination cannot. However, the success of collaborative coordination for all rationally 
self-interested parties hinges on the degree to which all actors can reduce their 
uncertainty about the behaviours of all others. This uncertainty reduction requires 
mechanisms that enable actors to make “credible commitments” to each other (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001:10; Thelen, 2004:17); mechanisms that can ‘embody’ and ‘embed’ relations 
of trust and cooperation in the institutional architecture (Brown, 1999; Brown et al, 
2001:33).  
 
These credible commitment mechanisms include state policies and institutions that 
facilitate and govern deliberation among actors as a result of the open exchange of 
information; monitor behaviours; and where necessary impose sanctions for disobedience 
and defection. The formality of these mechanisms – particularly monitoring and sanction - 
structure the terms of strategic interaction and effectively lock actors in to particular 
active behaviours, given the punishing consequences and costs of non-compliance (Hall & 
Thelen, 2009). In relation to skill formation, for example, Thelen (2004:17-19) discusses 
the need for such mechanisms by which employers and employees can offer each other 
credible commitments (often with formal punishments, enforced by the state, for 
breaching these commitments) in order to reduce the risks, and share the costs, involved 
in firm or industry specific skills training for both parties. This is particularly the case in 
relation to the sort of high level, high quality, and longer-term training associated with 
traditional occupational apprenticeships.  
 
The general point that Thelen (2004) makes – that skill formation is dependent on the 
extent to which actors can be assured of the actions of others, and likewise offer 
assurances of their own – is echoed in the contribution by Estevez-Abe et al (2001) to the 
VoC literature. Focusing on theorising skills formation in different types of capitalist 
economies, Estevez-Abe et al (2001) seek to explain the institutional complementarities 
that incentivise, and insure against risks associated with the attainment of skills necessary 
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to support and reproduce the distinctive competitive product market and production 
strategies of firms in LMEs and CMEs.  
 
Clearly, whatever their product market and production strategies may be, firms require a 
supply of ‘suitably’ skilled workers. The argument of Estevez-Abe et al (2001) posits that 
since, by themselves, firms are unable to guarantee that (potential) workers will engage in 
the development of suitable skills, they seek and exploit appropriate mechanisms of 
coordination to underwrite and influence workers’ investments. Identifying dominant 
national product market and production strategies that tend to utilise (although not 
exclusively) firm-specific, industry-specific, or general skills (strategies that are prefigured 
by the degree of competitive or collaborative economic coordination), their analysis 
explains why both (potential) employees and employers have established preferences for 
or against institutionalised employment, unemployment and wage protection, as crucial 
mechanisms by which credible commitments can be made. Preferences pivot on the 
extent to which skills are adaptable and transferable – ‘portable’9 - between firms and 
industries within the economy (Estevez-Abe et al, 2001:148).  
 
Essentially, their argument is that (potential) workers require significant assurance of 
employment and wage protection to insure their investment in firm-specific skills (low 
portability), and unemployment and wage protection/replacement to insure their 
investment in industry-specific skills (medium portability). As a result, employers that seek 
to utilise firm-specific or industry-specific skills (and wish to protect any investment they 
make in training by preserving these skill-sets during times of economic downturn) will 
also develop preferences for these welfare enhancing institutionalised forms of social 
protection and wage-bargaining (see also Mares, 2001). Furthermore, the 
institutionalisation of these social forms of insurance complements the institutionalisation 
of internal (within the firm) or occupational (usually sectoral) VET systems, which in turn 
function (in different ways) to reduce skills poaching and further reduce the risks to 
                                                  
9 The portability of skills is related to their degree of asset specificity. The argument is that firm and industry 
specific skills are valuable (increase productivity) only to that firm or industry, whereas general skills are 
valuable (increase productivity) in potentially any employment environment. 
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employers of investment in, and utilisation of, specific skills (Rubery & Grimshaw, 2003; 
Crouch et al, 2004). Estevez-Abe et al (2001:145) argue that coordination (via institutions 
of social protection and the VET system) becomes institutionalised because on their own 
individual firms cannot make sufficiently credible promises to (potential) workers that 
they can protect the risks associated with choosing to invest in a given skill trajectory.  
 
In contrast, in circumstances where businesses have developed preferences for general 
skills – i.e. highly competitive, market-coordinated economic conditions where businesses 
generally require ‘switchable’ production assets (Hall & Soskice, 2001:17), that can be 
easily adapted (workers with high level generic skills), or discarded (workers with low level 
generic skills whose employment terms are casual and flexible)10, in light of changing 
markets - workers rely on the high portability of their skills to underwrite their initial, and 
any on-going, investment in education and training. As a result, neither they nor their 
employers are assumed to have any need for social protection, or indeed any other state 
policies and institutionalised mechanisms through which actors can make credible 
commitments to each other. In fact, it is argued that these institutions become an 
unnecessary cost; provide a perverting disincentive for workers to invest in general skills; 
and impede the free movement of the labour force that both workers and businesses 
benefit from in the rational pursuit of higher returns (Estevez-Abe et al, 2001; Hall & 
Soskice, 2001). 
 
Estevez-Abe et al (2001:146) refer to the confluence and complementarity between firm 
product market and production strategies, employee skills trajectories, and systems of 
social protection, as the ‘welfare production regime’ and – as described above - clearly 
distinguish the welfare production regimes of LMEs from different versions of CMEs. By 
employing the analytical devise of ‘welfare production regimes’ Estevez-Abe et al (2001) 
again bring state policy (of the non-interventionist and interventionist variety respectively) 
                                                  
10 Although they take a different approach to explaining the institutional political economy of skill formation 
in the UK/England, Brown et al (2001:191-195) provide an analysis of the “flexible labour market” in Britain 
which also describes firms’ use of small numbers of adaptable ‘core’ workers (with high level generic skills 
that can be built on with ‘need to know’ firm-specific training), and larger numbers of disposable ‘causal’ 
workers (often, but not exclusively low skilled).  
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into the mix of factors that determine the institutional shape of the regime. In common 
with the VoC approach in general, they emphasise tight and complementary coupling 
between institutional factors, and the embedding of institutional arrangements overtime. 
They therefore posit that actor interests become ‘locked-in’ and reproduced as a result of 
developing strategic strengths in relation to the particular structures of the capitalist 
political economy, which in turn gives firms a certain comparative advantage in 
international markets (including international markets for labour). Specifically, their 
analysis suggests that the absence of welfare enhancing state policy in relation to 
(adequate) systems of social protection in LMEs, such as the UK/England – and the effect 
for skill formation - offers firms strategic strengths utilising high level general skills (broad 
undergraduate and postgraduate university education) in ‘radical product innovation’ 
strategies, and utilising low level general skills in ‘standardised Fordist mass production’ 
(Estevez-Abe et al, 2001: 149).  
 
Clearly, such an analysis of the foundations of skills formation in LMEs predicts polarised 
national labour markets (Brown et al, 2001; Crouch et al, 2004), with the preservation of a 
dominant (although not exclusive) low skills equilibrium (Finegold & Soskice, 1988) in 
significant regions, industries, sectors, or workplaces within the UK economy (Wilson & 
Hogarth, 2003). As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, low skills equilibrium is 
explained as a self-reinforcing consequence of firms establishing a comparative advantage 
in low cost, low value product market and production strategies, and the consequence of 
such a prevalent production and employment regime for the ways in which weak, market 
coordinated and voluntarist VET systems11 have developed and continue to produce a 
low-skills workforce, in the context of low demand for high skills (Finegold & Soskice, 
1988).  
 
                                                  
11 In the context of employer voluntarism the UK/England is analysed as having both weak occupational 
(that is national or sectoral programmes of training and accreditation) and internal (that is firm designed and 
delivered programmes of training either accredited or not). Furthermore these weaknesses in the VET 
system are analysed as intensifying (Rubery & Grimshaw, 2003). Unlike internal or occupational VET systems, 
market-coordinated VET systems cannot alleviate firms’ risks of poaching and as a result reliance is placed 
on the individual (or the state) to bear the cost of training (Brown et al, 2001:193).  
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What exacerbates this low skills equilibrium (in the context of voluntarism) situation 
further, is that in highly competitive and dynamic economic conditions - conditions that 
deny collaborative relationships between actors, underwritten by credible commitment 
mechanisms - firms that do train face risks associated with the poaching of skilled workers 
by free riding firms (Finegold & Soskice, 1988; Crouch et al, 2004; Hoque et al, 2005). 
Since firms cannot accommodate the risks associated with training and then losing their 
workforce (particularly given finance requirement for short-term profit timescales in 
LMEs) they tend to downgrade their skills aspirations, and reinforce their preferences for 
low skill product market and production strategies. Such strategies render it more unlikely 
that they will generate product innovations from within their workforce (Brown et al, 
2001), further cementing their position in the low specification; low value-added markets 
(Wilson & Hogarth, 2003).  
 
Although this may be a perfectly rational (meaning profitable, at least in the short term) 
business strategy, producing stable conditions (as implied by the term ‘equilibrium’), the 
consequences for longer-term productivity, social justice and social prosperity are 
certainly undesirable (Gleeson & Keep, 2004). Low skills equilibrium traps significant 
proportions of the working population in low-paid, insecure and unrewarding 
employment (Crouch et al, 2004) and creates wide income disparities associated with the 
inequalities of ‘academic background’ (Estevez-Abe et al, 2001:147). Furthermore, this 
model perpetually widens these inequalities because those with existing low skills are 
demonstrably far less likely to receive further employer-sponsored education and training 
opportunities (Page & Hillage, 2006; Knell et al, 2007; UKCES, 2009).  
 
2.3.4 Explaining New Labour Skills Strategy? Limits of the VoC Approach  
 
This section has reviewed institutional accounts of skill governance that explain 
voluntarism as the functional outcome of a particular variety of capitalism. One in which 
the broader institutional configurations of the political economy – including a lack of 
active/enabling state policy and provision in the spheres of industrial relations and VET – 
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have led firms to develop, and as a result preference, competitive strategies based on 
utilising low-level general skills in low value added production. Furthermore, the section 
has shown how these accounts explain change to skill governance as constrained by the 
tight institutional coupling that constitutes the regime logic.  
 
In other words, these theories argue that skills are produced and used in complement to 
the product market and production strategies available to, and therefore preferred by, 
firms; which are in turn related to and constructive of the social context and societal 
capacity for skill formation; and both skill formation and the productive strategies of firms 
are determined by and determine types of state policies. Given that the essential 
nature/logic of each of these factors effecting skill governance reinforces the essential 
nature/logic of the others, and given that the overall institutional configuration of the 
regime produces particular advantages for actors (firms and their employees), change to 
how skill is governed – ordered and organised - is typically considered both difficult and 
unwanted.  
 
The VoC approach, specifically the contribution of Estevez-Abe et al (2001), has gained a 
great deal of currency as an institutional account, and explanation of skill governance in 
different national contexts. However, as was becoming increasingly apparent in the above 
review, its inherent recidivism to rational functionalism puts it on shaky ground trying to 
stabilise the inherent problems of low skills equilibrium associated with LMEs (such as 
UK/England) for both individual firms and workers, and for states. As a result, whilst it 
offers justification and credible cause to problematise the prediction of regime 
convergence on ‘one-size-fits-all’ higher skills production and employment models, it also, 
and by implication, cannot adequately account for why there are claims of a strong 
consensus regarding the need to overcome the problem of low skills in the context of 
global competition; a consensus on which the New Labour Skills Strategy for England 
builds. Indeed, as a theory of skill governance in LMEs it cannot account for and explain 
the thread of state-led ambition to raise demand for skills that travels through the New 
Labour Skills Strategy alongside a commitment to demand-led voluntarism.  
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Given the limitations of the VoC approach to aiding understanding of the New Labour 
Skills Strategy, the chapter now turns to review alternative approaches that seek to 
explain skill governance in the context of voluntarism. These alternative approaches begin 
by further developing the critique of the explanatory merit of the VoC account to skill 
governance.  
 
2.4 Power, Politics and Policy of Skill Governance 
 
Although the VoC approach makes a significant contribution to institutional approaches to 
analysing and explaining skill governance and the resulting low skills equilibrium in 
England, there are a number of problematic elements of this theory. Specifically, despite 
being an actor-centred analysis, there is a distinct lack of consideration of both the force 
of ideas, particularly with regard to the role of education and training in the social 
development and division of labour (Clarke & Winch, 2007; Brown et al, 2001), and the 
conditions that enable the exercise of power to promote the privilege of some ideas over 
others. This section draws on alternative approaches to understanding skill governance 
and the conditions for skills formation in the UK/England, which expose critical tensions 
between actors (employers and employees), and evaluates the relative power they 
possess to progress their skills aspirations. In doing so an alternative analytical approach 
emerges by which the English case can be explained. This approach, it is argued, puts the 
politics back into the study of the political economy.  
 
2.4.1 Putting Politics Back In  
 
Critical commentary has highlighted that as a result of adopting a rational choice approach 
to theorising institution building there is a tendency within the VoC literature (specifically 
the contribution of Estevez-Abe et al, 2001) toward naive functionalism (Pierson, 2000; 
Howell, 2003; Schmidt, 2007; Lauder et al, 2008). The VoC approach has a propensity to 
derive regime coherence from institutional complementarity and institutional 
46 
 
complementarity from mere compatibility12, because it assigns a disproportionate degree 
of influence over institutional purpose and function to the resolution of problems faced by 
one group of actors; namely firms.  
 
This functionalism has been subjected to vigorous challenge. For example, Pierson (2000) 
warns that the functionalist reading of the relationship between types of welfare state 
provision and dominant production and employment regimes has a tendency to vastly 
overstate itself. Although he notes that firm-centred analysis makes an important 
theoretical contribution to understanding diverse forms of capitalist economic 
coordination and the role of systems of social protection, he is concerned that this 
contribution should be wary of taking a good point so far that the development and 
maintenance of welfare states appear to be first and foremost a business strategy and 
project (ibid: 795). Equally Howell (2003) is critical of the extent to which VoC has re-
written and deflated radical political projects - contingent on particular times and 
particular capacities of actors – such that they appear as merely the outcome of firms 
attempting to solve coordination problems.  
 
Criticism of the inability of the VoC logic to account for conflicts over institutional form - 
the charge that they take the ‘politics’ out of the study of ‘political economy’ (Howell, 
2003; also Korpi, 2006; Schmidt, 2007; Lauder et al, 2008) and therefore under 
acknowledge the potential for institutional change - has led to attempts to clarify and 
enhance the theoretical approach from within, in order to find ways of dealing with the 
dynamic tensions implicit in actor interaction. Without getting too embroiled in the 
debates over the mechanics of institution building, it is worth saying how VoC scholars 
                                                  
12 There is a wide ranging debate (largely between proponents of different approaches to institutional 
analysis) seeking to clarify the contentious and contested concept of complementarity; specifically the need 
to distinguish complementarity from compatibility and coherence. All imply, to some degree, institutional 
stability. The issue is perhaps the source and nature of this stability. The crux of this debate rests on the 
degree to which the VoC approach identifies zero-sum institutional relationships that are not performance 
enhancing but are equally not fundamentally destabilising (compatible institutional arrangements) and 
misrecognises this as positive sum institutional complementarity (based on common governance logics, or 
coherence of purpose). For a fuller account of the debate see for example Crouch et al (2005), Hall & Thelen 
(2005) and Höpner (2005a; 2005b).  
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have attempted to fashion a ‘politics of rational choice’ which can continue to explain, 
among other things, the skills aspirations and behaviours of actors, but which can also 
serve to explain the possibility (but not the probability) of change.  
 
Considering the process of institution building slightly differently Hall & Thelen (2005) 
highlight the problem of securing social (distributive) justice. They note that even where 
institutions are deemed Pareto-improving, the relative benefits and the share of the risks 
going to different groups of actors are not equal. In these circumstances, and given that 
actors are self-interested, they will seek means by which to improve their position. This 
process of jostling for gains is, they contend, intensely entrepreneurial and political, and 
involves the exercise of power by the relevant parties in pursuit of their preferences. It is 
however, for them, still ultimately a “politics of institutional stability” (Hall & Thelen, 
2009:12). Potential turbulence is perpetually mediated by the rationally conceived 
opportunity cost of destabilisation (particularly where there is high institutional 
interdependence), and the relative advantage of compromise through which all actors 
consent to the resultant distribution of benefits and share of risks. In the end, VoC theory 
argues, it must be the case that all parties - at least all insiders, or at very least sufficient 
numbers of insiders - benefit from the existence of a particular institutional arrangement 
in order for that institutional arrangement to remain stable (Hall, in Crouch et al, 2005)  
 
Looking at the VoC approach to theorising skill formation through the lens of the ‘politics 
of rational choice’, we can see the tendency to imply that the politics of skill governance 
and skill formation takes place via a process of reasoned negotiations with (relatively) 
equal contribution from all interested parties, and the ultimate identification of the 
preferences of actors by the outcome of decision-making. (Indeed the analysis of Estevez-
Abe et al (2001) which seeks to explain the institutional complementarities that predict 
skills preferences, is empirically derived entirely from outcome measures13). As a result, in 
relation to explaining skills formation in the UK/England, it must be again somewhat 
irrationally deduced that despite a seeming consensus of opinion about the need to 
                                                  
13 Such as: indicators of labour market regulation; unemployment protection generosity and degree of 
‘activation’; employment tenure; skill profile; and incidents of vocational training.  
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develop high(er) skills in the context of a dynamic and global knowledge-based economy, 
both firms and (potential) workers find they are satisfied with the terms of production and 
employment competitiveness that emerge from and (re)produce low-skills and the 
inequalities of academic background. Clearly, the theoretical and empirical limitations of 
the VoC perspective therefore centre on the degree to which the preferences of actors 
can be wholly deduced from, or allied with, outcomes; and the degree to which portability 
between experiences of low skill, low wage work for workers in LMEs can be taken as an 
expression of negotiated compromise and consensus rather than disempowerment.   
 
In short, what is still missing from the VoC analysis of skill governance is any consideration 
of the relative, contingent and highly political ability of different actors with different and 
competing interests (Brown, 1999; Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Korpi, 2006) to effectively act in 
their own interest? In other words, there is no account of actors differing abilities to make 
or affect choices about how skills are governed and with what consequences for skill 
formation and the availability of either high or low-skilled routes to profitability, 
employability, and competitiveness; choices which are as desirable to some as they are 
contested by others, and are therefore “the stuff of politics” (Aston & Green, 1996:176). 
Choices which become more viable when they are supported by a partisan state with a 
political and policy role in class conflict beyond neutral arbiter (Schmidt, 2007). A role to 
discursively and materially determine the social position of skills actors in relation to skill 
governance (Brown, 1999); the “social purpose” of skill (Brown et al, 2001:3); the value of 
labour (Clarke & Winch, 2007); and the ideological and substantive goals of education and 
training (Gleeson & Keep, 2004). What is missing, as Avis (1998:258) reminds us, is that 
“There is a struggle here over the development of labour power and the direction this 
takes that is informed by the balance of force between capital and labour, which itself is 
mediated by state policies” (see also Lauder et al, 2008).  
 
The failing of functionalist theories to account for struggle and the role of state policy 
(intervention or non-intervention) as mediating struggle, is persuasively illuminated by 
contrasting the rather ahistorical VoC account of the UK/England as an LME, and the 
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analysis by Coates (2000), which marks a contrast between the institutional configurations 
(and their effects) of post-war Britain (collective bargaining/universal welfare state) and 
the successful outcome of employer struggles for institutional reform supported by a 
neoliberal political agenda from the mid-1970s (see also Howell, 2003; Schmidt, 2007)14. 
In particular the neoliberal project to effect a ‘new settlement’ (Avis et al, 1996; Avis, 
1998; Brown et al, 2001) with regard to the relationship between education and the 
economy that has placed the onus on individuals (as learners) to make themselves market 
compatible via skills (Avis et al, 1996; Coffield, 1999; Keep, 1999; Brown et al, 2001; 
Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Ball, 2008a). A project bolstered by a particular and flawed reading 
of human capital theory (Avis, 1998; Coffield, 1999; Brown et al, 2001), that for Brown 
(1999:238) has achieved the “drying out of social facets of skill formation”.  
 
In summary, alternative theories seeking to explain skill governance in the UK/England – 
the existence and perseverance, the order and organisation of voluntarism – argue against 
functionalist accounts to highlight struggle based on the relative and contingent power 
resources of different groups of actors (with different ideas about and interests in skills) 
and their ability to mobilise these power resources at different times and in different 
(state-mediated) contexts. One literature in particular, to which this chapter now turns, 
has theorised and specified the power resources of groups, and the terms under which 
they are able to mobilise and wield them in relation to their ideas and interests in 
education and training.  
 
2.4.2 The Power Resources Approach 
 
Korpi (2006), in response to the growing employer-centred VoC literature, argues against 
the perspective that skill governance - or rather the governance of business practices and 
processes and the implications for the production and utilisation of skills (i.e. labour 
market regulation and the nature of social protection) - is an outcome of mutual 
                                                  
14 For an fuller overview of the historical evolution of different forms and modes of state regulation of 
training policy in the UK see King (1997) 
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preferences and consensus. Instead, he highlights conflict and struggle between different 
actors with disparate interests and preferences. Although his grouping of actors 
(employers, employees and the self-employed) by socio-economic class may need to be 
reconsidered in light of the changing nature of work and workplaces15; by distinguishing 
between actors in terms of the different risks that they face, the individual resources they 
possess to cope with risk, and therefore the level of vested interest they have in either 
market-oriented or welfare-enhancing institutions, he provides a useful alternative ‘actor-
centred’ reading of different capitalist forms of economic coordination that addresses the 
VoC recidivism to functionalism. For Korpi (2006) it is the relationship between the 
resources actors possess, and their ability to wield these resources in pursuit of their 
interests and preferences, which determines the relative power position of actors, their 
ability to influence skills policies and outcomes, and that therefore determines the 
governance of skill formation.   
 
Put simply employers and employees are understood to possess different “power 
resources” (Korpi, 2006:172) by which to advance their interests; employers control 
economic assets whilst employees possess human capital (here meaning labour power).  
What matters, in terms of influence over the institutional design of skill governance, is the 
relative ability and success of the actor groups to concentrate and mobilize their power 
resources, whilst simultaneously counteracting and curtailing the ability of others to do 
the same. The critical focus of analysis is therefore the circumstances under which the 
different power resources can gain an advantage; specifically given that whilst capital has 
a tendency to accumulate, employees require mechanisms to collectivise - such as Trade 
Unions and representation by Social Democratic government (left power) - in order to 
realise the effectiveness of their human capital.  
 
                                                  
15 Korpi (2006:174) defines class as “categories of individuals who share relatively similar positions, or 
situations, in labor markets and in employment relations.” However, the distinctions by class that he makes 
between employers, employees and the self-employed, is being complicated given new forms of post-
Fordist work organisation, for example by the distinct circumstances of ‘workers’ operating in the extremely 
high-skills segments of the global labour market whom Reich (1991) terms “symbolic analysts” (see also 
Pierson, 2000). 
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This point returns us to Thelen’s (2004) historical comparative analysis of the emergence 
of training regimes and labour market regulations in the context of more or less active and 
substantial state involvement – liberal or corporate forms of regulation – and the effect of 
state involvement in establishing the power of key actors (also Aston & Green, 1996; 
Coates, 2000: Gleeson & Keep, 2004). Again, the VoC approach ‘proper’ misses the 
significance of this point as a consequence of not being a theory of institutional origin, or 
of the power that institutions confer (Schmidt, 2007).  
 
Another significant point of divergence between VoC, and PRA perspectives of labour 
market relations is that whilst VoC scholars have tended to see actor interests as 
situationally derived (in so much as they will vary according to the exogenous situation), 
the PRA perceives actor interests to conform to class-based circumstances (in so much as 
they will remain the same in accordance with endogenous circumstance)16. In other words 
the PRA implies that regardless of the institutional configuration which determines the 
nature of labour market relations, within the relatively homologous class groupings of 
employers and employees the members will share similar interests which subsequently 
determine their first-order preferences.  
 
As a result Korpi (2006) criticises the VoC contention that employers are, in any given 
situation, concerned with social citizenship rights, even as a means to achieve certain skills 
trajectories, and equally disputes the assertion that employees with generic skills in a 
production regime that preferences generic skills will perceive their investment amply 
insured by the possibility of being able to move easily between jobs and will not seek 
welfare-enhancing institutions. He maintains that employees are susceptible to a broader 
range of life-course risks than simply the extent to which their initial outlay on education 
and training will be adequately remunerated. For this reason employees will always have a 
first-order preference for redistributive social citizenship rights; including those they 
achieve via a meaningful labour market conceptualisation of being ‘skilled’ (Brown et al, 
                                                  
16 Korpi (2006) notes that internally these class groupings are quite heterogeneous however they can be 
meaningfully grouped together for the purposes of analysing their interests and preferences as inter-
category variance is perceivably lower that the variance between the categories. 
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2001; Clarke & Winch, 2007) and associated security both within and outwith employment.  
Again, what matters, in terms of influence over the institutional design of skill governance, 
is the relative ability and success of the different actor groups to concentrate and mobilize 
their power resources, whilst simultaneously counteracting and curtailing the ability of 
others to do the same. 
 
In short, what taking a power resources approach shows is that organized capitalism can 
be considered as a highly politicized configuration (Höpner, 2005b), by which “reciprocal 
reinforcement” (Crouch, C in Crouch et al, 2005) between institutions, as distinct from 
complementarity, embeds specific regime logics within an institutional hierarchy. In other 
words political support for a specific institutional form provides that institutional form 
with an asymmetrical degree of influence by which to impose a dominant logic onto the 
broader institutional architecture, and thus set the general tone and mode of socio-
economic regulation (Coates, 2000; Höpner, 2005b). For Thelen (2004:32) institutional 
development is “a contest among actors to establish the rules which structure outcomes 
to those equilibria most favourable for them”.   
 
2.4.3 Explaining Skill Governance in England: a Politics of Skills Approach 
 
In terms of the governance of skill in England it is argued that employers have been, and 
remain powerful (Wellington, 1994; Avis et al, 1996; King, 1997; Brown, 1999; Gleeson & 
Keep, 2002; Keep, 2004; Keep, 2005), with government playing a highly supportive role - 
operating as a ‘policy monopolist’ (Crouch, C in Crouch et al, 2005) - in maintaining that 
power (Höpner, 2005b; Streeck, W in Crouch et al, 2005; Amable, B in Crouch et al, 2005). 
Indeed, Gleeson & Keep (2004) highlight that employers have attained the right to a 
disproportionate degree of influence over the purpose and function of education and 
training institutions (see also King, 1997). With government acting as facilitator and 
regulator of relations between education and the economy in the interests of markets 
(Gleeson & Keep, 2004:50). 
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King (1997) argues that intellectually the dominance of employers’ interests in training 
programmes has achieved credibility as a result of persistent claims that the focal purpose 
of skills is enhanced economic growth and prosperity (see Introduction), and that the 
market/managerial prerogative offers the most efficient means of facilitating skills 
improvement. Since regulating employer preferences (aspirations and behaviours) 
regarding skills is off the policy agenda (Brown et al, 2001; Lloyd & Payne, 2002; Keep, 
2002; Keep, 2005) the underlying assumption is that skills will be best provided via market 
forces. In other words the labour market, in which employers are purchasers of the labour 
product, if left to its own devices will naturally signal demand for economically 
appropriate levels of skills to meet needs. Therefore employers simply need to be listened 
to (Gleeson & Keep, 2004). 
 
The ramifications of this disproportionate influence are that employer ideas17 about the 
value of skill (and therefore the value of labour) in relation to their economic imperatives 
determine skill governance, and the social context and capacity for skill formation. For 
example, politics of skills informed approaches argue it is possible to discern from 
employers preferences for skills – broadly either general skills paid for by the 
individual/the state, or uncertified specific skills which are non-transferable and masked 
from competitors18 (Keep & Gleeson, 2004) - and their power to act in defence of their 
interests, a rationale for the shape of the institutions of education and training in England. 
Specifically it is possible to discern from these preferences an explanation for a weak VET 
system in which the role of the state is reduced to principal investor; and employer 
voluntarism (legitimised as the deregulation of demand for skills) and low skills 
equilibrium persists. Significantly, such outcomes are considered to be in direct contrast 
and conflict to the skills interests and preferences of (potential) employees (Korpi, 2006), 
                                                  
17 It is acknowledged that determining the preferences of an internally heterogeneous group of actors is 
intensely problematic (Huddleston & Keep, 1999; Gleeson & Keep, 2004). However some broad assumptions 
can be made by accepting Korpi’s (2006) distinction that inter-group variation is less than between group 
variation 
18 Issues of certification and visibility of firm provided and firm specific training in voluntarist systems may 
account for the discrepancies of perspective between the VoC approach that perceives firms in LMEs (such 
as the UK, and particularly England) to preference generic skills, and the observations of others (including, 
Gleeson & Keep, 2004 and Clarke, 2007) that consider much of the post-compulsory VET that takes place in 
England to be firm-specific and uncertified. 
54 
 
who seek to maximise the positional benefit they are able to realise from the attainment 
of certified skill whilst minimising/insuring the risk of any personal investment (Gleeson & 
Keep, 2004)19.  
 
Furthermore, and related to this struggle over the value of skill accreditation and 
certification, another manifestation of the asymmetric power relations between 
employers and employees can be discerned from how skills are thought about and 
rendered significant in social relations.  Namely that in the context of a politically 
supported variety of capitalism (Schmidt, 2007) that promotes the interests of capital via 
unfettered labour-market deregulation (Brown et al, 2001) - particularly the absence of 
regulation by skill (such as licences to practices) - the concept of skilled employment is not 
unanimously defined or substantially meaningful (Keep, 2005; Clarke & Winch, 2007)20. 
Again, such a devaluing of the concept of ‘skill’ and being ‘skilled’ reinforces low skills 
equilibrium.  
 
2.4.3 Explaining the New Labour Skills Strategy? The Limits of the PRA 
 
This section has reviewed accounts of skill governance that have been broadly taken 
together to offer a ‘politics of skills’ approach; in particular addressing the contribution of 
the PRA to understanding skill governance presented by Walter Korpi (2006). The purpose 
of this section has been to show how putting issues of power and politics at the centre of 
theorising the governance of skills, and therefore skill formation, offers an alternative 
reading and explanation of the UK/English case; low skills equilibrium in the context of 
voluntarism. In particular, and unlike functionalist theories, these accounts can – to use a 
well-worn expression – ‘bring the state back in’. Or more precisely bring back in a role for 
                                                  
19 See also Rainbird et al 2003; Wallis et al, 2005; Lloyd & Payne, 2006 for discussions of the conflict between 
employer and (potential) employee interests in VET provision. 
20 Keep (2005) identifies that in many developed countries skills attainment at level 3, (or what is termed, in 
international comparison parlance, ‘intermediate skills’), are a prerequisite for entry into large sections of 
the labour market. Specifically in Germany, (along with much of Europe, Canada, and the USA albeit to a 
lesser degree), a ‘statutory licence to practice’ regulates many occupations. This licence is obtained as a 
result of acquiring a predetermined level of qualification within the relevant vocational training programme.  
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the state, state actors and actions, in the governance of skills, which renders these 
theories better able to account for conflict over governing logics and practices, and the 
possibility of change. These accounts focus on the relative and contingent power of actors 
to influence skill governance according to their interests. They take state action to 
represent both the site and the outcome of fierce tensions and struggles (Aston & Green, 
1996) over these interests; ideas about the social purpose of skill, the value of labour, and 
the goals of education and training.  
 
However, as a consequence of such a conceptualisation of both divergent interests and 
state action, ‘politics of skills’ informed theories equally struggle to explain claims of a 
strong consensus regarding the need to overcome the problem of low skills in the context 
of global competition; a consensus on which the New Labour Skills Strategy for England 
builds. Indeed such claims were empirically challenged (see Introduction; Aston & Green, 
1996; Keep & Mayhew, 1999; Lauder, 1999; Lloyd & Payne, 2002). In addition by 
perceiving state action as deeply partisan, ‘politics of skills’ accounts struggle to reach 
conclusions about the governance of skill and skill formation that can account for both 
demand-led and demand-leading aspects of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England (as 
discussed in the Introduction).  
 
For politics of skills informed approaches to theorising the governance of skill a demand-
led strategy can be explained as ‘business-as-usual’ neo-liberal state-sponsored 
voluntarism. However, leading demand would require a radically different strategy that 
strongly intervened to regulate employers training decisions, relocating the institutions of 
the state to act as power resources in the interests of labour. In the end then, the thread 
of state-ambition to raise demand for skills that travels through the New Labour Skills 
Strategy is incongruous to both possible (but, given ‘reciprocal reinforcement’ between 
institutions of the regime, not equally probable) theories of how skills are/or could be 
governed. It seems that ‘politics of skills’ approaches, whilst having the advantage of being 
able to ‘bring the state back in’ and better explain conflict over, and changes to, governing 
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logics and practices, are no better able than VoC to understand and explain the paradox at 
the heart of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England.  
 
2.5 Conclusion: Towards an Alternative Conceptualisation of State Work 
 
This chapter contextualised skill governance in England as defined by the ethos and 
tradition of voluntarism, and reviewed two prevalent theoretical approaches through 
which it is possible to account for and explain skills governance, and therefore the social 
context and societal capacity for skill formation. The central questions that guided this 
chapter were:  
o How can voluntarism in the UK/England be accounted for and explained (how is 
voluntarism ordered and organised, and with what effects for skill formation)? 
o How can the seemingly paradoxical New Labour Skills Strategy – both a demand-
led strategy and a state strategy to lead demand in the context of voluntarism – be 
accounted for and explained?  
 
Reviewing these theoretical approaches in light of these questions found that both can 
explain the existence and perseverance of asymmetrical voluntarism and both arrive at 
the conclusion that, in the context of asymmetrical voluntarism, the UK/England has 
developed conditions that produce low skills equilibrium (Finegold & Soskice, 1988). 
However, as this chapter has shown, with reference to their own conceptual and 
analytical frameworks, neither can explain an apparent consensus for higher skills - a 
consensus on which the New Labour Skill Strategy builds – and neither can address the 
paradox of a ‘demand-led’ strategy, wherein demand is to be led by the state, in the 
context of voluntarism. 
 
As has been shown, functionalist accounts of skill governance (reviewed in section 2.3) 
explain asymmetrical voluntarism and associated low skills equilibrium as the outcome of 
a particular variety of capitalism. One in which the broad institutional configurations of 
the political economy – such as a lack of active/enabling state policy and provision in the 
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spheres of industrial relations and VET – have led firms to develop, and as a result 
preference, competitive strategies based on utilising low-level general skills in low value 
added production. Skills are governed, as other parts of the regime are, by the constraints 
of tight and embedded institutional coupling. In other words the way in which skills are 
produced and used - the product market and production strategies of firms - and the 
types of state policies, are so mutually reinforcing and have produced particular 
advantages for actors (firms and their employees), that change is deemed both difficult 
and unwanted. Given this explanation of how skill is governed in Liberal Market 
Economies, and with what effects for the ordering and organising of social relations, the 
New Labour Skills Strategy – with its thread of state-led ambition to lead and raise 
demand for skills - appears incongruous and unexplainable through this theoretical lens.  
 
On the other hand, ‘politics of skills’ approaches (reviewed in section 2.4) explain 
asymmetrical voluntarism and associated low skills equilibrium as the outcome of 
inherent conflict over skill, between actors with differing abilities (power resources such 
as authorative state support) to act in their own interest; conflict associated with struggles 
over labour market relations (the terms of production and employment); and as therefore 
linked to the social value and reproduction of labour. These approaches argue that in the 
UK/England employers - supported by a neo-liberal state favouring the perseverance of 
managerial prerogative over skills decision - occupy a privileged and powerful position in 
determining the shape and trajectory of skills policy. Such a privileging of employers 
presumes and predicts a demand-led strategy for skills. But, just as with VoC, the 
coexisting thread of state-led ambition to lead and raise demand appears incongruous and 
unexplainable through this theoretical lens 
 
In short, this chapter has argued that neither theory of the governance of skill in the 
context of voluntarism can account for and adequately explain the New Labour Skills 
Strategy.  Specifically neither can help make sense of the paradox of a ‘demand-led’ 
strategy, wherein demand is to be led by the state, in the context of voluntarism (outlined 
in Introduction). Whilst the ‘politics of skills’ informed approach arguably offers a more 
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useful contribution to understanding skill governance in the UK/England as it allows for 
conflict and struggle better able to account for the ambiguity of paradox, this thesis 
argues the need for an alternative conceptualisation of ‘state work’. One better able to 
explain policy and policy debate in more complex discursive relation to partisan interests. 
The next chapter (Chapter 3) provides the conceptual approach this thesis takes to the 
analysis of New Labours Skills Strategy that exposes struggles over discursive meaning-
making to (re)create governable subject positions and subjectivities.  
 
 
59 
 
3. Conceptualising State Work in Governing Skills 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
his chapter is concerned with developing the conceptual approach for this study. An 
approach developed in response to the limitations of the accounts reviewed in the 
previous chapter, and through which I analyse skills policy and policy debates in England 
under New Labour in order to explain and understand how skills were governed – ordered 
and organised – in England at that time. The introduction to this thesis has shown that 
skills policy and policy debate in England under New Labour was once again concerned 
with the economic and social ‘problem of low skills’. Furthermore, and as discussed, there 
was an observed coalescing of political debates about education and training around a 
consensus regarding the importance for businesses and worker-citizens - increasingly 
operating in conditions of heightened global product market and labour market 
competition - of pursuing higher skills strategies for innovative knowledge-based 
production and employability (see for example Crouch et al, 2004).  
 
However, the introduction also discussed the grounds on which empirical analysis and 
evaluation of skills policy in England has been highly critical of attempts by successive New 
Labour Governments to operationalise and institutionalise a high(er) skills strategy, and 
deliver higher skills outcomes. For many skills policy scholars and commentators the 
identified paradox – of both a demand-led and demand-leading strategy in the context of 
voluntarism – amounted to little more than policy failure, and at worst could be construed 
as an empty gesture or a smoke and mirrors trick. A policy ultimately based on a 
fundamental misapprehension, or inability/unwillingness to intervene in any significant 
way to affect the private (meaning market) decisions of employers with regard to 
workforce development (Brown, 1999; Lauder, 1999; Keep & Mayhew, 1999; Brown et al, 
2001; Lloyd & Payne, 2002; Gleeson & Keep, 2004; Coffield, 2006; Payne, 2008; Keep et al, 
2008).  
T 
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That said, and in response to this state of the art in skills policy scholarship and 
commentary, this thesis questions whether such analysis and evaluation of policy failure 
(largely based on reading policy intentions back in something of a straight-line from policy 
outcomes) problematically obscures more subtle and explanatory accounts of the 
existence of paradox. Downplaying the implications of it for how skills delivery was 
attempted to be done and experienced.  
 
The distinctive contribution of this thesis to skills policy debates in England is the 
application of an alternative conceptual approach to the analysis of the New Labour Skills 
Strategy for England. An approach that exposes discursive struggles over policy meaning 
and purpose - which I argue is the analytical task at the heart of critical governance studies 
- and the implications for policy in practice. I build my conceptual framework by starting 
with a critique of two different accounts of the ‘limited state’, that suggest government, in 
the context of heightened economic and social complexity, has lost exclusive power to 
determine the meaning, purpose, and management of policy agendas to relatively 
independent self-organising networks (Rhodes, 1997; Kooiman, 20003). In contrast this 
thesis highlights the significance of the state’s role in steering governance arrangements 
from a distance through managerialism and metagoverance to shape and direct the 
meanings that frame governing.  
 
Having established the role of the state in steering governance arrangements, I take a step 
back in order to address the question of how we can understand the normative dimension 
of state steering activity. The core of this chapter is then devoted to exposing meaning-
making (associated with governmental rationalities) as state work through the discursive 
selection and retention of particular economic and social imaginaries, which give 
inflection and substance to policy context and content. I draw on a combination of 
approaches that have a principle concern with meaning-making and meaning 
reproduction: predominantly ‘cultural political economy’ and critical governance studies.  
Utilising these approaches I argue the importance of discursive meaning-making for the 
political ordering of the social world and therefore the significance of interpreting the 
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discursive meaning that policy inscribes on the objects and subjects that it seeks to 
govern. In particular, the creation of governable subject positions which policy seeks to 
steer subjects towards. Beyond this however, I also argue that it is important to consider 
the fallibility of meaning-making as discursive and material practice. I highlight both the 
ambiguity and contestability of state projects and policies.  
 
Having presented the conceptual approach for my study the chapter concludes by 
reiterating the research questions. The focus of the research on discursive meaning-
making through policy and policy debate - its ambiguity and contestation, and the effects 
for skills delivery - inspires the epistemological and methodological approach to 
interpretative policy analysis (IPA) (Yanow, 2000; Fischer, 2003; Yanow, 2007) which is 
presented - along with the specifics of the research design and research process - in 
Chapter 4. 
 
3.2 The changing role of the state in governing  
 
This thesis is interested in the governance of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England. 
Following Newman (2001:11), I treat governance as an “analytical concept”. The study of 
which “explores changes in political practices and their implications for political rules of 
the game” (Kjær, 2004:10; also Newman, 2005; Newman, 2007). In other words being 
interested in governance is to be interested in the modes and mechanisms by which 
governing is done. As both forms of political regulation of social subjects (Carmel & 
Papadopoulos, 2003:32) and distributional devises that determine who does what, who 
gets what, and how (under what conditions and by what processes). As such treating 
governance as an analytical concept directs concern towards the forms of power as 
political authority that are conferred to governors, in relation to objects and subjects to be 
governed, and with what effects (outcomes), without obscuring the potential for modes 
and mechanisms of governing, as with all forms of power, to be contested. I therefore 
perceive changing modes and mechanisms of governance as expressions of changing 
relations of power and political attempts to (re)order social relations.   
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Occupying a considerable space in debates about contemporary governance is the ‘limited 
state’ account of recent changes to the modes and mechanisms by which governing is 
done (Rhodes, 1997; Kooiman, 2003). An apparent proliferation of networked forms of 
coordination in complex societies is taken as the empirical starting point and litmus test 
for these accounts. However, drawing on critical governance studies, I argue ‘limited state’ 
perspectives offer an impoverished conceptualisation of the political power associated 
with the steering functions of government.  
 
3.2.1 The Limited State: from government to governance 
 
In one, loosely connected, body of work - within which two different but prominent 
perspectives are offered by Rod Rhodes and Jan Kooiman - the term governance is used in 
a ‘narrow’ sense to denote a new phenomenon and object of analysis. A new mode of 
‘network’ (or partnership) coordination involving both state and non-state actors 
(sometime distinguished as public and private actors) distinct from both the hierarchy of 
states and the anarchy of market exchange (Jessop, 1998), and which tends to be 
optimistically perceived as able to offer the potential to overcome both state and market 
failure, (Jessop, 1998; Jessop, 2000b; Newman, 2001)21.  
 
That said scholars in this tradition appear firstly and predominantly concerned with the 
problems and failings of states, specifically bureau-professional hierarchy. For Rhodes 
(1996) governance as decentred, horizontal self-organisation between independent actors 
through networks (or ‘heterarchy’ – see Jessop, 1998; Jessop, 2000b; Kooiman, 2000) is 
given analytical definition as a mode and mechanism for governing society distinct from 
government. Furthermore, Rhodes (1996) analysis of the circumstances giving rise to 
governance starts by demarcating the unitary authority and freedom of the state to 
govern in changed conditions; exposing the degree to which it has been internally and 
externally “hollowed-out” (Rhodes, 1996). The well-rehearsed argument is that the state 
(particularly in the context of the UK) has been externally hollowed-out as a consequence 
                                                  
21 For a perspective on the risks and probability of governance failure see Jessop (1998; 2000b; 2003). 
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of its inability to exercise sovereign and central control over the national economy and 
society as significant powers have shifted to economic and political institutions beyond 
the national borders, and internally hollowed-out as a consequence of political projects 
(specifically market-oriented reforms associated with ‘New Public Management’) that 
have dismantled and fragmented the public sector; brought new actors into governance 
projects and processes; and created a “differentiated polity” (Rhodes, 1997:7, see also 
Pierre and Peters, 2000; Stoker, 2000; Marinetto, 2003). As a result governments are 
considered to have become limited players in the coordination of the social world; 
operating under conditions of reduced capacity to ‘steer’ the activities of autonomous 
self-organising networks, which necessarily involves them in greater degrees of 
interactivity with, and co-dependence on, non-state actors (Rhodes, 1996; Rhodes, 2000) 
 
In addition, the implication of the hollowed-out state thesis - that states can no longer 
govern alone - has been given credence by diverse claims that it shouldn’t seek to; that 
the bureaucratic state has become overloaded, and that bureaucracy cannot pay sufficient 
attention to societal complexity and calls for a politics of difference (Kooiman, 1993; 
Clarke & Newman, 1997; Pierre and Peters, 2000; Kooiman; 2003; Kjær, 2004; Osborne, 
2010). For Osborne (2010), it is the concern with complexity and plurality that 
differentiates ‘New Public Governance’ through interdependent networked relationships 
from ‘New Public Management’ associated with the ideological belief that public service 
coordination should mimic marketplace coordination.  
 
For Kooiman (1993; 2000; 2003; 2010), in societies that are diverse (made up of disparate 
actors), complex (in terms of the intrinsic nature of social systems), and dynamic 
(intersected with changing tensions between actors, organisations, institutions etc.), 
governance requires interaction and interactivity. The engagement of state and non-state 
actors in cooperation, coproduction, and co-regulation (Kooiman, 1993) is necessary to 
produce solutions to diverse, complex, and dynamic societal challenges that cannot be 
determined by one actor alone (Kooiman, 2000:142). Furthermore, for Kooiman (2000; 
2003) the solving of societal challenges is a societal concern shared by social actors in 
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ways which blur boundaries between public and private interests and responsibilities in 
the context of mutually recognised interdependence. In such contexts the state adopts a 
steering role to coordinate and facilitate the sites of interaction. The process by which 
actors then elucidate, compare, and negotiate opinions and options towards consensual 
shared solutions in the open space of the network involves the integrated “management 
of meaning” (Kooiman, 2003:35). By conceptualising meaning management in such a way 
Kooiman’s model of levels of societal governance, through and within networks and 
partnerships, explicitly implies reflexive relations of power between social actors - within 
structures and involved in the shaping and maintaining of those structures - and in terms 
of on-going judgements regarding the legitimacy of the overall system to be governed 
(Kooiman, 2000; Kooiman, 2003).  
 
Taken together therefore, and despite their differences, the verdict offered by these 
perspectives of the ‘limited state’ is that, in the context of heightened economic and social 
complexity, a significant degree of governmental power and political authority has been 
relocated; transferred from government to self-organising, reflexive governance networks, 
confining the state’s role to steering and facilitating rather than directing political 
decision-making. These explanations of change have, however, been problematised by 
critical approaches to the study of governance (in the ‘broad’ sense), which suggest they 
account for a different but not a reduced role of the state in governing (Pierre & Peters, 
2000; Pierre, 2000; Newman, 2001).  
 
3.2.2 The steering role of the state: Managerialism and Metagovernance 
 
The first critical claim to make of the ‘limited state’ perspective is that decisions regarding 
appropriate modes and mechanisms of governance (whether bureaucracies, markets or 
networks) are, in the first instance, both political and symbolical, and largely taken by 
states (Jessop, 1998). Bevir & Rhodes (2003a:63) identify different “narratives of 
governance” without or, more accurately, beyond government; normatively associated 
with different political traditions, ideologies and projects. Specifically, they identify the 
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Thatcherist Conservatives defence of market or quasi-market mechanisms as underpinned 
by a neoliberal belief in minimal state (cf. ‘politics of skills’ scholars), but New Labour’s 
promotion of networks as underpinned by ideals of trust in individual capacity to self-
govern in partnership with an enabling state (see also Newman, 2001; Bevir, 2003; Bevir & 
Rhodes, 2003b; Bevir & Rhodes, 2003c). 
 
Furthermore, we can draw attention to the failure of ‘limited state’ accounts to 
adequately theorise and address the significance of the power to ‘steer’ in governing; the 
power to derive the need for action and determine and drive the direction that action will 
take (Peters, 2000; Newman, 2001). For example ‘limited state’ perspectives tend to 
under account for state steering through ‘managerialism’. Clarke & Newman (1997) 
associate managerialism with the emergence of a remade form of the state. A new 
political settlement between the state and citizens that is redefining, in important ways 
for this study and the attempt by New Labour to lead demand through supply, the 
relationship between public policy and provision and the boundaries between public and 
private spheres or spaces.  
 
Marinetto (2003:601) makes the empirical claim that different networks or partnerships, 
involved in public policy and public service delivery, experience different degrees of close 
control and regulation through ‘steering instruments’ that remain the preserve of the 
central executive, including: mechanisms that direct financial and non-financial resources; 
statutory requirements and bureaucratic procedures; and performance criteria and 
targets. These steering instruments enact state work; imposing the will and political 
authority of government through the management of managers. Through these forms of 
‘managerialism’ governments work to constrain the limits of opinions and options 
available for negotiation, not just by public, private, ‘third sector’, or hybrid service 
providers, but also their ‘customers’. Through these forms of managerialism governments 
work to discipline ‘partners’, shaping their behaviours and actions towards certain visions 
and objectives (Clarke & Newman, 1997; Ball, 2008b).  
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Even in more complex, ‘loose’ network arrangements (for example between systems of 
economic governance, or the coordination of economic governance logics with the logics 
of socio-political governance systems), where central executives have a more detached 
role, Jessop (1998; 2000b) identifies governments as involved in “de-centred, context-
mediated inter-systemic steering”. For Jessop (1998; 2000b), this engages states in 
symbolic mediation of systems logics to lessen the perception of differences between 
them and build consensus. This is done through strategies of ‘noise reduction’, which 
involves facilitating shared understandings through the organisation of dialogue, and 
‘negative’ coordination, which engages actors in considering the potential adverse 
repercussions of their actions on other actors and/or systems and therefore exercises 
their self-restraint (Jessop, 1998:33). By engaging in noise reduction and negative 
coordination, governments define and seek to direct the rules, roles, visions, imperatives 
and horizons within which systems and their disparate logics of governance come to 
interact. In other words, governments are involved in ‘metagovernance’ (Jessop, 1998; 
Jessop, 2000b; Jessop, 2002); in establishing and managing the context of governance.  
 
Identifying governments as involved in metagovernance draws acute attention to the role 
of states in shaping the frameworks of meaning that underpin governance arrangements 
and modifying the self-perception of social actors; both in terms of their interests and 
capabilities, and in terms of their subject position in the political ordering of social 
relations. Conceptualising the role of the state in this way provides an important challenge 
to ‘limited state’ accounts of change, which tend not to problematise the power of implicit 
meanings that contextualises governance arrangements, and the asymmetries of power 
involved in the cultural (re)production of meanings that then iteratively (re)construct 
meaning-making terms of reference.  
 
3.2.3 Summary: looking beyond the limited state 
 
This section has outlined debates regarding contemporary changes to how governance, as 
regulation and distribution, is done. It has contrast accounts of the ‘limited state’ in the 
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context of complex societies, with alternate accounts that the state’s role has changed to 
steering governance arrangements through managerialism and metagovernance. 
Highlighting the managerial and metagoverning role of the state illuminates the 
significance of the role of government in steering governance, but raises the question of 
how we can understand the normative dimension of steering activity. To address this 
question the next section is devoted to conceptualising and exposing discursive meaning-
making as state work through public policy.  
 
3.3 Meaning-making: a conceptual approach 
 
“Labels, like rumours, can take on a life of their own. […] Once sufficiently established they 
can govern reality” (Kumar, 1992:45). 
 
When Kumar (1992; 1995) warns of the power of labels to govern reality he is referring to 
the way in which intellectuals – with particular relevance here, ‘policy intellectuals’ (Ball, 
2008a) – develop and utilise theoretical constructs in an attempt to analyse and explain 
the world, and the phenomena by which these constructs develop a self-reinforcing life of 
their own. He examples the terms: ‘post-industrial society’ (the ‘information society’ or 
‘informational capitalism’); ‘post-Fordism’; and ‘post-modernism’, as labels of economic 
and socio-political change, and as descriptors of grand new epochs. As we have seen (in 
Chapter 1), skills policies and debates in the UK are littered with references to such labels 
of change. In addition to those listed by Kumar (19992; 1995) and employed to describe 
new or emerging economic and social conditions, we could add: the (neoliberal) post-
welfare society; the global knowledge-based economy; and the high-skills economy (see 
for example Brown, 1999; Lloyd & Payne, 2003; Tomlinson, 2005).  
 
Kumar (1992; 1995) is concerned with the validity of terms; the extent to which they 
resonate with, and depict ‘reality’, and therefore with the extent to which their claims of 
particular change can be substantiated with reference to the actual existence of what they 
intend to describe. However, this thesis highlights how labels applied to skills policies and 
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policy debates can also be thought of as attempting to be transformative; productive of 
what they intend to describe. In other words labels, as discourse, can claim truths (Clarke 
& Cochrane, 1998; Clarke, 2004a; Ball, 2007; Ball, 2008a). As Clarke & Cochrane (1998:26) 
note “how we name things affects how we behave towards them. The name, or label, 
carries with it expectations”. Labels can be utilised as meaningful devises to narrate a way 
the world is, or could and should be. Intrinsic to them is a particular depiction and 
articulation of current problems and foreseeable challenges, as well as future solutions 
and realisable opportunities (Ball, 2006:26). They are advocated by those predisposed to 
think positively about these particular futures and who seek to make them possible; who 
endeavour to rally support (or silence opposition) for the primacy and preference of their 
agenda. Borrowing from Clarke (2004a:30) we can see these labels as doing “political 
work”.  
 
The role of labels in governing reality highlights “governance as political communication” 
(Bang, 2003b:7) through which binding, or seeking to be binding, decisions and actions are 
interactively articulated and negotiated by political actors. However, it is stressed that this 
focus on governance as political communication does not inevitably lead back to the 
perspective that the state is fundamentally limited. Rather it reminds us of the significance 
of the steering role of government. Which highlights that order is not always sought by 
the barking of authorative commands to settle political struggles, but is effectively 
pursued through efforts to discursively produce intersubjective meaning - associated with 
socially constructed imperatives - and by silencing, subordinating, or absorbing the 
expression and mobilisation of alternative viewpoints about problems, and their solutions 
(Newman, 2001; Bang, 2003a; Clarke, 2004a; Jessop, 2009). 
 
This section of my conceptual framework will discuss approaches that conceptualise and 
expose discursive meaning-making as state work through public policy and policy debate. 
Specifically, I consider the significance of discursive meaning for determining the objects 
of governance, as well as the production of governable subjects and subjectivities and the 
political ordering of social relations. I discuss these approaches to firstly highlight the 
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limitations of the conceptual framing of existing skills policy analysis that primarily 
concentrates on evaluation of policy tools and outcomes; specifically the degree to which 
policy is misaligned with, or misapprehends the (rational) interests of economic actors. 
Secondly, to provide a challenge to narrow accounts of limited states, and therefore less 
government, in the forming of collectively binding decisions (see presentation above in 
section 3.2). Finally, therefore, my central aim is to highlight the significance of discursive 
meaning—making to the context and content of policy and policy debates. Specifically, I 
develop a conceptual approach to understanding how, and under what conditions, public 
policy (of specific relevance to this thesis, skills policy) meaning is made and remade. This 
conceptual approach will also inform an interpretive policy analysis methodology (Chapter 
4) 
 
I draw on somewhat eclectic approaches which make the ‘cultural turn’ in studies of 
political economy and society, and I address them here in a somewhat liner way. However, 
in making a ‘cultural turn’ these approaches have in common an ontological commitment 
to taking culture seriously. That is, not rendering meaning production and reproduction 
through meaningful practice as the epiphenomenal consequence of particular institutional 
arrangements of the political economy, but foundational to, and productive of, 
institutional possibilities and impossibilities, without reducing to radical contingency 
(Gottweis, 2003; Clarke, 2004; Jessop, 2009; Sum, 2009).   
 
In particular I draw on the ‘cultural political economy’ (hereafter CPE)22 approach which 
emphasises the role of semiosis (intersubjective meaning-making) in reducing, or more 
accurately structuring or binding complexity, through the strategic selection of particular 
economic (and social) imaginaries that specify particular objects and subjects of 
governance, and the subsequent attempts to retain and embed these as hegemonic 
accounts of the world. In common with scholars within the CPE approach, I argue that not 
all imaginaries have an equal chance of being selected and retained/embedded (Jessop, 
2009); narratives of how the world could or should be - and their narrators as story-tellers 
                                                  
22 Developed by scholars at Lancaster University within the Cultural Political Economy Research Centre, 
including: Bob Jessop; Ngai-Ling Sum; Norman Fairclough; and Andrew Sayer 
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from the position of ‘viewpoint characters’ - struggle for the privilege to claim their 
accounts as meaningful, and have unequal ability to legitimise these accounts. 
Furthermore, imaginaries once embedded are reproduced in discursive and material 
practice by social actors reinforcing their dominance (Jessop, 2009). 
 
However, CPE alone contributes only a part of my conceptual approach. Given that for 
CPE scholars the primary level of analysis is the political economy, their focus tends to 
offer broad accounts of changing or stabilising capitalist social formations (institutional 
arrangements in periodic flux between unstable equilibrium or crisis, Jessop, 2002), and 
they retain a core preoccupation with material outcomes (albeit as both produced by and 
as producing discourse) that consigns actors and their agency to the margins of their 
analysis. I find this level of analysis useful in situating the New Labour Skills Strategy, for as 
Ball (2007:5) comments “education is itself now in almost permanent ‘crisis’ as it has 
taken centre stage in the complex relations between the state and the ‘imagined 
economy’”. However, given my interest in discursive meaning-making and meaning 
contestation through policy and policy debate, I also synthesise and complement this 
approach with other critical governance studies that focus on language and discourse to 
expose both the privilege and fallibility of meaning in public policy and policy debate. 
These approaches are interested in policy as both symbolic – and as such attempting to 
win and hold on to support (Ball 2007; Ball, 2008a) - and policy as sites of ambiguity and 
contestation (Clarke & Newman, 1997; Clarke, 2004b; Newman & Clarke, 2009).  
 
Therefore, having discussed meaning-making as an exercise in complexity reduction and 
the conditions of relative unequal chances for certain imaginaries to be selected and 
retained, I will finish this chapter by critique the CPE approach for their overemphasis on 
relative ideational unity of meaning as the outcome of discursive struggles, and their 
overemphasis on the structuring consequences of embedded (hegemonic) meanings. I will 
argue that state projects can be multifaceted, muddled, and contested. All of which 
disrupts the coherence of economic and social imaginaries, the objects of governance they 
signify, and the subject positions and subjectivities they seek to create. 
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3.3.1 Struggles over meaning-making: selecting economic (and social) imaginaries 
 
In thinking about the political ordering of social relations through intersubjective meaning-
making and its interaction with material structures, CPE offers a particular and distinctive 
analytical approach  to making the ‘cultural turn’ in studies of political economy and 
critical policy analysis (Jessop, 2009)23. The CPE approach focuses on institutional and 
institutionalised dynamics of the political economy in ways that draws attention to the 
causal effectiveness of semiosis (intersubjective meaning-making); its evolutionary role in 
the construal (particular interpretation of ideas and concepts, and therefore the forming 
of ways of understanding) and the construction of extra-semiotic, or material dimensions 
of the social world and social relations (Jessop, 2008; Jessop, 2009; see also Gottweis, 
2003 on ‘semiotic-materialism’ and Clarke, 2004b:38 on the relationship between 
‘polysemy’, ‘articulation’, and ‘cultural formations’).  
 
For Jessop (2007a; 2009), semiosis is critical to the necessity of ‘real world’ complexity 
reduction, and the strategic selection and retention of particular economic (and social) 
imaginaries. Jessop (2009) argues that complexity reduction is necessary in order for 
actors to make sense of and operate in the world. However, complexity reduction should 
not be confused, in a straightforward way, with simplification. The methodological 
objective of the CPE approach is to apply critical semiotic analysis to highlight how 
potentially boundless and chaotic economic and social complexity is meaningfully reduced 
by actors to what structured and therefore bounded interpretations and constructions of 
economic and social complexity associated with particular imaginaries. For example, 
associated with the specific imagined complexities of a post-Fordist knowledge-based 
economy (Jessop, 2002; 2008); ‘discourses of competitiveness’ (Sum, 2009); or discourses 
                                                  
23 Specifically, CPE scholars seek to carve out a discrete epistemological space for their approach, which is 
broadly ‘post-structuralist’, (or more accurately synthesises the pre-structuralist approaches of Gramsci and 
post-structuralist approaches of Foucault and Foucauldian scholars), and critical of both realist orthodox 
analysis of the political economy (which leads towards rational choice institutionalism and economic 
determinism), and the radical contingency of social constructivism, which writes-out the conditioning 
influence of structure from accounts of the social reality and social capacity of agents (Jessop & Sum, 2006b; 
Jessop & Oosterlynck, 2008; Jessop 2009). They therefore define their approach as overcoming economism 
versus culturalism and structuralism versus voluntarism (Jessop & Sum, 2006b).  
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of globalisation (Watson & Hay, 2003). Therefore, imaginaries are explained from the 
perspective of the CPE approach (Jessop & Oosterlynck, 2008; Jessop, 2008; Jessop, 2009; 
Sum, 2009), in partial relation to ‘real world’ or ‘actually existing’ complexity (Jessop & 
Sum, 200b) as particular and privileged relatively coherent sub-sets of meaningful logics, 
principles, and priorities according to which social relations could be structured, and 
which seek to become ‘fixed’ as objects of governance (Jessop, 2002).  
 
However, whilst imaginaries may be various, unrestrained, immeasurable, and changing - 
as  actors constantly re-envision and redefine ways of understanding the world; the 
objects and subjects/subjectivities to be governed; and the strategies, projects and modes 
of governance - only some are selected. Those that come to be selected achieve wider 
discursive resonance (including with the personal and subjective autobiographical 
narratives of certain individuals and groups, Jessop, 2002); become materially 
consequential such that they have lived effects; and are (temporarily) retained through 
their discursive and institutional reproduction in ways which achieve popular support and 
can destabilise opposition (Jessop & Sum, 2006). For CPE scholars these selected 
imaginaries can, at least for a time, become dominant hegemonic accounts of the world 
(Jessop, 2008; Sum, 2009).  
 
This identified relationship between construal and construction in complexity reduction 
and the (re)production (albeit temporarily) of hegemonic accounts of the world, leads us 
to consider the conditions that enable unequal chances for particular economic and social 
imaginaries to be selected and retained (Jessop, 2002; see also Jessop & Oosterlynck, 
2008; Jessop, 2009). For Jessop, there are two such conditions, which, whilst not without 
their criticisms, offer a useful starting point for exploring discursive meaning-making as 
state work in practice. Firstly, given a primary interest in critical political economy 
(specifically the analysis of the anatomy of capitalism as an ‘integral’ economy, Jessop & 
Sum, 2006a; Jessop, 2007a) Jessop observes that imaginaries achieve greatest resonance, 
and come to structure the macro-economic semiotic and extra-semiotic order, where they 
are suitable to the social regulation needs of capital (or specific capitals) accumulation and 
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reproduction. In particular, he argues that these imaginaries come to be retained where 
they affect an always unstable ‘spatio-temporal fix’ (Jessop, 2002:48; Jessop, 2008:17) 
able, albeit temporarily, to reconcile the inherent contradictions and crisis tendencies of 
capitalism. Secondly, (but related to the first) imaginaries have unequal chances to be 
selected and retained as a consequence of their status in relation to existing embedded 
discursive and extra-discursive hegemonic accounts of the social world and social 
relations, that have achieved wider resonance (Jessop and Sum, 2006b:166; Jessop & 
Oosterlynck, 2008) and are reproduced in practice. This point links me to policy as 
discursive practice (Clarke, 2004b; Ball, 2007; Ball, 2008a).  
 
Whilst undoubtedly offering an overly structurally determined and determining account of 
meaning selection and retention, these conditions under which certain economic and 
social imaginaries attain greater chances of being selected and retained have implications 
for the meaning-making context and therefore objects and subjects of contemporary skills 
policy and policy debates in England; the focus of this thesis. They are discussed below 
before being critiqued (in section 3.4) with regard to their residual overemphasis on 
structure and ‘relative ideational unity’ as an outcome of discursive structuration. An 
overemphasis on structure that under theorises agency, and the potential for actors to 
unpick, disrupt, and change projects.  
 
3.3.2 Macro-economic meaning-making 
 
This sub-section discusses the first of the conditions under which certain meaningful 
economic and social imaginaries have unequal chances to be selected and retained. In 
other words it discusses the role of semiosis in complexity reduction at the level of the 
macro political-economy (or regime), as the discursive-strategic selection of imaginaries – 
such as the ‘knowledge-based economy’, or ‘post-welfare society’ - suitable to the social 
regulation needs of (specific) capitals accumulation and reproduction. Furthermore, by 
considering the selection and retention of economic and social imaginaries that structure 
the macro political-economy we expose those ‘paradigms’ that, for CPE scholars, are both 
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‘constitutive’ and ‘performative’ in shaping and embedded policy meanings and policy 
trajectories (Jessop, 2008:19).  
 
The remaking of the British state has been a central focus of politics and political analysis 
for the last four decades (Clarke & Newman, 1997:1). Much of this analysis has been 
centred on the perspective that, ‘something happened’ to the welfare state (Clarke et al, 
1994:1). It has been reconceptualised and restructured (see also Ainley, 1997; Jessop, 
2002; Bobbitt, 2002; Ainley, 2004; Cerny & Evans, 2004; Cerny, 2010a). The theories of 
change to state rationales and functions reviewed here offer the argument  that what is 
emerging (has emerged) in terms of state form can be understood as expressions of 
changing intersubjectively meaningful imaginaries,  and associated changing relations of 
power, which constitute the political (re)ordering of social relations. Furthermore, their 
selection and retention is, in part, an expression of discursive meaning-making as state 
work in policy and political debate.  
 
Whilst recognising diversity within accounts of the changing nature of the British state, 
and the divergent standpoints from which these accounts are presented, it is possible to 
identify analysis of change as clustering around two focal points: changes to welfare and 
the social policy role of the state; and changes to the economy and the economic policy 
role of the state (Jessop, 2002).  More specifically changes have occurred in the 
relationships between the state, the economy, and society (Clarke & Newman, 1997). 
Scholars from political economy and political sociology offer various and persuasive 
models for describing and classifying change. In place of the national Keynesian welfare 
state Cerny (1997, 2010a) offers us the ‘Competition State’; Bobbitt (2002) offers us the 
‘Market-State’; and Jessop (2002) the shift towards the ideal-typical Schumpeterian 
workfare post-national regime (SWPR).  
 
In ‘The Future of the Capitalist State’ (Jessop, 2002), and elsewhere (Jessop, 1999; Jessop, 
2000a), Jessop provides an account of contemporary changes to the form and function of 
the state based on the articulation of discursive-strategic (imagined and selected) shifts 
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between analytical ‘ideal-type’ imaginaries. In doing so he provides a framework for 
analysis of the empirically changed macro-economic semiotic and extra-semiotic order, 
which reconceptualises the relevant objects and subjects of governance, giving new 
meaning to policy making trajectories. Specifically, he identifies the imagined and 
(temporarily) embedded Keynesian welfare national state (KWNS) as experiencing major - 
multiple and variable - discursively mediated crises 24 , and as therefore becoming 
increasingly untenable as a system of economic and social governance. Similarly, Clarke et 
al (1994:1) note that in the UK, the 1980s bore witness to the emergence of an orthodoxy 
claiming a ‘terminal crisis’ of the post-war Keynesian welfare state25. As a result the KWNS 
is analysed as having given way (in degrees) to a new semiotic and extra-semiotic order; 
an imaginary which Jessop (2002) terms the Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime 
(SWPR), or Schumpeterian competition state (see also Cerny, 1997; Cerny; 2010a). 
 
Of particular relevance to understanding the macro-economic meaning-making context of 
skills policy and policy debates in the UK/England, is how the imaginatively narrated 
distinction between the KWNS and the SWPR or ‘competition state’ (Cerny, 1997; Cerny, 
2010a), re-construes and reconstructs the ‘structurally coupled’ economic and social 
policy roles of the state. That is the ‘structural coupling’ of the accumulation regime and 
the regulation regime, (Jessop, 2002:3; Ball, 2007) and the associated imagined “proper 
role of the state” (Clarke & Newman, 1997:1).  
 
Briefly stated, the economic role of the state is imagined as required to relocate away 
from a Keynesian concern with demand management - the active commitment of nation 
states to secure the conditions necessary for the Fordist growth dynamic by ensuring that 
mass consumption cleared (exponentially increasing) mass production within a (relatively) 
closed or walled national economy, (Ainley, 1997; Brown & Lauder, 2001; Jessop, 2002) - 
                                                  
24 Associated with the stagflationary tendencies of Atlantic Fordism; technological advancements; the 
internationalisation of (parts of) the economy and economic activity; and social movement calls for 
attention to ‘the politics of difference’. What Ball, (2007:4) identifies as “conjunction of crises”.  
25 Jessop (2002) distinguishes between narratives of crisis in - requiring incremental ‘path-dependent’ 
change to - or crisis of - requiring more radical ‘path-breaking’ or ‘path-shaping’ departures from (as in the 
UK) - the KWNS. 
76 
 
towards a concern with Schumpeterian supply-side interventions to promote perpetual 
‘knowledge-based’ productivity and flexible adaptability, for the purpose of sustaining a 
competitiveness growth dynamic in a (relatively) open global economy (Brown & Lauder, 
1996; Brown & Lauder, 2001; Jessop, 2002; Ball, 2007; Cerny, 2010a). In relation, the 
social policy role of the state is imagined as required to reorient away from a concern with 
welfare towards a concern with workfare (Jessop, 2002; Bobbit, 2002).  
 
It is noted that Jessop (2002) perceives the social policy role of the state in rather narrow 
terms in relation to the (re)production of labour power. Taken as a whole state social 
policies have much broader, different and/or additional, intentions and aspirations; for 
example the (re)production of active and responsible citizens; expert-patients; 
empowered public service consumers/customers; and highly ambiguous but seemingly 
Do-It-Yourself but Do-It-Our-Way ‘Big Societies’ (see for example Vidler & Clarke, 2005; 
Newman & Clarke, 2009a). However, given that this thesis is concerned with skills policies 
and policy debates in relation to workforce/workplace development, a more narrow 
definition of the social policy role of the state is compatible with the object and scope of 
analysis.  
 
The welfare state, as a particular imaginary, organised on principles of solidarity and social 
inclusion (for those culturally and politically accepted for inclusion, Clarke & Newman, 
1997:3-4), offered a commitment to economic opportunity and security; full male 
employment in conditions of regulated responsible unionism, and the institutionalisation 
of variable degrees of decommodifying economic and social rights to full citizens (Esping-
Anderson, 1990; Brown & Lauder, 2001; Jessop, 2002). With the ascendency of neo-liberal 
ideology (particularly with reference to the UK, see Ainley, 1997; Brown & Lauder, 2001) a 
dominant political rhetoric (offering a semiotic account of the way the world is imagined) 
identified the social wage and the collection of taxes in order for governments, acting in 
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the ‘public’ interest, to meet various calls for insurance and redistribution as having 
abundant negative effects (Clarke, 2004a)26.  
 
For Cerny (2010a), the combination of a dominant neo-liberal ideology urging ‘economic 
modernisation’ (Avis et al, 1996 Newman, 2001), and intensifying processes of 
globalisation, far from exclusively limiting the power of the state has fundamentally 
redefined the state’s role in providing population security. He argues that the new 
‘competition state’ functions, in different ways and on different scales from the ‘welfare 
state’; in a seeming paradox to ensure national competitive advantage and economic 
growth by retreating from the defence of the sociological nation (Cerny & Evans, 2004). 
Instead of (economically) defending the nation (or defending the nation, meaning people, 
from the economy, meaning worst excesses of the market) the state works to ensure the 
integration and inclusion of domestic businesses and worker-citizens inside the terms of 
transnational competition to secure the benefits of globalisation within its territory. In 
short, the governmental rationality of the state has shifted from the hitherto raison d’État, 
or ‘reason of the state’ - the taken-for-granted legitimisation of the state as derived from 
the mission to improve the welfare of the population (Bobbitt, 2002; Cerny, 2010b), giving 
way instead to a raison du Monde, or ‘reason of the world’ associated with the market 
forces of neo-liberal globalisation (Cerny, 2010a). Indeed, put in formidable terms, Cerny 
(1997:258) identifies an emergent state role as “the enforcer of decisions and/or 
outcomes which emerge from world markets”.   
 
It is with the selection and retention of this Schumpeterian competition state (and post-
welfare society, Tomlinson, 2005) imaginary that education and training has come to be 
seen as utterly subordinated to particular economic imperatives (Jessop, 2002; Lauder et 
al, 2006; Ball, 2008a; Rizvi & Lingard, 2010), situated in the complex relations between the 
state and the ‘imagined economy’” Ball (2007:5). A position for education and training 
                                                  
26  These included demographic change, unemployment and welfare dependency; the overload, 
ungovernability and fiscal crisis of the state; burdening the cost of production in the context of heightened 
pressures on domestically-based businesses to remain competitive in global marketplaces; and 
disincentivising flows of inward investment given the potential for mobile capital to ‘regime shop’ (Ball, 
2007). 
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that is also impacted by the competition state (or “Market State”, Bobbitt, 2002) 
promotion of the moral imperative on citizens to work, and work well (in secure 
independence from the state), by becoming skilled and by continually up-skilling and re-
skilling (Avis et al, 1996; Bobbitt, 2002; Ainley, 2004; Tomlinson, 2005) throughout their 
working lifetime. 
 
3.3.3 Meaning-making and reproduction through policy and practice 
 
Having described the role of semiosis in the construal and construction of certain 
meaningful economic and social imaginaries that come to determine the objects and 
subjects of governance at the level of the macro-economy, this sub-section will consider 
the second of the conditions by which imaginaries come to have relatively unequal 
chances to be selected and retained. That is where they support already existing 
embedded discursive and extra-discursive hegemonic accounts of the social world and the 
political ordering and organisation of social relations, and are reinforced through policy. In 
short, this sub-section is about policy as discursive meaningful practice which seeks to 
reinforce ways of construing and constructing the social world and social relations.  
 
As noted above, Jessop (2009) highlights the consequential effect of established meaning-
making systems - the associated material constructs and their path-dependencies - for 
policy-making. Where selected imaginaries are retained and materially embedded as 
hegemonic accounts of the world their way of understanding the world in turn acts as a 
meaning-making reference points for actors in the on-going iterative relationship between 
semiotic construal and construction of the social world and social relations (Jessop, 2009; 
Sum, 2009). As Jessop (2009:338) states “construals may also contribute to the 
construction of the natural and social world insofar as they guide a critical mass of self-
confirming actions premised on their validity”. However, being more interested in the 
structural outcomes of semiosis (specifically complexity reduction and the evolutionary 
mechanisms of variation, selection and retention Jessop, 2009; Jessop & Oosterlynck, 
2008) Jessop tends to under theorise and, therefore, under account for the role of actors 
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and their actions in meaning-making; its production and reproduction. (He also makes a 
rather obscure and problematic distinction between ‘actors’ and ‘observers’, see Jessop, 
2009:337)27. 
 
In avoiding overly structural explanations of how meaning is made, this thesis synthesises 
Clarke’s observation that we have to read the social world and social relations (culture) as 
actively constructed and reproduced by the practices of social actors, and which (re)makes 
what is meaningful to these social actors (Clarke, 2004b:39). However, this synthesis is not 
to propose (or even open a door to) the reduction of meaning-making to radical 
contingency, or the idea that actors can speak any eventuality into being (Jessop, 2004). 
Illuminating actors acting, in particular struggling over policy meanings, recognises that 
these actions and struggles are contained within the constraining – possible and plausible 
- parameters of the meaningful discursive frame (Ball, 2006:49; Ball, 2007).  This is 
something of a self-evident, even circular, point when we return to the role of discourse, 
in particular ‘policy as discourse’ (Ball, 2006:48; Ball, 2008a:7) as attempting to condition, 
direct and produce the meaningfully responsible action of actors (Clarke, 2004:33). 
 
Policy is thus bounded political communication as discursive practice, which, as Ball 
(2008a:7) reminds us, requires seeing policy as both text and process. Not just one-off 
statements or directives, but a reinforced, re-inflected and reworked interactive 
momentum of discursively mediated ideas, decisions and actions (built into agendas, 
programmes, initiatives, and so on). With this definition of policy as discursive practice in 
mind, we have to be attentive to the relationship between meanings and material effects 
                                                  
27 Although not the central focus of this thesis, the distinction Jessop draws between ‘actors’ and ‘observers’ 
speaks to a body of research work concerned with the dynamics that shape the relative ability of some social 
actors to participate more than others in the selection of imaginaries of the social world due to their 
position in relation to dominant discourses (Gottweis, 2003:254). For example: in education ‘reform’ Ball 
(2008a; 2008b) highlights the influential role of policy intellectuals, who fit with and validate new policy 
discourses; Jessop (2008) examples the influential role of the OECD in promoting the imaginary of the 
knowledge-based economy (see OECD, 1996);  Sum’s work on competitiveness as a ‘knowledge- brand’ 
highlights the influential role of policy consultants in discursive networks; and Cerny (2010b:30) highlights 
the expansion of competing interests in competition states, and the particularly powerful influence of a 
‘transnational elite’. 
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(the semiotic and the extra-semiotic dimensions of policy). The relationship between 
“what is enacted as well as what is intended” (Ball, 1994:10) 
 
This thesis therefore understands policy as discursive practice to include the attempted 
enactment of meaning through the articulation and formation of particular modes and 
mechanisms of governance (hierarchies, markets, networks or partnerships) as both 
regulatory and distributional devises; by which I mean premised on ideas that seek to 
legitimise the political authority to determine who does what, who gets what, and how. 
This point reinforces the contention that modes and mechanisms of governance should be 
considered as neither inherently neutral nor pragmatic, but as performing, and remaking, 
what is deemed meaningful within selected and retained imaginaries (Newman, 2007). 
This point is made explicit in the work of Carmel & Papadopoulos (2003) and Carmel et al 
(2007) where they draw attention to the iteration between the ‘formal and operational’ 
dimensions of governance. That is the relationship between the meaningful discursive 
logics, rationales and principles of public policies (what is to be governed), and the 
meaningful modes and mechanisms that organise how, and with what effects, it is 
governed. In their words “forms of governance involve the institutional crystallisation of 
particular discourses” (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003:33). The distinction but 
interconnectedness between the formal and operational dimensions of governance that 
Carmel & Papadopoulos (2003) illuminates exposes the reproduction (and the re-
inflection) of meaning-making through practice.  
 
Ways of understanding the world, manifest in policy discourse and reproduced in practice, 
influence (for a given time and space) the boundaries of plausibility, possibility and 
credibility; manufacturing and framing a putative ‘common-sense’ which closes down 
opportunities for alternative understanding (Clarke, 2004b; Ball, 2007). For example, 
Carmel & Harlock (2008) highlight how policy discourse and practice determines and 
delimits the ‘terrain’ of normatively prescribed subjects and objects of governance; 
imaginatively narrating subject positions and subjectivities, and seeking to affect these 
through policy technologies.  
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Policy discourses are therefore determining and constitutive forms of relational power 
(Lukes, 1974; Clarke & Newman, 1997). Policies ‘speak’ their subjects – making new 
subjects and subject positions (for example worker-citizen, Clarke, 2005b) - and inviting 
them to take up the image articulated (Ball, 2006:48; Ball, 2007; Newman, 2007). Policies 
create contrasts between authorative and subordinate voices and actions, and therefore 
places from which to speak or answer, and act or perform (Clarke, 2004b; Ball, 2006; Ball, 
2008); seeking to relegate “voices on the outside of normal” (Ball, 2007:2) to the 
‘unsayable’ margins of the debate in order to maintain the coherence of the conversation 
between insiders. In short, policy as discursive practice seeks to perform meanings. As Ball 
(1998:124) states “policies are both systems of values and symbolic systems; ways of 
representing, accounting for and legitimating political decisions. Policies are articulated 
both to achieve material effects and to manufacture support for those effects.”  
 
Understanding policy as discursive practice offers a useful analytical entry point for this 
thesis in the endeavour to reconceptualising state work in the governance of skills. 
However, whilst policy may seek to discursively win support for and achieve certain 
material effects, it is important to be mindful of the fallibility of meaning-making efforts 
and policy as discursive practice on two counts. Firstly, that state projects are coherent 
and seek the straightforward (re)production of objects and subjects of governance; and 
secondly, that state projects can be contested, disrupted and derailed.  
 
3.4 Ambiguity and contestation: disintegrating discursive meaning-making 
 
So far in this chapter I have been concerned to outline discursive meaning-making as state 
work in public policy and policy debates, as the normative dimension of state steering in 
governance. In doing so, I have in part developed the conceptual approach to my analysis 
of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England. However, to finalise, this section will 
challenge the implicit assumptions of both relative ideational unity, and straightforward 
(re)production of social actors, as outcomes of discursive meaning-making in policy and 
policy debate. I will draw on critical governance studies and cultural analysis to highlight 
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complexity, incompleteness and contradiction in state projects (ambiguity), as well as to 
highlight the possibilities for contestation, resistance, and subversion of policy discourses, 
practices and processes.  
 
3.4.1 Muddled meanings: policy ambiguities  
 
For Clarke (2004b) analysing shifts between macro political-economic imaginaries, that 
seek to (re)articulate and structure particular formations of the social world and social 
relations, can be at best considered an exercise bound by the extent of incomplete 
change. Bold proclamations of the end of the welfare state have, for example, been met 
by counter-claims of partial transformation, resilience and persistence (Clarke, 2004b). 
Even within narrow definitions of social policy as concerned with the reproduction of 
labour power, debates about the ‘proper role of the state’ are multifaceted; involving 
many and differentiated ideas, principles and rationalities, and which may be context or 
circumstance dependent. Even given the forceful assault of neo-liberal ideologies on the 
senses, that has “squeezed – in material and symbolic ways - the spaces that we inhabit” 
(Clarke, 2004b:6), and reframed the objects and subjects of governance, misaligned (‘old’) 
perceptions of welfare state functions retain popular and therefore political currency. As 
such, Ball (2007:5) observes aspects of the Schumpeterian competition state imaginary as 
layering over, as opposed to dismantling, the logics and principles associated with welfare 
states, in ways which he describes as involving trial and error ’fumblings’ and ‘muddling 
through’ as a opposed to a systematic colonisation.   
 
This is not necessarily merely indicative of an evolutionary rather than revolutionary pace 
and process of change. Rather, Clarke (2004b:2) demonstrates that “[welfare] states might 
be more than one thing at once […] they may be experiencing multiple and contradictory 
pressures for change”.  This draws attention away from linear progressions altogether, 
and refocuses on the complex conjuncture of multiple narratives of the state and state 
projects, and the unstable power relations between them (Clarke, 2004b:5). As Newman 
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(2005), highlights the new paradigm of (economic and social) modernisation may appear 
to have a coherent rhetoric but this masks the incoherence of its rationalities.  
 
Dominant economic competitiveness discourses intersect uncomfortably with secondary 
discourses of work-life balance, rights to request flexible working, or time off to train (one 
skills policy tool discussed in the empirical chapters of this thesis). For Fairclough 
(2000:44), this speaks to a Third Way agenda of ‘reconciliation’. It speaks to the 
“impossibility of alternatives” (Newman, 2001:45); or conflicts, or antagonisms, within or 
between governing projects. It speaks to there being more than one type of state. Always 
and at the same time the modernisers; the social democrats; the enablers; the investors; 
the entrepreneurs; the evaluators (Fairclough; 2000; Newman, 2001). A state with more 
than one type of imagined subject (Clarke, 2005). A state, in relation to skills policy, 
engaged in attempts to reconcile between what Avis (1998:261) identifies as “remnants of 
earlier radical movements” - a residual commitment to post-Keynesian management of 
economic and social security - and multiple additional convictions. Specifically regarding 
the need for higher skills to underpin a prosperous and fair high-skills economy and 
society; and a political and cultural wariness and distrust of the merits of intervening – 
compelling and regulating – inside the ‘black box’ of the firm (Keep, 2002) 
 
In explaining (parts of) the New Labour project (and contemporary policy-making the 
UK/England more broadly) as defined by ‘ambiguity’ and the reconciliation of multiple, 
coexisting and conflicting, discourses and agendas, Clarke & Newman (2009) offer the 
concepts of “articulation” and “assemblage” to aid analysis of  political and policy puzzles. 
They apply these concepts to explain ambiguity surrounding discourse of ‘the public’ as 
both in decline and as prolific.  In short they use the concept of articulation to highlight 
how words, as resources for making meanings, are mobilised and recruited in different 
ways; brought together and linked, to speak a persuadable project in a certain way. In 
particular, they draw attention to the dynamic fluidity of these words; the ways in which 
they can be appropriated to certain agendas and fixed in different compositions of 
meaning. How they can be disconnected and reconnected from and into political-cultural 
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projects, in order to attempt the forging of different versions of common-sense (Newman, 
2007). Most significantly the concept of articulation offers analytical insight into this 
process of locating and connecting words in arrangements that, in that pattern, represent 
legitimised ‘truth claims’, which highlights meaning-making as on-going and arduous state 
work. Work which involves ensuring alternative articulations are subverted or silenced, 
and closed down; work that is not always successful.  
 
Closely linked and building on the concept of articulation, is the concept of assemblage as 
state work to make meanings. Assemblage is explained by Newman & Clarke (2009) as the 
way in which institutionalising state projects involves coordinating and aligning often 
diverse ideas, images, actors, institutions, technologies, techniques and tools for 
governing, and bring these together to forge an apparently coherent whole. The concept 
of assemblage brings into sharp analytical relief the notion of state work and state policy 
as construction and production of meanings, practices and processes of governing. More 
significantly the concept allows the complexities and intricacies of this construction and 
production to be examined. In contrast to the ‘politics of skills’ approaches to explaining 
states as functioning in relatively straightforward relation to partisan interests, Newman & 
Clarke (2009) highlight political projects as involving the fragile alliance of “ill-suited 
elements” that requires constant maintenance work. This conceptual approach is useful in 
the context of studying the governance of skills as it offers ways of, for example, capturing 
both the building of economic agents in line with imaginaries of the global knowledge-
based economy and post-welfare society, but which can narrate these economic agents in 
ways which reconcile and harmonise them as also social subjects, offered opportunities 
for better social functioning and flourishing; to borrow from Clarke (2005) as worker-
citizens at one and the same time “activated, empowered, responsibilized, abandoned” in 
the construction of political projects.  
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3.4.2 Undoing discourses: contestation, resistance, subversion 
 
Paying attention to the complexity and intricacies of state projects to construct and 
produce meanings, practices and processes of governing - built on the articulation and 
assemblages of ‘ill-suited element’ used to portray and narrate coherence, but which 
requires on-going maintenance work - highlights the inherent fragility of state work 
(Newman & Clarke, 2009; Newman, 2007). Indeed, Clarke (2004b:38) draws attention to 
the ever present potential for any state policies as cultural formations to be discursively 
contested and undone, as people “modify, disrupt or negate the intended processes and 
outcomes of public policy” (Barnes & Prior, 2009:3). However, this contesting and undoing 
of policy meanings and practice should be remembered as also amounting to a complex, 
intricate and multifarious process, as opposed to being read from the way in which social 
actors are expected to be shaped by large-scale forces and trends (Clarke & Newman, 
1997:xi) and their collision with group or individual interests. 
 
Drawing on her collaborative work on ‘creating citizen-consumers’, Newman (2007) 
highlights the complexities and intricacies of struggles that took place over the coupling of 
the subject positions of ‘citizen-consumer’. Specifically, struggles over the meanings of 
these conflicting subject positions between policy-makers, publics and public services 
staff, and that took place around policy to reform (modernise) public services. She 
highlights the need to complicate how ‘resistance’ to forms of governance happens. In the 
research project that she reports she notes that resistance occurred in many ways. Firstly, 
as subjects were able to ‘ignore’ policy; declining to take up the subject positions that had 
been constructed for them. Secondly, she also notes how subjects found ways to disrupt 
the articulation and assemblage of the project; ways of breaking discursive and material 
chains of aligned ideas, images, meanings, subject positions, practices, processes, and 
techniques of governing, re-appropriating and redirected parts of the project towards 
other ends (also Newman & Clarke, 2009b). In both Newman’s (2007) report of the 
‘citizen-consumer’ project, and Newman & Clarke’s (2009b) report of two stories of 
‘subversive citizens’, what becomes apparent is that there is a relationship between the 
86 
 
complexity and intricacies with which the ‘governance project’ (in the case of this thesis 
the state project for governing skills in England) is constructed and produced (articulated 
and assembled by drawing together ‘ill-suited elements’ portrayed as a coherent whole), 
and the complexity and intricacy of the ‘resistance’.  The ability of subjects to either ignore 
policy; fail to reconcile the tensions of policy; or to use the fragile lines of incoherence to 
re-appropriate and re-direct policy meanings, practices and processes.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the conceptual approach for this study which theorises state 
work as the construction of meanings, practices, and process for governing skills in 
England under New Labour. It began by critically reviewing accounts that the role of the 
state in governing has become limited; hollowed-out both externally and internally by the 
combined forces of globalisation and localisation, and as a result of the fragmenting of the 
polity by quasi-market reforms associated with ‘New Public Management’ and subsequent 
‘New Public Governance’ calls for a ‘politics of difference’. In response the chapter argues 
that such a reading of the ‘limited state’ ignores the powerful role states retain in 
managing and steering; ‘metagoverning’. The power to shape the framework of meanings 
that underpin governance arrangements, derive the need for action and drive the 
direction that action will take.  
 
Having established a role for the state in steering governance arrangements the chapter 
then considered the question of how to understand the normative dimension of state 
steering activity. It presented a justification for taking state work as meaning-making 
seriously. Drawing on two approaches to theorising meaning-making and meaning 
reproduction (CPE and critical governance studies), I explored and explained both the role 
of semiosis in construing and constructing the objects and subjects of governance that 
offers arguably a better way of understanding the institutional and institutionalised 
dynamics of the political economy; and the way in which meanings are (re)produced in 
policy as discursive practice.  
87 
 
The chapter closes by recognising that both approaches reviewed allude to the inherent 
fallibility of discursive meaning-making as state work in public policy. Drawing 
predominantly on the work of John Clarke and Janet Newman, I discuss the application for 
my thesis of the concepts of ‘articulation’ and ‘assemblage’ that they offer as aids to the 
analysis of political and policy puzzles. I also consider how thinking about governance 
projects as fragile, complex and intricate, exposes forms of ‘resistance’ as equally fragile, 
complex and intricate. This consideration has implications for my subsequent 
methodological decisions. Specifically, it informed my decision to capture the meaning-
making activity of employer, employee/learner, and skills delivery representatives, 
alongside policy-makers, in the original empirical analysis.  
 
In summary then, I built my conceptual approach around theorising state work as the 
construction of meanings, practices, and process for governing skills in England under New 
Labour, which seeks to account for the complexities and intricacies inherent to state 
projects, and that renders them subject to contestation and resistance. Having established 
the conceptual approach for this thesis, and given the ontological commitment this 
implies to understanding and explaining the strategic and selective (normative) realm of 
meaning-making and meaning reproduction, the next chapter will outline my 
methodological approach informed by interpretive policy analysis (IPA) (Yanow, 2000; 
Fischer, 2003; Yanow, 2007).  
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4. Research Methodology and Analytical Approach 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
his chapter will outline the methodological and analytical approach adopted in this 
thesis in order to empirically investigate how the governance – ordering and 
organising – of skills policy under New Labour can be explained and understood? The 
chapter will begin by outlining the ontological foundation and methodological 
commitment to interpretive policy analysis (IPA), an approach that facilitates an interest in 
the meanings vested in policy and policy debate, and the closely intertwined and iterative 
relationship between meanings and the purposeful practices and processes of governing. 
It then details the research design, and research approach, starting with the identification 
of the main actor groups for inclusion in the study, and then considering sources of data 
to be drawn on (documents and interviews). The chapter then specifies the research 
process, by recalling methods of sampling, data access, and data analysis used in this 
study. Throughout the chapter ethical issues and my role as a researcher will be critically 
reflected on.  
  
Ontological and Epistemological Commitments: Interpretive Policy Analysis  
 
Given the conceptual approach to studying policy meanings that I propose in Chapter 3, 
this thesis adopts an ontologically constructivist position, and an interpretive approach to 
policy analysis. I employ interpretive policy analysis (IPA) as it offers a methodological 
framework which reflects both this thesis’ interest in understanding policy and its 
commitment to a conceptual focus on interpreting meanings and meaning-making. I 
follow IPA scholars in making the claim that the role of policy analysis is to engage 
reflexively in the process of accessing the normative meanings vested in policies. IPA calls 
for “the use of interpretive and discursive techniques to demonstrate that politics and 
policy are grounded in subjective factors” (Fischer, 2007:101). Such that, as Yanow 
(2000:11) highlights “the central question then for interpretative policy analysts is, how is 
the policy issue being framed by the various parties in the debate”. This perspective weds 
T 
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the research design to qualitative methods (Bryman, 2008) of analysis (see section 4.3), 
and a particular interest in narratives as tools to accessing the ways in which actors make 
sense of, and coherence out of, complex policy agendas (Yanow, 2000; Yanow, 2007). The 
remainder of this chapter will describe in more detail how this IPA strategy has 
underpinned the research design and approach.  
 
 
 4.2 Research Design  
 
This section of the methodology explains the research design. Given that the research 
interest is the meanings vested in policy by key strategy actors, I start by explaining how I 
mapped the relevant actors. Determining the actor groups and reflecting on issues that 
were raised in relation to determine strategic and elite actor representatives. I also offer 
an account of my approach to both documents and interviews as data, based on my IPA-
informed research perspective.  
 
4.2.1 Mapping the Strategic and Elite Actors 
 
Given the research question for this study, and the methodological approach adopted by 
which to address it, the unit of analysis for my research was the voice of key strategic 
actor groups.  Intuitively the key strategic actor groups involved in the governance of skills 
policy under New Labour were categorised as policy-makers (politicians with a portfolio 
responsibility for skills policy and senior civil servants within key government 
departments); strategic representatives of employers (businesses); strategic 
representatives of employees (worker-citizens/learners); and strategic representatives of 
skills delivery. Figure 4.1 below shows, in broad terms, the mapping of the strategic actor 
groups and the lines of relationship between them.  
 
However, whilst in the context of my research question and research approach broadly 
categorising the key strategic actor groups involved in the governance of skills policy in 
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EMPLOYER 
(BUSINESS) 
REPRESENTATIVES 
 
 
EMPLOYEE 
(WORKER-CITIZEN) 
REPRESENTATIVES 
 
 
SKILLS DELIVERY 
REPRESENTATIVES 
 
 
POLICY-MAKERS 
England under New Labour appeared, in the first instance, as a straight-forward exercise, 
two issues faced during this phase of the research design process warrant attention and 
further explanation here.  
 
Figure 4.1: Mapping the Actor Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Defining strategic and elite actors 
 
Firstly, these broad categorisations, whilst intuitively arrived at, tell very little about the 
actual population of these groups or, more importantly, what is meant here by ‘strategic’ 
actors.  
 
Further to identifying the distinct skills actor group I conducted a detailed mapping 
exercise to identify the specific and relevant organisations within these populations and 
the key personnel I wished to contact within these organisations (details of how  selecting 
and accessing the research participants was done is discussed further in section 4.4). In 
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mapping both I was guided by the interplay between my definition of, and requirement to 
access, organisations that were ‘strategic’ and interview participants considered ‘elite’ 
actors.  
 
In recent years contributions to the body of methodological literature on ‘interviewing-up’ 
has expanded, in a valiant attempt to fill the knowledge void left behind by a wealth of 
sociological guidance overwhelmingly concerned with the best way to gaze down (Neal & 
McLaughlin, 2009; Smith, 2006; Welch et al, 2002). Two of the main contributions of this 
body of literature are firstly, to present perspectives on what is meant by an ‘elite’ actor – 
how are they distinguished and defined as such? There is some lack of agreement on this 
subject. Secondly, what is the nature – power dynamic - of the researcher/researched 
relationship? If the sociologist is looking up, are they then by default being looked down 
on? Again, there is some considerable disagreement on this point. Although it is not the 
aim to explicitly contribute to either debate here, I drew on this work to determine the 
definition of ‘elite’ actor I used to mean ‘strategic’ and ‘expert’ actor, and which I 
employed to broadly determine how I understood the participants of this research, and 
their status in the project. Furthermore, I reflect throughout this chapter (as relevant) on 
my experience of the research dynamic when interviewing-up. I broadly align with those 
that problematise the straightforward notion that power flows top down, as I 
encountered several instances of elite actor vulnerability (Smith, 2006) 
 
For the purposes of my research I sought to identify key personnel within relevant 
organisations that I defined as offering an ‘elite’ voice on skills policy as a consequence of 
having some ‘strategic’ and ‘authorative’ power to speak and act in relation to policy-
making. In other words, I defined elite actors as those operating in close proximity to 
policymaking, and who could be perceived as offering a critical and expert testimony28 
(Desmond, 2004; Lilleker, 2003; Leech, 2002). Furthermore I defined the actors (other 
                                                  
28 It is noted that the term elite applied to the practice of qualitative interviewing also refers to the status 
afforded to the interviewee by the interviewer (Leech, 2002b). In the sense that during the interview 
process (including pre-interview communications) I afforded the interviewee the position of expert within 
the policy field. I also apply this definition, however I use the term ‘elite’ to denote not just my perception of 
the interviewee, but the position they hold within the New Labour Skills Strategy 
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than policy-makers) I sought as ‘strategic’ and therefore ‘elite’ as a consequence of their 
ascribed role in the skills policy to represent a wider actor group in promotion or defence 
of the interests of that group (Flick, 2000).   
 
Acknowledging issues with the implied homogeneity of actor populations 
 
The second issue faced in the actor group mapping phase of the research design, was that 
the ‘clean’ borders suggested between strategic actor groups were found to be somewhat 
less robust than expected; as was the relative homogeneity of the populations they 
enclosed. Border fluidity and population diversity was found to be most acute within the 
grouping of skills delivery actors (shown by dotted line around this group in Figure 4.1 
above). ‘Skills delivery’ is a diverse field, and the strategic organisations that represent the 
sector have many and varied remits:  
o As strategic bodies, to advise on skills issues  
o To manage or represent other parts of the skills delivery infrastructure 
o To deliver (albeit it in a strategic capacity) parts of the system  
 
However, it was not only the assumption of homogeneity within the population of 
strategic skills delivery actors that needed to be treated with caution, even within the 
more clearly defined ‘interest’ groupings of employer and employee representatives there 
was a great deal of organisational distinctness (in terms of membership composition, and 
remit and strategic focus in relation to the skills agenda during the New Labour 
administrations). Recognising, and avoiding any tendency to obscure, the complexities 
involved in broadly distinguishing the strategic actor groups was critical to all stages in the 
research process. However, in two important and related respects the complexities of 
strategic actor group diversity were mitigated in this research design. Firstly, given the 
broad focus of the research question the intricacies of intergroup variation were less 
critical to the aims of the study. Secondly and again given the broad focus of the research 
question, despite the diversity of their roles and some variations between them, my 
analysis (faithful, data-led and reflective) of their accounts with regard to the research 
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question(s) of this thesis has found within group variation to be less than between group 
variation 29. 
 
4.2.2 Research Methodology: Documents and Interviews as Sources of Data 
 
Having identified the key strategic actors involved in the governance of skill, I decided to 
use a combination of two qualitative methods - documentary analysis and semi-structured 
interviews - to identify and capture the meanings, and more precisely the relationships 
between meanings, practices and processes for ‘doing skills’ that these key strategic 
actors attributed to the New Labour Skills Strategy for England. In other words, combining 
these methods enabled a detailed investigation and examination of the ways in which 
actors constructed the logic for skills (the ‘formal’ dimension of policy that determines 
what is to be governed in terms of principles, priorities, purposes and intended outcomes), 
and the operational dimension or ‘mode’ (practices and processes) of doing policy. Before 
detailing how the research was carried out, this section will outline the approach taken to 
documentary analysis and semi-structured interviews, therefore providing the 
methodological justification for these approaches to data generation within a 
commitment to interpretive epistemology and analysis.  
 
Documentary analysis was used to establish the normatively inflected perspectives and 
meanings of key strategic actors involved in the governance of skills in England (under 
New Labour), and in relation to the high(er) skills project at the time, as they were 
formally reported and openly published in text. In addition documentary analysis was 
used to help identify themes for further exploration in interview (this is discussed in more 
detail in section 4.4). Semi-structured interviews were used to probe beyond openly 
reported perspectives and meanings, to explore a deeper level of meaning-making and 
meaning attribution, particularly focusing on tensions and contradictions regarding 
                                                  
29 I borrow this turn of phrase from Korpi (2006), whose ‘interest-based’ analysis (in his case of class 
grouping perspectives of welfare enhancing services) is also broadly focused enough to consider intergroup 
variation to be less than between group variation.  
94 
 
project and policy meanings, and the meaning, practice/process relationship in how skills 
governance was narrated in documents.  
 
Approaching Documents as Data  
 
Documents, for the purpose of this research, are defined as purposive containers of text 
such that they become the physical embodiment of text (Scott, 1990). There are many 
types of documents. However, utilising Scott’s (1990) categorisation of document types, 
the most relevant for this research were publicly accessible ‘open-published’ documents 
(Scott, 1990). As a source of data such documents are often particularly credited for being 
easy to access. Although certainly true (the vast majority of the documents I used for the 
purposes of this research were readily available on the internet) their high degree of 
accessibility is important and relevant to research for other more substantive and 
qualitative reasons.  
 
Paying attention to how accessible a document is draws attention to the conditions under 
which such documents are produced, and therefore to the purposes of the documents in 
terms of both the intended communication and the assumed or anticipated audience 
(Bryman, 2008). For this study, the particular relevance of publically accessible open-
published documents rests explicitly with how and why they are created.  
 
Whilst a positivist-informed searches for the objectivity of ‘truth’ warn of the problems 
with reading and treating documents of this kind as ‘neutral artefacts’; a ‘true’ account of 
the social world. A point which particularly troubles some political scientist concerned 
with elite actors abilities to distort, or conceal ‘truths’ (Dorussen et al, 2005; Berry, 2002; 
Goldstein, 2002; Richards & Smith, 2002). Given the ontological commitment of this thesis 
to the ways in which meaning are produced and remade (chapter 3), I approach 
documents as part of the meaning-making and communicating work of strategic actors 
engaged in producing the normative underpinning of the governance of skill. I treat 
documents as representing some account or reflection of a constructed reality as it is 
perceived, and as it is intended to be communicated, by the actor groups as authors (May, 
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2001; Bryman, 2008), inseparable from the social context in which they are produced, and 
the assumed/intended relationships between author and reader.  
 
Indeed, this thesis treats documents as a significant and valued source of data precisely 
because of what they intend to accomplish: the perspectives they seek to crystallise; the 
persuadable audience for whom they are written; the communication of an impression 
held by the author, and the reinforcement of the semiotically construed and constructed 
nature of reality, in part via the alternatives which are omitted and rendered closed 
(Hodder, 2000; May, 2001; Atkinson & Coffey, 2004; Bryman, 2008). As such what 
becomes important is the way in which documents attempt to ‘make’ a normative sense 
out of some subjective and constructed interpretation of ‘reality’ (Watson, 1997).  
 
Considered in this way documents are important in terms of their role in supporting the 
exercise of power over the political ordering of social relations (May, 2001). As Hodder 
(2000) observes, words do something beyond the saying of them. The written word 
enables the concretisation and control of language and meaning. Text becomes an 
expression of authority over the context; an attempt to produce and justify a truth, which 
in turn provides the legitimacy to act in certain ways, and to the exclusion of others (May, 
2001). Taking this point further, Young (1990) observes the production of documents by 
specific groups of actors as seeking to “…continually foster the desire for consensual world 
views…and the obscuring of differences” (Young, 1990:164-165) 
 
As instruments by which to attempt to wield power and control over a social reality 
documents offer a rich source of insight into the perspectives of actors. However in the 
interpretative analysis of documents an important and defining feature of such forms of 
meaningful communication needs to be borne in mind.  Documents, and the text they 
contain, are in essence preserved and enduring. Therefore, to some extent it can be 
assumed that in the writing the authors gave particular concern to the degree of scrutiny 
to which they may be subjected, and thus may seek to obscure or down play tensions and 
contradictions (Bryman, 2008). This is of paramount importance when considering the 
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intention of actors as authors in promoting the reader towards certain interpretations, 
whilst curtailing the potential emergence of contrary perspectives. A point which gives 
enhanced significance to the complementing of document analysis with semi-structured 
interviews. 
   
Approaching Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
If documents allow an interpretation of actors reality as they perceive it and as they seek 
to influence others, then interviews provide an opportunity to generate conversation 
about how actors construct their realities. These conversations provide a depth that 
cannot be so readily extracted from the written word, and to a greater extent enable 
actors to give answer on their own terms, and include issues of complex disagreement, 
tension or contradiction (May, 2001). Indeed interviews offer a complement to the 
analysis of ‘open-published’ documents because they provide access to those perspectives 
which are in comparison closed, or at least not publicly known (Lilleker, 2003:208). 
 
The approach I adopted to interviewing actors can broadly be classified as semi-structured 
in the sense that whilst I devised a thematic guide (appendix 1) to direct the conversation 
to cover a range of topics of interest to my research and to enable me to answer my 
research questions, I also wanted to engage in dialogue with those to whom I was 
speaking, and probe beneath their answers (May 2001). Interviews were conducted in 
order to glean greater depth of insight and understanding regarding the meanings 
strategic actors brought to the high(er) skills project, and vested in skills governance 
practices and processes.  Importantly a semi-structured approach, as opposed to an 
unstructured approach, enabled, within its flexibility, the possibility to analyse broad 
comparability between interviews and actor groups (Arthur & Nazroo, 2003).  
 
However, some of the questions asked (typically at the beginning of the interview process) 
were more of an unstructured nature, particularly where I was keen to glean from the 
actors’ the frame of reference they applied to the meaning of the New Labour Skills 
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Strategy without inference drawn from the phrasing of an explicit question. To achieve 
this I asked “grand tour questions” (Spradley, 1979) such as ‘can you describe your role 
within the Skills Strategy?’, or ‘what is the activity of your organisation with regard to the 
Skills Strategy?’ Given the brevity of the interviews, questions of this nature were useful in 
attempting to overcome interviewee apprehension about any preconceived notions I may 
carry, as they signalled the primacy I afforded to the interviewee’s point of view and 
perspective. Overcoming interviewee apprehension was critical to building rapport and 
trust with those I spoke to (May, 2001; Leech, 2002a; Fontana & Fry, 2003). Since my 
research drew on the perspectives of strategic ‘elites’, as actors within the governance of 
skills, rapport and trust were essential in creating an interview relationship that 
subsequently enabled me to get beyond what can be considered ‘official’ responses, (or 
the painting of an idealised world which offers the interviewee a politically safe option), to 
a representation of social reality as it was perceived by them.  
 
4.3 The Research Process 
 
4.3.1 Selecting and Accessing the Research Samples   
 
Selecting the Documentary Sample 
 
As stated above this thesis took an interpretive approach to exploring the governance of 
skills policy in England under New Labour, which took as its unit of analysis the voice of 
the key strategic actor groups involved. These key strategic actor groups included policy-
makers; representatives of employers; representatives of employees; and representatives 
of skills delivery. I therefore sought documents authored by these actors (in particular 
policy-makers, employer and employee representatives) regarding their perspectives of 
the New Labour Skills Strategy for England.  
 
Scott (1990) highlights the importance of considering documentary authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness and meaning. I used contemporary documents published 
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by the actors, understood to be authentic in the sense that they were genuine and the 
origin was known, and credible at least in the sense they had not be distorted since 
original publication (either by translation or secondary interpretation). In addition, they 
were representative in the sense that they were typical types of documents (for example, 
government white paper, commissioned reports and consultation documents, and the 
responses to these by employer and employee representatives). This attention to 
authenticity, credibility, and representativeness does not negate the contention that such 
documents are implicitly biased. However, as has already been discussed, the interest in 
these documents for my research was the very biased nature of them; the biases that they 
reveal, and what this informs about the meaning ascribed to the governance of skills in 
England under New Labour.  
 
In selecting the documents of relevance and interest to my research I began by compiling 
an “index” (Scott, 1990:27) of key government publications. The government’s ‘official’ 
agenda for skills in England was contained with a flexible, and to an extent virtual, 
construct known as the ‘Skills Strategy’, and defined by government as encompassing their 
reform in this policy area since the launch of the 2003 White Paper: 21st Century Skills. 
However, the suite of documents that comprised policy-makers’ written communication 
regarding the meanings, practices and process of governing skills in England during the 
New Labour period of government (and up until completion of fieldwork in 2009) was 
more extensive. In particular including some important agenda setting reports published 
before 2003 and that informed the Skills Strategy White Paper. The documents identified 
as relevant for analysis in this research, as an outcome of the indexing exercise, are 
outlined in Table 4.1 below. Other relevant documentary sources used included various 
Ministerial speeches; press releases from relevant government departments; and strategic 
analysis produced by strategic representatives of skills delivery, including the UK 
Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES), and the Learning and Skills Council (LSC). 
 
Having identified as rigorously as possible the relevant corpus of government publications, 
I proceeded to identify, and “index”, the documents regarding the governance of skills in  
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Table 4.1: Index of core documents: the New Labour ‘Skills Strategy’ (for England) 
 
Title of Document Author Type of Document Date 
In Demand: Adult Skills in the 21st Century PIU Report 2001 
In Demand: Adult Skills in the 21st Century – part 2 Strategy Unit Report 2002 
Developing Workforce Skills: Piloting a new approach HM Treasury Report 2002 
21st Century Skills: Realising Our Potential – Individuals, Employers, Nation DfES White Paper 2003 
Getting on in business, getting on in work – part 1 DfES White Paper 2005 
Getting on in business, getting on in work – part 2 DfES White Paper 2005 
Getting on in business, getting on in work – part 3 DfES White Paper 2005 
Further Education: Raising Skills, Improving Life Chances DfES White Paper 2006 
Leitch Review of Skills - Skills in the UK: The long term challenge Leitch  
(HM Treasury) 
Commissioned Report: 
Interim Report 
2005 
Leitch Review of Skills - Prosperity for all in the global economy: world class skills Leitch  
(HM Treasury) 
Commissioned Report: 
Final Report 
2006 
World Class Skills: Implementing the Leitch Review of Skills in England DIUS White Paper 2007 
Time to Train: Consulting on a new right to request time to train for employees 
in England 
DIUS Consultation 
Document 
2008 
Shaping the future: a new adult advancement and careers service for England DIUS Prospectus 2008 
Raising Expectations: Enabling the system to deliver DCSF & DIUS Consultation 
Document 
2008 
Train to Gain: A plan for growth – November 2007-July 2011 LSC Report 2007 
Empowering Employers: Building Employer Influence - Relicensing Sector Skills 
Councils 
UKCES Guidance Document 2008 
Empowering SSCs: Employer driven skills reform across the UK - A Relicensing 
Framework for Sector Skills Councils 
UKCES Guidance Document 2008 
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England associated with other strategic skills actors groups (particularly strategic 
representatives of employers and employees). This was to an extent a rather more 
sporadic exercise. I started by reference back to government policy documents to identify 
the strategic representatives of skills actor groups, constituted in policy as able to speak 
and act in relation to strategy as a result of an ascribed status as ‘partners’ in the high(er) 
skills project.  
 
As a result I began the compilation of non-state strategic skills actor documents with those 
produced by the Confederation of British Industries (CBI) and Trade Union Congress (TUC); 
accessing these documents by consulting their websites and press offices to identify those 
most relevant for this study. From this I widened my search by reference to the strategic 
organisations I identified as making up the broad populations of strategic actor groups, 
and by snowballing from documentary references (and interviews) to other organisations; 
again consulting websites and press offices to identify relevant documents.  
 
Aware that such a search may turn up an exorbitant and unmanageable quantity of data I 
initially sought specific responses to government consultations or direct replies to ‘Skills 
Strategy’ documents. From the initial result I widened my search to included 
supplementary publications which specifically addressed the issues of relevance to the  
research questions; particularly actors’ perspectives of skills, their interest in skills, and 
the role they consider themselves to play in directing and delivering the high(er) skills 
agenda. The final identified suite of relevant strategic non-state actor documents for 
analysis in this research are outlined in Table 4.2 (employer representatives) and Table 4.3 
(employee representatives) below.  
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Table 4.2: Index of core documents: Employer Representatives  
 
 
 
 
Title of Document Author Type of Document Date 
Shaping up for the future: the business vision for education and skills CBI Report 2007 
CBI response to Education & Skills Select Committee call for evidence: post 16 – skills 
training 
CBI Policy Response 2007 
News Release: government must recognise the training and investment by firms in their 
staff  
CBI Press Release 2007 
FSB Research into Sector Skills Councils FSB Report 2009 
FSB Research into Train to Gain FSB Report 2009 
Putting the economy back on track: Skills and Training FSB Report 2008 
Response from the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) to the consultation by the 
Department for Education and Skills (DfES) on the Further Education White Paper 
FSB Policy Response 2006 
Learning to Change: why the UK skills system must do better EEF Report 2006 
Skills for Productivity: Can the UK deliver? EEF Report 2006 
Vocational qualifications: current issues, Government responsibilities and employer 
opportunities’ 
IoD Report 2006 
Consultation response - Further Education: Raising Skills, Improving Life Chances IoD Policy Response 2006 
Consultation response - Investing in Skills: Taking forward the Skills Strategy IoD Policy Response 2004 
UK Skills: Making the Grade BCC Report 2007 
Building a Skilled Nation: The business perspective on education and skills BCC Report 2006 
Parliamentary Briefing: World Class Skills for 2020 LCC Briefing Document 2007 
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Table 4.3: Index of core documents: Employee Representatives 
 
Title of Document Author Type of Document Date 
Counting the Cost: The NIACE Survey on Adult Participation in Learning 2008 NIACE Report 2008 
How adults like to learn: A NIACE briefing on learning and skills development outside of the 
workplace 
NIACE Report 2008 
Unions and Partnerships: Union Learning Representatives and the Government’s Skills 
Strategy 
TUC  Report 2009 
Briefing Document: National Employers Skills Survey 2007 TUC Briefing Document 2008 
Briefing Document: Skills – Government Funding Plans TUC Briefing Document 2007 
Skills Pledge: a TUC briefing TUC Briefing Document 2007 
TUC response to Delivering World Class Skills in a Demand Led System TUC Policy Response 2007 
Time to tackle the training divide TUC Report 2007 
Further Education White Paper: TUC response to Further Education White Paper – Further 
Education: Raising Skills, Improving Life Chances 
TUC Policy Response 2007 
Skills White Paper: TUC response to Skills White Paper – Skills: Getting on in Business; Getting 
on at Work 
TUC Policy Response 2005 
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Selecting the Interview Sample 
 
Again, since I adopt an interpretive approach to analysis of the governance of skills under 
New Labour interested in the meanings of the high(er) skills project vested in actor 
accounts of skill policy, and the relationship between meanings, practices and processes 
of governing, I sought interviews with representatives of the key strategic actor groups 
involved in skill policy in England at that time. Determining the representatives of the 
strategic actor groups was carried out through a population mapping exercise (see section 
4.3.1) which was to some extent intuitive but also informed by the definition of ‘strategic’ 
actors as operating close to policymaking and as representative of the wider actor group 
interests. I was also careful not to obscure the distinctions between organisations within 
the populations and the distinctiveness of intergroup variations. 
 
Again, starting from the identification of the key government departments with 
responsibility for skill policy - initially the Department for Innovation, Universities and 
Skills (DIUS) and later the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) – and by 
consulting the key publications of these departments, I determined the ‘official’ (ascribed 
in policy) partnership.  From this point I built up a map of involved actors demarcated 
within the broad populations, by employing a range of techniques. These techniques 
included references made to additional organisations in the documents I had collated (this 
was to some extent an iterative process as documents led me to actors and actors led me 
to documents); references made to additional organisations in previous academic 
research in the field of skills policy in the UK/England; and references made to additional 
organisations during interviews with other actors. This is a method of sampling known as 
‘snowballing’ (my use of snowballing will be dealt with in terms of approach and 
limitations below). Although I didn’t seek, nor would claim, a definitively complete 
inclusion of all potential actors (such an exhaustive mapping and coverage of the policy 
field in terms of included actors was not the aim or requirement of this research), it was 
important to ensure that I achieved a high calibre and robust representation of the most 
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relevant strategic actors. As a result the process of constructing the actor map continued 
throughout, and was informed by the data gathering phase of this research study.  
 
The method that I adopted in determining my interview schedule can therefore be 
defined as a combination of purposive and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling is a “fit 
for purpose” (May, 2001) strategy employed where the interviewer has specific 
requirements from their sample, such that they demonstrate the required “features or 
characteristics” (Ritchie et al, 2003:78) that enable the exploration of the research 
question. For my study I sought research participants with a particular strategic/elite role 
in representing a set of perspectives about the governance of skills in England. More 
specifically then my approach can be seen as employing “critical cases sampling” (Patton, 
2002, cited in Ritchie et al, 2003:80) in the sense that the participants case can been seen 
as having a pivotal relevance, which is critical to understanding the research subject.  
 
At the beginning of the data collection phase of the research study I put together an 
aspirational interview schedule, or “sampling frame” (Bryman, 2008; Goldstein, 2002), 
which represented the critical cases I wished to include in generating an understanding of 
the governance of skills in England. This list included more cases than I knew I would be 
able to feasibly include within the time and resource parameters of my study, however I 
anticipated difficulties in being able to gain access to all cases and it was important at that 
initial stage to assess the plausibility of the study in light of a reasonable non-response 
rate. In addition I decided to supplement my purposive sampling approach with some 
snowball sampling.  
 
Snowballing (also referred to as ‘chain sampling’) is a method of generating a data sample 
by asking one interview participant to identify potential additional interview participants, 
that they know of, and who meet the requirements for the study (exhibit the same 
relevant “features or characteristics”). The use of snowball sampling within my research 
design offered many advantages but also presented potential concerns of which I was 
mindful. One crucial advantage was the ability to learn about, and include, relevant actors 
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about whom I had no previous knowledge, but who offered a critical testimony. A second 
advantage was in avoiding the potentially destabilising effect of a high non-response rate. 
Indeed in one case, where following my initial ‘cold’ enquiries a crucial actor had 
responded as unable to participate due to the prioritisation of work commitments, I 
subsequently managed to secure the interview via another contact I had made. As this 
example indicates I experienced that in certain circumstances the actors I succeeded in 
gaining access to acted as ‘gatekeepers’ for others. This was particularly the case where I 
had interviewed, and snowballed from, senior and strategic policy makers. I found that 
this phenomenon was indicative, to some degree, of the power relationship between the 
actors involved in the governance of this policy field30. I also found that some actor groups 
became less apprehensive of me, and my research intentions, in knowing that I had 
already met with an ally; or more determined to meet with me in knowing that I had 
already met with an adversary.  
 
However, whilst I found snowball sampling to be an effective strategy for gaining access to 
valued cases, I was aware of, and sought to limit, the weaknesses of this approach. 
Particularly the degree to which an over reliance on snowballing one interview from 
another may limit necessary diversity (Ritchie et al, 2003). When discussing the 
application of snowballing strategies Goldstein (2002:671) warns “Researchers need to be 
careful about straying from their target sample or using connections to get only one set of 
interviews.” 
 
As a result I employed snowball sampling in complement to purposive sampling, and 
continually referred to my initial sampling frame when making decisions about pursuing 
interview leads. It is however worth noting here that in a number of circumstances I found 
that interview participants, without prompt from me, offered suggestions of individuals 
and organisations for me to contact with which they had articulated explicitly divergent 
interests and opinions. Often they would say things like “I suppose I shouldn’t suggest this 
but you should contact [name] if you want to hear the other side” (PM4), or: “Of course 
                                                  
30 I deal with some concerns I have about the negative implications of this phenomenon in the section 
regarding research ethics below.  
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[name] disagrees with this entirely. You should contact them actually I am sure it would be 
useful to get a different opinion.”(EER3).  
 
Experiences of this kind have been documented by other researchers undertaking ‘elite’ 
interviewing. In one example Berry (2002) outlines circumstances in which he 
encountered interviewees speaking at length about the weaknesses of their case, whilst 
highlighting the virtues of alternative perspectives. My encounters deviated from his in 
the sense that whilst I encountered respondents acknowledging differences of opinion, on 
occasions I perceived that some sought to apologise for, or contextualise, the subjectivity 
of their opinions and arguments. I noted that in particular actors representing 
employee/learners, and actors representing VET providers, were more apt to apologise for 
subjectivity; saying “But then I would say that wouldn’t I” (SD5), or “Of course I see things 
differently” (EER1). On the other hand senior strategic policy makers, (perhaps given their 
extensive political experience), were more likely to openly acknowledge (but ring fence) 
divergent opinion.  
 
4.3.2 Accessing the Interview Sample 
 
Having constructed my sampling frame I next considered the appropriate strategy for 
gaining access to the cases I had selected. Since my research study required me to gain 
the perspectives of incumbent actors in the policy field for the most part accessing contact 
details was a matter of consulting published lists of organisations, and narrowing down to 
the relevant individual by reference to organisational charts. In addition, and as I have 
already noted, I sought to overcome the limitations of this method via the complementary 
use of snowball sampling.  
 
In order to make initial contact I devised a template letter of introduction (appendix 2). 
Much of the existing literature regarding interviewing ‘elites’ suggests that a written 
request for participation in the research study is the best technique for establishing initial 
contact (Lilleker, 2003; Aberbach & Rockman, 2002; Goldstein, 2002). In the sense that 
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this letter of introduction served to negotiate access, and gain the informed consent of 
the participants, I considered that it needed to explicitly include succinct information 
about the objectives of my study; an explanation of their importance to the research; an 
accurate assessment of what I required from them (including a specified time 
commitment, and my intention to travel to a location convenient to them); the topics that 
I proposed to cover; clarity regarding how I intent to use and disseminate findings; what I 
hope to be able to reciprocally offer them (in terms of a research summary, research 
reports, and key findings); and finally my willingness to accommodate flexibility within my 
proposed data gathering method (Lewis, 2003; Lilleker, 2002). I also explained my desire 
to record the interview in order to facilitate a conversational style, and to minimise 
inaccuracy or loss of data (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). However, I equally offered them 
the option to decline to be recorded.  
 
In terms of drafting the letter of introduction, I decided against a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approach, and instead tailored critical aspects of my letter to their organisation; 
particularly why I sought their involvement and my use of language. Whilst being 
committed to ethical openness (Woliver, 2002), and accepting the credibility that 
potential participants attach to an academically sound project undertaken in a 
professional manner (Lilleker, 2003), I needed to ensure that I couched my study in terms 
that would resonate with those I contacted. I therefore researched my potential 
participants, and their organisations (partially as an exercise in selecting and analysing 
documentary evidence), and sought to employ as appropriate the language they use both 
in my written communications and during the interview (Lewis, 2003)31.  
 
                                                  
31 As an example I felt that my use of the term ‘actors’ would be misconstrued and create confusion. I 
therefore substituted the term ‘actors’, (which I use to denote those granted some ability to express a 
perspective on, and influence, skills governance), with ‘stakeholders’. A term common in the contemporary 
political lexicon, but which I distinguish from ‘actors’ as including all those with an interest, or degree of risk, 
associated with the policy area, but not necessarily an ability to act in defence of that interest or risk. To 
make this point more explicitly an individual employee/learner or an individual employer would be 
considered a ‘stakeholder’ in VET, but they are not usually, on their own, able to act within the policy 
environment. This distinction is however not implied in the popular use of the term ’stakeholder’ I therefore 
felt able to use ‘stakeholder’ during my fieldwork, substituting for ‘actor’ in my analysis and writing.  
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This initial written approach had some considerable success, however, as I indicated 
above, on occasion I received no response, or the contact declined to be interviewed. In 
these circumstances I supplemented my initial approach with a range of follow-up 
strategies as appropriate. These strategies included further written communications 
addressing (to the best of my ability) the barriers to participation they had elucidated, or, 
where I had received no response, a telephone conversation. Indeed, I often found I had 
more success where I was able to speak directly to my intended interview participant to 
explain and arrange our meeting.  In addition to persistence, I also successfully employed 
the strategy of patience. In some circumstances I chose to temporarily postpone further 
communications with the intention of seeking an alternative access route, such as 
personal contact via another interview participant, or if snowballing was unsuccessful I 
sought out public/professional conferences at which my contact, or another member of 
their organisation, would be attending. Networking at conferences proved a particularly 
successful strategy in gaining access to senior strategic policy-makers, to whom access via 
more conventional routes is often barred by first-point-of-contact ‘gatekeepers’.  
 
The final schedule of elite interviews undertaken is shown below in Table 4.4, and relates 
to the mapping of strategic actor groups involved in the governance of skill in England 
under New Labour as shown in Figure 4.2.  
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Table 4.4: Elite Interview Schedule 
 
Policy-Makers Employer Reps Employee Reps Skills Delivery 
Member of House of 
Commons (MP) 
Confederation of 
British Industries 
(CBI) 
Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) 
Association of 
Colleges (AoC) 
Member of House of 
Lords 
Employer 
Representative 
(Board Member) on 
Regional LSC 
Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) 
UK Commission for 
Employment & Skills 
(UKCES)/Skills for 
Business Network 
(SfB) 
Senior Civil Servant 
(DIUS) 
Institute of Directors 
(IoD) 
Unionlearn UK Commission for 
Employment & Skills 
(UKCES) 
Senior Civil Servant 
(BIS) 
Federation of Small 
Businesses (FSB) 
National Institute of 
Adult and Continuing 
Education (NIACE) 
Alliance of Sector 
Skills Councils (ASSC) 
 Engineering 
Employers 
Federation (EEF) 
National Institute of 
Adult and Continuing 
Education (NIACE) 
Lifelong Learning UK 
(Sector Skills Council 
for the Lifelong 
Learning Sector) 
 Chambers of 
Commerce 
 Council for 
Administration (CfA) 
   Learning and Skills 
Council (LSC) 
   Qualification and 
Curriculum Authority 
(QCA) 
   Qualification and 
Curriculum Authority 
(QCA) 
   City & Guilds  
   Sixth Form Colleges 
Forum (SFCF) 
110 
 
Figure 4.2 Final Mapping of Strategic Actor Groups  
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4.3.3 The Importance of Ethics in Elite Interviewing 
 
The ethical implications of this study were an important aspect of the research design, 
data gathering, data analysis, and reporting stages. Whilst there are ethical concerns 
associated with any qualitative inquiry (Lewis, 2003), there are a number of specific 
issues of particular relevance to ‘elite’ interviewing and the way in which data 
gathered is reported. I was particularly concerned with ensuring that I sought 
interviewees’ informed and voluntary consent on the grounds of incomplete 
anonymity and confidentiality.  
 
Informed consent relates to the ability of the research participant to ‘freely’ and 
‘voluntarily’ agree to take part in the research activity (Lewis, 2003; May, 2001; 
Silverman, 2001). As Lewis (2003) attests consent can only be given freely and 
voluntarily where the interviewee feels under no obligation to participate in the 
research, and is fully apprised of the purpose of the study; how the data will be used, 
and what degree of attribution will be applied to them, with reference to what they 
convey. This final point makes clear the link between informed consent and the issue 
of anonymity and confidentiality in qualitative research inquiries.  
 
Anonymity is concerned with ensuring that the identity of the research participant is 
not revealed to any third party outside of the research team 32  (Lewis, 2003). 
Confidentiality refers to avoiding the potential for reported data to be directly or 
indirectly attributed back to the individual participant without specific consent. In 
relation to my study there existed a number of difficulties regarding anonymity and 
confidentiality which resulted in me seeking consent under the conditions of 
incomplete anonymity and confidentiality. Firstly, where snowball sampling occurred, 
anonymity of participation was unavoidably compromised but in all cases contained 
within the three-link chain. Secondly, given the research objective to explore the role 
of actors in the governance of skills, I felt it necessary to be able to reveal the research 
sample (in terms of the organisations I included within each actor population), and 
                                               
32 In my research study I deemed the research team to include myself and my two supervisors. I 
therefore made clear to my research participants that I was working with the supervision of Mr Peter 
Cressey and Dr Theo Papadopoulos, who would also be privy to details regarding the research sample 
and the content of data gathered. 
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attribute the data collected to the broad actor groups as defined. In other words whilst 
I had no intention of using individual’s names or job titles, I wanted to be able to make 
reference to the organisation as being included in my sample, and I wished to attribute 
the data they gave me to the actor group they represented: either policy-makers (PM); 
employer representatives (ERR); employee representatives (EER); or representatives of 
skills delivery (SD).  
 
The requirement within my research design to identify the representation of my 
sample, and attribute data to an actor group, presented me with significant ethical 
concerns that made achieving informed consent of paramount importance. In order to 
establish that participants were fully informed I firstly ensured they received my letter 
of introduction regardless of how they were contacted. In all cases I re-sent a copy of 
the letter of introduction along with confirmation of our arranged meeting. I also 
repeated the information contained within the letter of introduction at the beginning 
of the interview, offered to provide further clarification about any points that were 
unclear or raised concern, and finally ascertained that they remained happy to 
proceed33.  
 
My pre-interview statement explicitly explained the importance I ascribed to being 
able to reference their organisation within my research sample, and to attribute their 
perspectives as representative of an actor group within my findings. However, I 
reassured them that I would not use their names or job titles at any point, and would 
omit organisational name and contextual details, which may indirectly identify them, 
from the way my findings are reported. The way I deal with contextual detail within 
the reporting of findings is of significant importance given that I have interviewed 
‘elites’ in the policy field, and ‘elites’ are, by definition, a relatively small and easily 
identifiable group. In addition some of the organisations I have included in my study 
are very small, and as such have only one or two individuals operating at a strategic 
level. I identified these participants as vulnerable elites in this research relationship 
(Smith, 2006). Again without careful consideration regarding the way data is reported 
                                               
33 All participants agreed to be recorded, and I ensured that the tape recorder was on to capture this 
important introduction to the interview, and their agreement to participate.  
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they become relatively easily identifiable; as one respondent put it “If you mention my 
organisation everyone will know it was me you spoke to. Who else would it be?”(SD34)  
 
In order to minimise the risk to participants associated with incomplete anonymity and 
confidentiality, I strictly applied the journalistic rules (familiar to my research 
participants) associated with the terms “off the record”, “on background” (or “not for 
attribution”) and “on the record” (see Lilleker, 2003; Goldstein, 2002:671). In addition I 
offered to send a full transcript of the interview in order to provide them with the 
opportunity to, on reflection, highlight any issues that should be treated sensitively, or 
sections of text that should not be directly quoted. I also offered to send them, for 
their comment, an advance report of my findings. I made these offers not simply to 
minimise their risk of participation, but also because I believe that it is ethically 
important to acknowledge the partnership between us, and the contribution of 
interviewee to the research exercise. Indeed, without the interviewee there would be 
no research (Woliver 2002). Finally, and perhaps most importantly I offered all 
participants the right to elect not to continue with the interview if they were in any 
way concerned about the degree of incomplete anonymity and confidentiality.  
 
It is worth noting here that none of the contacts or interviews pursued were 
compromised or lost as a result of incomplete anonymity and confidentiality. Indeed, 
was my experience that at the beginning of the interview process participants largely 
dismissed the need for rigorous concern regarding anonymity and confidentiality. 
However, in a number of cases the research participant took up the offer of a full 
transcript at the end of the interview. I interpreted this to reflect the fact that whilst 
the participants of my study were confident of their perspectives and their ability to 
justify them, the topics we discuss were contested, and sensitivities increasingly 
emerged during the course of the interview, as trust and rapport was established 
within our relationship. I observed that in some circumstances the sense that they had 
perhaps revealed too much created apprehension. Offering them a chance to review 
the transcript of the interview was one way to at least partially alleviate this 
apprehension, by enabling the interviewee to retain ownership and control over the 
                                               
34 Skills delivery representative number omitted here for obvious reasons 
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use of the data. It should be noted that whilst 40% of interview participants requested 
a copy of the transcript, none were changed or censored in any way. 
 
One final point to note regarding the particular ethical considerations of this study is 
the issue of ensuring voluntary participation when using snowball sampling. I was 
concerned about the degree to which some individuals felt obliged to consent as a 
result of being referred, or suggested, by a previous participant; particularly in cases 
where their organisation had a financial dependency on central government, and they 
had been referred to me by a senior strategic policy maker. I attempted to overcome 
this issue by breaking the three-link chain after initial contact had been made, and 
subsequently offering the referred party the unconditional opportunity to decline to 
participate.  
 
4.3.4 Data Analysis  
 
With this research being interested in accessing meanings vested in policy, documents 
and interviews with strategic actors described above have been scrutinised with a 
systematic interpretive approach. I draw on a specific branch of IPA which has been 
particularly concerned with exploring narratives underlying policies. According to 
Yanow (2000: 57f) narratives operate “as conveyors of meaning […] for the purposes of 
argument or claims-making” in the storytelling of policymakers and other actors 
involved in policymaking processes. I extracted narratives from my raw data through a 
process of coding and interpretive analytical steps.  
 
As I outlined in the introduction, this thesis began from an identification of a paradox 
at the heart of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England. This paradox was identified 
in the initial reading of documents (indexed above) related to the New Labour Skills 
Strategy for England. The first stage of coding therefore was to identify from within the 
documents instances of narrative associated with either demand-led or demand-
leading strategies. In a second step, I then identified the different roles and functions 
that were ascribed to both employers and employees in both cases of strategy. Moving 
on to a third step in which these roles and functions were further refined to identify 
where strategy afforded either rights or responsibilities to workplace actors. Finally, 
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the process of coding documents identified the differential claims made about the role 
of the state, and the state in relation to the skills providers and types of provision in 
each strategy.  
 
This nuanced mapping of the narratives and claims entailed in the policy documents 
was used to tease out the scaffold on which highly diverse meanings are built within 
policy, and lines of tension hence occur. This mapping informed the topic guide 
developed for interviews with elite actors (see appendix 1). For example, I built a 
section of the topic guide around the different rights and responsibilities of employers 
and employees in the strategy, which allowed interviewees to specify details and 
develop these themes of policy.   
 
Following the interviews, transcript coding then began again from the top level, 
categorising narratives by instances of demand-led or demand-leading strategy 
context. In a second step, analysis then looked for the common and divergent themes 
(initially within actor groups) that were used to substantiate the parameters of the 
strategies, and the way in which relations between actors were ordered. Again 
commonly occurring themes included rights and responsibilities; roles and functions 
(including those ascribed to other actors); and wider contextualising factors actors 
drew on as forming the logic for strategy. This analysis exposed the highly diverse ways 
in which employers, employees and skill providers responded to and used policy 
narratives coming from the state, thus informing the way in which the empirical 
chapters of this thesis are presented.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has outlined the methodological and analytical approach adopted in this 
thesis. The chapter began by outlining the ontological foundation and methodological 
commitment to interpretive policy analysis (IPA). It then detailed the research design, 
and research approach, starting with the mapping of the main actor groups for 
inclusion in the study, and then presented the approach taken in this study to 
documents and interviews as sources of data. The chapter then elaborated the 
research process, explaining the methods of sampling, data access, and data analysis 
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used in this study. Ethical issues and my role as a researcher were critically considered. 
The thesis now proceeds to present the findings and analysis of the research.  
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5. Constructing and Narrating the Logic for Skills: Progress in Partnership 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 
his thesis addresses the question how can the governance – ordering and 
organising – of skills policy under New Labour be explained and understood? To 
begin this task, the chapter that follows presents an in-depth interpretive analysis of 
the key policy documents (that formed the New Labour Skills Strategy for England – 
see Chapter 4, Table 4.1) and the interviews conducted with senior politicians and civil 
servants (see Chapter 4, Table 4.4), in order to detail how the narratives of policy-
makers’ - up until completion of fieldwork in 2009 - sought to establish the ‘logic’ for 
skills and give meaning to a high(er) skills project in England35 (SRQ1).  
 
Drawing on the conceptual approach to policy analysis outlined in Chapter 3 that 
informs my interpretative methodology (developed in Chapter 4), this chapter will 
show how policy-makers sought to build the case for the New Labour Skills Strategy, 
and in doing so meaningfully defined the parameters of the strategy. As such, the 
chapter is concerned with identifying and analysing what Carmel & Papadopoulos 
(2003:32) term the ‘formal’ dimension of skills policy; ‘what is to be governed’. 
Specifically it is concerned, with identifying and exposing the role of semiosis 
(intersubjective meaning-making) in the construal and construction (Jessop, 2009) of 
the principles, priorities, purposes, and intended outcomes - associated with a 
particularly imagined economic and social ‘reality’ - that oriented the Skills Strategy 
and gave symbolic and substantive expression to what policy-makers were selectively 
and discursively seeking to bind and fix as the normative object of governance.  
 
The chapter begins by detailing how policy-makers framed and narrated the ‘problem’ 
of complexity associated with a particular interpretation of dynamic production and 
employment uncertainty in a global post-Fordist knowledge-based economy - 
confirming the global ‘high skills’ rhetoric thesis discussed in Chapter 1 (Brown & 
                                               
35 As I stated in the Introduction skills policy is a devolved issue, therefore many of the policy documents 
I refer to, and the discussions I had with policy-makers in the interviews conducted, relate only to 
England. 
T 
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Lauder, 1996; Aston & Green, 1996; Brown, 1999; Brown & Lauder, 2001; Crouch et al, 
2004; Gleeson & Keep, 2004) - and framed and narrated the ‘solution’ as skills-led 
‘flexibility’ and ‘adaptability’ to perpetual change. This section concludes that high(er) 
skills were offered by policy-makers as a critical  means of unblocking and unlocking 
‘progress’ and betterment (see section 5.2).  
 
The chapter then goes on, (in section 5.3), to explore how policy-makers framed and 
narrated skills as mediating and reconciling the interests and agendas of multiple 
actors, specifically: businesses; worker-citizens; and the state. This section first 
describes how skills were positioned as cohering national state-led economic and 
social agendas; as vital to delivering the ambitions for ‘UK plc.’ and ‘UK social’. I argue 
that policy-makers constructed a fundamental interdependence between the 
economic and social gains from high(er) skills, associated primarily with the perceived 
relationship between ‘better’ more productive workers for business and ‘better’ more 
rewarding work for citizens, but also with a perceived synergy between ‘skills for 
employment’ and ‘skills for life’. The section secondly exposes the ways in which 
policy-makers presented high(er) skills as a matter of both public and private concern. I 
identify policy-makers as ‘speaking out’ and ‘speaking about’ shared and coherent 
benefits; equivalising the aspirations of the state in the interest of the collective nation 
and the aspirations of individual business and worker-citizen. Finally, the section 
demonstrates how policy-makers presented the pursuit of high(er) skills as an issue of 
strong workplace consensus; particularly between ‘enlightened’ employers and 
‘motivated’ worker-citizens. The section concludes by highlighting how coherence of 
multiple interests and agendas is used to justify a ‘skills partnership’ between 
government, representatives of business and representatives of worker-citizens.  
 
The chapter ends with a discussion of the findings and analysis presented.  In 
summary, the chapter argues that the logic for skills was based on mitigating 
complexity (associated with the uncertainties of the production and employment 
environment), and mediating coherence (between interests of multiple actors). This 
logic gave meaning to a skills project associated with ‘progress in partnership’. The 
ways in which policy then orders, organises and acts – the ‘operational dimension’ or 
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“mode of doing policy” (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003:32) - in relation to imagined 
progress and partnership will be discussed in the subsequent two chapters.  
 
5.2 Narrating the logic for high(er) skills: the powerful discourse of complexity 
 
Speaking at the Guardian Further Education and Skills Summit (20-21 June, 2007), Bill 
Rammell MP - then Minister of State for Lifelong Learning, Further and Higher 
Education – opened his address with the following saying, to express the experience of 
economic survival in the global economy  
 
“Every morning in Africa a gazelle wakes up. It knows it must run faster than the fastest 
lion or it will be killed. Every morning a lion wakes up. It knows it must outrun the 
slowest gazelle or it will starve to death. It doesn’t matter whether you are a lion or a 
gazelle. When the sun comes up you better start running.” (Anon)36 
 
This saying (and its apparent applicability in the setting in which it was delivered) 
succinctly captures what this section explains: the particular way in which policy-
makers interpreted and articulated economic dynamism in order to give meaning to 
and ‘fix’ the selectively imagined - structured and bounded - complex environment of 
businesses and worker-citizens. Critical to this image of complexity is the depiction of 
production and employment competitiveness as exclusively associated with the skills-
led ability to stay alive by running faster in the ‘knowledge-based’/knowledge-
weaponised economy and ‘post-welfare’ society.  
 
The narratives of policy-makers’ described the dynamic uncertainty experienced by 
businesses in both the domestic and global economy as associated with on-going 
technologically-driven innovations and advancements that continuously alter the basis 
of productivity, and therefore profitability. That uncertainty was framed in terms of 
‘out pacing’ the competition, and excelling at the ‘cutting edge’ of perpetually 
changing and changeable conditions for economic success (the ‘high skills rhetoric’ – 
                                               
36 Bill Rammell MP attributes his awareness of this saying to a Multinational Corporation (MNC) with a 
production facility in China, where, he claims, a copy of this saying is pinned up on the factory floor 
(Rammell, 2007). 
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see Chapter 1), created an imperative for businesses to pursue strategies reliant on 
more and better skills that enable greater ‘flexibility’ and ‘adaptability’ to progress.  
 
Equally, worker-citizens were described as experiencing an uncertain labour market; 
the dynamism of which could best be navigated by attention to the development of 
more and better skills. For worker-citizens high(er) skills were presented as supporting 
employability in two regards. Firstly, by enabling them to adapt and innovate at the 
workplace thus contributing to the basis of business productivity and prosperity - in 
line with a particular and flawed reading of human capital theory (Avis, 1998; Coffield, 
1999; Brown et al, 2001) the skills of worker-citizens were increasingly explained as 
driving the production and employment regime - and secondly by enabling them to 
adapt and align to alternative sources of employment should the business fail. In this 
way skills were seen to provide worker-citizens with employability security, which was 
deemed the most credible form of welfare. Again, the imperative was therefore to 
pursue more and better skills to enable greater ‘flexibility’ and ‘adaptability’ to 
progress. 
 
What is significant about this ‘flexibility and adaptability to progress’ line of policy 
narrative, applied to both businesses and worker-citizens, is that it is incongruent with 
the explanations and predictions of both VoC (as a functionalist theory) and PRA (as an 
example of a broader theoretical approach I have termed ‘the politics of skills’) for skill 
governance in the UK/England (see Chapter 2). Although the VoC approach would 
expect and predict flexibility and adaptability skills (at higher and lower levels) as an 
outcome of skill governance in LMEs, we here see these terms given as the object of 
governance and objective of policy, and applied to a state narrative seeking to shape 
the economy/society. Although the PRA would expect and predict state work to shape 
either the aspiration/behaviour of businesses or worker-citizens, we should expect 
both more decisive and more partisan (non)intervention/regulation. Given the 
limitations of existing theories of skill governance to account for New Labour’s high(er) 
skills project, this section will approach analysis from an alternative conceptual and 
methodological direction to explain policy logic as state work to produce 
intersubjective meanings.  
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5.2.1 Skills implications of a dynamic and complex business environment 
 
Selecting and framing the problem: narrating the uncertain business environment 
 
Policy discourse depicted the increasing relevance of higher levels of skills in relation 
to an economic imaginary framed by two putatively existing and mutually reinforcing 
phenomena. Firstly, policy-makers’ narratives sought to define and preference the 
(emerging) “post-industrial knowledge-based economy” (PM3), as requiring a 
production and employment regime distinct from ‘industrial Fordism’. This selective 
and biased account of economic ‘reality’ was presented as initiated and accelerated by 
on-going technological advancements - considered to have created possibilities for 
new consumer products, (specialised and bespoke goods and services) and new 
production processes - and was perceived as the critical source of enhanced business 
profitability and competitiveness. Secondly, and related to the advancement of new 
production technologies and techniques, the UK economy was imagined as challenged 
by the experience of globalisation and processes of increasing global competition. 
Globalisation was (and is) a privileged policy paradigm; proclaimed as both 
unavoidable, (Watson & Hay, 2003) and as offering UK businesses potential 
opportunities for growth in new markets. However, these are opportunities which 
must be realised in circumstances of intense rivalry and uncertainty (Leitch, 2006:3; 
DIUS, 2008b:4).  
 
Digitalisation, automation, outsourcing, and off-shoring, as well as falling transport 
costs, were presented as having disembedded business operations from geographic 
restrictions, and as extending the market for skills beyond national borders (PIU, 
2001:22). In this context the arrival of the newly industrialising countries (NICs) – 
described as “economic powerhouses” (PM4) - as increasingly important players in the 
global economy, was considered to have positioned the advanced industrial countries 
(AICs) at a significant dual disadvantage. Not only were NICs depicted as able to offer 
cheaper options for those businesses ‘regime shopping’ on the basis of lowest 
production cost – a situation which was presented as effectively barring countries like 
the UK, and the businesses located there, from competing on the basis of low-skills 
and low-wages (DfES, 2003:11) - but they were also reported as simultaneously 
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seeking to shift their economic activity towards higher skilled, higher value-added 
production.  
 
New Labour skills policy documents were littered with statistics highlighting the 
relationship between the economic productivity and skills performance of countries 
(see in particular HM Treasury, 2002; Leitch, 2005; Leitch, 2006): mostly presented in 
the form of league tables; talked about and operating as benchmarking devices; and 
further serving as forecasting models that contrasted the outcome of different future 
skills performance scenarios. Such as failure to plan ahead and win the next round or 
match in the skills game (PM4).  
 
“China will be the largest economy in the world by 2040; it will outstrip the United States 
in the size of its economy. Britain will slip back perhaps to 5th or 6th in the league table. 
[but] we’re not just simply going to be able to say well we will stand apart from the 
nations that produce widgets, we’re going to have to say those nations that produce 
widgets are going to create the wealth to develop their next stream of intellectual 
capital. Where do we fit in there; if we are struggling at one level, and we’ve given up 
the other?” (PM2) 
 
“Without [a more highly-skilled workforce] businesses will become increasingly 
vulnerable to global competition, finding it difficult to take advantage of new markets 
and increasingly difficult to retain their current markets.” (Leitch, 2006:61) 
 
The overwhelming conclusion for the UK/England that these statistics presented was 
that failing to at least “catch up” and “keep pace” (PM4) with comparative skills levels 
would risk loss of pole position, and deteriorating potential in the high skills reliant 
product market and production strategies; the only strategies that remain viable. The 
disastrous consequences of failure to improve skills was strenuously and repeatedly 
stated by policy-makers as a “clear and present danger”, framing the “here and now” 
(PM3) of the renewed focus on skills.  
 
“In our rapidly-changing world, having a highly skilled workforce isn’t an optional extra; 
it’s an economic necessity.” (DIUS, 2007a:4) 
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“Without increased skills, we would condemn ourselves to a lingering decline in 
competitiveness, diminishing economic growth and a bleaker future for all. The case for 
action is compelling and urgent.” (Leitch, 2006:1) 
 
In short, UK businesses were described as operating in an economic environment 
characterised by an increase in the number of games in play and an increasing number 
of players in the games. Where the chances to play an advantage had been critically 
reduced to strategies dependent on higher skills (Brown, 2007). Past failings to 
improve skills levels were lamented, and the implications of a comparatively low 
baseline position utilised by policy-makers to underline the urgency to act in 
accordance with a new skills mission (Leitch, 2005:4; Leitch, 2006:10). No alternative 
was offered; the consequence of inaction, and the subsequent failure to excel in the 
unceasing “skills race” (Brown, 2008), presented as devastating.  
 
Selecting and framing the solution: skills as flexibility and adaptability to progress 
 
In order to fully exploit the potential and avoid the threats inherent to the imagined 
highly competitive global knowledge-based economy, businesses were described as 
needing to seek product innovation and productivity gains realised through the 
application of high(er) skilled individuals to technologically-advanced enterprise (Leitch, 
2006:32). In particular, businesses were depicted as needing to develop and utilise 
higher skilled workers because they are better capable of not only implementing new 
processes and operating in a new production environment, but also have the 
‘flexibility’ necessary to initiate innovative product market and production strategies 
and continuously ‘adapt’ to new value-adding technologies and techniques as they 
inevitably emerge (PIU, 2001:22; HM Treasury, 2002:2; Leitch, 2006:33; DIUS, 2007a:6).  
 
“Economic and industrial change increasingly demands a workforce that is flexible and 
adaptable. For business, retraining and redeploying employees to support more efficient 
and effective operations, and integrating new technologies, will be crucial to remaining 
competitive.” (PIU, 2001:56) 
 
The importance of flexibility and adaptability to change, not as an outcome of skill 
governance (Estevez-Abe et al, 2001; Hall & Soskice, 2001) but as the object of skill 
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governance, was a recurring theme in the way policy-makers narrated the logic for 
higher skills. Considered particularly critical as the pace of change that businesses were 
experiencing was described as unavoidably rapid, relentless (Strategy Unit, 2002:2; 
Leitch, 2006:52), and replete with uncertainty such that: “no one can predict with any 
accuracy future occupational needs” (Leitch, 2006:13). Given that the emergent 
conditions of economic success were presented as unpredictable and indefinite, 
businesses were depicted as operating in an environment in which the only concrete 
functional prerequisite for survival and prosperity that could be known was the 
capacity, via the skill-led flexibility and adaptability of the workforce, to expediently, 
and continuously seek out developments and advancements.  
 
“We need to look at where there is a perceived [skills] need. Not for an individual 
technology or an individual piece of research, because we don’t know where that’s going 
to come from, but in terms of how you actually apply your resources, and how you 
develop a workforce which is coming through to deliver on […]the technologies which 
will sweep the world. We don’t know which ones will win. We don’t know which will be 
successful. (PM2) 
 
The implication was that in a context of uncertainty, businesses need for constant 
flexibility and adaptability could best be achieved with an approach to skills that was 
also constantly flexible and adaptable to the need to cope with perpetual change. By 
comparison, the alternative for businesses was again cast as beyond doubt. 
Attempting to continue with a low-skills operating base, and ignoring or undervaluing 
the need to utilise skills, was presented as exposing the business to certain stagnation 
and decay, and as the “route to inevitable failure” (PM3).  
 
5.2.2 Skills implications of a dynamic labour market 
 
Selecting and framing the problem: narrating labour market uncertainty 
 
The depiction of a fundamental business requirement for more and better skills was 
presented as having obvious correspondingly significant implications for worker-
citizens. Also, referencing putative changes and challenges in the imaginatively 
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narrated domestic and global economy, policy-makers interpreted and articulated 
labour market uncertainty in very particular ways. Ways which structured the nature 
and form of experienced complexity associated with securing employment and 
progressing in work.  
 
Firstly – and in direct challenge to both VoC and PRA explanations and predictions of 
skill governance in England - low skills levels were rendered highly problematic in the 
narratives of policy-makers. Policy documents presented data indicating growth in the 
numbers of managerial, professional, and associate professional occupations, and a 
relative decline in elementary or routine manual occupations, as evidence of the 
inexorable shift towards an increased share of higher skilled work in the economy 
(DIUS, 2007:24). Additionally, in direct contrast to evidence of overqualification in the 
UK labour market (for example, Fauth & Brinkley, 2006); the Leitch Review (2006:5) 
claimed significant increases in the level of skill required within employment even in 
lower skilled occupations. For example, by drawing on the argument that skills, such as 
being ‘computer literate’, which were previously considered ‘specialist’ or ‘technical’, 
were now considered necessary basic competencies.  
 
Given the way in which policy portrayed the trajectory of change to the basis of 
competitiveness in the domestic and global economy, the requirement for more and 
more intermediate and higher level skills was presented as likely to continue and 
intensify (PIU, 2001:22). The Leitch Review (2006:13) claimed that throughout the 
economy skill demand was increasing, and that evidence suggests more and more jobs 
were requiring intermediate and graduate level qualifications (Leitch, 2005:5). Such 
changes were analysed as further exacerbating the employment security difficulties 
faced by individuals with lower, increasingly redundant levels of skills (Leitch, 2006:61). 
Raising levels of skills attainment was offered as the only available way of protecting 
against the looming spectre of certain low-skills related unemployment, as successive 
policy statements continually battled to out-bid each other in warning of the ever 
growing magnitude of the problem.  
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“Leitch identified that currently we’ve got roughly five million people who are employed 
in basically un-skilled activities, and that by 2020 we might need half a million. I mean 
that was his comparison and indeed I suspect we might even need less than that.” (PM2)  
 
It was, however, not just the unskilled or very low-skilled for whom employment 
security and progression was presented as becoming more problematic. In general 
policy depicted the nature of the labour market within which individual worker-citizens 
must function as being in an almost permanent state of flux, with technological 
advancements likely to entirely erode certain occupations. Again, worker-citizens were 
presented as only able to mitigate the uncertainty and instability of this ‘reality’ 
through unwavering dedication to the on-going advancement of their skills (HM 
Treasury, 2002:21) in order to stay useful in a dynamic economy (Leitch, 2005:5). 
 
 
Selecting and framing the solution: skills as flexibility and adaptability to progress 
 
Putative employment volatility was used to discredit as ‘out-dated’ the concept of “a 
job for life” (DfES, 2003:11) – rearticulated as associated with stagnating in low skills 
stasis and eventual redundancy - and introduce the: “new ambition of ‘employability 
for life’” (DfES, 2005a:1) associated with exponentially ambitious aspirations in the 
labour market. The need to be mindful of lifelong progressive employability was 
presented as vital in a dynamic economy. A sentiment inculcated through policy 
statements that placed a new requirement on worker-citizens to be: “autonomous, 
self-motivated learners” (PIU, 2001:56), who are: “willing to train” (Leitch, 2006:61), 
and who recognise the need to perpetually pursue advancement at work, and in their 
careers, through continuous education and training, and the attainment of higher level 
skills.  
 
“You’ve got to get a situation whereby people actually feel that: ‘yeah I do want to 
progress. I don’t want to be in this job all my life. I realise that a robot could do this and I 
ought to be doing something else’. And I just think that that’s going to happen. I think 
people are already waking up to the fact that there are no jobs for life anywhere now, 
you know.” (PM2) 
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In particular, the specific employability benefits of skills-led ‘flexibility’ and 
‘adaptability’ to change (again the object rather than the outcome of skill governance) 
were explained by one policy-maker (PM1) in two distinct respects. Firstly, skills were 
presented as providing the employee with the capacity to innovate in the workplace. 
For policy-makers ‘innovation’ at the workplace fitted with the framing of how 
complexity was experienced as related to uncertainty, and mediated via attention to 
ambitions for progress. Employees that had the skills, and are therefore able to: 
“adjust to economic change” (HM Treasury, 2002:21), contribute to the development, 
advancement, and therefore on-going success of the business, were depicted as 
simultaneously securing the continuation of their employment as useful and usable 
workers. Such an interpretation of the role and function of skills as a coping strategy – 
remade from a ‘concern’ to an ‘opportunity’ (PM1)- in the context of uncertainty, was 
offered as a positive preference to antagonistic less discerning mechanisms that 
fallaciously attempted to blockade change and insecurity in the labour market rather 
than supporting employees to adapt to it.   
 
“The major area of concern, or opportunity – opportunity to succeed and grow in the 
business – for the individual is, in fact, to make sure that they are constantly up-skilled. 
So they’re skilled to come in but over a five year period those skills become, or can 
become, redundant if they’re not constantly up-skilled. So there are two ways that 
unions deal with that. One is obviously fighting the job losses in lots of different ways 
and including negotiating for redundancy. But my view was that if we started ahead of 
the businesses having redundant skills and as a consequence having redundant people, if 
we started with the skills stuff…” (PM1) 
 
This sentiment was echoed in the Leitch Review (2006:31) where skills were depicted 
as not only the primary means to improve an individual’s probability of securing 
employment, but also as one of the principle mechanisms for enabling business growth, 
and therefore maintaining and creating employment opportunities. 
 
Secondly, skills were presented as an insurance against the inevitable employment 
hardships and insecurities faced by vulnerable individuals unfortunate enough to find 
themselves employed in stagnating low-skills work organisations, which fail to keep 
pace with the necessity for change. In situations of ‘poor’ employment – “the low-skills, 
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low-pay trap” (DfES, 2005a) - or business failure and unemployment - “the low pay/no 
pay trap” (PIU, 2001:7) - the individual could, through flexible skills enhancement, 
enable themselves to conform to the requirements of future and better employment 
elsewhere (DfES, 2003:20).  
 
Indeed, in general skills were constructed as the principle mechanism by which an 
individual could be empowered to mediate the uncertainties of a dynamic labour 
market, and continuously reposition themselves in relation to ‘good’, more secure, and 
advantageous employment opportunities. 
 
“Unless people are equipped with flexible skills […] they will not be able to move into 
growth industries and take new opportunities.” (Leitch, 2006:61) 
 
“In the new century, improving and updating skills is the best way to help people make 
the most of change.” (Leitch, 2006:27) 
 
 “There may always be job losses but you and I have got more skills now than we had 
before, so we can go somewhere else and say ‘actually I can walk in tomorrow and I 
could do this, that, and the other, for you’. I mean they’re all transferable skills; you 
know skills are very transferable aren’t they.” (PM1)  
 
What comes across in all of the presentation above is that the transferability or 
portability potential of skills (between workplace roles, and between workplaces) was 
considered critical to contemporary policy interpretations of the role of education and 
training in securing population welfare in changed and changeable employment 
circumstances. In other words, skills-led adaptability and flexibility was the object 
rather than the outcome of skill governance.  Alternative means of protecting worker-
citizens from the insecurity of changes to the basis of competitiveness in the labour 
market were repeatedly present as anachronistic, and lambasted for having masked 
the seriousness of skills shortages amongst current and potential employees. Past 
governments were chastised for misguidedly interpreting their welfare role as: 
“protecting people from change” (Leitch, 2006:31), rather than preparing people for it 
– supporting their capability to find new employment and remain employable through 
skills-led flexibility and adaptability.  
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“In the old days the problem may have been employment, but in the next decade it will 
be employability. If in the old days lack of jobs demanded priority action, in the new 
world it is lack of skills. And that means our whole approach to welfare must move on.” 
(Forward by Gordon Brown - DWP, 2008:2) 
 
In clearly distinguishing the past from the present and future the experience of change 
was reinterpreted; no longer a threat but an opportunity.  Preference for stability (‘job 
for life’) became synonymous with a reckless disregard for declining employability and 
obsolescence, given the discursive framing of imagined realities associated with the 
dynamic nature of work. Again, it was this particular depiction of an uncertain, 
changeable and complex labour market that determined the logic for progressive, 
higher levels of skills, and discredited any alternative.  
 
5.2.3 Skills as progress 
 
“He who stops being better, stops being good.” 
(Oliver Cromwell, Lord Protector of England 1653-58 cited in PIU, 2001:17) 
 
In summary, the particular discursive framing of heightened global competition 
coupled with rapid and constant change to the basis of production and employment 
prosperity, presents businesses and worker-citizens as operating in conditions of 
extreme uncertainty. This depiction of uncertainty was articulated as irrefutably 
actually existing, and as unable to be ignored. As such it offered a specific and highly 
bounded way of construing and constructing complexity, which gave meaning to and 
fixed the logic for continuously seeking more and better, higher levels of skills as a 
primary imperative. For businesses high(er) skills were depicted as enabling flexibility 
and adaptability to progress in the context of dynamic economic conditions, and 
therefore the ability to remain competitive and profitable. For worker-citizens high(er) 
skills were depicted as enabling flexibility and adaptability to progress in the context of 
a dynamic labour market, and therefore the ability to remain competitive and 
employable.  
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By linking skills to the flexibility and adaptability to cope with complexity, they were 
given a generative, alchemical property and quality in policy discourse. Valued in terms 
of the ‘good’ things they unlock, unblock and make possible, rather than given a 
specific known quality or application. Indeed, beyond offering the necessary flexibility 
and adaptability to change, skills tended to be described by policy-makers in 
substantively hollow terms. Policy documents made reference to unacceptably low 
levels of basic skills - specifically literacy, numeracy and ICT skills, as well as ‘broad 
employability skills’ (Leitch, 2006:6) - a general requirement to develop more 
intermediate and higher level skills (PIU, 2001:22; Leitch, 2006), and the need to tackle 
weaknesses in leadership and management such that businesses and worker-citizens 
could be able to identify the skills they are lacking and effectively utilise what skills 
they have more effectively (PIU, 2001:34; Leitch, 2006:89). However, these broad 
stipulations were not offered as an exhaustive list of priorities, but indicated a general 
logic of onward and upward progression from any given base point, towards ever more 
ambitious aspirations to ensure productivity and better wages in highly competitive 
economic conditions (Leitch, 2006:28). In general skills were described as ‘anything’ 
and ‘everything’ performative of transformative aspirations for progress and 
betterment (PM3). 
 
“Skills are not an end in themselves, but a means towards supporting successful 
businesses and organisation” (DfES, 2003:21) 
  
[Skills are:] “Sort of everything really; it’s anything that helps you function effectively” 
(PM3) 
 
This image of ‘skills-as-progress’ was particularly powerfully expressed in relation to 
employees. Critically linked to the capability of worker-citizens to positively 
participate in the labour market and add value in the workplace. Also, therefore, as 
the principle source of their security in a post-welfare society, and most importantly 
as associated with the means of capturing the personal development and life 
improvement opportunities that better market compatibility was perceived to offer 
(DfES, 2005a:18).  
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“[Skills are] activities which increase the capacity of individuals to participate effectively 
in the workplace, thereby improving their productivity and employability” (PIU, 2001:6).  
 
“Skills mean equipping people with the wherewithal, if you like, to do something more 
than I currently do. So they’re skilling me to do it. So they open up the opportunity. Skills 
are giving somebody the ability, the wherewithal, to do something at a greater level 
than the one they currently work at, no matter what it is really […] But that is what it 
means. It means I can do this today, but if I have the opportunity to have some training 
or whatever… ” (PM1) 
 
In short, policy-makers constructed a logic for high(er) skills based on the problem 
of uncertainty-based complexity, only able to be mitigated with skills-based 
adaptability and flexibility, and used this logic to present skills as the means of 
progress.  
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Figure 5.1: Mapping the Discourses of High(er) Skills Coherence 
 
 
Source: author’s analysis, compilation and design 
 
5.3 Narrating the logic for high(er) skills: The powerful discourse of coherence 
 
Having presented how policy-makers interpreted and articulated uncertainty as 
structuring the complexities faced by businesses and worker-citizens, and narrated a 
logic for more and better skills in mitigating this complexity, this section explores how 
policy-makers imagined high(er) skills as able to cohere economic and social agendas 
and reconcile the interests and ambitions of multiple actors. Policy-makers described 
high(er) skills as fusing state-led economic and social ambitions for the nation; as 
cohering and realising public/collective interests of the state, and the 
private/individual interests of businesses and worker-citizens; and as able to reconcile 
private interests at the site of the workplace. These many and intricately 
interconnected discourses of coherence are mapped in Figure 5.1, before being 
examined more fully below.  
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5.3.1 Reconciling economy and society: skills for ‘UK plc.’ and ‘UK social’ 
 
“This is not only an economic challenge. It is just as much a social one” (DfES, 2003:18) 
 
The issue that the UK/England faces with regard to the unacceptably low skills levels of 
many working people – specifically: “the gap between the skills-rich and the skills-
poor” (DfES, 2003:7) - was presented by policy-makers as equally inhibiting both 
economic prosperity, and particular social justice aspirations, associated with achieving 
social inclusion through participation in (paid) work, and reducing (low income related) 
deprivation.  
 
“The economy will not maximise its long term growth potential, and UK society cannot 
be inclusive, if over a third of the workforce have few or no skills and qualifications.” (HM 
Treasury, 2002:37 emphasis added) 
 
“Skills is the most important lever within our control to create wealth and to reduce 
social deprivation” (Leitch, 2006:2 emphasis added) 
 
“Supporting training for low-skilled adults is an important way of reducing social 
exclusion as well as promoting productivity” (HM Treasury, 2002:14 emphasis added) 
 
At the core of interdependence between the economic and the social agendas was a 
particular interpretation of the function of high(er) level (flexible and adaptable) ‘skills 
for progress’ as mediating imaginatively selected and framed complexities associated 
with production and employment uncertainty. However, this framing of high(er) skills 
as able to cohere progressive production and employment aspirations was further 
grounded in a general (party) political belief in economic and social interdependence 
(DfES, 2003:11). An interdependence that is expressed in the New Labour ideological 
hybrid of a ‘Third Way’ that claimed to combine the egalitarian focus of social 
democracy with economic liberalism (Blair, 1998; Giddens, 2000), and that ultimately 
framed the pursuit of ‘fairness’ as supporting the chances of all to enhance their 
market compatibility.  As such, the coherence of more and better skills was  perceived 
to be substantiated and realised in the virtuous, circular and symbiotic production of 
economically better, more productive workers for business, and socially better, more 
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rewarding work and working prospects for individual worker-citizens; work that amply 
remunerates recommodification. 
 
“We seek a fairer society which ensures that every individual […] is helped to realise their 
own capacity for learning, and raise their quality of life. We also seek a dynamic 
economy where our national and regional productivity is enhanced through high-skilled, 
well-rewarded employees working in companies committed to long term investment and 
leading the world in their business sectors.” (DfES, 2005a:1) 
 
“We’ve still got quite a large cohort of our population that have got no qualifications at 
all, and therefore if we’re going to compete they need the skills. […] But the second part 
of that – the same story but in two parts – is to ensure people have social mobility to 
ensure they are employed and included in our society; the best way to do that is through 
education and skills. So there is a social inclusion agenda and a social mobility agenda 
going hand in hand with an economic agenda, because if we can get one right we get the 
other one right and that is the goal behind this Government.” (PM4) 
 
“From this Government’s point of view skills is about lifting everybody. So businesses but 
also [the individual] gets lifted up as well, and that’s the social agenda isn’t it? (PM1) 
 
As is suggested in all of the above policy statements, ‘lifting up individuals’ was 
typically explained in terms of degrees of social inclusion predicted by employment 
status. more specifically, the social benefits of education and training were framed as 
not only determined by the ‘exclusion’ of unemployment vs. the ‘inclusion’ of 
employment, but also as determined by: ‘good’ vs. ‘poor’ work; ‘developmental’ vs. 
‘dead-end’ work; ‘secure’ vs. ‘insecure’ work; aggregated and summarised as ‘skilled’ 
vs. ‘unskilled’ work37.  
 
”Social inclusion is about quality of work and prospects for the future as well as 
employment. Those with basic skills problems, or skills levels below level 2, usually 
                                               
37 The point here is that unemployment is presented as the principle factor in social exclusion; however 
work is not perceived entirely uncritically as the source of social inclusion. Early policy documents in 
particular explicitly distinguish between ‘any’ employment, and ‘quality’ employment with a degree of 
security and prospects for future progression (see PIU, 2001:19-20). This distinction was clear in the 
interviews with policy-makers and remains - albeit somewhat less pronounced but implied - through the 
later policy documents (see for example Leitch, 2006:36). 
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receive lower wages and have little prospect of achieving progression to higher incomes 
and more rewarding work” (HM Treasury, 2002:14) 
 
As a consequence of trapping people in ‘poor’ employment and/or (periodic) 
unemployment, skills deficiencies were explicitly presented as responsible for, or 
exacerbating, a myriad of low income related social risks and social problems, such as 
(child/intergenerational) poverty and deprivation; health inequalities; and crime (DfES, 
2003:18; Leitch, 2005:6; Leitch, 2006:60; DIUS, 2007a:25). However, the narrative of 
economic and social coherence was even more nuanced than simply describing the 
social prosperity outcomes of better employees for better employment. Policy-makers 
also appealed to the logic of conceptualising ‘skills for employment’, and ‘skills for a 
more rewarding life’ as synonymous.  
 
“A lot of the issues that come up with skills - particularly if you talk to Unionlearn, to the 
TUC, or anything – is that they shouldn’t just be vocational related, that  learning for life 
opportunities should be in there and everything, and there is a lot of agreement between 
us on that. But for me […] as you progress you’re acquiring skills […] and actually aspects 
of your personal life change as well. […] So it is developing individuals as well as making 
them, if you like, more equipped, or better equipped to do their jobs.”(PM1) 
 
Specifically, policy-makers presented those better skilled for the dynamic economy as 
explicitly better parents and as generally better able to: “function effectively in 
society” (PM3) - offering a particular depiction of functioning as more independently 
able, and less socially risky individuals, families and communities - in society.  
 
“Now to me this is what the social mobility agenda is about: we want them to get the 
skills - get the qualification – and earn the money and then that comes back in their 
families. That’s also about the second generation.  Those children who are brought up in 
households who can’t read don’t read much themselves; those households who are now 
learning to read, or can read, will have more books, they do better at schools, and we 
break into the cycle of deprivation with that. Therefore I can’t split the policy one from 
the other because it has such an impact on people’s own family lives as well as the 
impact at work.” (PM4) 
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“I actually think that in social terms there is no doubt about the correlation between 
having higher order skills and health; what happens to your kids; where you live; what 
sort of lifestyle you have; the range of activities that are open to you.” (PM2) 
 
By articulating the coherence between skills-dependent ‘good’ employment potential 
and the broader social benefits of skills, policy-makers forged, and sought to embed, a 
powerfully coherent economic and social logic for overcoming the problem of low-
skills. Arguments that the attention of the skills strategy was asymmetrically focused 
on the needs of the economy – ‘UK plc.’ - could be diverted back to the social 
ramifications of unemployment or ‘poor’ employment and the wider lifestyle benefits 
of better skills; and could thus be closed down and discredited by an analysis of the 
role of skills in the expansive pursuit of a ‘better society’ (DfES, 2003:17) – ‘UK social’.  
 
“Gaining new skills and qualifications, learning and training are – alongside finding work 
– the most powerful ways individuals can transform their life chances and those of their 
families.” (DIUS, 2007a:19). 
 
“It’s really the impact skills have, or can have, on disadvantaged groups as much as 
anything else […] on the basis that if you are in work you are more likely to feel part of, 
and aligned to, your community and to society as a whole really.” (PM3)  
 
“When people are better educated and better trained, they have the chance to earn 
more and use their talents to the full, both in and out of work. They are better able to use 
their skills for the benefit of their families and their communities.” (DfES, 2003:18) 
 
As a consequence the economic argument for skills was further reinforced and given 
renewed credence. Policy-makers legitimised the need to drive skills for employment 
forward because employment was intricately entwined with securing social benefits 
(social justice as social inclusion) and reducing individual, familial and intergenerational 
social risks. 
 
“It’s much more exciting driving the economy forward if you believe in employment – 
and I do believe in employment, I think it is good for people for all sorts of other reasons 
– I think that becomes a really, really exciting agenda. You know, rather than saying well 
 137
we’ll leave unemployment to these guys, and we’ll leave business to these guys, it’s 
actually pulling those together.” (PM2) 
“The Skills Strategy itself, for me, is very much woven around social justice and how it 
meets with business” (PM1) 
 
Indeed, policy-makers presented as anachronistic and problematic the previous, 
seemingly disinterested, disaggregation of economic and social agendas (HM Treasury, 
2002:14); instead articulating their role in fusing the governance of the economic and 
social within a synergistic policy focus on skills. This coherence-based logic was again 
presented as having no alternative and skills were repeatedly described as: 
“increasingly the key lever [for achieving] world class prosperity and fairness” (Leitch, 
2006:52, emphasis added). 
 
“A strong focus on economic impact does not come at the expense of social inclusion and 
equality of opportunity the two reinforce one another.” (DfES, 2006:30) 
 
“I think we are genuinely starting to see all these strands come together. I think 
traditionally they’ve all operated in separate silos, and there has been this belief that a 
process of osmosis occurs whereby if you build up this silo then it pollinates the next silo. 
I think what Government is looking at, at the moment, is actually plugging things 
together so that economic policy, skills policy and social policy are all one and the same.” 
(PM2) 
 
Such a presentation and political positioning of the New Labour high(er) skills project 
fundamentally challenges straightforward distinctions between types of partisan states 
in the politics of governing skills, (Chapter 2).  
 
5.3.2 Reconciling public and private interests: the ‘I’ in ‘team’ 
 
Alongside presenting high(er) skills as cohering national economic and social agendas, 
policy-makers also presented high(er) skills as realising the collective ambitions of the 
nation and the individual ambitions of businesses and worker-citizens. Policy narratives 
shifted seamlessly between, and in doing so sought to render synonymous, the 
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aspirations of the state and the public/national (economic and social) interest in skills; 
and the private skills aspirations of business, interested in enhanced productivity and 
profitability, and individual worker-citizens, interested in improved employability and a 
better life.  
 
“Investing in talent is one of the most powerful things we can do to ensure that our 
nation’s employers and our economy as a whole can compete in the global age, and to 
help us build a society where everyone has the opportunity to rise as far as their talents 
will take them, to improve their lives and those of their families.” (Forward by John 
Denham – DIUS, 2008b:4) 
 
“Skills are central to achieving our national goals of prosperity and fairness. They are an 
essential contributor to a successful, wealth creating economy. They help businesses 
become more productive and profitable. They help individuals achieve their ambitions for 
themselves, their families and their communities.” (DfES, 2005a:5) 
 
“Improving skills will help individuals to improve their employability, progress in their 
careers, and secure better wages. It will help employers to secure increased productivity 
and profitability for their businesses. It will help us to reduce unemployment, tackle child 
poverty and improve social mobility. And it will help to reduce crime, improve health 
outcomes, and improve civic and community participation.” (DIUS, 2007a:8) 
 
The synergy between economic and social, public and private, skills interests was 
expressed in the narratives of policy-makers’ in two ways. Firstly, policy language 
‘spoke out’ to businesses and worker-citizens about the critical importance of their 
higher skills strategies for the economic and social success of the nation (UK plc. & UK 
Social – see Figure 5.1); promoting the equivalence of skills for the public/collective 
‘we’ and the private/individual ‘you’.  
 
 “Helping businesses boost their profitability and improving our productivity so we are fit 
to compete successfully with China, India and other emerging economies, and can make 
full use of the opportunities presented by these markets.” (DfES, 2005a:1 emphasis 
added)  
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“The skills of our people are a vital national asset. Skills help business achieve the 
productivity and profitability needed to compete […] they help individuals raise their 
employability and achieve their ambitions for themselves, their families and their 
communities” (DfES, 2003:7) 
 
Policy-makers established and built the case for a relationship between public and 
private skills interests by constructing a logic that explained the condition of the 
national economy and society as determined by the sum of better skills prospects for 
individual businesses and worker-citizens. Policy-makers’ statements repeatedly 
juxtaposed private and public outcomes of skills; emphasising both the stultifying 
consequences of low skills, and the invigorating potential of high skills, for economic 
success at the level of the individual business and worker-citizen and at the level of the 
nation. 
 
“Having large numbers of people in the workforce with low skills levels limits the 
prospects of individuals and firms as well as negatively affecting national productivity 
and increasing wage inequality. It is estimated that the UK economy loses as much as 
£10 billion a year due to basic skills problems in the workforce.” (HM Treasury, 2002:7) 
 
“Better skills mean better productivity and higher incomes for all. A workforce with the 
right blend of skills helps create and sustain vibrant and successful businesses – the 
bedrock of national economic success.” (Forward by Tony Blair - Strategy Unit, 2002:2) 
 
Secondly, policy-makers described – ‘spoke about’ - actually existing, explicitly shared, 
skills-dependent aims, objectives and benefits, which were being pursued by 
government for the sustained economic and social security and prosperity of the 
nation, and by businesses and worker-citizens in accordance with their own private 
rational ambitions.  
 
“Benefits will be shared. Businesses will gain a more productive workforce and larger 
pool of skilled labour. Individuals will gain better job and pay prospects. Society will be 
both more prosperous and fairer.” (Leitch, 2006:70) 
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“We all want a more prosperous and inclusive country. That can only be achieved by a 
partnership of government, employers and employees.” (Forward by Tony Blair, Strategy 
Unit, 2002:3)  
 
To support the contention of shared public and private benefits policy-makers 
explained the organised interests of businesses and workers as also recognising the 
significant and mutually beneficial implications of high(er) skills, (at least of 
overcoming the problem of low skills). Indeed, in the foreword to his final report, 
Sandy Leitch presented the outcome of his consultation with ‘key stakeholders’ as 
explicitly highlighting this collective agreement, stating: “there is consensus that we 
need to be much more ambitious and a clear message that the UK must ‘raise its 
game’.” (Leitch, 2006:1). Policy-makers referenced the importance of the strong 
contribution to policy made by the social partners; specifically the CBI and the TUC. 
Policy documents described a: “coalition of support”, which had worked with 
Government to: “achieve a national unity of purpose” associated with the critical 
economic and social relevance of skills (DfES, 2005a:2). 
 
“Government, employers, trade unions and others have been concerned for well over a 
century about the decline in relative UK economic performance compared with other 
industrial countries; and about the social consequences of a workforce with low skills 
levels.” (PIU, 2001:11) 
 
“The CBI and the TUC have jointly acknowledged the importance of dealing with basic 
skills deficiencies in the workforce.” (HM Treasury, 2002:9) 
 
In short, the national economy was imagined and described as needing businesses 
and worker-citizens to enhance their productivity and employability via skills, and 
individual businesses and worker-citizens were imagined and described as 
internalising the need for more and better skills at higher levels, and as pursuing 
such strategies in their own rational interest. 
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5.3.3 Reconciling workplace interests: an age of enlightened consensus 
 
As well as delivering shared public and private benefits, policy-makers presented skills 
as an issue of workplace consensus; as able to reconcile and cohere the private 
rational interests of the business and the worker-citizen interacting in the employment 
relationship. Given that high(er) skills were defined in terms of their potential to 
enable progress and betterment, policy-makers presented the interdependence of 
more and better skills at the site of the workplace as predicated on the mutual needs 
of ‘enlightened’ business for a useful and usable worker, capable of applying their skills 
and knowledge to raise productivity and therefore competitiveness on an on-going 
basis (DIUS, 2007a:6); and the needs of ‘motivated’ worker-citizens for a means of 
attaining their personal goals associated with ambitious and on-going employability, as 
the requirements of employment and their employer changes (DCSF, 2007).  
 
“The nature of jobs will continue to evolve in response to economic, technological and 
social change. For many people, the re-training, up-skilling and qualifications that will 
best help them meet their personal goals will also meet the needs of their employers, 
because there is a shared benefit from higher skills generating higher productivity at 
work.” (DfES, 2005a:17) 
 
“If you increase people’s skills they therefore become more productive and therefore you 
increase first of all their ability to get employment, but also to enhance the company’s 
productivity and therefore profitability.” (PM2) 
 
“I think the aim is to have successful businesses, and in having successful businesses you 
have successful employees as one needs to happen for the other to happen as well.” 
(PM1) 
 
This narrative offers a micro analysis of the function of skills in cohering national 
economic and social aspirations. As the last comment particularly highlights, what was 
being explicitly constructed and explained was the symbiotic relationship between the 
shared interests of successful businesses and successful people; enlightened about, 
and motivated by, the progressive potential of skills. A potentially virtuous circle 
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initiated by the rational progressive skills needs of businesses and worker-citizens, 
which delivers mutually beneficial outcomes and is therefore in everybody’s interest 
(PM1). 
 
“I think there’s a common view, I think now there is a very robust view, that this [skills] is 
a really good way of doing stuff.” (PM1) 
 
In articulating this image of coherence the discourses of policy-makers fused business 
and worker-citizens aspirations when describing how the role of skills in mitigating 
putative complexity is understood and experienced. Ostensibly the logic policy-makers 
communicated was one that equivalised desire and responsibility to skill and utilise 
skills; a message that was presented as reflecting needs and rational predispositions. In 
essence policy-makers described high(er) skills as able to support and help build the 
potential for better, more ‘enlightened’ workplace relations.   
 
“[Improving skills will support] “creating new workplace partnerships between employers, 
trade unions and employees, and improving employment relations through better skilled 
and motivated staff contributing to higher performing companies and organisations.” 
(DfES, 2005a:1) 
 
5.3.4 Skills as Partnership 
 
In summary, policy-makers constructed the logic for a high(er) skills project around the 
powerful discourse of high(er) skills as cohering multiple interests and agendas. 
Specifically policy-makers narrated the potential for high(er) skills to serve the: 
interdependent economic and social betterment ambitions of the nation; public and 
private aspirations for prosperity; and the mutual interests of employer and employees 
for better functioning, more successful workplaces. By linking skills to coherence 
between, and consensus of interests and agendas, they are given a collective and 
partnership quality in policy discourse. Indeed, the ways in which policy-makers 
articulated and positioned the logic for high(er) skills in relation to coherence and 
consensus created the discursive foundations for legitimising particular actors and 
actions in the governing of high(er) skills. Specifically, policy-makers called for a ‘skills 
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partnership’ between government, businesses and worker-citizens (PIU, 2001; DfES, 
2003; DfES, 2005; Leitch, 2006). Based on the perception and articulation of: “shared 
interests” (PM1; also PM3; Leitch, 2006:14); “joint endeavour” (DfES, 2005a:25); and: 
“common action” (Leitch, 2006:17).  
 
In policy-makers narratives’, a skills partnership between government, businesses and 
worker-citizens was considered both highly beneficial (PIU, 2001:60) for all, and 
absolutely intrinsic to the longer-term success of the high(er) skills project. Recalling 
the ‘problem’ of complexity (section 5.2) – specifically the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the pace of economic and employment change – policy-makers 
reiterated the inability of governments to act alone in determining and dictating the 
skills that will be progressive and transformative, from the top down.   
 
“This exciting agenda cannot be delivered top down or by Government alone. It will 
require a strong partnership in every area between the key public agencies, employers of 
all sizes in the private, public and voluntary sectors, schools, colleges, universities and 
training providers, trade unions and individuals, whether in work or seeking 
employment.” (DfES, 2005a:3) 
 
“Government cannot do this alone. We need to build a new Skills Alliance, where every 
employer, every employee and every citizen plays their part.” (DfES, 2003:18) 
 
In short, policy-makers constructed a logic for high(er) skills based on the possibility of 
coherence between multiple interests and agendas only able to be mediated through 
high(er) skills, and used this logic to present skills as in everybody’s interest and 
therefore as an issue of partnership.  
 
5.4 Discussion and Concluding Reflections 
 
This chapter has presented an interpretive analysis of how policy-makers’ narratives 
(during the New Labour administration, and up until completion of fieldwork in 2009), 
sought to build the case for the New Labour Skills Strategy for England, and in doing so 
established a logic for skills (formal dimension of skills policy), that gave meaning to, 
and sought to fix, ‘progress in partnership’ as the normative object of governance 
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(‘what is to be governed’). Specifically, the chapter has established how policy-makers 
sought to construct and narrate the logic for high(er) skills based on:  
o Progress as a means to mitigate insecurities of economic and social complexity 
associated with dynamic uncertainty  
o Partnership as a means to cohere multiple interests and agendas (economic 
and social, public and private, and workplace interests) 
 
This section will discuss the implications of these findings for theories of skill 
governance. It will highlight how these findings expose the limitations of both the VoC 
and PRA perspective, as unable to account for and explain the role of semiosis in state 
work and skill governance under New Labour. It will conclude by confirming the 
usefulness of a CPE-informed conceptual approach to theorising intersubjective 
meaning making as state work.   
 
Firstly, this chapter has shown that policy-makers’ narratives depicted high(er) skills as 
the means by which businesses and worker-citizens were able to position themselves 
in ways which successfully managed and mitigated the complexities of production and 
employment uncertainty and change. This uncertainty and change was narrated as 
associated with the terms of supposed post-Fordist knowledge-based production; an 
ultra-competitive global economy; and a post-welfare (workfare) society that can no 
longer offer assurances of employment security (Brown & Lauder, 1996; Brown & 
Lauder, 2001; Jessop, 2002; Jessop, 2004; Crouch et al, 2004; Gleeson & Keep, 2004; 
Cerny, 2010a). In the context of this strategically selected economic and social 
imaginary – indeed as a causal effect of the meaningful practices and processes of 
(re)making of economic and social reality in this way (Jessop; 2004; Jessop, 2008) – 
higher skills were forcefully proselytised as the route to the necessary flexibility and 
adaptability to change, but beyond that insubstantially defined. Indeed, in policy-
makers’ narratives high(er) skills were largely depicted as unable to be centrally 
determined; having meaning only as whatever would enable businesses and worker-
citizens the flexibility and adaptability to cope with dynamism - keep pace’ and ‘excel’ 
in the: “knowledge wars” (Brown et al, 2008:4) - and achieve progressive betterment 
capacity and capability.  
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The two key points that therefore came across throughout the presentation of this 
logic for high(er) skills were: firstly, that the flexibility and adaptability potential of 
skills, (between workplace roles and between workplaces), was considered critical to 
policy interpretations of the role of education and training in securing on-going 
business and worker-citizen prosperity, in changed and changeable production and 
employment circumstances; and secondly, that businesses and worker-citizens were 
best placed, at any given time, to know precisely what skills would achieve this secured 
prosperity.  This leads to a situation where high(er) skills for flexibility and adaptability 
to change are to be governed through policy (demand-leading), but where determining 
what constitutes the high(er) skills for flexibility and adaptability is a private 
(workplace or individual business/worker-citizen) decision (demand-led). 
 
In seeking to account for and explain this identified logic of skill policy - more and 
better flexible and adaptable skills, to be determined privately and specified from 
within the workplace - it is necessary to appraise the findings of this chapter in relation 
to the perspective of established theories of skill governance (in UK/England), 
reviewed in Chapter 2. As was discussed in Chapter 2 (and section 5.2 above), the 
flexibility and adaptability (portability) function of skills is presumed in LMEs as an 
outcome of institutional complementarities that determine the generic skill 
preferences of businesses and worker-citizens. However, here we see skill portability 
as actively pursued by policy-makers in relation to the flexibility and adaptability to 
cope with product market and labour market complexity, and therefore as an object of 
governance and intended objective of policy. Given meaning in relation to the way that 
uncertainty is framed; depicted as inevitable; and imagined as able to be mitigated. 
 
The main challenge that can therefore be put to the VoC approach to explaining skill 
governance is that it overlooks the role of a seemingly interested state, operating 
beyond the remit of liberal arbiter, seeking to discursively regulate – bind, fix and 
reproduce (Jessop, 2009) - the logic and case for high(er) skills in relation to a 
particular selected macro-economic and social imaginary (global knowledge-based 
economy, and post-welfare society). A discursive regulation that seeks to set the 
parameters of the conversation about skills in policy and political debate more widely. 
In addition we find this seemingly interested state to be specifying high(er) skills-led 
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flexibility and adaptability for the particular purpose of distinctly defined notion of 
‘progressive betterment’; economically better (more productive) workers for 
businesses, and socially better (more rewarding) work for worker-citizens. As such 
discursive regulation appears as an attempt at semiotic market-shaping in line with 
Schumpeterian competition logic and a post-welfare concern with the recommodified 
insertion of all into the better functioning parts of the labour market (Jessop, 2002; 
Cerny, 2010a). An attempt to forge intersubjective meaning, such that the market 
would manage itself in relation to the high(er) skills project and dislodge the terms of 
low skills equilibrium.   
 
Secondly, the chapter has shown that high(er) skills were depicted as the means by 
which multiple interests and agendas could be brought into a shared partnership for 
high(er) skills, (to dislodge the low skills equilibrium on the basis of consensus), and 
cohered. Again, in seeking to account for and explain this identified logic of skill policy 
by appraising the findings in relation to the perspectives of established theories of skill 
governance, we find the VoC approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Estevez-Abe et al, 2001; 
Thelen, 2004) to explaining skill governance in LMEs (such as the UK/England) has no 
means to conceptualise the role of the state in seeking to discursively forge alliances; 
particularly where those alliances fall well short of institutionalising credible 
commitments. Furthermore, the politics of skill approaches (Chapter 2, and section 5.2 
above), in particular the PRA, are no better able to account for a state operating in 
more complex relation to partisan interests. By assuming the state to operate as an 
overt power resource for a given set of interests – as a site and outcome of class 
struggle (Aston & Green, 1996) - again obscures state work as meaning making to 
construct and (re)produce the terms under which to bring divergent interests into 
some form of unstable alignment. A key finding of this chapter has been to show how 
New Labour policy narratives constructed, as reconcilable, the better market 
compatibility of employees as in the social, public and private interest of worker-
citizens, and the social inclusion and social mobility of worker-citizens, and the 
associated wider lifestyle benefits, as in the economic, public and private interest of 
business. 
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In conclusion, by adopting an ontological (as well as methodological) commitment to 
CPE-informed interpretive analysis – taking meanings and meaning-making seriously, 
and highlighting the integral relationship between meaning and practice (Jessop, 2004) 
– this chapter has offered an alternative theoretical approach to the analysis of the 
formal dimension (what was to be governed) of the New Labour Skills Strategy for 
England (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003). Firstly, the chapter has highlighted the power 
of selected economic and social imaginaries as productive of meaning. What Jessop 
(2008:20) refers to as the: “performative force of the policy paradigm”. It has shown 
how discourses of complexity and coherence in relation to the high(er) skills project 
were narrated manifestations of the “logics of possibility and limitation” (Brown, 1999; 
also Ball, 2007) associated with an imagined and selected global knowledge-based 
economy and post-welfare society. Secondly the chapter has shown how the solution 
of progress in partnership – in response to the selected macro-economic imaginary - 
was narrated by policy-makers in the attempt to (re)produce intersubjective meanings, 
subjectivities and subject positions (of businesses and worker-citizens) associated with 
the economic and social imperatives of high(er) skills. In other words, the chapter has 
shown intersubjective meaning making and meaning (re)production through 
articulation and narrative as state work; as governing.   
 
Having established how New Labour established the logic for and gave meaning to a 
higher skills project in England, the thesis now turns to consider the second of three 
empirical sub-questions, and addresses the relationship between how the logic for 
skills was constructed and narrated, and the associated way in which ‘doing skills’ is 
imagined and done 
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6. Governing Workplaces I: The Multiple Strategies for Skills   
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
he previous chapter identified and analysed the logics - established in policy-
makers’ narratives - which gave meaning to, and built a case for, skills as a vehicle 
of progress in response to a particularly imagined complex world, and as able to 
reconcile and cohere the interests, (public/national and private/individual), of the 
state, businesses, and worker-citizens, within a skills partnership. The chapter 
therefore addressed the first of the empirical sub-questions (SRQ1) of this thesis – 
‘how did New Labour establish the logic for, and give meaning to, a high(er) skills 
project in England’ - and presented how policy-makers imagined and narrated the 
principles, priorities, purposes, and intended outcomes (‘what was to be governed’) of 
the New Labour Skills Strategy as ‘progress in partnership’. 
 
Building on this analysis the thesis is further concerned with the relationship between 
how the logic for high(er) skills is narrated by policy-makers, the ‘formal dimension’ of 
policy (Chapter 5); and the associated ways in which ‘doing skills’ is imagined and done, 
the ‘operational’ dimension of policy (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003:32). I have 
organised the analysis of the operational dimension of skills policy into two closely 
linked chapters (this chapter and the next) that together offer an interpretative 
analysis of New Labour Skills Strategy for England, drawing on key policy documents 
and interviews with policy-makers- politicians and senior civil servants (see Chapter 4). 
Together they address the second empirical sub-question (SRQ2) of this thesis: ‘how 
was the logic for a high(er) skills project used to order and organise skills policy in 
England?’  
 
The chapters argue that the operational dimension of skills policy (doing skills under 
New Labour) involved articulating and assembling: imagined workplace skills actors; 
the relations between them at the site of the workplace; the form and role of the 
state; and the organisational arrangements, resources, practices, and processes for 
skills delivery, into distinct architectures of skill (workplace) governance. I borrow the 
T 
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concepts of ‘articulation’ and ‘assemblage’ from Newman & Clarke (2009a:8-9) and use 
them to draw attention to state work (Chapter 3) as discursively and materially 
mobilising meanings, practices and processes, that construct, categorise and position 
workplace skills actors (businesses and worker-citizens), and seeks to govern them 
accordingly. This constructing, categorising and positioning of workplace skills actors is 
based on their imagined degree of responsible skill aspiration and behaviour in relation 
to the high(er) skills logic of progress in partnership.  
 
The first of the two chapters (this chapter) presents the articulation and assemblage of 
a skills strategy in relation to a positively imagined: ‘responsible workplace’; 
encountering an ‘empowering state’; and a ‘demand-led system’ for skills. The second 
(Chapter 7) presents the articulation and assemblage of two further skills strategies in 
relation to: two versions of negatively imagined ‘inert’ or ‘irresponsible’ workplaces; 
encountering an ‘enhancing’ or ‘exhorting/emancipating’ state; and therefore either a 
‘system to lead demand’ for skills, or a ‘system to mitigate and circumvent lack of 
demand’. In summary, taken together the chapters find that within what is framed as a 
“coherent approach” to high(er) skills (Foreword by Tony Blair – PIU, 2001:3), policy-
makers’ narratives construct and classify three distinct skills strategies for England, by 
workplace actor skill aspiration and behaviour and therefore proximity to the high(er) 
skills logic.  
 
Figure 6.1 below provides an outline of these three strategies within a framework that 
shows how they align with imagined workplaces and different forms and roles of the 
state. The aim and purpose of the two chapters that follow is to populate this outline 
with the details of state work in skills policy under New Labour. A populated outline 
that summarises the two chapters is shown in Figure 7.3. The chapters conclude with a 
discussion of, and reflection on, the analysis of findings presented.  
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Figure 6.1: Three Skills Strategies for England 
 
 
 
Source: author’s analysis, compilation and design 
 
A note on coherence as opacity: paradox revisited 
 
Before detailing the first of the three skills strategies - the ‘demand-led strategy’ – it is 
important to note that distinguishing and explicating these three strategies for 
governing skills (the presentation that follows) represents the interpretive analytical 
contribution of this thesis. These three strategies coexist and are muddled in policy. 
Recalling the paradox that frames this study – a ‘demand-led’ strategy for skills; 
wherein demand is to be led by the state; in the context of voluntarism – remembers 
that contradictory discourses of demand-led or demand-leading/demand-
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emancipating skills were entangled and collapsed in New Labour’s policy statements, 
for example: 
 
“Change must focus on raising the demand for [training and skills] 38  from both 
employers and individuals, through the development of a demand-led system based on 
empowering individuals and employees to increase their demand for [training and 
skills].” (PIU, 2001:5) 
 
The identification here of three discrete strategies does not seek to correct for 
contradiction and the incoherence of a supposedly intended ‘coherent approach’. 
Rather it serves to illuminate the cause of contradiction as ambiguity; the blurring of 
lines between strategies, resulting in the opacity of policy meanings, practices and 
processes. This is an important factor in understanding the exposure of policy to 
contestation and reinterpretation, and the implications for skills delivery. This will be 
returned to at the end of Chapter 7 and is the focus of Chapter 8.  
 
6.2 Responsible Workplaces: an Empowering State and Demand-led Strategy 
 
This chapter presents the first of three New Labour skills strategies for England, based 
on a policy imaginary of ‘responsible workplaces’ within which ‘enlightened’ employers 
and ‘motivated’ employees were seen to demonstrate reciprocal progressive skills 
aspirations and behaviours in partnership. In other words, this imaginary of 
responsible workplaces follows directly from the way policy-makers discursively 
construed and constructed the logic for skills as a shared ‘partnership’ concern, in 
pursuit of sought after progress in the context of complexity. As a consequence policy-
makers presented an ‘empowering’ role for the state. Enabling these responsible 
workplace skills aspirations to be realised by remaking skills delivery to adapt and 
respond to employer (and employee) voice and choice, as partner-customers in the 
‘demand-led’ system.  
 
                                               
38 The report uses the term ‘workforce development’ (WfD) rather than skills, but defines WfD as “a 
relatively new term for training and skills development. It sits between training (which has a narrow 
focus) and education (which is broad), and is firmly grounded in business need” (PIU, 2001:3) 
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6.2.1 Constructing and Positioning the Responsible Workplace Skills Partnership  
 
Policy-makers’ narratives imagined and described employers and employees, 
interacting at the site of the workplace, that recognised the challenges and 
opportunities inherent to the complexity of the production and employment 
environment as requiring attention to progressive skills aspirations and behaviours.   
 
Constructing the Enlightened Business:  a responsible and willing partner in skills 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, uncertainty and change was utilised by policy-
makers to construct a particular depiction of complexity. Specifically, that the 
possibility of economic success is exclusively dependent on the ability of businesses to 
initiate high(er) skills strategies in light of increasing global competition, and 
continuously seek out and capitalise on future unknown innovations as a consequence 
of fostering skills-led flexibility and adaptability to change. In imagining ‘enlightened’ 
businesses, this putatively apparent operating reality was presented by policy-makers 
in personalised language which both spoke to and for (on behalf of) these inherent 
interests. In other words, the complexity of the productive environment was narrated 
by policy-makers as experienced by businesses, and as galvanising their want and 
willingness to train and utilise the skills-led flexibility and adaptability of their 
employees as the means to survive, bolster their competitiveness, and augment their 
profitability and long-term prosperity. 
 
“Change is happening very fast […] Modern businesses know that to survive they must 
adapt. And to adapt they need a flexible and skilled workforce.” (Foreword by Tony Blair 
– Strategy Unit, 2002:2) 
 
“As an employer, you recognise that developing your workforce and making best use of 
their skills can increase your productivity and competitiveness.” (UKCES, 2008a:3) 
 
“Successful employers see up-skilling and re-skilling of the workforce as one of the most 
powerful things they can do to drive their business forward” (Foreword by John Denham 
– DIUS, 2008b:4) 
 
 153
As a consequence of perceiving businesses as cognisant of the challenges and 
opportunities inherent to the complexity of their operating environment, policy-
makers were able to construct and present a rationally self-interested, and responsible, 
businesses case for investing in skills development. Businesses, even those traditionally 
considered unlikely to train, were repeatedly explained as realising and actively 
demonstrating their desire to enhance skills(even of lower skilled employees) because 
of the numerous benefits – all boiling down to improved productivity and profitability 
in a dynamic economy - that they perceive to extend from having a more capable and 
useful workforce. 
 
“Many employers in England are already engaging in […] training their low-skilled 
employees, because they recognise the long term benefits from providing this training.” 
(Leitch, 2006:93) 
 
“You look at McDonalds as a really good case; ten years ago the idea that this was a 
graduate opportunity to go into McDonalds - you would have been laughed at. You look 
at the big supermarket chains; Tesco have a whole range of NVQ qualifications right 
through which take people up. They actually have seen that investing in the skills they 
keep them [employees] for a start. You know they don’t do it out of altruism, they do it 
because it makes good business sense: they’re better with their customers; they’re better 
with their products; there’s less wastage; and all the rest of it. I think that catches on. I 
think that is catching on.” (PM2) 
 
In essence the desire and pressure for more and better skills was explicitly described as 
emerging not from government alone but bottom-up from the productive economy 
(Denham, 2007); from business leaders who were actively engaged in skills 
development, had existing employee training aims and strategies, and who were 
setting an increasingly contagious and pervasive example within the business 
community. These imagined ‘enlightened’ businesses, at whom the Skills Strategy was 
aimed, were described in unequivocally different terms from businesses of the past. 
These businesses were neither indifferent to, nor sceptical of, the benefits of skills. 
They were not prepared to leave skills development to chance, or rely on reactive and 
remiss poaching strategies. In short, policy-makers presented the skills interests of 
enlightened businesses as wholly compatible with their own. Enlightened businesses 
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were narrated as recognising their share in the potential benefits and were, as such, 
imagined as invested, responsible and unequivocally necessary partners, alongside the 
state, in the skills vision and mission. Indeed, the perspective of policy-makers was that 
“it would be insane to do it without them really” (PM3). 
 
“I think we’ve past that stage where employers say ‘oh I don’t want my staffed trained’, 
you know, ‘I’ll go and head hunt from somewhere else if I want a skilled person’. I think 
most employers really do see that it’s their responsibility to help us here.” (PM4) 
 
Constructing the Motivated Worker-Citizen: a responsible and willing partner in skills 
 
Policy narratives also explicitly described worker-citizens as experiencing the 
difficulties of remaining competitive in the modern labour market. As discussed in the 
previous chapter policy-makers presented the notion of a ‘job for life’ as anachronistic, 
and drew on constant uncertainty and change to reframe employment risk 
management, security and prosperity, as emanating from skills-dependent progressive 
employability. By linking employment security and prosperity to progressive 
employability, on-going high(er) skills attainment was also credited as the principle 
means of unblocking and unlocking life chances and lifestyle betterment for individual 
worker-citizens, their families and wider communities, throughout the life course.  
Again, in imagining ‘motivated’ worker-citizens as cognisant of this putatively apparent 
reality policy was framed in language which spoke both to and for (on behalf of) their 
inherent interests. In other words, the complexity of the employment environment, 
and the impact of employment on living standards, was narrated by policy-makers as 
recognised by worker-citizens, and translated into a personal want and willingness to 
train and utilise their skills to increase their long-term employability-dependent 
welfare and well-being.  
 
“At the personal level, lack of skills and qualifications hold many adults back from 
realising their potential. Many are looking for a better job, a better standard of living, 
and more fulfilling lives. They know that the right skills could help them get there.” (DfES, 
2005a:6) 
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“Most people I meet, whether they are 16 or 60, acknowledge that taking a course could 
improve their prospects.” (Foreword by John Denham – DIUS, 2008a:3) 
 
Specifically, individual worker-citizens were depicted as predominantly economic 
actors, that recognise the interdependence of ‘skills for employment’ and ‘skills for 
a more rewarding life’, and sought to realise the benefits of training and 
qualifications as prosperity gains, associated with attaining the skills necessary to 
underwrite diverse current and future employability advancement potential.  
 
“The learner side is very interesting because most people who walk into an FE college for 
instance, if you talk to them, to learners or to prospective learners, they’re either looking 
for something for social interest – that’s the evening class student and the rest of it – but 
often beneath that, if you go beneath that, they have got a glint that they want to 
change their profession, you know they want to be in a different profession at some time. 
So that’s one group, but then the main people who come during the daytime – the full-
time young person or the full-time adult – what they want is the qualification at the end 
of it so that they can go and get a good job. So in a way they are the easiest of our 
stakeholders because they’re on the same wave length as the policy. They actually want 
that qualification to go and get a good job because they want to improve their lives.” 
(PM4) 
 
Again, by portraying such an image of worker-citizens policy-makers were able to 
insist that the drive for more and better skills emanates from the bottom-up; from 
responsible, motivated and ambitious individuals actively pursuing training and 
learning opportunities (Denham, 2007). As a consequence worker-citizens were also 
conceptualised as on the same page as policy. Interests (public and private) were 
compatible, benefits shared, and worker-citizens were understood to be willing and 
active partners, alongside the state, in the skills vision and mission.  
 
Positioning relationships between skills actors: the Responsible Workplace  
 
In describing images of actually existing bottom-up desire for more and better skills 
from ‘enlightened’ business and ‘motivated’ worker-citizens, policy-makers presented 
skills enhancement in these responsible workplaces as an issue of strong consensus 
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around the mutual aspiration to “raise our game” (Leitch, 2006:1). Taken together at 
the site of the imagined responsible workplace, employers and employees were 
conceptualised and narrated as allies. Both were willing and active partners. Both were 
convinced by the case for skills and had compatible interests in up-skilling; even if their 
drivers (profitability or employability) for engagement were different (see Chapter 5, 
section 5.3.3).  
 
“There is pressure from employers to meet their training needs, particularly for the high 
level skills the economy now demands. There is also pressure from individuals who want 
to move into or on at work.” (Denham, 2007:2) 
 
Indeed, policy-makers’ narratives further imagined this responsible workplace skills 
alliance to run deeper; cementing the coherence of attainment and application of skills 
in the mutual concern that both employers and employees had for each other’s 
aspirations and ambitions. Employees were described as having an intrinsic interest in 
the success of the business in which they work, and employers were described as 
having an (at least second-order) interest in the prosperity of their workers; even of 
society at large.  
 
“They [employees] want to improve their skills to improve their lives: if they improve 
their lives they’ll get better wages; that company will do better; it’s a [pause] that is part 
of it.” (PM4) 
 
“Well employers are more [pause]. I was going to say more interested in the economic 
agenda but actually there are many who are interested in the social inclusion agenda, 
either personally or because they know if society is more affluent then they will sell more 
of their products. So they themselves have a dual agenda. […] Those employers are very 
keen that their employees do training, and they are qualified.” (PM4) 
 
6.2.2 The ‘empowering’ role of the state 
 
In describing skills enhancement as an issue of partnership consensus, and the benefits 
as mutual and shared, policy-makers presented enlightened businesses and motivated 
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worker-citizens, interacting at the site of the responsible workplace, as necessarily 
predisposed to act in the national/public economic and social interest in relation to 
skills, as a consequence of pursuing their own end goal of progress and betterment. 
Subsequently, policy-makers’ narratives presented themselves as having a public 
obligation, and political mandate, to act in the private interest in relation to skills and 
support the actually existing progressive ambitions of businesses and worker-citizens.  
 
“It is in the interest of the UK government to have successful businesses. People often 
wonder why businesses should be supported by government but actually if you look at 
the GDP, and look at everything else, there is an interdependence that goes on there. 
Okay businesses make money for shareholders and all the rest of it, but actually the 
country gains tremendously.”(PM1) 
 
“I think [skills] is good politics. This is doing the nation - i.e. people who work in business, 
business itself, and as a result of that the communities that they operate in - this is doing 
the right thing, taking the right track.” (PM1) 
 
However, by defining skill as the manoeuvrability to cope with the putative complexity 
of a dynamic business environment and labour market (as discussed in the previous 
chapter), policy-makers rendered incompatible attempts, particularly by the state and 
its agents, to a priori prescribe and fix either the knowledge, capabilities and 
competencies that were required, or the production and employment strategies to 
which they should be applied. In the analysis of policy-makers, just as the progressive 
skills demands of enlightened businesses and motivated worker-citizens were for skills 
that enable flexibility and adaptability to successfully respond to uncertainty and rapid 
change, what constitutes skill and being skilled, and subsequently the training and 
learning opportunities available, must equally be flexible and adaptable to rapidly 
changing demand in response to an uncertain world (PIU, 2001:57). In short, attempts 
to centrally plan skills needs and impose a top-down agenda for production and 
employment success were presented by policy-makers as inherently problematic (DfES, 
2005a:3). 
 
“There is a massive problem in forecasting the future and politicians would be anxious to 
say this is not about picking winners” (PM3) 
 158
 
Instead policy-makers described their strategic role as “getting on for tactically 
neutral” (PM3), and policy narratives afforded a privileged status to the skills decisions 
and actions of enlightened businesses and motivated worker-citizens. They were 
positioned as “best placed to know what the future demands” (PM1); the specific 
knowledges, capabilities and competencies that were needed in light of changing 
production and employment requirements, and that would therefore constitute the 
realisation of collective economically and socially valuable ambitions. Furthermore, 
their investment as partners in a shared and vitally important skills vision was deemed 
only to be secured by ensuring that they were empowered to steer the skills project 
and product in accordance with their own interests, motivations, and ambitions (Leitch, 
2006:48). 
 
“The UK will not reap the benefits from a world class skills base […] unless the skills 
delivered are the ones employers and individuals need and businesses want, and know 
how to use effectively in the workplace. Similarly employers will not invest further in 
skills unless they can see the benefits that such an investment will bring and how they 
might use new skills.” (Leitch, 2006:89) 
 
“For people to consider improving their skills, they need to be aware of and motivated by 
the benefits of doing so. They must see a link between skills development and achieving 
their own personal ambitions, such as improving their career, or being able to help their 
children with their homework” (Leitch, 2006:106) 
 
“Addressing the national skills challenge will be far more effective if individual employers 
and learners make it their own agenda, which they pursue energetically because it helps 
them achieve their own goals and ambitions.” (DfES, 2005a:25) 
 
As a consequence of presenting a case for both trust in the consensus of privately held 
aspirations at the site of the responsible workplace, and the inability of governments, 
and its delivery agents, to prescribe need, policy-makers carved out space for, and 
legitimised, their intervention in both promoting the skills interests and empowering 
the skills decisions of private actors (DIUS, 2007a:44); facilitating a responsible 
workplace-led partnership for high(er) skills. Leitch (2006:48) identified the role of 
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government in “empowering people and employers to make the right training decisions 
for themselves.” 
 
“The government’s intention in introducing the Skills Strategy was to empower people at 
the workplace; I mean empower businesses, but in empowering businesses empower 
their employees.” (PM1) 
 
The depiction of an ‘empowering’ role for the state to meet mutually responsible 
aspirations, had corresponding and significant implications for the way in which the 
institutional arrangements for skilling were considered best organised in order to 
capture and respond to the actually existing and mutually progressive demands of 
businesses and worker-citizens (PIU, 2001:57). 
 
6.2.3 Imagining and structuring the skills delivery architecture: a demand-led system 
 
Overcoming the problems of the supply-led system: 
 
Having established the basis for a policy logic that extends from ‘empowering’ the 
aspirations of imagined skills responsible workplaces, policy-makers presented a highly 
critical analysis of the hitherto ‘supply-led’ system. The supply-led system was 
explained as a fallacious attempt to centrally determine and plan skills – to “predict 
and provide” (Leitch, 2006:48) - and, as such, was considered to have resoundingly 
failed to meet the need for economically and socially valuable and valued skills and 
qualifications. Specifically, policy-makers’ narratives discredited the supply-led system 
as susceptible to degenerating into a mechanism that privileges and responds to the 
beliefs and interests of misguided politicians, focused blindly on qualification 
attainment figures rather than relevance and quality.  
 
“We’ve been so interested in what I call ‘process rather than product’ that we’ve failed to 
recognise that simply letting people drop off the end of the conveyor belt with a 
particular qualification has not in fact enhanced our nation in terms of its 
competitiveness. What it’s done is to satisfy politicians who’ve said:  ‘well we’ve 
achieved that’.” (PM2) 
 160
Consequently, the focus on ‘process’ in the supply-led system was further criticised for 
creating conditions, and enabling them to remain unchecked, in which funding bodies 
and providers understood their role, and benefited accordingly, from filling and 
completing courses regardless of their utility for businesses and worker-citizens; 
becoming an inherently venal and self-serving system. The usual stereotypes of 
unscrupulous colleges receiving funding for persuading unwitting learners to sign up 
for “NVQ level 2 egg painting” and the like (PM3), were dusted off and rehearsed to 
make the argument that the skills required to meet progressive workplace aspirations 
were not for funding bodies and delivery agents to define and determine, and anyway 
an education and training system characterised by unchecked supplier privilege was 
unlikely to induce incentives for them to do so (Leitch, 2006:111).   
 
Having identified a ‘mismatch’ between the skill needs and wants of businesses and 
worker-citizens, and the types of courses and modes of delivery typically offered by 
publically-funded providers in a supply-led model (DfES, 2003:19), policy-makers’ 
narratives described employers and employees as: manipulated by providers; 
frustrated about the lack of applicability of training and qualifications; concerned 
about quality; and put off by ossified, bureaucratic delivery arrangements that 
hampered accessibility (PM1; PM3; PM4; Strategy Unit, 2002; Leitch, 2006). In addition, 
a self-serving system, in which producers benefited from selling quantity, was 
considered to have led to an unwieldy plethora and complex variety of skills and 
qualification products39 (Leitch, 2006:71).  
 
As a consequence employers and employees were considered to have become 
alienated from engagement with publically-funded training and learning40, and the 
supply-led system was further criticised for creating barriers to employer and 
employee involvement and investment in up-skilling (Leitch, 2006:48) despite their 
enlightened and motivated aspirations. To overcome the problems inherent to the 
supply-led system policy-makers proposed new, as well as restructured and 
reorganised institutions of skills delivery that realigned the focus of the skills product 
on meeting the demands of businesses and worker-citizens as partner-customers.  
                                               
39 Leitch (2006:80) reports that there are in excess of 22,636 qualifications in the UK.  
40 Leitch (2006:12) reports that less than 10% of employer training is conducted in further education 
colleges.  
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“For too long skills development has been based on what is provided, not what is needed. 
I believe that for Government to deliver improvements, public services have to be rebuilt 
around the needs of customers.” (Foreword by Tony Blair - Strategy Unit, 2002:2) 
 
Making customers: voice and choice in the responsive demand-led system 
 
In contrast to the “predict and provide” (Leitch, 2006:48) supply-led system of the past, 
policy-makers proposed a ‘demand-led’ approach – able to “adapt and respond” 
(Leitch, 2006:69) - which they claimed would be able to foster the conditions necessary 
to treat imagined enlightened businesses and motivated worker-citizens as ‘customers’ 
of the skills system (DfES, 2003:35; DIUS, 2007a:11). Putting them, and their needs, in 
the “driving seat” in terms of determining service delivery priorities (DfES, 2006:35; 
DfES, 2005a:11).  
 
“The Government’s job is to ensure that the skills system delivers what employers need – 
high quality, responsive training that helps employers to improve their businesses and 
employees to improve their lives.” (DIUS, 2007b:2) 
 
“What all our reforms have in common is that they are trying to put the customer – in 
this case, adult learners and employers – first. We call this our ‘demand-led’ approach.” 
(DIUS, 2007a:7) 
 
Central to the conceptualisation of a demand-led system, that remakes businesses and 
worker-citizens as empowered partner-customers, were policy discourses and 
practices (operationalised mechanisms) of ‘voice and choice’ (DfES, 2005a:3). 
 
Raising voices: routes to responsive skills  
 
Throughout the progression of the New Labour Skills Strategy, policy-makers’ 
narratives consistently placed considerable emphasis on the intention to give 
employers and employees a “strong and coherent voice” (Leitch, 2006:17) to better 
articulate their demands. In particular, policy-makers talked about the need to 
“strengthen the employer voice” (Leitch, 2006:71; DIUS, 2007a:36) by enhancing their 
leadership role and influence over the organisations that made up the institutional 
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architecture, and specific skills policies and practices (DUIS, 2007a:36; DIUS, 2008b:9). 
The term ‘demand-led’ was therefore often, but not exclusively, used synonymously 
with ‘employer-led’; as policy-makers reiterated the imagery they had shaped of 
consensus and alliance between the skills interests of businesses and worker-citizens. 
Specifically, policy-makers described a circular logic that explained productivity 
benefits for employers as a precondition and pre-emptive of employment benefits for 
employees, whilst retaining the potential to treat worker-citizens as customers of skills 
in their own right.   
 
Organisations and partnership alliances responsible for aspects of skills delivery were 
established or remodelled (as an institutional ramification of imagined ‘responsible 
workplaces’) with a specific remit to be the voice of business, communicate their 
needs, and raise their influence over the system. In particular the UK Commission for 
Employment and Skills (UKCES) - proposed in the Leitch Review of Skills (2006) and 
established in April 2008 to “champion the development of an effective and more 
demand-led skills and employment system across the UK” (UKCES, 2009a:6) – was 
described as being able to act in this capacity as a consequence of being ‘employer-led’ 
(UKCES, 2010:5)41. In practice policy-makers attempted to give the term ‘employer-led’ 
meaning through the prescription of organisational governance arrangements. Such 
as: the appointment of an ‘eminent business leader’ as chair; employer representation 
and active participation on the board; and the direct involvement of the Director 
General of the CBI and General Secretary of the TUC  (Leitch, 2006:18). As well as by 
giving the UKCES a remit and requirement to generally build strong relationships with 
                                               
41 Prior to the implementation of the recommendations of the Leitch Review of Skills, employer and 
employee representatives were involved in overseeing skills strategy design and implementation in 
England via membership on high-level strategic groups such as the ‘Skills Alliance’ - a Ministerially-led 
group consisting of senior representation of Government departments, delivery agencies such as the 
major skills funding bodies and Jobcentre Plus, representatives of providers, as well as key external 
organisations, particularly the CBI, TUC and NIACE (Leitch, 2006:73). In addition employers held a skills 
advisory role as participants in the ‘Skills for Business Network’ (SfB), led by the Sector Skills 
Development Agency (SSDA), originally responsible for establishing, overseeing and (re) licensing Sector 
Skills Councils, and the National Employment Panel (NEP) and its local coalitions (Leitch, 2006:73). The 
Leitch Review of Skills (2006) recommended the dissolution of these mechanisms of employer 
involvement in favour of the establishment of a new national employer-led Commission for Employment 
and Skills. The UKCES was originally created by the merger of the SSDA and the NEP, and is ostensibly 
the re-manifestation and (remains the) current locus of the Skills Alliance.  
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employers and Trade Unions (DIUS, 2007a:39; UKCES, 2009a:6)42 in order to act as a 
credible and relevant voice of the skills partners (UKCES, 2009a:6).  
 
Equally the Sector Skills Councils (SSCs)43 were set up with the role to “build a skills 
system that is driven by employer demand” (UKCES, 2008a:4). They were also required 
to be led by employers (DfES, 2006:39), and as such were intended to function as “a 
major new voice for employers and employees in each major sector of the economy” 
(DfES, 2003:14).  Like the UKCES, SSCs were considered to be ‘employer-led’, and 
therefore able to carry out their remit to articulate the skills demands of employers in 
their sector as a consequence of having business representation involved in their 
organisational governance; ensuring that employers could direct their work and have 
‘confidence’ in SSC leadership (UKCES, 2008b:7). Indeed, for policy-makers the critical 
test for any SSCs - upon which its very continuation was dependent (UKCES, 2008a:5) - 
was its ability to “command powerful support from its industry” (UKCES, 2008b:13).44   
 
“The most fundamental test of each SSC will be whether it carries the confidence and 
support of its industry.” (UKCES, 2008a:5) 
 
“The big, big thing for them [SSCs] is employer engagement. If they don’t get employer 
engagement then their Sector Skills Council doesn’t work. You know you can have all the 
best ideas in the world but unless it’s employer driven…” (PM1) 
 
Indeed all organisations within the institutional framework of skills delivery - both 
those newly established under the auspices of the New Labour Skills Strategy, and 
those that pre-existed this policy era - were (re)described as having an explicit purpose 
and remit to be led by employer voice that articulates the aspirations and demands of 
                                               
42 On its current website the UKCES describes itself as a “social partnership, led by Commissioners from 
large and small employers, trade unions and the voluntary sector.” (UKCES, 2011) 
43 SSCs were established to replace the 73 former National Training Organisations. They were introduced 
in phases and initially licensed from 2003 to 2006. At the time of conducting fieldwork there were 25 
SSCs, however, following the relicensing process that commenced in 2008 this number has since been 
rationalised to 22. According to the UKCES (2008a:13; 2011) and the Alliance of Sector Skills Councils 
(ASSC) the network has achieved approximately 90% coverage of workforce activity across the UK 
economy.  
44 SSCs have gone through periodic relicensing, which has involved audit and inspection of their 
functions undertaken by the UKCES with involvement from the National Audit Office. The 2008-2009 
relicensing process principally focused on the degree to which the SSCs had achieved ‘employer 
engagement’. 
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businesses and worker-citizens. Along with the UKCES and SSCs, policy-makers’ 
narratives first tasked the LSC to reconceptualise its role in order to better capture the 
voice of business and relinquish its previous responsibility for planning skills supply 
(Leitch, 2006:76; DIUS, 2007a:49); and later proposed the replacement of the LSC with 
a new Skills Funding Agency more explicitly focused on overseeing a system more able 
to respond to demand by ensuring a funding mechanism that follows the purchasing 
choices of ‘customers’ (DCSF & DIUS, 2008:11)45.  
 
Equally skills providers were described as having a core requirement to engage with, 
and enhance their understanding of, employers’ workforce skills needs, and (re)focus 
their activity accordingly.  
 
“We will expect the colleges, universities and training providers that supply education 
and training to be increasingly responsive to what learners and employers actually 
want.” (DIUS, 2007a:7) 
 
Following the Foster Review into the future role of Further Education (FE) Colleges 
(Foster, 2005), policy-makers gave employers the authority to propose and sponsor 
National Skills Academies to lead networks of specialist providers in developing and 
delivering training and learning for their sector (DfES, 2006:26). These Academies were 
also explicitly described as employer-led. As one policy-maker explained, the principle 
aim was to reposition all the elements of the skills delivery infrastructure around the 
same purpose – to capture, listen to, and respond to the demands of their customer. 
 
“If you look at the Sector Skills Councils, which are the main partners in putting all this 
together, it is very much in their interest to make sure that both the employer – because 
it’s employer-led – is on board, but also the employees, and the Sector Skills Councils all 
work with the Trade Unions to try and keep that relationship on board. Then obviously 
LSC and providers, and now there are a number of manufacturing academies and stuff 
like that, so all of them have the same remit; they’re all there for a purpose; from the 
nuts and bolts of it they all have just exactly the same purpose.” (PM1)  
                                               
45 The LSC was officially abolished and replaced with the Skills Funding Agency on 1 April 2010. At the 
time of proposing the establishment of the new Skills Funding Agency the decision was described by 
policy-makers as underscoring a further move towards a more responsive and flexible demand-led 
system facilitated by an agency more explicitly focused on funding rather than planning skills provision.  
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The dominant rationale presented for organising institutions around enhanced 
customer voice was to create a system that was directed by, and responsive to, the 
articulated need for economically and socially valuable and valued skills and 
qualifications; ensuring that these needs, rather than the self-interest of providers, 
drove the design and delivery of provision (PIU, 2001:8; DfES, 2006:6). Again, policy 
discourses tended to preference the influence of employers; privileging their right to 
determine the skills and qualifications that are needed, and how they should be 
delivered (DfES, 2003:21), for both business productivity and associated worker-citizen 
employability. Again policy-makers validated the privileging of employer skills 
decisions as simultaneously the best means to ensure valuable training and learning 
for worker-citizens, by imagining employers as acting in ways that secured improved 
productivity and competitiveness that were inherently and entirely compatible with 
improving employability prospects. As such, although the actual policy mechanisms 
proposed offered more limited avenues by which the voice of worker-citizens could 
directly influence the design and delivery of skills products, policy-makers were able to 
imagine and narrate an employer-led system as, in practice, responding to employee 
needs and securing their confidence in the training and learning outputs. For example, 
policy narratives spoke of SCCs as needing to function as a  
 
“[…]strong mechanism to ensure that employers, sector by sector, can shape the training 
provided by the system, helping also to ensure a continued focus on what will be of most 
value to learners” (DfES, 2006:22).  
 
“The Sector Skills Councils have got a job to do in making sure that all the qualifications 
we’re offering are fit for purpose, and then it makes the life of the college and the 
provider much easier because they know that those qualifications that they get funding 
for have got the credibility with employers, and therefore when the learner comes along 
they are feeling very confident because they know if they’ve got this NVQ in construction, 
or in plumbing, or in childcare, the industry thinks it’s a really good qualification, so 
therefore you get this buoyancy of confidence being built up” (PM4) 
 
Specifically, a number of tools and mechanisms were established in policy with the 
intention of operationalising the vital influence of employers over the design and 
delivery of skills and qualifications. SSCs were charged to work with employers to 
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develop Sector Skills Agreements (SSAs) with businesses in their ‘footprint’46. The SSAs 
were described by policy-makers as a means of setting out the skills priorities of the 
sector and establishing a Sector Qualification Strategy (SQS) that reflected the 
qualifications employers, and therefore employees, find valuable (Leitch, 2006:74; 
DfES, 2006:22).  
 
Policy-makers’ narratives described the outcome of increasing employer voice and 
influence over curriculum and qualifications as serving to energise engagement with, 
and investment in, skills training. The outcome of refocusing provision in accordance 
with captured demand was considered to be an increase in customer, particularly 
employer, investment in skills. A demand-led system was therefore offered as a 
remedy to the stifling influence that the perverse incentives structure of the supply-led 
system was perceived to have on actually existing skills aspirations of enlightened 
businesses and motivated worker-citizens.  
 
“We will give employers the opportunity to exert real leverage and decision-making over 
both the content and delivery of skills […] programmes. That will help us to build 
employer confidence in the qualification and learning programmes provided by 
universities, colleges and training providers, and it will open the door to increased 
employer investment in skills.” (DIUS, 2007a:11) 
 
“Building a demand-led system is the only way in which to increase employer and 
individual investment in skills and ensure that increased investment delivers 
economically valuable skills” (Leitch, 2006:49) 
 
Exercising choice: routes to responsive skills 
 
The other important dimension to the remaking of businesses and worker-citizens as 
skills ‘partner-customers’ was illuminated in the way policy-makers narrated 
discourses and practices of increased choice. Again, when policy-makers promoted the 
need for greater priority to be given to the choices of partner-customers, they drew 
                                               
46 In the Skills Strategy lexicon a SSCs ‘footprint’ is a way of describing the boundaries of inclusion that 
delimit a particular Councils sectoral coverage. It is shorthand for all the industries, occupations and 
specific businesses/organisations that are represented by the particular Sector Skills Council and thus 
constitute the ‘sector’.  
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specifically on their conceptualisation of businesses as ‘enlightened’ and worker-
citizens as ‘motivated’; reemphasising the coherence of private and public interests in 
progressive skills such that the national Skills Strategy was presented as principally 
functioning to liberate responsible personal choices.  
 
“You and I might make personal choices about where we choose to develop our skills 
because of where we think the labour market is going, so it’s kind of doing that on a 
national level really” (PM3) 
 
In terms of best promoting the exercise of choice, policy-makers commonly extolled 
the virtues of mechanisms designed to boost the ‘purchasing power’ of both 
employers and employees, and contrasted them with the depiction of the “you’ll-get-
what-you’re-given” (PM4)  approach to determining the training and learning offer 
available under a supply-led system. Policy-makers envisaged, and sought to affect, the 
boosting of employer purchasing power by routing significant proportions of the adult 
learning budget through Train to Gain. The Train to Gain service was introduced in 
200647. It offered employers free or subsidised training for their lower skilled 
employees48, and brokerage expertise to support them in translating their skills needs 
into relevant and sourced packages of study and qualifications for their workforce 
(DfES, 2006:40; LSC, 2007:3; DIUS, 2007a:56).  
 
As such, policy-makers emphasised the most important feature of Train to Gain to be 
ensuring that funding for training and learning followed and reflected employer 
demand. Policy-makers described the changes as meaning providers were no longer 
able to attempt to predict need and recruit learners to planned provision; instead 
providers could only receive funding for programmes that had been validated and 
agreed to by employers.  
 
                                               
47 Train to Gain followed on from the Employer Training Pilots (ETP) trialled in England in 2002 with the 
intention of testing a new approach to workforce training; particularly the training of low skilled 
employees (Leitch, 2006:75) 
48 The New Labour Government introduced a new entitlement to a free first full NVQ level 2 
qualification and, in specific cases, a free or subsidised NVQ level 3 qualification. Employers could access 
this entitlement via Train to Gain to fund training for their low skilled employees 
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‘You [provider] can’t get the funding for a course unless an employer agrees to buy it on 
behalf of their staff. […] The employer has to sign up to the plan which says: ‘yes these 
are the skills that my business needs’; as opposed to: ‘I’ll just take what you give me or 
get nothing’. Now you can only give me something if I agree to take it, and you don’t get 
the money unless I agree to take it” (PM3) 
 
This policy-maker went on to describe the new process – that gives employers 
purchasing clout to realise their choices in meeting their needs - as a change for the 
better to the “balance of power” (PM3) between the partner-customer and the 
supplier of training and learning. In policy-makers’ narratives, reforms that put 
purchasing power in the hands of employers were considered a crucial element in 
increasing engagement and investment in skills and qualifications (PIU, 2001:8). These 
reforms would, it was suggested, ensure demand leads supply, and counteract the self-
serving incentive structures that had prohibited providers aligning their courses and 
qualifications with need (Leitch, 2006:85).  
 
In addition to Train to Gain - the principal mechanism for improving employer choice - 
Individual Skills Accounts were introduced49 to provide a mechanism for supporting 
worker-citizens in exercising choice. Individual Skills Accounts were described as virtual 
funding (DIUS, 2007a:27) or a ‘training voucher’ (PM3); and as designed to enhance 
the purchasing power of the worker-citizen/learner by enabling them to exercise 
choice over courses and providers. Again, by improving the purchasing power of 
worker-citizens/learners as customers, policy-makers expected to improve 
engagement with, and investment in training and learning. Policy-makers perceived an 
individual’s motivation to participate with skills and qualification to derive from having 
a sense of choice and ownership over what they do and where (DfES, 2005a:21), in 
order to meet their responsible and progressive skills aspirations (DfES, 2006:18).  
 
Taken together, both the demand-led (voice-led) institutions and the choice-led policy 
mechanisms were narrated by policy-makers as empowering; designed, by 
government, to improve the responsiveness of the skills system and the institutions of 
supply. 
                                               
 49 Learner Accounts were one of the recommendations of the Leitch Review of Skills (2006) piloted in 
2007/08 and rolled out across England in 2010.  
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“The advent of Skills Accounts and the growth of Train to Gain herald a radically different 
model of organisation of the skills system, where the role of Government is to ensure 
that customers are empowered, well-informed and well-supported, so that demand can 
lead supply”. (DCSF/DIUS, 2008:11) 
 
6.2.4 Summary: The Demand-led Strategy 
 
Figure 6.2 below illustrates the findings of this chapter. Overall the chapter presents a 
distinct demand-led strategy for skills based on a particular arrangement of skills 
actors and the relationships between them defined, articulated, and assembled into an 
order and system of organisation by the state, in relation to imagined responsible 
workplaces.  
 
The image of responsible workplaces follows directly from the way in which policy-
makers construe and construct the logic for skills as a shared ‘partnership’ concern in 
pursuit of sought after ‘progress’. Enlightened employers and motivated employees, 
interacting at the site of the workplace, were depicted as cognisant of the uncertainty-
based complexity of their environment, and as having rational and shared self interest 
in mitigating this complexity through the attainment and utilisation of higher skills. 
That the private interests of businesses and worker-citizens were perceived as also in 
the public/national interest of UK plc. and UK social (Chapter 5, section 5.3.2) afforded 
a privileged position to employer and employee demand to drive the skills partnership. 
Policy-makers then defined the role of the state as an empowering facilitator and 
enabler of the high(er) skills aspirations and behaviours of these responsible 
workplaces. The state was positioned between the workplace partnership and the 
institutions of skill delivery to realign skills supply in response to the voice and choice 
of partner-customers.  
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Figure 6.2: The Demand-led Strategy  
 
 
 
Source: author’s analysis, compilation and design  
 
6.3 Discussion and Concluding Reflections 
 
As stated in the introduction, this chapter is one of two focused on exposing, 
explaining and understanding the relationship between the formal dimension of skill 
policy (Chapter 5) - the semiotic construal and construction of ‘progress in partnership’ 
as the ‘object’ of governance (Jessop, 2008; Jessop, 2009), in relation to a selected 
economic and social imaginary defined by complexity and coherence - and the 
operational dimension of ‘how skills are done’. (I borrow the terms and distinctions 
between ‘formal’ and ‘operational’ dimensions of policy from Carmel & Papadopoulos, 
2003).  
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The argument of both chapters is that the operational dimension of skills policy (doing 
skills under New Labour) involved discursively and materially ‘articulating’ and 
‘assembling’ the components parts of the skills project: imagined skills actors; the 
relations between them at the site of the workplace; the form of the state; and the 
organisational arrangements, resources, practices, and processes for skills delivery, 
into distinct architectures of skill governance. The foundation of these architectures is 
the imagined degree of responsible skill aspiration and behaviour of workplace actors 
in relation to the high(er) skills logic established in policy. (I borrow the concepts of 
‘articulation’ and ‘assemblage’ from Newman & Clarke, 2009a:8-9).  
 
Although the main discussion and concluding reflections regarding how New Labour 
used the logic for high(er) skills to order and organise the operational dimension skill 
policy will be provided at the end of Chapter 7, it is worth making a few points here in 
relation to the articulation and assemblage of the demand-led strategy for skills. One 
of three skills strategies for England under New Labour identified in this thesis.  
 
The demand-led strategy starts from the image of enlightened and motivated 
employers and employees within a responsible workplace partnership, constructed 
and narrated as having high(er) skills aspirations and behaviours in close proximity to 
those required to achieve ‘progress in partnership’. From this articulation of 
workplaces as having internalised the logic for high(er) skills, the other components 
parts of the skills project were articulated and assembled by the state (not a neutral 
state à la VoC, or a  straightforwardly partisan state à la PRA) so that the overall order 
and system of organisation involved the arrangement and sequencing of:  
o Enlightened employers and motivated employees (section 6.2.1) 
o Interacting in a responsible (high skills) workplace partnership (section 6.2.1) 
o Empowered by the state (section 6.2.2) 
o Through a demand-led system of skill delivery (section 6.2.3) 
 
The analytical strength of the concepts of ‘articulation’ and ‘assemblage’ are shown in 
the way in which they draw attention to and explain the complex practices and 
processes involved in the continuous semiotic construal and construction of economic 
and social imaginaries, and the associated objects and subjects of governance; the way 
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in which meanings make policies and policies make meanings (also Carmel & 
Papadopoulos, 2003; Ball, 2007). Practices and processes that involve on-going work 
(in this case state work) to meaningfully (re)make, (re)produce or disrupt discursive 
and material alignments and alliances (Newman & Clarke, 2009a; Jessop, 2004) 
between workplaces, workplace actors, skills delivery and the state. The ongoing-ness 
and partiality/incompleteness of this work (shown through the combination of the 
finding of this Chapter and the next) highlights its fragility and instability; its exposure 
to redirection, contestation, and resistance, (which will be the focus of Chapter 8).  
 
The demand-led strategy involves making-up/imagining ‘progressive’ workplaces and 
workplace actor relations, based on subject positions and subjectivities associated with 
enlightened employers and motivated employees, that have some partial resemblance 
to ‘actually existing’ workplaces. But that involves discursively accentuating and 
extending aspects and features of these sites and the interactions within them, whilst 
subverting and obscuring others. Furthermore, the demand-led strategy involves 
bringing workplaces into alignment with some aspects and features of economic and 
social state projects and policies (supporting economic competitiveness and better 
social functioning) and in relation to a selected interpretation of the delivery of skills 
products and services (ossified and self-serving). Overall, articulating and assembling 
the demand-led strategy is an exercise in selective discursive exaggeration and 
caricature to present a bounded version of the policy terrain – normatively prescribed 
objects and subjects of governance (Carmel & Harlock, 2008) - that presumes certain 
modes and mechanisms of governing to act as regulatory and distributional devises; 
determining who does what, gets what and how. In this case determining relations 
between workplaces, the state, and the institutions of skills delivery as governed 
through a ‘workplace-led’ and enabled partnership. As such, we can see this form of 
governing - the demand-led strategy - as the “institutional crystallisation of particular 
discourses” (Carmel & Papadopolos, 2003:33).  
 
In conclusion the chapter has shown that the demand-led strategy for skills represents 
an instance of fragile discursive and material assemblage. The selecting, bringing 
together, arranging and sequencing of a set of articulated and linked ideas, images, 
actors, institutions, technologies, techniques, or tools of skills delivery, that order and 
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organise the governance of skills policy to create a seemingly coherent response to 
solve a problem; the low skills problem in England. In the demand-led strategy, where 
employers and employees are invited to see themselves as enlightened and motivated 
about the potential of high(er) skills, and the state affords itself an obligation and 
mandate to empower private skills decision in the public interest, the problem of low 
skills in England – the stick in the cogs of the ‘progress in partnership’ wheel - is a 
system of delivery that needs to redirect its activity; adapting and responding to the 
responsible skills aspirations and behaviours of workplace partner-customers.  
 
Chapter 7, to which we now turn, will however show that this was not the only way in 
which the problem of low skills in England was given meaning in relation to complexity 
and coherence, and depicted and narrated as being responded too by the state. The 
demand-led strategy represents one strand of state work to narrate one version of the 
workplace and the skills system in response, and therefore one conjunctural possibility 
for relating the formal dimension of policy (‘what is to be governed’) to the operational 
dimension (‘how skills were done’).  
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7. Governing Workplaces II: The Multiple Strategies for Skills   
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
his chapter provides the second part of the interpretive analytical work to 
explicate the multiple strategies for skills from within the New Labour high(er) 
skills project for England, and address the second empirical sub-question (SRQ2) of this 
thesis: ‘how was the logic for a high(er) skills project used to order and organise skills 
policy in England?’. Following on from the previous chapter (Chapter 6) it presents 
state work to articulate and assemble two further skills strategies in relation to: two 
versions of negatively imagined ‘inert’ or ‘irresponsible’ workplaces; encountering an 
‘enhancing’ or ‘exhorting/emancipating’ state; and therefore either a ‘system to lead 
demand’ for skills, or a ‘system to mitigate and circumvent lack of demand’. In other 
words this chapter presents two further distinct architectures of skill governance in 
England under New Labour that are based on: re-imagined skills actors; the relations 
between them at the site of the workplace; the form and role of the state; and the 
organisational arrangements, resources, practices and processes for skill delivery. The 
reconstructing, re-categorising and repositioning of workplace skills actors is based on 
their imagined distance from responsible skill aspiration and behaviour in relation to 
the high(er) skills logic of progress in partnership.  
 
The first main section that follows (section 7.2) presents the imaginary of inert 
workplaces as required to raise their responsibility for high(er) skills. In this workplace 
type, businesses and worker-citizens are perceived as deficient partners in the skills 
project; lacking the capacity and capability to demonstrate sufficiently progressive 
skills aspirations. Such an image suggests the requirement for an enhancing role of the 
state to drive the skills vision forward via ambitious targets for betterment, and a 
(re)structured system of skills delivery to lead raised levels of skill demand.  
 
The second main section that follows (section 7.3) presents the imaginary of 
irresponsible workplaces; an imaginary that predominantly involves the juxtaposition 
of either skills deviant businesses and disempowered and vulnerable worker-citizens, 
T 
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or skills deviant worker-citizens and disempowered and vulnerable businesses. Such an 
imaginary suggests the need for an emancipating form and role for the state, and 
institutions of skills delivery that attempt to change attitudes and mitigate bad 
behaviour and/or release the disempowered and vulnerable party by circumventing 
the deviance of the other. In this context skills become the means to free the 
progressive aspirations of disempowered and vulnerable worker-citizens from the 
bondage of the ‘bad boss’ in the low-skills business, and skills become the means by 
which businesses can free their progressive aspirations, which are suffocated by the 
indolence of the low-skilled ‘bad worker’.  
 
Having presented these two further strategies for skills; strategies based on negatively 
imaged workplaces operating at degrees of distance from the high(er) skills logic, the 
chapter concludes with a discussion of, and reflection on, the analysis of findings 
presented in both Chapter 6 and this chapter (Chapter 7). In particular the issue of 
policy opacity – the muddled blurring of the lines between distinct strategies – will be 
returned to.  
 
7.2 Inert Workplaces: An enhancing state, leading demand for skills 
 
“We have committed to joining the worlds ‘premier league’ for skills. This will require an 
enormous shift in attitudes and aspirations […]. For the Government, it means adopting 
a much more positive approach […]. It means encouraging people to raise their 
aspirations for themselves.” (DIUS, 2007a:3) 
 
This section presents the policy imaginary of ‘inert workplaces’ within which employers 
and employees demonstrated blocked and therefore deficient, skills aspirations and 
behaviours in relation to mitigating complexity and mediating coherence of high(er) 
skills. In response policy-makers depicted an ‘enhancing’ role for the state – to 
communicate a vision and drive the direction of progress via high(er) skills targets – 
realised by remaking the organisations of skills delivery to ‘lead’ the demand of 
employers and employees as ‘partner-subjects’ of the Skills Strategy for England.  
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7.2.1 Constructing and Positioning the Deficient Skills Partnership  
 
Policy-makers narratives’ imagined and described employers and employees, 
interacting at the site of the ‘inert’ workplace, as demonstrating deficient skills 
aspirations and behaviours. In this workplace imaginary policy-makers depicted both 
businesses and worker-citizens as experiencing barriers to engaging in education and 
training, associated with lack of motivation and means to up-skill; trapping them in 
short-termist low skills equilibrium (Finegold & Soskice, 1988; Wilson & Hogarth, 2003). 
As such the ‘problem’ of deficient skills aspirations and behaviours was considered to 
emanate from – was a consequence and condition of – the structure and effect of inert 
workplaces.  
 
In response, policy-makers presented the ‘solution’ to this experience of low skills 
equilibrium as equally emanating from within the workplace. Albeit as a consequence 
and condition of state support to affect the reciprocal influence employers and 
employees could have over each other by each upgrading their skills-led ambition, and  
thereby catapulting the workplace forwards towards a better, more progressive 
performance culture.  
 
Constructing the inert Business:  a deficient partner in skills 
 
In contrast to the discursively constructed depiction of businesses as ‘enlightened’ 
responsible partners in the progressive skills project, policy-makers’ narratives also 
presented a distinct image of ‘inert’ businesses. Despite overwhelming pressures to 
up-rate their product market and production strategies and techniques, these 
businesses exhibited sluggish/deficient skills behaviours (DIUS, 2007a:38). They were 
imagined as principally suffering from a lack of capacity and capability to overcome the 
barriers they face in rethinking and upgrading their skills aspirations.  To act in their 
own best interests to develop the progressive skills needed to mitigate challenges and 
exploit opportunities inherent to the complexity of their competitive operating 
environment.  
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This image of inert workplaces was exposed, in part, where policy-makers presented 
and lamented past failures to embrace the potential of skills. Failures which gave the 
UK a comparatively poor baseline position from which to embark on a skills mission, 
and carve out a competitive high-skills space in the global knowledge-based economy. 
Although in general policy-makers’ narratives tended to place blame for the national 
skills deficit with the ossified and self-serving education and training system (see 
Chapter 6, section 6.2.3 and Leitch, 2006:39; Leitch, 2005), employer risk aversion (PIU, 
2001:34) compounded by poor strategic management capacity to effectively utilise 
skills (Leitch, 2005:5), in a voluntarist system, was also highlighted as contributing to 
the problem. The implied concern was that, left to their own devices, employers had 
not yet responded to the need to generate and utilise high(er) skills, and could 
therefore be considered unlikely to step up to what policy-makers perceive to be the 
more urgent necessity to do so now.  
 
In accounting for under investment in skills, policy-makers’ narratives insisted on the 
recognition of ‘actually existing’ barriers to training faced by many employers. 
Contradicting the portrayal of ‘enlightened’ businesses as actively engaged - for 
rational, self-interested profit-making purposes - in the up-skilling of their low skilled 
workforce (section 6.2.1). A counter-narrative existed that presented, as accepted 
wisdom, the problem of employers realising negligible returns from lower levels of 
training whilst risking their staff being poached by their competitors (Leitch, 2006:92), 
and recognised that low skills product market and production strategies, once adopted 
and embedded, are difficult to break away from (PIU, 2001:33; Strategy Unit, 2002). 
Policy-makers further justified the barriers businesses face, and their limited capacity 
to train, by reference to dynamic economic cycles (more pronounced in certain 
sectors) and their relative size (PM3). In general smaller businesses were portrayed as 
experiencing the greatest barriers to training their staff, but importantly, not because 
they don’t want to (PM4). They were presented in policy narratives as less resilient to 
training ‘risks’; less able to absorb the cost of fees and lost work hours; and as having 
less capacity to plan long-term skills needs strategically.  
 
 178
“One of the difficulties, that I think in part is dependent on economic cycle, is that it’s 
very difficult to focus on three or five years ahead when what you’re really trying to do is 
survive the next three months.” (PM3) 
 
“We still have a problem with smaller and medium sized companies, who cannot 
somehow manage to get training in as part of their normal yearly pattern of activity, but 
that’s not because they don’t want to now.” (PM4) 
 
Overall, the image that policy-makers presented here was one of businesses struggling 
against their experience of barriers to training and utilising more and better skills, 
despite potentially harbouring progressive ambitions, and therefore as stuck in a short-
termist trap of low skills aspiration and behaviour (Leitch, 2006:59). These ‘inert’ 
businesses were portrayed in policy-makers’ narratives as requiring encouragement 
and support to enhance their skills demand.  
 
Constructing the inert Worker-Citizen:  a deficient partner in skills 
 
Again, in contrast to the discursively constructed depiction of employees as 
‘motivated’ responsible partners in the progressive skills project, policy-makers’ 
narratives also presented a distinct image of ‘inert’ worker-citizens. In this construction, 
worker-citizens were also portrayed as suffering from a lack of capacity and capability 
to act in their own best interests. Similarly to ‘inert’ businesses, they were described as 
generally less able to respond to the pressure to skill and enhance their employability 
in an uncertain and competitive labour market.  
 
This image essentially encapsulates policy-makers identification of low skills demand 
amongst low-skilled, low-paid worker-citizens, stuck in a trap of low skills ambition. 
What Gordon Brown MP – then Prime Minister - referred to in a speech delivered at 
Greenwich University as “inequalities in aspiration” (Brown, 2007). Low-skilled worker-
citizens were presented as predominantly experiencing barriers to training and 
learning that extended from low confidence (PIU, 2001:93; Leitch, 2006:106; PM1; 
PM2; PM3; PM4), which blocked their motivation to train and inhibited them from 
developing the necessary longer-term responsible and beneficial skills aspirations and 
behaviours.  
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“I don’t believe it is just the highly skilled; the wealthy; the well-educated who respond to 
incentives. I think everybody does that. But I think there is a resistance which is often 
borne out of inadequacy. I think it’s a fear of failure; it’s a fear of this isn’t quite for me.” 
(PM2) 
 
“Low aspirations and a low awareness of the benefits of skills mean that many people 
choose not to improve their skills even where it would benefit them.” (Leitch, 2006:103) 
 
Overall the image that policy-makers presented here was one of worker-citizens 
struggling against barriers to train and enhance their employability and employment 
prospects, despite having the potential to develop progressive aspirations. As such, 
policy-makers conceptualised their role as encouraging these worker-citizens to 
enhance their progressive skills-led ambitions. 
 
Positioning relationships between skills actors: the Inert Workplace  
 
Bringing together conceptualisations of the deficient skills aspirations and behaviours 
of businesses and worker-citizens, policy-makers imagined and constructed the ‘inert 
workplace’. The inert workplace is presented as a profoundly interconnected space of 
employer and employee relations, functioning as a vicious cycle of low skill, low wage 
employment and low skill, low value-added production, and depicted as inherently 
problematic in light of the complex and increasingly uncertain and unstable 
environment in which businesses and worker-citizens find themselves. However, the 
way in which policy-makers also imagined and narrated the interplay between the 
latent progressive ambitions of both the employers and employees in these 
workplaces, created the possibility for policy to be directed at overcoming inertia, and 
initiating the production of “virtuous spirals” (Strategy Unit, 2002:12) of increasing 
engagement with skills, as a consequence of encouraging and enhancing responsible 
skills aspirations and behaviours.  
 
Specifically, policy narratives highlighted the potential for these inert workplaces to 
change their performance culture, as a result of the influence employers and 
employees could have over each other given government support to upwardly adjust 
their own demand for skills. The logic presented was that if employers could be 
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prevailed upon and helped to increase their demand for skills, it would encourage 
individuals to train to realise the increased recognition and reward from employment. 
In turn, policy-makers perceived that assisting employees to raise their demand for, 
and attainment of, skills would pressure employers to utilise the increased capabilities 
of the workforce. As a result policy-makers constructed a strong justification for their 
role in unblocking, unlocking, and stimulating the latent progressive skills aspirations 
and behaviours of employers and employees in inert workplaces (PIU, 2001:53; 
Strategy Unit, 2002; HM Treasury, 2002).50  
 
“The UK needs to raise the aspirations of both individuals and employers to create 
workplace environments that enable skills to be used to maximum effect, increasing 
performance and improving job satisfaction.” (UKCES, 2010:5) 
 
“Motivating employees to learn is critical to ensuring training is effectively used in the 
workplace.” (Leitch, 2006:92)  
 
7.2.2 The encouraging and ‘enhancing’ role of the state  
 
The need to intervene 
 
Whilst imagined ‘responsible’ workplaces were met by an ‘empowering’ state to 
facilitate and promote the realisation of private progressive skills aspirations, (Section 
6.2.2 above). The depiction of ‘inert’, if left to their own devices, workplaces called into 
question the validity of leaving skills decisions to the whim of private interest, 
(employer/employee ‘voice and choice’), which was reinterpreted as lacking 
appropriate ambition. In particular, policy-makers’ narratives highlighted a critical 
disjuncture between the short-term, immediate and narrow specificity of ‘inert’ 
business skills interests – preoccupied with their need for a “widget-maker for 
tomorrow” (PM2) - and the long-term developmental and transformative skills 
                                               
50 This imagined connection between employer and employee aspiration, and virtuous circles of skill 
supply and skill demand at the workplace, is explicit in earlier policy documents and more implied in 
later documents. However by reading together the (somewhat separated) sections of later policy 
documents addressing the (expected/anticipated) skill aspirations and behaviours of employers and 
employees this connection is re-established in policy discourses of the inert workplace (see for example 
DIUS, 2007a).  
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interests of government, conscious of the need for ‘UK plc.’ to secure a position of 
competitive advantage in the global knowledge-based economy.  
 
“Employers rightly focus on the success of their own organisation. […] But no business 
operates in isolation. In a highly inter-connected and inter-dependent world, the 
Government also has a role to promote long term, as well as short term, gains from skills, 
and the value of broad-based training programmes and qualifications in promoting 
wider employability and labour market flexibility.” (DfES, 2003:30) 
 
“We’ve accepted that the market isn’t perfect. And the way the market articulates 
demand - employers articulate demand - will not be perfect, and it will not meet all our 
sort of strategic needs. So you arrive at the conclusion that you do need, as government, 
to do something about it, or enable things to happen.” (PM3) 
 
Therefore, in response to the image of ‘inert’ workplaces, in which employers and 
employees exhibit deficient skills aspirations and behaviours, policy-makers 
constructed and narrated an inherently more “interventionist” role for the state and 
state policy (PM3). In defining this role policy-makers set the New Labour 
Administration apart from disinterested (more liberal state) government of the past 
(PM2). Appealing, as indicated in the statements above, to their discursively 
constructed logic for skills - as able to mitigate complexity and mediate progressive 
economic and social and public and private agendas and interests (see Chapter 5) - 
they validated and legitimised state action to enhance employer and employee 
awareness and demand for skills (Leitch, 2006:5; DfES, 2003:120; DfES, 2006:36; DIUS, 
2007a:39).  
 
“We must raise ambition in the demand for skill. We will only achieve increased 
productivity and competitiveness if more employers and more employees are 
encouraged and supported to make the necessary investment in skills.” (DfES, 2003:8) 
 
“There are a lot of people who are not able to exploit all the opportunities that are 
available to them - and I don’t just mean work opportunities, I mean all sorts, you know 
the whole range – simply because they don’t have the skills or enthusiasm or whatever 
[…]. The question is should we be doing something about that?” (PM3) 
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The role of the state became to encourage a changed culture of betterment (PIU; 
2001:53; HM Treasury, 2002:22; Brown, 2007), through support (including the removal 
of financial barriers) to stretch the skills ambitions of businesses and worker-citizen. 
Specifically, policy-makers perceived their role as galvanising a sense of possibility and 
responsibility to overcome the limited demand for skill in ‘inert workplaces’ (Leitch, 
2006:22; PM2), by making high(er) skills provision available and accessible. To 
persuade employers to develop the required higher level skills ambitions necessary to 
upgrade to higher value-added product market and production strategies (DfES, 
2003:21); encouraging them to become: “responsible for high aspirations in their firm” 
(PIU, 2001:61). Or as one policy-maker expressed it: “it’s about making what we call 
UK plc. It’s making [pause] you know allowing or supporting businesses to become 
world class businesses” (PM1). Equally, to “energise” (Leitch, 2006:25) and “motivate” 
(DfES, 2003:9) individuals; encouraging them to enhance their commitment to learning, 
and make provision available. Again, the purpose was expressed as: “to make people 
[pause] or sorry to accommodate and support people so that they get on the skills 
path” (PM1).  
 
Communicating the vision and driving the target 
 
In essence what policy-makers presented was their discursively constructed role to 
determine and define the “big picture” (PM2); to communicate the ‘skills vision’ as 
amounting to an economic and social vision for the nation (PIU, 2001:61; Leitch, 
2006:3; Brown, 2007; PM1).  
  
“First of all I think the role of government is to have vision; you know for the nation. I 
don’t mean that it has got to have vision in terms of individual businesses or individual 
areas of economic activity, but […] I think there are huge benefits […] which apply to a 
nation that is ambitious for its people, and I actually think that this Labour Government 
has been ambitious for its people.” (PM2) 
 
“As a Government, we have an ambitious agenda for transforming our society and 
economy. Much of that agenda is dependent on developing ever higher skills, in our 
young people, in the workforce, and across the community.” (DfES, 2003:9) 
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As the last statement implies, policy-makers’ narratives perceived this ‘vision for the 
nation’ to be manifest in stretching government targets that reflected the ‘agenda’ for 
higher levels of skill and qualification attainment across the board (Leitch, 2006; DIUS, 
2007a). Specifically, New Labour established a commitment (in England) to  meeting a 
series of qualification attainment goals, originally recommended in the Leitch Review 
of Skills (2006:3), that came to be known as the ‘2020 ambition’ (DIUS, 2007a:9). These 
goals included:  
 95% of adults to achieve basic skills of functional literacy and numeracy51;  
 more than 90% of adults qualified to NVQ level 2 or above52;  
 1.9 million more adults to achieve an NVQ level 3 qualification; and  
 40% or more adults to achieve an NVQ level 4 qualification or above53.  
The UKCES report (2009b:42) assessing progress toward the ‘2020 ambition’ exposed 
the magnitude of the targets by calculating that achieving them would amount to the 
equivalent of over 22 million additional qualification attainments54. This represented 
more than one additional qualification attainment for very second working age adult in 
the UK. 
 
However, despite the unequivocally ambitious extent of the targets, we again see that 
policy declined to define the skills project in substantive terms (Chapter 5). At the 
strategic level skill was quite simply quantitatively more and higher, measured by 
qualification attainment. Rather than prescribe the nature of skill, for policy-makers, 
ambitious targets represented a vehicle to communicate greater expectation, and 
served as a means to direct and shape enhanced economic and social aspirations. In 
other words, skills policy, framed by a particular imaginary of ‘inert’ workplaces, 
                                               
51 This target, when originally recommended in the Leitch Review of Skills (2006:3) represented an 
increase from the 2005 baseline position of 85% of adults with basic literacy and 79% of adults with 
basic numeracy 
52 This target, when originally recommended in the Leitch Review of Skills (2006:3), represented an 
increase from 69% of adults qualified to NVQ level 2 or above in 2005. It was further recommended by 
Leitch (2006:3), and accepted by the New Labour Government (DIUS, 2007a:15), that the target be 
extended to 95% of adults qualified to NVQ level 2 as soon as possible 
53 For clarification Leitch (2006:3) defines ‘adults’ as referring to persons aged 19 to State Pension age; 
NVQ level 2 as broadly equivalent to 5 good GCSEs (A*-C); NVQ level 3 as broadly equivalent to 2 ‘A’ 
levels; and NVQ level 4 as broadly equivalent to a degree. Others equate NVQ level 4 with a Higher 
Education Certificate; and equate Bachelor’s degrees and Foundation degrees with NVQ level 5 (see 
Cuddy & Leney, 2005:18) 
54 UKCES calculated that achieving the ‘2020 ambition’ requires: 7.4 million basic skills attainments; 5.7 
million NVQ level 2 attainments; 4 million NVQ level 3 attainments; and 5.5 million NVQ level 4 
attainments (UKCES, 2009b:42) 
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sought to regulate a sense of aspirational betterment; to normalise the requirement to 
excel beyond acceptance of low skills; and be transformative and performative of the 
progressive skills behaviours of employers and employees (significantly enhancing 
engagement and investment in education and training). Including the expectation that 
we should all be actively encouraging friends, colleagues and family members to 
embark on skills-led self-improvement (PIU, 2001:61). 
 
Furthermore, again drawing on their construction of ‘skills as progress’ to mitigate the 
challenges of staying prosperous in the context of perpetual and rapid changes to the 
basis of competitiveness (Chapter 5), policy-makers depicted skills targets as a 
movable feast (Brown, 2007; PM3); reflecting the ideal of a never-ending, unremitting 
pursuit of ambitious betterment to keep pace with a dynamic economy. A mechanism 
by which policy-makers could narrate and communicate, particularly to worker-citizens, 
the responsibility to always be making advancements for their on-going employability, 
and to ensure they are able: “to maximise the chances of businesses success” (PM3).  
 
“What we really want now is for people to progress. So if they get their Level 2 we want 
them to go on to their Level 3, we want them to do a Foundation Degree. That’s the vital 
bit of the strategy.” (PM4) 
 
“No matter how advanced their skills are today, we need to see every individual across 
the nation rising up the skills ladder, reaping the financial benefit for themselves, their 
families, their employers and the community.” (DIUS, 2007a:4) 
 
“It’s exactly what Obama said at Georgetown when he made his big speech on skills, you 
know, that he expects everyone to actually think about how do I go up another level?” 
(PM2) 
 
Reordering the partnership 
 
Although a partnership discourse remained present and critical in the policy narrative; 
expressed as businesses and worker-citizens engaging in skills advancement with 
government (Leitch, 2006:71; PM2). Given the reconstructed role of the ‘enhancing’ 
state in communicating the skills vision and driving the skills target the relations 
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between the partners were fundamentally reordered and remade. Despite policy-
makers’ narratives firmly resisting the implication that the more interventionist role 
for the state extended to predicting and prescribing the (flexibility and adaptability) 
skills that are needed for prosperous businesses and worker-citizens, they nonetheless 
placed government squarely at the head of the partnership table; setting and dictating 
the aspirational and progressive direction of travel for others – ‘partner-subjects’ - to 
embrace and follow. This reordering and remaking of relations within the ‘skills 
partnership’ was again justified by policy-makers by drawing on the progressive 
potential of skills in the context of production and employment complexity, and as 
such their rhetoric retained a flavour of the empowerment discourse. Albeit 
rearticulated with a different inflection to subtly alter meaning from customers 
‘directing’, to subjects ‘being directed’ for their own good. 
 
“It is not for the Government to tell private business what products and services to invest 
in. But it is the Government’s role to offer support to businesses to increase productivity 
and invest in innovation, so that they stand the best chance of success. That means 
encouraging and helping employers to invest in skills and training in a more strategic 
way.” (DfES, 2003:22) 
 
“For those both in and outside the labour market, we want to create a culture where 
everyone knows and understands that what people can do is not set for life, it is ‘in our 
hands’ and all of us can, through up-skilling, take control and change our lives for the 
better.” (DIUS, 2007a:35) 
 
7.2.3 Imagining and structuring the skills delivery architecture: leading demand 
 
Given the imaginary of ‘inert’, (if left to their own devices), workplaces, within which 
employers and employees lack the capacity and capability to develop sufficiently 
responsible skills aspirations and behaviours, and therefore the construction of an 
‘enhancing’ role for the state, policy-makers’ narratives remade the institutions and 
mechanisms of skills delivery to ‘lead’ demand. Although still described as a ‘demand-
led’ system, the demand that leads the system was rearticulated as unblocked and 
therefore expected and anticipated - related to government vision and targets - rather 
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than existing and articulated (from within the workplace). Although still described as a 
‘new approach’ to workplace skills delivery, the new skills delivery approach for 
workplaces was reoriented from ‘adapting’ to ‘encouraging’, and from ‘responding’ to 
‘initiating’ a change in skills demand (PIU, 2001:55).   
 
“What is needed in the UK, therefore, is a new approach that encourages firms and 
individuals to train.” (HM Treasury, 2002:20) 
 
“As a key part of creating a genuinely demand-led system, the Skills Funding Agency will 
lead the development and management of the new England-wide adult advancement 
and careers service. It will play a vital role […] in boosting individual demand for skills.” 
(DCSF/DIUS, 2008:12) 
 
“I think it is about giving people the opportunity, and managing the opportunity to 
change the way you are towards what is there for you. And the government has got to 
be able to make sure […] that those opportunities are there to change.”  (PM1) 
 
In seeking to lead demand and ‘manage change’ policy-makers’ narratives reorganised 
and reordered the relations between the institutions and mechanisms of skills supply, 
and employers and employees. As a conduit for government vision and targets the 
institutions of skills supply were recast as leaders rather than followers in the Skills 
Strategy for England. As actively communicating rather than passively listening, in 
order to “not just engage with [employers] but try and win over hearts and minds 
about the benefits of skills in general” (PM1).  
 
The UKCES – which in relation to the imaginary of ‘responsible’ workplaces was 
described as exclusively employer-led - was re-tasked in policy discourse with the “job 
to say what the nation needs” (PM4). To communicate the skills ambition out to 
businesses and worker-citizens with the intention to “promote employer investment in 
people and the better use of their skills at all levels” (DIUS, 2007a:38). In short, policy-
makers’ narratives in relation to the imaginary of inert workplaces required the UKCES 
to take on the altered role of “driving forward the skills agenda” (Alan Johnson, MP 
cited in DCSF, 2007).  
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The SSCs – also described as exclusively employer-led in relation to the imaginary of 
responsible workplaces – were recast in policy discourse to “take a leading role” 
(Leitch, 2006:18), and “raise employer ambition and investment in skills” (DIUS, 
2007a:36). Indeed, to champion and galvanise skills action within their sector and 
support businesses significantly drive up their engagement with education and training 
(HM Treasury, 2002:16; Leitch, 2006:74; UKCES, 2008a; UKCES, 2008b). To set ‘hard’ 
skills attainment targets for employers to deliver against (Leitch, 2006:79) - for 
example, through National Skills Academies (also depicted as employer-led 
mechanisms of skills delivery in relation to imagined responsible workplaces), and 
Apprenticeships - and require employers to clearly set out their commitment to 
participate in up-skilling their workforce in the SSAs. As such, SSAs were 
reconceptualised. No longer depicted as the means by which ‘enlightened’ employers 
could set the qualification priorities for their sector, but redefined as a contract for 
skills improvements; an “agreement between Government and the SSC and employers” 
(DfES, 2006:42) to address training needs (shortages and weaknesses) as a 
consequence of low aspiration in inert workplaces.  
 
The role of brokerage as part of the Train to Gain offer was likewise remade. Described 
by policy-makers in relation to ‘inert’ workplaces as functioning to “encourage 
employers to see the benefit of higher skills” (DfES, 2005b:7); principally targeting 
employers and employees perceived to have not historically engaged in education and 
training (DfES, 2006:40) and that were depicted as suffering from insufficiently 
responsible aspirations and behaviours with regard to skill enhancement. Similarly, 
policy-makers’ narratives repositioned providers of Further Education (predominantly 
FE Colleges)  as required to “achieve demanding targets for level 2 and level 3 
qualifications […] persuading more employers of the value [of these qualifications] to 
them” (Denham, 2007). Essentially envisaging the role of the FE sector to “increase the 
demand [for skills and qualifications] from employers and potential learners”, by 
addressing “the cultural, social and economic factors which can limit aspiration and 
participation” (DfES, 2006:36); particularly, by addressing the limited demand for skills 
amongst those who have not previously succeeded at school (Leitch, 2006:116). 
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Individual Skills Accounts were reconceptualised as a mechanism to “energise” 
learning. With Information Advice and Guidance (IAG) advisors re-tasked with an active 
role - based on “reaching out, rather than waiting for people to come” (Leitch, 
2006:109) - to raise people’s awareness of their skills deficiencies, as the first step in 
supporting them to address their weaknesses (Leitch, 2006:110), and to “steer” them 
to the courses that will best meet their needs (DfES, 2006:37). Union Learning 
Representatives (ULRs) – as well as the TUC and the trade unions in general - were 
narrated as having “a vital role in encouraging individuals back into learning through 
help and support in the workplace” (DfES, 2003:44; also Leitch, 2006:92).  
 
In short, what is exposed is an additional policy-maker narrative that significantly 
reconstructs the role of the skills delivery system in response to an inert workplace 
imaginary and an enhancing role of the state. Depicting the need for the institutional 
architecture and policy mechanisms to encourage employers and employees to raise 
their skills aspirations by ‘leading skills demand’. As such, employers and employees 
were redefined and rearticulated as ‘partner-subjects’ of the Skills Strategy for England. 
Repositioned as relative subordinates in relation to the state, state policy and policy 
delivery; expected to listen and respond to the state-led vision and targets in order to 
enhance their otherwise underdeveloped skills aspirations and behaviours.  
 
“The best way to increase employer demand is by helping employers to rethink their 
business and organisational strategies around more ambitious goals.” (PIU, 2001:8) 
 
“Employers need to be persuaded to adopt best practices in developing their employees 
and to put in place appropriate strategies to make best use of these individuals within a 
learning organisation.” (PIU, 2001:80) 
 
“Somehow you’ve got to incentivise an individual worker to say ‘look I’m alright now - 
I’ve a decent job here - but where do I want to be in five years’ time, and how do I 
actually get the advice to be able to say well will this job actually be here in five years’ 
time?’ […] One of the tasks of government is to be able to start to act as that broker […] 
so that people actually do invest in their own training and the employers invest in their 
workforce.” (PM2) 
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7.2.4 Summary: The Strategy for Leading Demand 
 
This section has outlined the second of three strategies for skills. Figure 7.1 below 
illustrates the findings of this section.  
 
Figure 7.1: The Strategy for Leading Demand  
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s analysis, compilation and design  
 
Overall the section presents a distinct strategy to lead demand for skills based on a 
particular rearrangement of skills actors and the relationships between them, again 
defined, articulated, and assembled into an order and system of organisation by the 
state, in relation to imagined inert workplaces. The slightly more negatively depicted 
image of the inert workplace positions employers and employees in subordinate 
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relation to a state-driven vision, and regime of targets, for high(er) skills. A vision and 
regime of targets deemed necessary to affect the high(er) skills necessary to mitigate 
complexity and mediate coherence. A vision and regime of targets to lead the 
unblocking of problematic deficient demand, and therefore legitimised as a state-led 
partnership directing partner-subjects for their own good. The institutions of skill 
delivery are reorder and reorganised to realise the vision and targets. As leaders of 
people their function shifts from listening to communicating, promoting, persuading, 
and encouraging, in order to enact the enhancement ambitions of the state.  
 
This chapter now turns to describe the last of the three skills strategies identified in 
the interpretive analysis of policy-makers narratives (documentary analysis and 
analysis of interviews). This last strategy for skills has been termed the strategy to 
mitigate and circumvent lack of demand.  
 
 
7.3 Irresponsible Workplaces: An emancipating state, mitigating and 
circumventing lack of demand 
 
This section describes the imaginary of ‘irresponsible’ workplaces. Or more specifically, 
it describes policy-makers’ narratives that constructed ‘irresponsible’ businesses or 
‘irresponsible’ worker-citizens as not only lacking requisite high(er) skills aspirations 
and behaviours, but that furthermore demonstrated a deviant lack of interest in, and 
regard for, skills improvement.  
 
Organised slightly differently from previous sections from here, it then goes on to 
describe the responding role of the state: firstly to exhort the need for changed 
behaviours; and secondly, where these changed behaviours failed to materialise, the 
withdrawal of the state from any direct responsibility for the consequences of skills 
deviance (inevitable business failure or the declining employability, and therefore 
security and prosperity, of worker-citizens and their families). Given the withdrawal of 
the state from any direct responsibility for the business or individual consequences of 
skills deviance, the New Labour Skills Strategy was reconceptualised and refocused as 
principally serving to mitigate and circumvent the ramifications of this lack of skills 
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demand on behalf of vulnerable others. Policy-makers’ narratives tended to juxtapose 
skills deviant businesses and disempowered and vulnerable worker-citizens, and skills 
deviant worker-citizens and disempowered and vulnerable businesses.  
 
Such a positioning of the relationship between skills actors at the workplace rendered 
necessary an ‘emancipating’ role for the institutions of skills delivery that were 
depicted as functioning – behind the scenes - to address bad behaviour, and release 
the disempowered and vulnerable party. In short the reconceptualised and refocused 
New Labour Skills Strategy, that sought to ‘circumvent lack of demand’, became the 
means to free the progressive aspirations of disempowered and vulnerable worker-
citizens from the bondage of the ‘bad boss’ in the low-skills business, or became the 
means by which businesses could free their progressive aspirations, otherwise 
suffocated by the indolence of the low-skilled ‘bad worker’. 
 
7.3.1 Constructing and Positioning Irresponsibility: the absence of skills partnership 
 
Constructing the Irresponsible Business: A deviant outsider55 
 
Alongside policy-makers’ narratives of ‘enlightened’ businesses and ‘inert’ businesses, 
an additional narrative of ‘irresponsible’ businesses can be extricated as a discrete 
story being told through skills policy discourse. These ‘irresponsible’ businesses were 
described by policy-makers as both undervaluing skills, and undervaluing low-skilled 
employees.  
 
Policy-makers lamented the resilience of low skills equilibrium. Raising concerns about 
the unacceptably large proportion of businesses that are “some way off the pace” 
(DIUS, 2007a:38) with regard to valuing the benefits of high(er) skills for progressive 
innovative product market and production strategies (Strategy Unit, 2002:8). 
Businesses that routinely failed to invest in skills and engage in training their workforce. 
                                               
55 This section draws on document analysis and compiled data also presented in a contribution to the 
Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency (QCDA) National Research Report for the United 
Kingdom (2009) published by CEDEFOP. This paper is referenced in the bibliography as Durrant (2009).  
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Drawing on survey data56 policy documents for England, published throughout the 
fieldwork period, made repeated reference to an identified one-third of firms (35%) 
that have no training budget, persistently do no training at all, and ‘condemned’ eight 
million employees to go without training at the workplace (Leitch, 2006:12; DIUS, 
2007a:37; DIUS, 2008b:4; UKCES, 2009b). A further 6% of firms in England were 
identified as only offering a minimum of induction and health and safety training (DIUS, 
2007a:37).  
 
Likelihood of training was also shown to be considerably variable by sector (UKCES, 
2009b), and size of business. According to the UKCES (2009b)57, in the following sectors 
significantly more that 35% of employers reported offering no training at all to 
employees: fashion and textiles (53%); environment and land based (48%); passenger 
transport (45%); and process and manufacturing sectors (42%). Smaller employers 
were less likely to train, with only just over half of the smallest firms providing any 
training or workforce development activity (LSC, 2008). According to NESS data, the 
most common reason for not training given by those employers that didn’t train was 
that they believed their employees to already be adequately proficient in their job 
(UKCES, 2009b). Indeed Fauth & Brinkley (2006) reported evidence of overqualification 
in the labour market, even amongst employees with fairly basic levels of skills58.  
 
Furthermore, even in those businesses that did train, the training that was done was 
identified as mostly unaccredited59 (Glesson & Keep, 2004), and disproportionately 
weighted towards those with existing higher levels of skills and qualification 
attainment60 (PM2; Strategy Unit, 2002:12; DfES, 2005a). Indeed, the Leitch Review of 
Skills (2006) reported highly-skilled workers to be five time more likely to receive 
                                               
56 For England, a much cited source of survey data was the LSC National Employers Skills Survey (NESS). 
The NESS was conducted in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007 and 2009. Since 2009 the UKCES has taken over the 
role of conducting employer skills surveys for the whole of the UK; the most recent being the UK 
Employer Skills Survey, 2011.  
57 Drawing on the 2007 NESS data 
58 See also TUC (2007) for a review of the evidence for overqualification in the UK workforce 
59 In general, when compared with European competitor nations, the proportion of UK employees 
receiving certified continuing vocational training is low (Dent & Wiseman, 2008; UKCES: 2009b; OECD, 
2011). 
60 It should also be noted that according to Labour Force Survey data analysed by Page & Hillage (2006), 
likelihood of training also declines significantly with age, as does training duration (a measure of training 
quality). Although women are more likely to receive training (UKCES, 2009b), average training intensity 
(a measure of training quality) remains greater amongst men, and being non-white negatively affects 
both likelihood of receiving training and training duration/intensity (DfES, 2005c). 
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training at work than low-skilled workers (Leitch, 2006:50)61. As such, policy-makers’ 
narratives presented ‘irresponsible’ businesses as overlooking and undervaluing the 
development of low-skilled employees (DIUS, 2007a:25).  
 
By undervaluing skills and undervaluing low-skilled employees, policy-makers 
positioned ‘irresponsible’ businesses as failing to recognise the inherent complexities 
of the economic environment in which they operate; complexities that require them to 
pursue high(er) skills strategies across the board as the means to progress. 
Irresponsible businesses were therefore positioned as ‘outsiders’ to the skills 
partnership, failing to recognise their private responsibility to act in the public interest 
with regard to skills.  
 
“Many private and public sector organisations undervalue how better skilled, trained and 
qualified workforce can improve their ‘bottom line’ performance. Such organisations can 
experience a ‘low skills equilibrium’, producing low value-added products and services, 
making it harder for us to compete internationally.” (DfES, 2003:19, emphasis added) 
 
Policy-makers’ narratives repeatedly insisted on the need for ‘action’ to ensure 
more lower-skilled workers received training, (PIU, 2001:61; HM Treasury, 2002:12; 
Leitch, 2006; DIUS, 2007a) 
 
Constructing the Irresponsible Worker-Citizen: A deviant outsider 
 
In addition to defining and describing ‘irresponsible’ businesses as lacking skills 
aspirations, policy-makers’ narratives depicted and lamented a widespread lack of 
appetite and desire to train and learn among worker-citizens (Leitch, 2006:2). The 
2001 Cabinet Office report – In Demand: Adult Skills in the 21st Century – had a section 
headed “Many individuals lack the motivation to learn” (PIU, 2001:35), and, by 
analysing data from the 1997 National Adult Learning Survey, went on to highlight 
“how little motivation many individuals have to participate in any activity through 
which they may learn new skills or acquire new knowledge” (ibid: 36).  
                                               
61 Evidence suggests that employees are more likely to start benefiting from employer investment and 
provision of training once they have attained a minimum level of basic skills or an NVQ level 2 
qualification (HM Treasury, 2002:11).  
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In contrast to the depiction of ‘inert’ worker-citizens that have latent progressive skills 
aspirations but face barriers to training and learning, in this imaginary individuals were 
seen as having more deviant reasons for not engaging in their own skills development. 
Leitch (2006:106) identified “lack of interest” in learning as an attitudinal barrier, 
distinct from lack of confidence and practical barriers such as lack of time or resources. 
Recklessly irresponsible worker-citizens were seen as harbouring a contumacious 
“preference to spend free time doing other things” (PIU, 2001:36). Again, policy-
makers’ narratives insisted on the need for individuals to recognise their private 
responsibility with regard to skills development.  
 
“There is a responsibility on the individual to do it as well, you know to take part in it […] 
for the individual to actually go out and do their best.” (PM1) 
 
7.3.2 The role of the state: exhorting change, excluding deviance  
 
Exhorting changed behaviours 
 
In response to an identified ‘irresponsible’ lack of skills aspiration and behaviour 
among workplace actors, and recognising their inability to act alone in pursuance of a 
high(er) skills vision (PIU, 2001; Strategy Unit, 2002; DfES, 2005a; Leitch, 2006; DIUS, 
2007a; PM2; PM4), policy rhetoric urged employers and employees to accept the 
obligations on them to alter their attitudes. In contrast to the keen portrayal of skills as 
instinctively cohering public and private interests (whether manifest or latent) and as 
such the proclamation of an endorsed high(er) skills consensus (certainly where policy-
makers imagine businesses as ‘enlightened’ and worker-citizens as ‘motivated’) this 
image of ‘irresponsible’ businesses and worker-citizens suggested that lack of interest 
in skills had to be checked and brought in line through the self-correction of private 
actors. 
  
“Changes in Government policy must be accompanied by changes in attitudes and in 
work culture. […] Government action alone cannot bring about the sorts of changes 
necessary to make a real impact on the problems of low skills. It is important that 
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everyone […] takes seriously their responsibility to deliver a high skill, high productivity 
economy.” (HM Treasury, 2002:20) 
 
Therefore, in relation to an imaginary of ‘irresponsible’ workplaces the role of the state 
in policy-makers’ narratives shifted from encouraging an enhanced culture of training 
and learning, to exhorting changed behaviours of employers and employees; insisting 
on a required set of properly responsible skills aspirations and behaviours. Policy-
makers described their role as “informing people that they’re morally responsible” 
(PM4); as requiring “[worker-citizens] to think about why they should get the 
qualification and making the employer understand that they have a responsibility over 
it” (PM4). 
 
Specifically, businesses were described as required to engage with a “something for 
something approach”; as needing to “play their part”, by “raising their engagement in 
skills at all levels and using skills effectively” (Leitch, 2006:87). As such, there was a 
strong insistence that employers should realise their responsibility to use the skills 
products and services that were on offer to train their employees (Leitch, 2006:89; 
DIUS, 2007a:12); particularly their low-skills employees. In essence, employers’ were 
urged to turn their backs on the exploitative deviance of operating in low skills 
equilibrium, which in turn would enable them, and ‘UK plc.’, to better compete in 
conditions of heightened global competition (DfES, 2003:30).  
 
Furthermore, and in support of ‘UK plc.’ and ‘UK social’, policy-makers’ narratives 
urged employers to take responsibility for the broader career development needs of 
their employees (HM Treasury, 2002:20). Investing in ‘portable skills’ and ‘accredited 
training’ (Leitch, 2006:88) because, in the context of uncertainty-based complexity, 
they recognised that their ‘social’ responsibilities extended beyond their immediate 
business needs.  
 
 “You know, we want the business to do better if we have [employees] better skilled and 
everything else, but also to understand exactly what it means if [they] fall on hard times 
[…] that they’ve equally got a responsibility there” (PM1).  
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Individual worker-citizens were similarly described as needing to “play their part in a 
shared mission for world class skills” (Leitch, 2006:22); to “feel that it is their 
responsibility to improve their skills throughout their lives” (DIUS, 2007a:7); to “take 
responsibility for their personal career development, and be prepared to learn new 
skills” (HM Treasury, 2002:20). Specifically, to realise their responsibility to gain the 
‘economically valuable skills’ necessary to bolster their “ability to contribute” to their 
workplace and “make the most of [their] own lives” (DIUS, 2007a:35) 
 
“We want to create a nation where all adults, whether employees, employers, self-
employed or non-employed, understand that training is the only reliable route to 
sustained employability, progression and success over a lifetime.” (DIUS, 2007a:35)  
 
“Our ambition is that we become a society in which young people and adults expect to 
keep learning and developing new skills, because everyone takes it for granted that you 
need skills to get a good job and a fulfilling life.” (DfES, 2005:7) 
 
Excluding the deviant: the withdrawal of the state 
 
Running alongside strong exhortation for businesses and worker-citizens to change 
their behaviour and amend their deviant attitudes towards reliance on low skills, was 
the fundamental axiom – common to LMEs in general and voluntarist ET systems 
specifically - that governments cannot compel the actions of private actors (PIU, 2001). 
Although earlier policy documents did not rule out the possibility of enforcing a 
minimum level of engagement with education and training at the workplace, and the 
Leitch Review of Skills (2006) recommended revisiting the case for compulsion should 
adequate progress towards the ‘2020 ambition’ not be made by employers and 
employees on a voluntary basis (a recommendation that provided an ever present 
threat to incentivise the urged need for changed behaviours), these recommendations 
were uttered tentatively, and were invariably closely followed by a list of reservations 
and warnings about the ineffectiveness of any such measures and mechanisms (Leitch, 
2006:94; DIUS, 2007a:44; PM1; PM2).  
 
Given the absence of a strong commitment to compulsion, and policy-makers 
insistence that ultimately engagement and investment in skills should be a private 
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responsibility, there was a clear sense that where businesses and worker-citizens 
refrained from changing their behaviours the inevitable consequences of declining 
productivity/profitability and employability in circumstances of heightened 
competition was not the responsibility of the state. Businesses that ostracise 
themselves from the ‘skills partnership’ were described as having full responsibility for 
the likelihood that they would fail as a result of: positioning themselves in the wrong 
product markets with the wrong product specification; losing their capable workforce; 
and, as a result of resisting the need to change their production strategies, finding 
themselves more and more unable to make improvements, and more and more at a 
distance from ‘best practice’ (PIU, 2001:8). 
 
“The reality is they will go out of business, you know. There will be such a small demand 
for an unskilled or low-skilled workforce-based business in the future, and that really is 
the challenge for employers”. (PM3) 
 
“You can lose your workforce or you can retain it. You can build your business to the next 
level or stay there and die. So it’s hard economics, and it’s not the government’s job to 
sustain low level business at all.” (PM2) 
 
Equally, worker-citizens that ostracise themselves from the ‘skills partnership’ were 
described as having full responsibility for the likelihood that they would fail to secure 
the potential for improving their lives by failing to realise the opportunity to reap the 
greater prosperity rewards of better market compatibility. 
 
“The Government cannot promise people jobs for life. Nor can we promise to meet the 
cost of all the training and learning that people need. Individuals have to play their part, 
in terms of motivation, engagement and financial investment” (DfES, 2005:17) 
 
“It’s a statement that was made that I believe is actually true that the greatest 
improvement people can make in their lives is by earning. You know you can do lots of 
other things in your life which are great – you know having a family, loving, and all the 
rest of it is fantastic – but life is much better and easier if you’re also earning a living. […] 
but the level of job that you can get also puts a burden and a responsibility on the 
individual. So I can, you know if I want to get on and do stuff then I’ve got to do 
something about it as well, nobody’s going to come along and just give me all of this. 
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Not many of us have got where we have got just by [pause] whatever. Most of it is hard 
work isn’t it? […] So other people can make the opportunity but unless you take it, it 
won’t happen for you.” (PM1) 
 
In summary, having remade employers or employees that don’t and won’t train (lack 
demand for skills) as irresponsible, policy-makers remade the role of the state as either 
to exhort changed attitudes and behaviours, or to exclude the deviant by removing the 
consequence of deviance (business failure, and declining employability and social 
security) from the care, concern or responsibility of the state. The next section shows 
how, given the depiction of persistently irresponsible employers or employees as 
outside the scope of the skills strategy, the position and function of skills delivery 
became to mitigate and circumvent this deviant lack of demand on behalf of, and to 
emancipate, the vulnerable other.    
 
7.3.3 Imagining and structuring the skills delivery architecture: mitigating and 
circumventing lack of demand 
 
The ‘Bad Boss’, the vulnerable employee, and the Skills Strategy 
 
Policy-makers presented images of the “bad boss” (PIU, 2001:34; PM1; PM4) 
juxtaposed with images of the ‘vulnerable’ employee being ‘left behind’ as a 
consequence of being “trapped in a cycle of low-skilled, poorly-paid, often short-term 
employment with few training opportunities” (DIUS, 2007a:22). These ‘bad bosses’ 
were described as both actively and maliciously undervaluing, and deliberately 
intending to hold back the skills development of their employees, in order to maintain 
their vulnerability in the employment relationship and in the labour market at large.  
 
Indeed, in interviews policy-makers offered an impression of businesses as wantonly 
disregarding their lower-skilled workers, and their potential. As failing to recognise 
their contribution in ways which called to mind an image of deviant employment 
practices, designed to reinforce and sustain (at least overlook) the existing 
discriminatory and oppressive imbalance of power relations and status at the 
workplace.  
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“I’ve talked to hundreds of employers over the years and their position doesn’t change. If 
the person’s employed, already with them - so it’s Joe or Sally who sits in that bit – then 
it’s: ‘oh they don’t need their qualification. I just want them to have the experience of 
doing the thing’. As soon as Joe leaves they advertise that job as the qualified job, with 
the qualification. It’s absolutely bizarre. Then for their own children they want them to 
have the best qualifications in the country.” (PM4) 
 
“Employers think they know what skills those lower-skilled – or ‘unqualified’ as they 
would say – people have, but actually if they sit and measure what they do they are huge 
skills, […] it’s quite amazing how people on the shop floor can just change the way in 
which something is done. I don’t say that in a patronising way. I’m just saying it in the 
sense of recognising it. And in a way these people haven’t expected any recognition 
either; it’s never been in their mind-set. They just do the job because it’s quicker that way, 
and it’s easier, and we can all work as a team better if we all do it this way, and so all 
those skills [pause]. If you just listen to what I’m saying, they’re huge skills aren’t they” 
(PM1) 
 
This disregarding of lower-skilled workers – the refusal to recognise their capabilities 
and develop their potential via skills and qualifications - was further explained in 
policy-makers’ narratives as firstly associated with the ‘bad bosses’ treatment of the 
workforce (or segments of the workforce) as disposable and infinity replaceable (PM1; 
PM2; PM4); and secondly, as serving to restrict the low-skilled workers employability 
potential in the wider labour market (PM1; PM3), effectively ‘handcuffing’ them to the 
workplace on the  low-pay and fragile employment terms offered.  
 
“If they’re not an enlightened employer or anything it’s because they don’t want that 
person to be promotable elsewhere; it’s a protection, it’s like a handcuff. They’re 
handcuffing them into that organisation […]. But often employers wrap it up as a caring 
thing, they say: ‘oh I don’t want Joe or Sally to have to go through the sort of harassment 
and stress of doing tests’, you know. But I think it’s just an excuse.” (PM4) 
 
In response to this problematic image of the ‘bad boss’ policy-makers’ narratives 
remade the institutions and mechanisms of skills delivery as functioning to mitigate 
and circumvent this deviant lack of skills demand, and emancipate the vulnerable 
worker-citizen. Firstly, the tools of skills policy – particularly the LSC, the Train to Gain 
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initiative, and the free entitlement for first full NVQ level 2 (and in some cases NVQ 
level 3) qualifications - were recast in a new role to overcome the ‘selfishness’ of 
irresponsible businesses (PM1); as seeking to enact exhortation of changed behaviours 
through practice. They described the LSC’s quality control function, Train to Gain 
brokers, and Union Learning Representatives (ULRs), as not just responding to what 
businesses want in terms of skills development, but as requiring them to undertake a 
more holistic review of the skills needs of their entire workforce; particularly those 
lower-skilled employees requiring basic and NVQ level 2 qualifications. In this way 
brokerage was described as presenting “a carrot and a stick” (PM1) to employers; 
preventing them from ‘cherry-picking’ their engagement with skills, and making full 
qualification attainment – in the interest of the vulnerable worker-citizen - a condition 
of receipt of funding.  
 
“[In the past] employers could say […] ‘well I really just want [employee] to do this, this, 
and this, because that’s just what I need for the job’. Now that might be fine but it’s like 
a third of a level 2 qualification, and the [LSC and broker] was saying ‘well no, she needs 
all these other things’. So, in the end, that was the carrot and stick stuff - for you to get 
those bits that you [employer] want I [employee] was able to get the other bits as well to 
give me a better opportunity for moving on.” (PM1) 
 
“If we were going to go down an employer focused strategy we wouldn’t [pause] we 
might have bended to some of the lobby groups that say qualifications don’t matter, but 
qualifications really matter for the individual; all our research shows that that’s what the 
individual really wants, yeah. So we’ve made sure that the qualification focus is there.” 
(PM4) 
 
Along with Train to Gain as a policy tool to persuade employers to change their 
behaviour towards lower-skilled employees need for training and development, the 
New Labour Administration introduced the ‘Skills Pledge’. Recommended in the Leitch 
Review of Skills (2006:4), the Skills Pledge was described as a mechanism by which the 
leadership of a business could make a voluntary commitment to instigate a ‘new 
workplace partnership’ (DIUS, 2007a:54) by agreeing to train their workforce to a 
minimum of NVQ level 2 (DIUS, 2007a:53; DIUS, 2008b:9); and as a way for 
government to measure commitment towards the ‘2020 ambition’. The Skills Pledge 
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was therefore offered as an alternative (carrot) to revisiting the case for compulsion 
(stick), and the introduction of a statutory entitlement to workplace training (Leitch, 
2006:20).  The Skills Pledge was described in ceremonious terms as a “particular form 
of words” (PM1; also DIUS, 2007a:54) constituting a formal promise made by the 
employer to their employees, accompanied by “celebrations of signing” (PM1). Policy-
makers claimed that this ‘carrot-with-the-threat-of-a-stick’ approach offered 
employers an incentive to change their behaviours towards engaging with, and 
investing, in education and training for the low-skilled workers (PM1; PM4); an 
incentive that was, at least in part, about avoiding stigma. Successive policy documents 
made reference to and commend the increasing number of employers who had signed 
up. Naming those that had as explicitly ‘good’ employers and urging them to become 
“Skills Pledge Champions” (DIUS, 2007a:55) to actively recruit further businesses to the 
cause, therefore implicitly shaming those deviant enough to continue to resist the 
pressure to reform their attitudes.  
 
In short, policy-makers’ narratives described the Skills Strategy as functioning as 
exhortation through practice; as instigating the reappraisal and revaluing of lower-
skilled employees, by drawing attention to their existing but unacknowledged 
capability and their potential for future development.  
 
“This is the massive change in level 2 that this Government’s brought about - 
responsibility to train people. […] What this level 2 stuff has done is give value to those 
jobs, so even if we have to lose our job because the business isn’t there then we’ve got 
something else to go to, and I think that’s a - for me – that’s a real social issue.” (PM1) 
 
To complement the Skills Pledge, and the exhortation through practice of the 
requirement to revalue lower-skilled workers, the New Labour Administration later 
consulted on and introduced (after the completion of fieldwork) a statutory right for 
employees to request time off for training62, known as ‘time to train’ (DIUS, 2008b). 
The introduction of this right to request was again accompanied by a guarantee from 
government to further delay the review of voluntarism and the revisiting of 
                                               
62 Employees are eligible to make this request as long as they: work in an organisation that employs 
more than 250 employees; are over 19; have a contract of employment; and have been with the 
employer for a minimum of 26 weeks.  
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compulsion; and therefore again was described as offering employers a ‘carrot-with-
the-threat-of-a-stick’ by which to redress their deviant attitudes to training low-skilled 
employees. Specifically, one policy-maker described ‘time to train’ as giving employers 
the chance to be enlightened employers, and then we’ll see what happens next” (PM4).  
 
As well as representing exhortation through practice, the right to request time off for 
training was also described in policy-makers’ narratives as serving as a mechanism to 
redress power imbalances in the workplace, and therefore emancipating employees 
from the restrictive, discriminatory and oppressive practices of irresponsible 
employers. John Denham, in the  foreword to the 2008 consultation on the 
introduction of ‘time to train’ (DIUS, 2008b:4) described the initiative as “giving all 
employees in England a right to a serious conversation with their employer about their 
skills development”. In essence ‘time to train’ was presented as a means for vulnerable 
employees, denied access to training – particularly training leading to a qualification – 
in the past, to “make demands” (PM2) at the workplace in relation to their own skills 
development, and exercise control over their own learning (DIUS, 2008b:11).  
 
The introduction of Individual Skills Accounts (and the associated IAG) was presented 
in policy-makers’ narratives as likewise giving vulnerable and disempowered 
employees back agency and leverage over their own circumstances. Giving them 
‘control’ as well as ‘choice’ in skills decision making as a result of having options to 
“develop their careers away from their existing employer or alongside their current 
jobs” (Leitch, 2006:24).  
 
“For those who are not being supported to train in the workplace, Skills Accounts will 
become the way into learning and up-skilling.” (DIUS, 2007a:27) 
 
“Individuals need opportunities to train to change jobs within a flexible labour market, 
particularly where their current employer is not committed to training.” (DfES, 2003:17) 
 
In this way the Skills Strategy further withdrew from taking responsibility for the 
inevitable failure of irresponsible businesses, and instead operated ‘behind the scenes’ 
to enable vulnerable worker-citizens to circumvent the lack of demand for skill 
displayed by their deviant employer. Helping them to develop and enhance their 
 203
progressive aspirations (PM1), and ultimately ensure that they can reposition 
themselves favourably in relation to the better functioning parts of the labour market 
where there is a consensus of high(er) skills aspiration and behaviour in the context of 
economic (and social) complexity. As one policy-maker explained 
 
“I don’t think anyone’s going to regulate call centres to say you have to have an NVQ. 
There are call centre qualifications, but I don’t think anyone’s going to regulate and say 
you have to do that. And people, I’m sure, get treated extremely badly in some of them. 
Is the objective of skills policy to get them treated better? Probably not, but the objective 
of the Skills Strategy might well be to give them the qualifications so they can choose not 
to be employed there anymore” (PM3) 
 
The ‘Bad Worker’, the ‘vulnerable’ employer & the Skills Strategy 
 
As discussed (in section 7.3.1 above) the image of ‘irresponsible’ worker-citizen is set 
apart in policy discourse from the images of ‘inert’ worker-citizen struggling against 
barriers to training and learning, as having a deviant lack of appetite, interest and 
motivation to invest and engage in skills. These indolent individuals were consequently 
presented as holding back aspirational businesses from developing the high(er) skills 
capacities and capabilities needed to stay competitive in complex economic conditions 
(Leitch, 2005:6). Policy documents highlight employers’ persistent experiences of skills 
deficiencies, gaps and shortages within their workforce and within the wider labour 
market that they recruit from (Leitch, 2005:6; Leitch, 2006:41). The NESS 2005 (cited in 
Leitch, 2006) reported one in four vacancies as ‘hard to fill’ due to the skills 
deficiencies of applicants, and 1.3 million employees as not fully proficient in their job.  
 
To overcome these apparent problems with the stock of human capital (Leitch, 2005:6), 
policy-makers’ narratives referenced the need for individuals to ‘change their 
behaviour’ (Leitch, 2006:22) “demanding more of themselves” (Leitch, 2006:17) in 
relation to training and learning and “working with their employers to improve their 
skills in work” (Leitch, 2006:103). To take more responsibility for their part in attaining 
the skills required for the success of the business in which they are employed. In short, 
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to “think about updating their skills and qualifications, to ensure that they are giving 
employers what they really need” (DIUS, 2007a:4). 
 
“There is also a responsibility for individuals to contribute to the success of the 
organisation that employs them by discussing their skills needs with their employer and 
participating in training programmes tailored to the needs of the organisation.” (DfES, 
2003:31 
 
In response to this problematic image of the ‘bad worker’ policy-makers’ narratives 
remade the institutions and mechanisms of skills delivery as functioning to mitigate 
and circumvent this deviant lack of skills demand and emancipate the vulnerable 
business. The tools of skills policy – particularly the Train to Gain initiative, the free 
entitlement for first full NVQ level 2 (and in some cases NVQ level 3) qualifications, the 
SSCs, and the Skills Pledge - were again reconceptualised as functioning to overcome 
the indolence of irresponsible employees, and release the aspirations of businesses 
from the suffocating burden of low-skill, low-aspiration workers. 
 
Specifically, the role of brokerage as part of the Train to Gain offer was recast as 
serving to raise employers’ awareness of the skills shortages they have by diagnosing 
the deficiencies within their existing workforce. Helping businesses to understand the 
implications of these deficiencies in light of economic developments, uncertainties and 
perpetual change, and identify relevant education and training programmes for their 
employees that meet the business need and circumvent deviant lack of demand for 
skills amongst their irresponsible employees (Leitch, 2006:91; DIUS, 2008b:6).  
 
Furthermore, the SSCs and Train to Gain were described as explicitly driving an 
economic agenda through the Skills Strategy; ensuring that providers and provision 
were exclusively focused on the delivery of the “economically valuable skills” (Leitch, 
2006:2) that businesses need. Contradicting the constructed coherence between ‘skills 
for employment’ and ‘skills for a more rewarding life’ policy-makers’ narratives 
explained worker-citizens as no longer able to look to a state-subsidised education and 
training system for their “social life” (PM4), but to recognise government’s first and 
foremost priority as the needs of employers for useful and useable employees (PM4). 
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Making this “economic mission” (DfES, 2006:5) a priority, was described as giving 
employers’ back ‘control’ (Leitch, 2006: 82) over skills decision making, and as again 
emancipating them from the lack of demand – or lack of correct demand – for skills 
amongst irresponsible worker-citizens.  
 
“We will put the economic mission of the sector at the heart of its role. That means 
defining its central purpose as being to equip young people and adults with the skills, 
competencies and qualifications that employers want, and which will prepare them for 
productive, rewarding, high-value employment in a modern economy.” (DfES, 2006:5) 
 
“We want to create a future where employers say, clearly and consistently, that our 
workforce now have the skills that are needed for productive employment and business 
success” (DIUS, 2007a:40) 
 
Finally, policy-makers narratives also reconceptualised the Skills Pledge from a 
commitment by employers to train their low-skilled employees to a statement of 
intention made by employers to set the tone of expectation for low-skilled employees 
to address their skills deficiencies in line with the requirements of business success. 
Employers were described as being able to use the Pledged commitment to drive up 
skills, productivity and performance in the workplace (DfES, 2008b:9); thereby 
mitigating the consequences of the deviant lack of skills demand amongst irresponsible 
worker-citizens.  
 
7.3.4 Summary: The Strategy for Mitigating and Circumventing Lack of Demand 
 
This section has outlined the last of three strategies for skills. Figure 7.2 below 
illustrates the findings of this section. 
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Figure 7.2: The Strategy for Mitigating and Circumventing Lack of Demand 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s analysis, compilation and design  
 
Again the section presents a distinct strategy for skills based on a particular 
rearrangement of skills actors and the relationships between them, again defined, 
articulated, and assembled into an order and system of organisation by the state. In 
this case related to the negative imaginary of irresponsible workplaces, where either 
the employer or the employees demonstrate a deviant lack of demand for skills; 
particularly given the identified uncertainty-based complexity of a dynamic economy. 
The role of the state, through the institutions, practices and processes of skill delivery, 
becomes to exhort changed attitudes and behaviours and/or mitigate and circumvent 
– working behind the scenes - the deviant disregard for high(er) skills to emancipate 
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the vulnerability party. The aim of the skills strategy becomes to separate the 
juxtaposed ‘vulnerable worker’ from the bondage of the ‘bad boss’, or to free the 
juxtaposed ‘vulnerable business’ from the indolence of the ‘bad worker’. Again the 
workplace occupies a subordinate position as subject to this state-led intervention; a 
suite of products and services designed to operate in both the public interest (for 
better business or worker-citizen prospects), and the private interest of the 
disempowered other. However, persistent skills deviance is not the care, concern or 
responsibility of the state. 
 
7.4 Discussion and Concluding Reflections 
 
This chapter is the second of two that have been focused on exposing, explaining and 
understanding the relationship between the formal dimension of skill policy (Chapter 
5) - the semiotic construal and construction of ‘progress in partnership’ as the ‘object’ 
of governance (Jessop, 2008; Jessop, 2009), in relation to a selected economic and 
social imaginary defined by complexity and coherence - and the operational dimension 
of ‘how skills are done’. The argument of both chapters is that the operational 
dimension of skills policy (doing skills under New Labour) involved state work (not a 
neutral state à la VoC, or a straightforwardly partisan state à la PRA) to discursively and 
materially ‘articulate’ and ‘assemble’ (Newman & Clarke, 2009a) the component parts 
of the skills project: imagined skills actors; the relations between them at the site of 
the workplace; the form of the state; and the organisational arrangements, resources, 
practices, and processes for skills delivery, into distinct architectures of skill 
governance. These architectures have their foundations in the imagined degree of 
responsible skill aspiration and behaviour of workplace actors in relation to the 
high(er) skills logic established in policy.  
 
There is a clear distinction between the two chapters. Whilst Chapter 6 discussed the 
articulation and assemblage of a skills strategy based on imagining workplaces 
(workplace actors) with a high degree of responsible skill aspiration and behaviour, 
acting privately in the public interest in recognition of the logic for skills; ‘progress in 
partnership’. This chapter has described two further articulated and assembled skills 
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strategies based on imagining workplaces (workplace actors) that exhibit a deficient or 
deviant lack of responsible skill aspiration and behaviour.  
 
Where Chapter 6 presented a demand-led strategy; by caricaturing responsible 
workplaces; aligned with a state project and policy to ‘support’ competitiveness; that 
positioned the problem of low skills with a delivery system needing to be reconstituted 
in service to the demands of partner-customer. Chapter 7 has shown a re-
conceptualisation of the problem of low skills as emanating from workplaces. By 
making-up and imagining workplaces as exhibiting a deficient or deviant lack of 
demand for high(er) skills (again workplaces and workplace actor relations that bear 
some partial, but accentuated and exaggerated, resemblance to actually existing 
workplaces) the problem of low skills is given new meaning. From this articulation of 
workplaces the other component parts of the skills project were articulated and 
assembled by the state. Strategies for high(er) skills that lead demand or circumvent 
lack of demand were brought into alignment and sequenced with differently construed 
and constructed state projects and policies. Projects and policies to discursively ‘shape’ 
the market and engender competitiveness concerns in the light of the knowledge-
based economy and post-welfare society; or to ‘work behind the scenes’ to 
emancipate the vulnerability of either businesses or worker-citizens, armed with 
justification narratives associated with economic prosperity or social inclusion and 
social mobility respectively.  
 
In essence what the two chapters offer is an explanation and understanding of how 
the component parts of doing skills are re-imagined, remade and re-narrated in 
relation to workplaces with more or less responsible skills aspirations and behaviours, 
and how these re-imagined, remade and re-narrated component parts are then 
selected, threaded and stitched together, into differently articulated and assembled 
strategies for high(er) skills in England: 
o Imagined responsible workplaces, meet an empowering state, and a demand-
led system of skills delivery (Chapter 6) 
o Imagined inert workplaces, meet an enhancing state, and a system of skills 
delivery to lead demand (Chapter 7, section 7.2) 
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o Imagined irresponsible workplaces, meet an exhorting and emancipating state, 
and a system of skills delivery to mitigate and circumvent lack of demand 
(Chapter 7, section 7.3) 
 
Having established policy as differentiating between workplace types, to be acted on 
and governed in relation to skills (where imagining different workplace types presumes 
different governance strategies) the chapters argue that the New Labour Skills Strategy 
for England can be explained and understood as three distinct strategies (see Figure 
7.3 and Table 7.1 below).   
 
The implications of these findings are firstly to confirm the importance of taking a CPE-
informed approach to understanding the logic of the regime, the objects of 
governance and the objectives of policy; an approach that avoids both the VoC 
tendency to write out the state in LMEs, and a traditional politics of skills approach (i.e. 
PRA) that has a tendency to neglect the nuanced complexity and multiplicity of state 
projects and policies. Projects and policies to ‘support’, ‘shape’ or ‘emancipate’ 
competitiveness for both business productivity and worker-citizen employability, 
within a selected economic and social imaginary of the knowledge-based economy and 
post-welfare society. The CPE approach refocuses analytical attention on 
intersubjective meaning-making or meaning reproduction, and the associated 
discursive regulation of subjects and subjectivities as state work with real (material) 
effects; for example, the real effects that are substantiated in the operational 
remaking of the institutional arrangements for doing skills (from demand-led to 
demand-leading).  
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Figure 7.3: Three Skills Strategies for England (populated) 
 
Source: author’s analysis, compilation and design  
 
Secondly, by combining CPE with critical governance studies the importance of looking 
below the level of regime logic ordering of policy objectives to explore how meanings 
are produced and reproduced in policy has been shown. Borrowing the concepts of 
articulation and assemblage from Newman & Clarke (2009a) the findings offer an 
explanation and understanding of three skills strategies for England under New Labour. 
It is argued that the different strategies involved state work to articulate: types of 
workplaces; workplace actor relations; the form and role of the state; and the 
institutions of skills delivery, into assembled and sequenced architectures of ordering 
and organising the governance of the high(er) skills project. This work was fragile and 
incomplete, requiring the repeated (re)making, (re)producing or disrupting of 
discursive and material alignments and alliances between these workplace types, the 
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institutions of skills delivery and the state. Again this assembling – reordering and 
reorganising - of the governance of high(er) skills represents an attempt at discursive 
regulation of skills actors (employers, employees and the institutions of skill deliver) by 
imagined workplace type proximity to the high(er) skills logic, as well as the 
redistribution of who does what, gets what, and how; as an attempt, in differently 
imagined contexts, to dislodge the low skills equilibrium in the context of voluntarism.  
 
In conclusion, taken together Chapters 6 and 7 have shown the different ways in which 
workplace actors are imagined, articulated and called to action in relation to skills; the 
ways in which relations between them are ordered by policy-makers; and the way 
policy organises skills delivery in response. Specifically, how policy-makers distinguish 
the form and role of the state in producing responsible skills aspirations and 
behaviours. The conceptual and methodological approach taken offers significant 
advantages for explaining the nuances of the relationship between the formal and 
operational dimensions of policy (cf. VoC and PRA), and therefore for explaining and 
accounting for the paradox of a ‘demand-led’ strategy for skills; wherein demand is to 
be led by the state; in the context of voluntarism.  
 
A note on coherence as opacity: paradox revisited again 
 
So far the analytical task and contribution of the empirical chapters of this thesis has 
been to extricate the distinct strategies for skills, from within what is framed as a 
“coherent approach” to high(er) skills ( Foreword by Tony Blair – PIU, 2001:3), to 
explain and understand the governance – ordering and organising - of skills policy and 
account for the paradox at the heart of the New Labour Skills Strategy. As has been 
shown the distinction between the strategies was based on how the logic for high(er) 
skills was built and used in policy, and how workplaces and workplace relations were 
imagined in response. However, at this point it is necessary to remember that the 
distinct strategies coexisted and were muddled (entangled and intertwined) in policy-
makers’ narratives and policy discourse.  
 
Indeed, as was shown in Chapter 1 (also recalled at the beginning of Chapter 6) the 
discourses of skill policy for England under New Labour shifted somewhat seamlessly 
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and fluidly between the importance of a “demand-led approach” and the facilitation of 
a “new culture for learning and an appetite for improved skills amongst individuals and 
employers” (Leitch, 2006); between “putting employers’ needs for skills centre stage”, 
and encouraging more employers and employee to raise their demand and “make the 
necessary investment in skills” (DfES, 2003:8). In short, between the demand-led and 
two versions of demand-leading projects for high(er) skills in England.  
 
Presenting the interpretative analytical findings of this thesis in the form of Table 7.1 
below (which displays the distinct strategies, and the ways in which their component 
parts are depicted and described, side-by-side) is better able to hint at the fluidity 
between the discursive categorisations of linked ideas, images, actors, institutions, 
technologies, techniques and tools of skills delivery, and their sequencing in the 
ordering and organising of skill governance. This presentation makes more apparent 
the source of skill policy contradiction as ambiguity and the blurring of lines between 
strategies, resulting in the opacity of policy meanings, practices and processes. The 
significance of this ambiguity and the blurring of lines between strategies is the focus 
of the next chapter (Chapter 8) which addresses the last of the empirical sub-questions 
(SRQ3): how did employer and employee representatives interpret and respond to the 
New Labour high(er) skills project for England, and with what implications for the 
ordering and organising of skills delivery? 
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Table 7.1:  Three Skills Strategies for England – the Component Discourses 
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8. Talking Back to Policy Opacity: The Limits of State-Steered Voluntarism 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
he analytical task of the previous two chapters (Chapters 6 and 7) has been to 
explicate from within the entangled, collapsed and therefore opaque paradox - of a 
‘demand-led’ strategy; wherein demand is to be led by the state; in the context of 
voluntarism - the distinct strategies for governing skill in England under New Labour: the 
demand-led strategy; the strategy for leading demand; and the strategy for mitigating and 
circumventing lack of demand. The chapters have shown that defining these distinct 
strategies involved state work to (re)articulate and (re)assemble: imagined skills actors; 
their relations at the site of the workplace; the form of the state; and the organisational 
arrangements, resources, practices and processes of doing skills delivery.  
 
This chapter now turns to address the final empirical sub-question of this thesis: how did 
employer and employee representatives interpret and respond to the New Labour 
high(er) skills project for England, and with what implications for the ordering and 
organising of skills delivery (SRQ3). Drawing on document analysis and interviews with 
strategic employer representatives and employee representatives, and interviews with 
strategic representatives of skills delivery (see Chapter 4), the chapter offers an 
interpretative analysis of how representatives of workplace actors utilised the opacity 
between distinct, but entangled and collapsed together, strategies for governing skills in 
England to reassemble and remake the strategy, and the effects for skill delivery. The 
chapter argues that collapsing and entangling (blurring the lines between) the strategies 
effectively creates a repertoire of available but contradictory and disconnected narrative 
threads associated with different depictions of the skills aspirations and behaviours of 
employers and employees; their rights and responsibilities with regard to skills, and in 
relation to each other and the state; the proper role of the state in empowering, 
enhancing or exhorting and emancipating skills aspirations and behaviours; and a skills 
T 
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delivery system that should adapt and respond to demand, encourage raised demand, or 
seek to mitigate lack of demand.  
 
It is this repertoire of easily disconnected and dislocated narrative threads within policy 
that representatives of workplace actors select from to firstly, remake the logic for 
high(er) skills (the formal dimension of skill policy that defines the object of governance); 
and secondly, stretch and reshape, and resist and restate certain aspects of the 
operational dimension of skills policy, that defines who is to be governed and how (Carmel 
& Papadopoulos, 2003). In other words, this chapter finds that representatives of 
workplace actors engage in a second level of strategic selection. Extracting, re-inflecting 
and elevating parts of the high(er) skills project discourse to reorder, reorganise, and 
reassemble the meanings, practices and processes of doing skills from within the skills 
strategy. Having addressed how employer and employee representatives interpreted and 
responded to the New Labour Skills Strategy for England, the chapter then goes on to 
expose how skills delivery representatives experienced the effects 63.  
 
This section finds skills delivery representatives articulating the disruption, disorganisation 
and frustration of their already disparate given roles in relation to being demand-led and 
demand leading. The section concludes by discussing how the experience of skills delivery 
illuminates how skill governance and the role of the state in skills policy under New Labour 
can be conceptualised as a limited attempt at managing workplace actor skills aspirations 
and behaviours through state-steered voluntarism.  
 
                                                  
63 Much of the section that describes and discusses skills delivery representatives accounts of strategic 
selection and reassemblage of policy meanings, practices and processes, relates to how they experience 
employer representatives as engaged in this work. This is because this is what skills delivery representatives 
talked about in interviews. The reason for their asymmetrical focus on how the strategy has been 
interpreted and responded to by employer representatives is twofold. Firstly, because the New Labour Skills 
Strategy for England tends to treat a demand-led system as synonymous with an ‘employer-led’ system on 
the basis of imagined shared and progressive high(er) skills aspirations and behaviours in responsible 
workplaces; and secondly (and in relation) because many of the skills delivery organisations were, at least in 
part, remade as employer-led (see Chapter 6). 
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8.2 Talking back into policy opacity: the narratives of employer representatives 
 
In response to the research aims guiding this chapter, this section presents the narratives 
of employer representatives as talking back into policy opacity. It starts by showing how 
employer representatives engaged in rebuilding the logic for skills (formal dimension of 
policy) around a primary and priority economic ambition, by twisting and tilting narratives 
of complexity and coherence available in policy. It then analyses how this rebuilt logic is 
used by employer representatives to underscore a selective stretching and reshaping or 
resisting and restating of the operational dimension of policy; how skills are to be done. It 
argues that by extracting, re-inflecting and elevating partial narratives available within 
policy associated with the imaginaries of enlightened employers and deficient/deviant 
worker-citizens, employer representatives were able to counter and attempt to close 
down alternative imaginaries of employer deficiency/deviance. The section concludes that 
the stretching and reshaping, and resisting and restating, work of employer 
representatives amounted to an attempt to reassemble the skills project from within.  
 
8.2.1 Remaking the Logic for Skills: Emphasising the Economic Ambition 
 
Employer representatives presented their members as both driving awareness and aligned 
with policy-makers in articulating the uncertainty-based complexity of the economic 
environment experienced by businesses in the context of heightened global competition 
and on-going technological advancements (see Chapter 5). As such, they equally voiced 
their support for an urgent policy focus on skills as a means to underwrite successful 
business strategies, ‘keep pace’ and ‘excel’ in the modern economy, and mitigate this 
complexity (ERR1; ERR2; ERR4; ERR6; EEF, 2006a; EEF, 2006b; BCC, 2006; IoD, 2006a; CBI, 
2007).  
 
Like policy-makers, they made specific reference to the ‘rise’ of NICs as meaning that the 
UK cannot afford to “rest on its laurels” (ERR4), with regard to pursuing the high(er) skills 
necessary for enhanced productivity, competitiveness, and profitability in changing 
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markets (ERR1; ERR4). Indeed, they presented a general and widespread recognition 
within the business community that there is no alternative to improving the skills base 
(CBI, 2007:5); that “to a certain extent it has become a crunch time” (ERR4).  
 
As such employer representatives constructed their members within the positive 
imaginary of ‘enlightened’ partners in the skills agenda that recognised and wanted to 
realise the progressive potential of high(er) skills. They depicted the businesses they 
represent as ambitiously “high-tech and high-skills” (ERR4); and as having the aspiration to 
“drive things forward much more aggressively” (ERR1). 
 
“We have been very supportive of the Government’s focus on skills as an issue because of 
what we know about how that impacts on our members growth strategies, and just how 
they can do business. So I think that is very positive.” (ERR1) 
 
“Well our members tell us that it is crucial. If you don’t keep up with the skills agenda, don’t 
keep up with up-skilling your workforce and skilling even the employer themselves, you’re 
going to lose ground on your competitors.” (ERR2) 
 
Employer representatives also picked up on, and sought to present themselves as aligned 
with, policy-makers portrayal of high(er) skills as cohering the interests and ambitions of 
multiple stakeholders and multiple agendas (see Chapter 5). Borrowing what employer 
representatives explicitly identify as a New Labour ‘language of reconciliation’ (Fairclough, 
2000; Newman, 2001) - by which policy-makers intertwine and harmonise public and 
private, economic (recognised as ‘supporting markets’), and social (recognised as ‘finding 
ways for everyone to participate more effectively in the market’), agendas (ERR5) - they 
equally presented the focus on skills as, in their view, the best way to simultaneously meet 
the interests and ambitions of government, businesses and worker-citizens. However, this 
coherence of stakeholder interests and agendas was somewhat reinterpreted, 
reorganised and retold in employer representatives’ narratives.  
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The logic for skills presented by policy-makers was subtly dissected and distilled, and 
consequentially repackaged; such that strategic emphasis was principally and 
fundamentally placed on delivering the economic ambitions of improved productivity and 
competitiveness; whilst social ambitions were relegated to the position of a secondary 
consequence.  
  
“It [the skills strategy] comes back to competitiveness and economic growth, and the fact 
that to have sort of all the things we’d like for the UK economy - both in terms of 
opportunities in terms of social welfare and standard of living - all those things come back to 
competitiveness.”(ERR5)  
 
“They [policy-makers] have accepted the Leitch targets, in doing so they wish not only to 
improve economic competitiveness but also social inclusion and individual’s development. 
It’s a very holistic strategy […] but as a fundamental goal - recognising that skills are 
absolutely fundamental to productivity and therefore to our competitiveness - absolutely 
support it.” (ERR1, emphasis in original) 
 
“I think clearly the main aims of the Skills Strategy are [pause] well if you’ve read Leitch and 
the Government reports it would be driving economic performance [pause] and, I guess, 
individual employability as well.” (ERR3) 
 
Indeed, employer representatives emphasised the need to ensure policy was able to “get 
the balance right” (ERR3; also ERR4; ERR6) between the co-existing, but in their view 
asymmetrically important, messages running through policy-makers’ narratives. Voicing 
their concern about the possibility of strategic drift (ERR1)64 if too much attention was 
paid to the lobby groups they perceived to represent the non-economically valuable 
interests of learners/workers (ERR3; CBI, 2007:45). Employer representatives strongly 
cautioned against allowing skills to become a predominantly ‘socially-driven’ or ‘welfare-
driven’ project; whereby the primary goal to support competitive business performance 
                                                  
64 One employer representative in particular questioned the meaning of changing names and functions of 
some government departments. Offering their perception that part of a previous Department for Education 
and Skills had become problematically re-focused on children and families, and that there had recently been 
a “subtle rowing back” going on inside DIUS to reorient policy to the needs of individuals and the more 
“welfare-driven aspects of that strategy”  (ERR1; also ERR4). 
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(CBI, 2007:45) - expressed as “the bigger picture” (ERR1) – becomes weakened. To make 
this case they selected and stretched the perspective available in policy that social gains 
for the individual employee and for society as a whole will best be achieved as a result of 
developing the kinds of skills businesses need and want (ERR5).  Furthermore, they were 
quick to draw out and elevate the narrative available in skills policy that “good employees” 
– those that “want to have good jobs, be able to support themselves and their families, 
and the kind of life they’d like to live” (ERR5) - share this perspective (ERR5).   
 
“It’s absolutely vital that individuals have got the opportunity and access to developing their 
skills, particularly up to a certain level to really make sure they get a foot in the labour 
market; get a good job. But […] I think we would argue that the focus has got to be on skills 
that are going to improve economic performance, because that’s the best way of improving 
employment opportunities and so on. […] We have to remember that businesses need to 
keep running.” (ERR3) 
 
In summary, in seeming contrast to VoC and PRA explanations of the dynamics that 
govern skill formation in liberal market political economies (of which the UK/England is an 
archetypical case), employer representatives presented their members as strongly 
favouring and supporting progressive market shaping strategies - such as investment in 
higher skills – and therefore as ‘enlightened employers’.  However, in their narratives the 
argument for high(er) skills was carefully rebuilt around an exclusively economic logic, 
which placed the interest of private business at the fore. They enacted this rebuilding by 
using, but twisting and tilting, the narratives available in policy-makers presentation of 
skills as cohering multiple interests and agendas. They selectively extracted the discursive 
threads that supported their argument (i.e. economically viable skills for business 
sustainability and prosperity): reordering, reorganising and realigning them in relation to 
the wider context of coherence between economic and social logics (i.e. nature of work 
and work opportunities), elevating them to a primary position and diminishing and 
therefore somewhat subverting social agendas (see Figure 8.1). 
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Figure 8.1: Remapping the Discourses of High(er) Skill Coherence: Economic Ambition65 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: author’s analysis, compilation and design  
  
Having rebuilt the logic for high(er) skills (formal dimension of policy) by emphasising the 
economic ambition, the next two subsections show how employer representatives used 
this remade primary and priority object of governance to stretch and reshape, or resist 
and restate certain aspects of the operational dimension of policy; the ‘doing of skills’. 
This stretching and reshaping/resisting and restating work was rendered possible by 
utilising the opaque spaces between the entangled and collapsed, but distinct and 
contradictory strategies, (to be demand-led; to lead demand; and to circumvent lack of 
demand) and parts of the narratives of policy-makers related to differently imagined 
workplaces and workplace skills actors.  
  
8.2.2 Stretching and reshaping skills policy: the ‘demand-led’ strategy retold 
 
Drawing on partial narratives available in relation to imagined enlightened business and 
inert and deviant worker-citizens, employer representatives stretched and reshaped the 
operational dimension of the New Labour Skills Strategy as exclusively concerned to 
provide for employers as customers. Specifically they remade the role of the state in 
                                                  
65 Policy-makers’ map of discourses of high(er) skill coherence shown in Chapter 5 as Figure 5.1 
  
Employer Representatives’ Narratives Policy-makers’ Narratives 
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listening to business, and managing the deficiency and irresponsibility of worker-citizens 
as subjects. 
 
Providing for employers: Disentangling the partner-customer narrative 
 
Given the way employer representatives rebuilt the logic for skills in relation to their 
‘enlightened’ members, the New Labour Skills Strategy was primarily interpreted as a 
“policy directed at business” (ERR3). They stretched policy narratives of skills both for 
business and designed in the interest of business, and in doing so disentangled their dual 
‘partner-customer’ role identified in the construction of enlightened employers (see 
Chapter 6). Specifically, they suppressed the active ‘partner’ element that implied a 
business commitment and contribution to developing an organisational up-skilling 
agenda; particularly with regard to low skilled employees. Whilst foregrounding their 
status and position as passive, and provided for, ‘customer’.   
 
They lamented the existing skills weaknesses in the workforce which their members 
experienced as severely holding back their competitive success (ERR2; ERR6; BCC, 2006; 
EEF, 2006a; IoD, 2006a; LCC, 2007). Particularly given the depiction of their ‘enlightened’ 
growth-orientated members whose business strategies are likely to suffer significantly, 
even fatally, as a result of skills supply shortages (ERR1; ERR4; IoD, 2006a:1).  Highlighting 
the extent to which these skills weaknesses are evidence that skills policy and skills 
delivery had not adequately met the needs of businesses as customers (ERR1). They talked 
back to policy with reference to the real and growing demand for ‘a new kind of worker’ - 
a better skilled worker – amongst their membership, and argued that this demand had not 
yet been satisfied (ERR2; ERR4; ERR6). 
 
“What we find generally on the skills agenda is that employers still aren’t finding the skills 
that they want and the skills that they need, and they’re always asking us what more we can 
do to sort of push the envelope to find more people that they need”” (ERR5) 
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What therefore became apparent in the way employer representatives interpreted the 
Skills Strategy is that better skilled employees were explicitly considered to be a 
product/resource that should be provided - from the ‘outside-in’ - to their member 
businesses in order to support their operational requirements. Drawing selectively on 
narratives available within the construction of the responsible workplace, they specifically 
interpreted the problem of low skills as acknowledged to be external to their members 
(ERR1; ERR3; ERR4; IoD, 2006:5). A problem they were seen to experience as a 
consequence of the previous failures of the supply-led education system, and that they 
should be engaged in highlighting through ‘voice and choice’, rather than engaged in 
solving through partnership (ERR1; ERR4; ERR6).  
 
The consequence of stretching their position as ‘provided for customer’ was a reshaping in 
employer representatives’ narratives of what is meant in policy by the ‘demand-led’ 
strategy. A reshaping that firstly involved government and the skills delivery system in 
actively and exclusively listening to the demands of employers (linking the output of the 
education and training system to their specific wants), and secondly involved transferring 
full responsibility for solving the problem of low skills to inert and deviant worker-citizens.   
 
Listening to business 
 
In interviews employer representatives expressed their support for a ‘demand-led’ 
system, which they interpreted to mean that government and the skills delivery system 
had finally realised the vital relevance of ‘listening to businesses’ (ERR5). Specifically, that 
government and the skills delivery system were committed to taking their steer on skills 
exclusively from them and their members, and were focused on providing what they 
needed and wanted (ERR2; ERR3; ERR5; ERR6). Indeed, that government and the skills 
delivery system had realised that to “create policy without them [employers] is crazy and 
would actually produce nothing” (EER5). As such, they emphasise what they recognised in 
policy as the new “rights” (ERR5) and “entitlements” (ERR6) of employers to have an 
“influence” (ERR2; ERR6); “telling the government and providers exactly the skills that they 
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need to be able to compete” (ERR2). To “call the tune” (ERR6), because they alone know 
what is required (economically valuable) to meet their business need.  
 
This right of employers to be listened to and to influence the skills product was stretched 
in the narratives of employer representatives as intended to extend across, and infiltrate 
all the activities of the education and training system. They presented their relationship 
with government as ‘good’ where they interpreted policy initiatives as being exclusively 
aimed at “ticking the business box” (ERR3). Train to Gain was supported where it was 
defined as the epitome of the demand-led system; “asking employers what the needs are 
[…] and then responding to that very directly” (ERR1). In the same vein, specific concern 
was taken to emphasise policy narratives that Individual Skills Accounts66 were intended 
to deliver the skills employers want (CBI, 2007a:10; ERR3), and not be misused by 
employees/learners to support non-economically viable ‘leisure activities’ (FSB, 2006:2). 
Indeed, as one employer representative neatly summarised, the business lobby 
perception of the overall stance of policy-makers was generally interpreted as “it’s no 
good educating people if they’re not going to have jobs at the end; so they’ve got to 
produce what employers want” (ERR6).  
 
Stretch responsibility of employees 
 
Having interpreted and stretched the position of employers as the priority customers of 
high(er) skills – the only demand that matters in the demand-led system - employer 
representatives simultaneously located employees as the responsibilised partner-subjects 
of the skills strategy. Specifically, and again drawing selectively on available narratives of 
worker-citizen inertia and deviance, employees were depicted as required to actively and 
continuously attend to and seek to align and realign their skills aspirations and behaviours 
with what employers want. Indeed, meeting the skills expectations of business was 
explicitly interpreted as the ‘responsibility’ - even the duty – given in policy to (potential) 
employees (ERR1; ERR3; ERR4).  
 
                                                  
66 Also referred to as Adult Learner Accounts (CBI, 2007a:10) and Learning Accounts (FSB, 2006:2) 
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“They [employees] have a responsibility to listen to what employers are going to want. There 
is an enormous tendency [...] of saying “but I want to do this”. Well if there isn’t a job doing 
that you can’t do it. So I think learners do have a responsibility to realise that actually they 
can’t call the tune. They’ve got to go with whatever flow there is, and look at what the 
opportunities are and not expect the opportunities to just suddenly fall in their laps.” (ERR6) 
 
What is implicit in such a depiction of employee responsibility is employer 
representatives’ characterisation of their further requirement to be independently 
accountable for actively and continuously seeking to change and adapt their abilities, and 
achieve necessary skills enhancement for the benefit of their employer. Essentially 
(potential) employees were portrayed as needing to assume responsibility for mediating 
the uncertainty-based complexity experienced by business. Indeed, utilising policy-makers 
presentation of a ‘job for life’ as anachronistic in the modern economy, they emphasised 
the skills strategy as being all about motivating employees to accept the challenge of 
ensuring they have the adaptability and flexibility to stay useful and useable, and 
therefore employable (ERR1; ERR4).  
 
“I mean it’s a cliché but there’s no job for life. Employees now are going to have to adapt to 
changing economic circumstances; you know changing roles, changing jobs. So I think it’s 
[the Skills Strategy] just making sure they’ve got the skills to do that really.” (ERR3) 
 
Mimicking policy language that constructs inert and deviant worker-citizens, they spoke 
the need for people to show they are “able and willing” to improve their “use to an 
employer” (ERR4). To “do something for themselves” (ERR6) to make sure they are 
“valuable in the labour market” (ERR1), rather than expecting to be “spoon fed by 
employers” (ERR6). In essence by stretching and reshaping policy narratives regarding the 
role of employees in a way that brings the entanglement of a responsibilised partner-
subject discourse to the foreground, employer representatives selectively emphasised 
policy as seeking to steer and manage the skills voluntarism of worker-citizens in relation 
to their members’ position as customers of skills. In doing so, they again remade the Skills 
Strategy as being exclusively about the passive delivery of what businesses need from 
employees.  
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In summary employer representatives utilised their rebuilt logic for skills, and selected 
partial narratives related to the construction of businesses as ‘enlightened’ and worker-
citizens as inert and deviant, to stretch and reshape a strong position for their members as 
customers of the New Labour Skills Strategy; to be listened to, and provided for though 
the steering and management of employee voluntarism. Furthermore, this strong 
(re)positioning of their members as customers provided the bedrock for their resistance 
and restating of alternative, but entangled and collapsed together, policy narratives 
related to differently assembled logics, workplace imaginaries, and roles and 
responsibilities of skills actors.  
 
8.2.3 Resisting and restating skills policy: the strategy to lead demand retold 
 
“What you’ll hear a lot is this phrase ‘bad employers’, you know. […] I don’t know what 
they’re doing by the way, but they’re somehow living in the dark ages and they’re probably 
exploiting their workforce.  All this is just complete bunkum. It’s just complete bunkum.” 
(ERR1)   
 
This subsection provides the mirror of the subsection above. It highlights how employer 
representatives countered and attempted to close down – resisted and restated - 
identified policy narratives associated with the inertia and irresponsibility of business; 
narratives that prefaced a skills strategy to lead or circumvent lack of demand. Again, that 
distinct policy narratives are entangled and collapsed rendered it possible for employer 
representatives to utilise the opacity of the spaces between them. Specifically policy 
opacity was used to firstly claim contradiction and therefore incoherence of strategy, and 
secondly to challenge employer deficiency and deviance. By recalling narratives of 
employer enlightenment and associated privilege in a demand-led system, employer 
representatives used one image of business as responsible to recast perceived inertia and 
irresponsibility as either a lack of recognition, that much business training is going 
‘unseen’; or as an issue of relevance, that policy prescriptions - targets for skills measured 
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by qualification - are irreconcilable with an aim and ambition to ensure skills in England 
are demand-led. 
 
Resisting inertia and deviance: restating a lack of recognition  
 
Employer representatives defended businesses in their membership – enlightened and 
therefore successful businesses - as fully engaged in training their workforce (ERR2; ERR3; 
ERR4). To the extent that, as one employer representative stated, “We think 100% of 
businesses train” (ERR2). These businesses, they argued, do not need to be encouraged or 
‘told’ to train by government (ERR1; ERR4; ERR5; CBI, 2007:34). These are businesses 
within which there is an actually existing and firmly entrenched realisation that training 
has critical intrinsic and instrumental value (ERR1; ERR4).  
 
“I wouldn’t think that they [members] would feel responsible [for training] because the state 
told them to be, and in fact that might put them off [laughs]. In fact I would think it was 
more that they would want to do so, and that would be good for their company, and good 
for the people who work for them, and they would feel good about doing so.” (ERR5) 
 
Indeed, they explicitly challenged what they considered to be the erroneous, and frankly 
incongruous, perception that insidious businesses – concerned about poaching – play risky 
games of chicken with their ambitious business aspirations in order to avoid the 
competitive disadvantage of making investments in skill development (ERR1). Drawing on 
the very logics used to build a case for skills, they questioned how policy-makers could 
reconcile the survival of such insidious businesses given the uncertainty-based complexity 
of the economic environment (ERR1; ERR2; ERR4). 
 
Instead they evidenced a range of survey data, especially LSC reported data regarding 
business spend on training, to highlight that, in their opinion employers were more than 
‘playing their part’ (CBI, 2007:5; ERR367; ERR4). Taking pains to mitigate controversy over 
                                                  
67 As would be expected, there were some discrepancies between reports over the total value of employer 
training. In interview (2008) ERR3 compared approximately £39bn per year spend on training by business 
 227
the figures (see section 8.3.2 below) by stating their belief that the vast majority of this 
spend is on “proper training” (ERR1). By which they mean training that is both valuable to 
the business and developmental for the employee - even if it is not necessarily formal and 
accredited - as opposed to just basic induction programmes and mandatory Health and 
Safety courses.  The issue then, as they restated it, was not that businesses weren’t 
training – a consequence of either their inertia or deviant irresponsibility – but rather that 
the quantity and quality of the training they were providing was largely going 
‘unrecognised’ (FSB, 2009b:1; FSB, 2008:30; ERR4).  
 
“We believe that in some form all businesses […] are training and unfortunately it’s going 
unrecognised. It’s going unrecognised by the employer themselves providing training to the 
employee; it’s going unrecognised by a colleague in the workforce providing on-the-job 
training; private providers coming in; etc. In any shape or form there is training going on it’s 
just not recognised.” (ERR2) 
 
“There is a lot of training going on sort of underneath the surface that, you know, isn’t easily 
measured; that’s on-the-job. It’s done by sitting next to a skilled person and sort of learning 
as you’re going.” (ERR3) 
 
In essence, what this narrative of the employer representatives attempted to achieve was 
to render visible forms of training and skilling which policy discourse obscured when the 
state-led vision for skills, and the targets for capturing progress towards the vision, were 
set out (see Chapter 7). Employer representatives’ narratives sought to locate the source 
of perceptions of inertia and deviance with a government (and therefore a policy) that 
only recognised as meaningful what it could measure and only measured and therefore 
recognised formal training that leads to a full qualification. The result was that informal, 
internal or private sector provided skills development, that they argued is ‘demanded’ and 
valued by businesses that “train to competence rather than qualification” (CBI, 2007:7; 
also ERR2; ERR3; ERR5), was ‘unseen’ (FSB, 2008; FSB, 2009b) and therefore overlooked.  
                                                                                                                                                        
with a government adult skills budget of £4bn to make the point about employers commitment to skills. 
Documents produced by employer representative groups during the fieldwork period reported business 
spend on training of around £33bn per year (CBI, 2007; EEF, 2006a:2; IoD, 2006:8; BCC, 2006:5) 
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This lack of recognition was often presented in terms of a ‘barrier’. A term that was here 
used to reinforce the perspective that what businesses face is not so much obstacles to 
training (lack of capacity, capability or care to engage – see Chapter 7), but barriers to 
shared meaning about the nature of the skills project; what counts as skills demand and 
development and therefore the proper role and responsibility of businesses in relation to 
the notion of ‘enlightened’ skills aspiration and behaviour. In short it was the absence of 
shared meaning that, for them, resulted in the erroneous perception that there are ‘bad’ 
employers. 
 
“I think often the Government’s obsession with measuring things through qualifications is a 
sort of barrier; that kind of ‘nothing counts’ in training really to the Government, to a certain 
extent, unless it’s a full qualification. I mean there’s quite a hell of a lot of very valuable 
training happening in-house which sometimes doesn’t have a qualification at all.” (ERR4) 
 
“It does frustrate me when you hear the language around ambition, around being 
enlightened. It doesn’t reflect a real understanding of what businesses are about, how 
businesses function. It’s very much based on this preconceived understanding that there are 
rapacious individuals who are, you know, running chain gangs, and exploiting people, and 
not investing in skills; I don’t know out of stubbornness, and not understanding? It’s just 
completely wrong.” (ERR1) 
 
In summary, when faced with messages from policy-makers that inert and deviant 
businesses need to ‘raise their game’ and change their behaviour in line with a more 
ambitious skills vision, employer representatives retaliated and responded by utilising and 
reasserting the positive image of enlightened and responsible businesses. Restating the 
problem as a lack of recognition, they instead challenged government to find ways of 
acknowledging – better ‘evidencing’ (ERR2; BCC, 2006:20; FSB, 2008:30) - their actually 
existing skills development activities.  
 
In addition to challenging recognition of informal and unaccredited training, employer 
representatives also called into question the ‘relevance’ of formal and accredited training 
(FSB, 2008; FSB, 2009b). They did this by reasserting the policy narrative – also associated 
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with images of enlightened and responsible employers - of ensuring demand-led skills. By 
questioning the ‘relevance’ of qualifications they further justified business choices to train 
and skill employees in other ways.  
 
Resisting inertia and deviance: restating a lack of relevance 
 
Drawing on explanations for why businesses don’t engage in the skills project  made 
available and legitimate in policy narratives (see Chapter 7), employer representatives 
talked back the challenges their members can face associated with capacity and capability 
to offer training that leads to ‘full formal qualifications’ (ERR1; ERR3; ERR4). However, 
they resisted inertia and irresponsibility as the basis of business limits to capacity and 
capability to train, and restated their reasons for not engaging with accredited training by 
recalling policy narratives associated with the need for a demand-led system to meet the 
aspirations of enlightened business in two different but interrelated ways.  
 
Firstly, they again distinguished and delimited their demand for training to task 
competence rather than qualification (ERR2; ERR3; IoD, 2006:8), thereby reemphasising 
the role of government to ensure (potential) employees are overcoming their inertia and 
deviance regarding more generic skills development: ensuring worker-citizens are taking 
responsibility and equipping themselves with the economically viable skills businesses 
need, which in turn serve the interest of the wider economy/country and are therefore 
rightly a ‘public’ concern (ERR4; IoD, 2006). Secondly, they argued that a publically funded 
system focused on full formal qualification attainment remains inflexible to 
accommodating and meeting the needs of businesses as customers and therefore remains 
‘unresponsive’ (ERR1; ERR2; ERR3; ERR4). 
 
By restating the basis of business limits to capacity and capability to train in this way they 
were again quick to disassociate what they perceived to be the actually existing challenges 
to formal training that employers’ face, from erroneous claims that inert and irresponsible 
employers are choosing not to train. Rather, they highlighted and emphasised the 
problem of business case ‘relevance’ (ERR2) - “real issues about how good the 
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qualifications are; how relevant they are; whether firms actually want them” (ERR3) - as 
presenting significant barriers to business engagement with government initiatives and 
programmes (ERR1; ERR2; ERR4).  
 
“When we did a study last year, half of our members hadn’t heard of it [Train to Gain]. Now 
if you think of the profile of the [organisation name] membership who are very switched on 
to training, who spend a lot of money training - skills are integral to their business strategy 
and how they approach their competitiveness - for half of them to not have heard of Train to 
Gain was surprising and really disappointing; disappointing in the sense that it just showed it 
wasn’t meeting their need.” (ERR1)  
 
“Train to Gain is the big programme through which the vast majority of Government funding 
of skills is going to be put, but, you know, we’re not at a stage where that’s demand-led. It’s 
still focused on qualifications; there isn’t a lot of flexibility. I think there’s a lot of work to do 
to make sure that you get the balance better in terms of actually meeting employers’ skills 
needs.”(ERR3) 
 
In essence they argued that there is a long way to go before the rhetoric of a ‘demand-led’ 
skills system – which they draw on as a “central pillar” (EER1) of strategy and they restate 
as being about “putting the employer in the driving seat” (ERR3); ensuring provision is “fit 
for purpose” (IoD, 2006:4); “tailored to meet their need” (ERR2); and “leading to outcomes 
they need” (ERR4) - is experienced by businesses as a reality (IoD, 2006:3; FSB, 2008:29). 
By utilising the opaque space between policy narratives of a ‘demand-led’ strategy and a 
strategy to ‘lead demand’, the problem, as it is restated by employer representatives, is 
that initiatives such as SSCs, Train to Gain, and the right to request time to train, are still 
driven to achieve targets for qualification attainment that have been set to meet spurious 
government aims and ambitions, not the aims and ambitions of businesses. They 
identified these spurious aims and ambitions of government as both problematically 
pseudo-social, and as inherently self-serving (IoD, 2006; EEF, 2006a; FSB, 2009a). As asking 
employers to make up the shortcomings of irresponsible worker-citizens and a failing 
education and training system despite the lack of relevance for their business (ERR1; 
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ERR2; ERR3; ERR4; ERR5; ERR6) - and as therefore having the intention of “creating ‘level 2 
basic skills factories’ out of those firms using the initiative” (FSB, 2008:29).  
 
 “One of the things in the consultation was ‘oh well the Learning and Skills Council met its 
objectives’. Okay, but employers don’t have the kind of skills that they want, and we still 
have this huge problem with people not being employed and not making the most of the 
skills they do have or gaining new ones. […] I mean ticking boxes and saying that the targets 
have been met doesn’t actually mean that we’ve gotten there” (ERR5) 
 
As this employer representative went on to state, when the training offer and associated 
qualifications are not perceived to map onto skills need (ERR3), the question businesses 
ask is “who are they actually delivering for?” (ERR5). Highlighting policy-makers own 
identification of the problems associated with the ‘old’ approach to centrally planned 
supply-led systems (see Chapter 6) - “government meeting its own targets and not 
actually creating any real impact” (ERR5; also FSB, 2006:1; ERR1; ERR3) – employer 
representatives depicted the New Labour Skills Strategy as nonetheless continuing in the 
mould of the mythical Procrustes. Determined to fit, however painfully, all their 
businesses ‘customers’ - with their diversity of specialised and niche requirements - into 
an iron framework of arbitrarily standardised and rationalised qualifications at different 
skills levels (ERR1; ERR3; ERR4; IoD, 2006:4). Whilst at the same time disingenuously 
attempting to ‘sell’ these fixed products, and the requirement for businesses to be drawn 
or chopped to size in order to align with them, as meeting need (ERR2; BCC, 2006:18).  
 
“Train to Gain seems more focused on sort of selling a product. I mean you get providers and 
brokers coming to firms and saying ‘we’ve got these level 2 qualifications which one do you 
want because they’ll be free’, rather than perhaps really looking at businesses skills needs, 
and tailoring the training so it’s actually much more relevant. […] I mean I don’t think it’s 
surprising that a lot of firms just think it’s not really worth my time.” (ERR3) 
 
“People just get funnelled into broad qualification solutions. You see a skills broker and the 
first thing they do is talk about an Apprenticeship because they’ve got a target to meet. It’s a 
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big national priority. Well if it’s not addressing the need it’s a complete waste of time, effort, 
and money.” (ERR1) 
 
Employer representatives argued that the consequence for their members of this attempt 
to ‘lead demand’ - requiring employers to enhance or change their skills aspirations and 
behaviours to meet prescribed targets – was the further ‘devaluing’ of qualifications and 
their further ‘disengagement’ with the system (FSB, 2006:1). However, for them, this 
withdrawal is not to be confused with inertia or deviance. The point, they argued, is that 
none of this ‘enhancing’ or ‘exhorting’ activity of the state can actually be reconciled as 
demand-led and as meeting demand.  
 
“If you’re going to have a truly demand-led system then it’s got to be demand-led. It’s got to 
be employers and individuals saying ‘look we need these sorts of skills’, and the system 
should be delivering it rather than the Government essentially coming to them and trying to 
push these skills onto companies” (ERR3) 
 
“If you’re going to be properly demand-led you’ve got to be open to being very flexible. […] 
What worries me is any initiative which tries to close down and make uniform the provision. 
How that is meeting demand? I just cannot fathom it.” (ERR1) 
 
In short, by utilising the distinction between ‘demand-led’ and ‘leading demand’ as 
contradictory skills strategies, employer representatives were able to effectively resist 
images of employer inertia and deviance, and restate the problem of ‘relevance’. In doing 
so, they sought to legitimise the disengagement of business from government skills 
initiatives and programmes. 
 
8.2.4 Summary of employer representatives: talking back 
 
This section has shown how employer representatives engaged with the New Labour Skills 
Strategy for England to firstly rebuild the logic for skills around a primary and priority 
economic ambition, and secondly stretch and reshape, and resist and restate, elements of 
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the practices and process of ‘doing skills’ in relation to this rebuilt logic. What has been 
explicitly and analytically developed through this section is that the rebuilding - stretching 
and reshaping, resisting and restating - work is rendered possible as a consequence of the 
way in which policy-makers entangle, collapse and therefore obscure the lines between 
the distinct strategies for skills (to be demand-led, to lead demand, and to 
mitigate/circumvent lack of demand).  
 
As a result of collapsing the lines between strategies employer representatives can 
selectively and strategically dissect, distil and dislocate available partial narrative threads 
within policy, stitching them back together in new patterns to reassemble the skills project 
from within. Specifically they use partial and re-stitched narratives associated with 
employers as enlightened and employees as deficient/deviant to reemphasise and remake 
the meaning and nature of the associated demand-led system (providing for employers as 
customers and managing employees as subjects); highlight the incongruence and 
incoherence between a demand-led strategy and a strategy to lead demand; and counter 
and attempt to close down policy imaginaries of inert and deviant employers, highlighting 
instead lack of recognition for their demand, and lack of relevance of demand leading 
activity.  
 
8.3 Talking back into policy opacity: the narratives of employee representatives 
 
As a mirror to the previous section, this section presents the narratives of employee 
representatives also talking back into policy opacity. It again starts by showing how 
employee representatives engaged in rebuilding the logic for skills (formal dimension of 
policy) around a primary and priority social ambition, by twisting and tilting policy-makers’ 
narratives of complexity and coherence. It then analyses how this rebuilt logic is used by 
employee representatives to underscore a selective stretching and reshaping or resisting 
and restating of the operational dimension of policy. The section shows that by extracting, 
re-inflecting, and elevating partial narratives available within policy associated with the 
imaginaries of motivated but disadvantaged worker-citizens and deficient/deviant 
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businesses, employee representatives were able to counter and attempt to close down 
imaginaries of employee deficiency/deviance and restate the disadvantage and 
vulnerability of the low-skilled. Therefore they constructed a case for increasing the 
responsibility of employers and the state in a ‘truly’ progressive skills agenda. The section 
again concludes that the stretching and reshaping/resisting and restating work of 
employee representatives amounted to an attempt to reassemble the skills project from 
within.  
 
8.3.1 Remaking the Logic for Skills: Emphasising the Social Ambition 
 
Employee representatives also aligned with policy-makers in narrating the strategic need 
for a focus on skills to mitigate uncertainty-based complexity, and ensure competitive 
advantage in the global knowledge-based economy (EER1; EER3). They described the 
nation as “facing a tidal wave of competition” (EER2), in particular from the NICs, and 
spoke in terms of the need to win the “skills arms race” (EER2) in order to maintain 
economic pole position and secure prosperous standards of living for all. Indeed, as one 
employee representative explained “the logic of moving towards a more skilled economy 
is the only industrial logic in a globally trading market” (EER1).  
 
The necessity for economic progress towards ever high(er) skilled activity, and the 
implications of an emerging “flowerpot” (EER2) shaped labour market, is narrated as 
requiring everybody - employers and employees alike - to urgently address their skill 
development needs. Employee representatives, like employer representatives, were quick 
to characterise those they represent as active partners in this project; as “committed, 
engaged, interested, enthusiastic, and supportive” (EER2); and as fully bought into the 
high(er) skills agenda (TUC, 2005). In short, they depict the worker-citizens they represent 
within the positive imaginary of ‘motivated’ employees that recognise and want to realise 
the progressive potential of skills (see Chapter 6).  
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In presenting skills as ‘everybody’s concern’, employee representatives also align 
themselves with policy-makers portrayal of skills as cohering the interests and ambitions 
of multiple stakeholders and multiple agendas (see Chapter 5). Again borrowing policy-
makers ‘language of reconciliation’ (Fairclough, 2000; Newman, 2001), they explicitly 
identified the focus on skills as addressing both the productivity and profitability of 
businesses (economic modernisation), and issues of social inclusion and social justice 
(EER1; EER2; EER3; EER4; EER5: TUC, 2007d). However, they stressed that “raising the 
skills level is particularly about social justice” (EER4). Specifically that policy was 
distinctively about the issue of economic and social ‘participation’ (inclusion) of all in the 
emerging knowledge-based economy and society, and therefore about the “social and 
cultural dimensions of Lifelong Learning” (EER1). That policy was about “empowering 
people to actually access training and development and to actually enable them to move 
up the career ladder”, and that that is “all about social justice.” (EER5).   
 
In emphasising the link between skills and social justice the coherence of stakeholder 
interests and agendas is again somewhat reinterpreted, reorganised and retold in 
employee representatives’ narratives. Selecting from within the ways in which policy-
makers build the logic for skills, employee representatives privileged and placed particular 
significance on the looming problem of low-skilled unemployment, and therefore the 
social ambition of improving employability and employment chances; bringing these 
issues to the foreground of the logic for skills (EER2; TUC, 2007d). In particular they 
remade and supported the focus of skills policy as particularly aimed at those most 
distanced from the better functioning/more progressive parts of the labour market, and 
therefore those placed most at risk by the dynamics of a knowledge-based economy.  
 
“You can see what the Skills Strategy tries to do is to say well for a substantial swathe of the 
people who are missing out in all of this there is a win-win between the wider economic 
interests of the country, and the interests of individuals in having choices in their lives if we 
can give them the skills for employability. All that I absolutely am behind.” (EER1) 
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“There are lots of aspects of the Government’s policy that we support. I mean the 
Government has had a focus on actually how do you help the most disadvantaged; the 
people who are not able to access training and skills at the workplace generally.” (EER5) 
 
They described policy-makers as “alive to the challenges facing people most excluded from 
the system” (EER1), and as having “no apologies to make for helping people in work who 
didn’t have chances, get chances” (EER1). Therefore, the logic of skills policy was remade 
as principally about addressing disadvantage and disaffection caused by workplace 
inequalities in access to training and skills (EER3; EER5). Skills become a way of addressing 
“the prospects of the individual […] the decent experience at work” (EER3), which 
employee representatives were also quick to point out should be of concern to ‘good’ 
employers (EER3; EER4).  
 
By remaking coherence in this way employer representatives were able to construct a 
case that strongly counselled against losing sight of the priority social ambition.  Like 
employer representatives, they recognise alternative logics and counter-narratives as 
strategic drift. In particular they warned against a HM Treasury driven “narrowing of 
public policy concerns with lifelong learning towards skills at, and for, the workplace” 
(EER1). They talked back that too much of a focus on the needs of employers will not 
necessarily ensure that policy is sufficiently concentrated on addressing issues associated 
with skill-based disadvantage (social exclusion, intergenerational poverty, health 
inequalities, and so on) and will therefore be unable to effectively target relatively more 
disadvantaged groups (EER4).  
 
In summary, again in seeming contrast to VoC accounts of skill governance in LMEs there 
is little to suggest representatives of employees discover their members have mutual 
preferences for low level but highly portable skills. Instead they highlight the politics of 
skill, and support investment in education and training as an issue of both progressive 
economic modernisation (for better work and workplaces) and social justice in a 
knowledge-based world. As such they carefully rebuilt the logic for skills around the 
interests of fairness and social inclusion. Again, in doing this rebuilding work they used - 
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but twisted and realigned - narratives available in policy. They selected and underscored 
the discursive threads that run through the New Labour Skills Strategy that supported 
their interests and arguments (i.e. inequalities of skill and the emphasis on employment 
quality); repositioning and elevating these interests and arguments in relation to wider 
coherence (i.e. business productivity and profitability); therefore diminishing and 
somewhat subverting economic agendas (see Figure 8.2) 
 
Figure 8.2: Remapping the Discourses of High(er) Skill Coherence: Social Ambition68 
 
 
 
Source: author’s analysis, compilation and design  
 
Having rebuilt the logic for skills (the formal dimension of policy) as primarily related to 
the social ambition of improving the employability and employment chances of the most 
disadvantaged, the next two subsections show how employee representatives used this 
remade object of governance to stretch and reshape, or resist and restate certain aspects 
of the operational dimension of policy related to differently imagined workplace. Again, 
this stretching and reshaping/resisting and restating work was rendered possible by 
utilising the opaque spaces between the entangled and collapsed, but distinct and 
                                                  
68 Policy-makers’ map of discourses of high(er) skill coherence shown in Chapter 5 as Figure 5.1 
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contradictory strategies (to be demand-led; to lead demand; and to circumvent lack of 
demand).  
 
8.3.2 Stretching and reshaping skills policy: the ‘demand-led’ strategy retold 
 
Having stressed the demand amongst ‘motivated’ worker-citizens for the developmental 
potential of skills to enable them to move beyond what they currently do, and unlock 
genuinely new and improved work and employment opportunities. Employee 
representatives utilised imagined inertia and deviance of businesses to stretch and 
reshape the operational dimension of the demand-led skills strategy as exclusively 
concerned to provide for employees/worker-citizens as customers. Specifically they 
remade the role of the state in managing the deficiency and irresponsibility of employers 
as subjects. 
 
Providing for employees: Disentangling the partner-customer narrative 
 
Employee representatives interpreted the New Labour Skills Strategy as primarily about 
providing for and empowering employees to ‘unlock their potential’ and pursue their 
goals (EER1) through skills for better employment available in a knowledge-based 
economy (EER2; EER3; EER4; EER5; TUC, 2005). They highlight that such opportunities are 
not necessarily related to what they are already doing and are therefore “not necessarily 
related to their employer” (EER3), but are about having capacities – ‘knowledge and 
confidence’ - that can be applied in “wholly new contexts” (EER1); skills-dependent 
contexts in which “their lives are improved, where they’re able to achieve their potential” 
(EER3). In short employee representatives stretched threads of the agenda of policy-
makers as being about skills for new work opportunities and future employment (albeit 
potentially with the same employer) rather than skills for current employers’ current 
needs (EER4; TUC, 2006; TUC, 2005).  
 
“I mean our mantra is that it’s not just skills for employers, its skills for employment. […] We 
support the government’s emphasis on skills for employment because we think that is 
 239
crucially important and it’s right. Skills for a particular employer may not necessarily be in 
the interests of employment.” (EER2) 
 
This stretch from ‘demand-led as employer-led’, to ‘demand-led as employment-led’ – 
specifically employment in new contexts, future and more progressive workplaces - is 
available within the opaque space between policy narratives for two reasons. Firstly, as 
the conceptualisation of an ‘employer-led’ strategy is built on the discourse of mutual 
higher-skills ‘employment’ aspirations of employers and employees in progressive 
workplaces (Chapter 6); and secondly, as within imagined inert and irresponsible 
workplaces the deficiency and deviance of employers is constructed in such a way as to 
redirect policy focus from the current needs of ‘employer’ to the future possibilities for 
‘employment’ (Chapter 7). The consequence of policy opacity is therefore a reshaping in 
employee representatives narratives of their position as provided for ‘customers’ within 
what is meant by a ‘demand-led’ strategy; which involves government, the skills delivery 
system and employers in the provision of more and better training and skills possibilities 
and opportunities for worker-citizens in relation to genuinely new and improved work 
opportunities. This remaking of the employee position as customers has related 
implications for how the responsibility of employers is stretched and reshaped by 
employee representatives.  
 
Stretch responsibility of employers 
 
“The responsibilities of employers are obviously to ensure - to provide the time and the 
money for those employees that need training to get that training” (EER3) 
 
For employee representatives “the underlying principle of the whole [skills] strategy is that 
employers should train their staff” (EER3). In particular they stretched the narrative 
available in policy that places a requirement on employers to invest more and train more 
in higher quality, truly developmental skills and qualifications, explicitly aimed at 
improving the employability and employment chances of their employees (EER2; EER4; 
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EER5; TUC, 2007a; TUC, 2007d); the requirement to “look at the wider employability and 
future career skills needs of their workforce” (EER5). 
 
They selectively interpreted policy to be presenting employers as not demonstrating 
enough commitment to this up-skilling agenda (EER2; EER4). By, utilising the available 
discursive distinction between ‘enlightened’ and ‘not so enlightened’ businesses (EER1; 
EER5), they identified and amplified a narrative that places a greater responsibility on 
those that are, so far, not sufficiently ‘tuned-in’ to their role in skills (EER2). For them this 
includes most businesses. They challenged the figures employer representatives claim as 
representing substantial business spend on so-called ‘proper’ training (section 8.2.3 
above) as significantly inflated by bogus expenses (such as salary costs, travel expenses 
and low-level basic induction courses), and emphasised government survey findings that a 
third of businesses still provide no training at all (EER2: EER5; TUC, 2008). 
 
In short employee representative emphasised the narrative thread running through policy 
that they identified as aimed at initiating a ‘step-change’ in workplace culture in the 
majority of workplaces (EER3; TUC, 2007d); the parts of policy that they interpreted as 
being about “how you sort of develop more high performance working practices” (EER5). It 
is this cultural change that they stretched and reshaped as placing a greater responsibility 
on employers. A business responsibility to take up and make use of the skills initiatives 
aimed at overcoming their material and attitudinal barriers to training and skilling (EER2). 
A responsibility not to expect employees to bear all the risks of personal and professional 
development, whilst reserving for themselves the right to cherry pick what they want to 
make use of as passive recipients of skilled workers (EER4; EER5).  
 
In other words employee representatives interpreted a responsibility on employers to 
engage effectively with the high(er) skills agenda “bringing with them really dynamic, fresh 
thinking [about] the productive needs of UK plc. and increased skills investment” (EER2). 
Thinking and investment that employers were expected to ‘engage’ and support their 
employees to participate in, in order to initiate ‘virtuous circles’ (EER1; EER4) of expansive 
skills development in ever better performing workplaces.  
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In summary, employee representatives utilised their rebuilt logic for skills to stretch a 
primary and priority position for employee/learners (particularly skills disadvantaged 
employees) as customers of a New Labour Skills Strategy. A strategy reshaped as being 
about managing employer voluntarism as responsibilised partner-subjects of policy, and 
aimed at improving current and future employment possibilities and opportunities. Again 
it was this (re)positioning of worker-citizens as priority customers that also provided the 
foundations for resisting and restating alternative, but entangled and collapsed together, 
narratives regarding imagined employee inertia or deviance.  
 
8.3.3 Resisting and restating skills policy: the strategy to lead demand retold 
 
Again, this subsection provides the mirror of the subsection above. Highlighting the ways 
in which employee representatives countered and attempted to close down – resist and 
restate - identified policy narratives associated with the deficiency of worker-citizens 
aspirations and behaviours towards skilling. Again, that distinct policy narratives are 
entangled and collapsed rendered it possible to utilise the opacity of the spaces between 
them. Where worker-citizens are seemingly depicted as needing to take more 
responsibility for their skill development employee representatives claim contradiction 
and therefore incoherence of strategy. Recalling the disadvantages faced by low skills 
workers in inert and deviant businesses to restate the responsibility of employers and the 
state. Equally by drawing on their logic for skills associated with social justice, they 
resisted and restated the relevance of skills targets perceived to be too restrictive to meet 
real need, and too narrowly focused on inert businesses to meet demands for progressive 
employment and wider social possibilities.  
 
Resisting employee inertia and deviance: restating the responsibility of employers  
 
Employee representatives characterised those they represent within the policy imaginary 
of ‘motivated’ worker-citizens convinced by the case for up-skilling, and conversely 
interpreted employers as needing to increase their commitment to providing proper 
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training and development to initiate a step-change in workplace culture. As a result 
employee representatives were able to resist policy narratives that correspondingly and 
contradictorily construct low-skilled worker-citizens as exhibiting deviant skills aspirations 
and behaviours, and exhort the need for them to take greater responsibility for their own 
skills development.  
 
They talked back wielding policy arguments that the disadvantages faced by low-skilled 
employees amount to real barriers to engaging with training and learning.  Barriers that 
influence the extent to which employees are able, and should be considered able, to 
recognise their own skills needs; and are able, and should be considered able, to act on 
them without substantial support (EER3). Certainly more support than employee 
representatives argue is available from most employers (EER2; EER3; EER4; TUC, 2005).  
 
“When you get employers saying ‘well we’ll give you three hours training but two hours is in 
your time and one hour is in our time, fair deal?’ […] I mean our argument on that would be 
well hang about, let’s just look at the kind of people you are talking about. An awful lot of 
the people who need the training most will be low paid with very demanding environments, 
you know, challenging circumstances. […] So the notion that people like that are cheerfully 
gonna be able to find some more money to do their course fees or suddenly find another 
couple of hours of an evening, quite often when they’ve got families to go home to and all 
the rest of it; forget it.” (EER2) 
 
In other words, utilising policy narratives that depict disenfranchised and vulnerable (as 
opposed to indolent and disobedient) employees as struggling against significant and 
multiple disadvantages to developing their skills, especially in the workplace (EER2; EER5; 
TUC, 2006; TUC, 2005), they redirect greater responsibility for skills development back on 
to employers and the state, to act on their obligations to address skill inequalities as part 
of a social justice and social mobility agenda (EER2; EER5). In doing so, they question 
whether the balance is always right between meeting the needs of business and meeting 
the needs of worker-citizens when policy appears to privilege employers (EER5; TUC, 
2006; TUC, 2007d), leaving employees “relatively powerless” (EER4). In particular 
employee representatives challenged why a “moral discourse suddenly gets applied to 
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workers, like it’s your obligation to pull your weight”, when that same moral discourse, 
applied to the obligation on business to “put something back into the communities that 
their working in”, is being ignored or rejected by deviant businesses (EER2). 
 
Taking this point about the balance of responsibilities further, employee representatives 
stress policy narratives that recognise the ‘risks’ employees can face when they 
acknowledge their skills needs and request training, particularly in workplaces where 
deviant employers don’t value training and don’t train (EER3; EER5). Employee 
representatives use policy narratives about deviant employers (Chapter 7) ‘trapping’ their 
workers in poor work with poor prospects (EER2; EER4; EER5) to further close down 
narratives of increased employee responsibility for skills. They emphasise the intention for 
mechanisms of skills delivery to function beyond ‘exhorting’ the changed behaviour of 
employers (EER1; EER4) and offer substantial rights for employees, particularly targeted at 
lower-skilled employees, in order to circumvent the ‘bad boss’ (EER3; EER5; TUC, 2006; 
TUC, 2005).  
 
Indeed, employee representatives challenged whether the skills strategy went far enough 
in offering these rights to employees (EER1; EER4; EER5). They recognised a discourse of 
emancipation ‘behind the scenes’ running though policy that positions skills delivery as 
providing welfare in the guise of the ‘ability to adapt to change’ (TUC, 2007b), but 
questioned the extent to which policy-makers acknowledged what this should ‘properly’ 
mean in relation to vulnerable employees in a still very voluntarist system (EER1; EER3; 
EER4; Clough, 2009).  
 
[Responding to Leitch statement that the best form of welfare is being able to adapt to 
change.] “Hmmm, well there’s an awful lot of truth in it, but like a lot of what’s in Leitch it’s 
quite glib. […] What do you mean by that? It’s all very well to say help people adapt to 
change but whose change and why, and in whose interests, and how do you help them? You 
certainly don’t help them by saying ‘look you’re gonna be unemployed and out of a job 
unless you go on this course, and by the way you’ve got to pay for half of it’. I mean what 
kind of help is that?” (EER2) 
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In summary employee representatives utilised narratives available in policy strategically 
and selectively to resist and refute images of employee deviance (and to some extent 
inertia), and instead underscored policy appreciation for the barriers to skills development 
employees face at the workplace as a consequence of ‘bad bosses’. Where lack of proper 
recognition for these barriers was identified it was presented as a problem of the lack of 
shared meaning about the nature of the skills project; what counts as support for 
employees; and therefore the proper role and responsibility of worker-citizens in relation 
to the notion of ‘motivated’ skills aspiration and behaviour. In short it was opacity of 
policy and therefore the contradictions that surround absence of shared meaning about 
the nature of the problem regarding realising skills development that, for them, resulted 
in the erroneous perception that there are ‘bad’ workers. 
 
Resisting inertia and deviance: restating a lack of relevance 
 
There was also a strong line of argument running through employee representatives 
narratives’ that policy is too prescriptive about what is considered to be ‘relevant’ skills 
and training. They recognised, but raised as problematic, government trying artificially and 
arthritically to determine and drive a vision of high(er) skills, which they perceived as 
consequentially and worryingly dictating and delimit ‘the skills that matter’ (EER1; EER4).  
 
Drawing on social justice oriented policy logics, and the associated construction of low-
skilled employees as disadvantaged and vulnerable (as opposed to inert and deviant), 
employer representatives argued that the state-led vision and corresponding targets were 
vastly misaligned with the stated policy focus and aims (EER2; EER4). They exampled the 
problem of setting targets and therefore prioritising funding at NVQ level 2, when the 
people and groups most at need – which employee representatives selectively interpreted 
as “what the policy is all about” (EER1; also Aldridge & Tuckett, 2008a) - have skills well 
below level 2, or have existing level 2 skills that are redundant (TUC, 2005). They argued 
that a consequence of misaligned targets is that mechanisms to build up skills attainment 
towards an eventual NVQ level 2 and train sideway – in short the skills that are demanded 
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by worker-citizens - have been lost in the rigidity of a system and its audit regime that 
can’t count what isn’t within the measurement framework (EER1; EER2; EER5).  
 
Furthermore they questioned what they interpreted to be a target-driven ‘narrowing’ of 
the policy focus on skills for employers (TUC, 2007c; TUC, 2005) at the expense of broader 
skills for employment, skills for personal development and even some apparently 
“seriously useless learning with no obvious immediate use value to the labour market” 
(EER1); learning for a “better life” (EER3). Learning that has a far wider reaching ‘social 
impact’ (EER3; EER4; TUC, 2007c) but also a significant impact on productivity and the 
‘bottom-line’ – as a consequence of boosting confidence, raising morale, and the 
development of so-called ‘soft skills’ - that tends to be misunderstood and therefore 
under-demanded by many employers (EER1; EER3; TUC, 2007b; TUC, 2006).  
 
By selecting and emphasising certain narratives available in policy they restated the 
disjuncture between the narrow specificity of inert businesses skills interests and the 
developmental and transformative skills that the economy and society needs (Chapter 7). 
Recognising the broader aims of skills (which they build from an identified policy logic 
tilted and twisted toward social agendas) they sought to remind policy-makers that “the 
things the Leitch Report is about - economically valuable skills - don’t have to be narrowly 
focused” (EER4), and in doing so they re-imagined what constitutes ‘economically 
valuable’ (TUC, 2006). Indeed they restated that too narrow a focus - particular 
qualifications at particular levels that are in the putative interest of under-aspirational 
business that don’t actually take up these offers and opportunities (EER1) - has the 
consequence of “robbing [activities] that are developing people and are actually, if we go 
by LSC surveys and others, developing their employability as well” (EER4, emphasis in 
original; also Aldridge & Tuckett, 2008a).  
 
In other words they argued that narrowing the focus of skills policy has led to a loss of 
courses and learners – described as “criminal vandalism” (EER4) - from “areas of study 
that made sense to people” (EER1); that actually were economically and socially valuable 
(EER1; EER4). They utilised this argument to resist constructions of imagined inert or 
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deviant employees, and restate the problem as a lack of relevant skills programmes which 
has had the effect of “dampening learners’ own aspirations” (Aldridge & Tuckett, 2008a:7).  
 
“We’ve just said bugger individuals judgement, you know, we won’t back that with public 
money, we’ll back what employers want with public money and then it’s an obligation on 
you as an individual to go out and look after yourself and become employable.” (EER1) 
 
Worker-citizens, they restated, want to learn. However, policy-makers need to remember 
that they enter learning for a complex host of different reasons; need programmes and 
support to access those programmes to be targeted at their need (often initially below 
NVQ level 2); want and need to learn skills for personal and employment development; 
and learn best in different ways (EER1; EER2; EER3; EER4; Aldridge & Tuckett, 2008b). As 
such, they argued, given employee actual demand for skills is to some extent out of 
alignment with inert and deviant employers, and governments attempt to ‘lead demand’ 
(via targets) in response to inert and deviant businesses, rather than being inert or deviant 
themselves their demand (actually existing aspirational and progressive demand) is being 
overlooked and ignored in the so-called ‘demand-led system’ (EER3; TUC, 2007c; TUC, 
2006). 
 
[We have]“been concerned that in strengthening the relationships with employers through 
carrots we seem at the same time to have required individual learners to deal with more 
sticks, if you like. The public funding has shifted from things that people actively chose to do 
with some level of public subsidy, towards things that they may chose or not chose to do, 
mediated through their employers, where the employer has been financially supported to 
help them to do it as long as it’s those things Government wants doing. So the difficultly is 
we have wonderful rhetoric about a demand-led system, but actually demand means only 
those things Government wants you to demand, will it support.” (EER1) 
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8.3.4 Summary of employee representatives: talking back 
 
This section has shown how employee representatives engaged with the New Labour Skills 
Strategy for England to firstly rebuild the logic for skills around a primary and priority 
social ambition, and secondly stretch and reshape/resist and restate elements of the 
practices and process of ‘doing skills’ in relation to this rebuilt logic. Again, what has been 
explicitly and analytically developed through this section is that the rebuilding - stretching 
and reshaping, resisting and restating - work is rendered possible as a consequence of the 
way in which policy-makers entangle and collapse and therefore obscure the lines 
between the distinct strategies of skills (to be demand-led, to lead demand, and to 
mitigate/circumvent lack of demand).  
 
As a result of collapsing the lines between strategies employee representatives can 
selectively and strategically dissect, distil and dislocate available partial narrative threads 
within policy, stitching them back together in new patterns to reassemble the skills project. 
Specifically they use partial and re-stitched narratives associated with employees as 
motivated and employers as deficient/deviant to remake the meaning and nature of the 
demand-led system as the future and progressive ‘employment-led’ system (providing for 
employees as customers and managing employers as subjects); highlight the incongruence 
and incoherence between a future and progressive employment-led strategy, and a 
strategy to lead demand according to narrow skills targets aimed at inert businesses; and 
counter and close down policy imaginaries of deviant employees (highlighting instead the 
disadvantage and vulnerability of low-skilled workers to restate the responsibility of 
employers). 
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8.4 Operating in Opacity: the Experience of Skills Delivery  
 
“Between the conception and the creation, between the emotion and the response, falls the 
shadow” (T. S. Eliot: The Hollow Men) 
 
Having presented employer and employee representatives talking back into policy opacity, 
this section provides skill delivery representative69 accounts of how their role and function 
in doing skills (the operational dimension of skill policy) was experienced in light of both 
multiple but entangled and collapsed strategies for skills; and the efforts of workplace 
actor representatives – predominantly employer representatives70 - to reassemble these 
strategies through a second level of strategic and partial selection, extraction, and 
intertwining of available policy discourses and narratives.  The attempts to reassemble the 
New Labour Skills Strategy from within. Given the task at hand, the analysis of skill 
delivery representatives’ accounts to some extent begins the discussion of the findings of 
this chapter in relation to the empirical sub-question (SRQ3): to understand and explain 
how employer and employee representatives interpreted and responded to the New 
Labour Skills Strategy and the implications for skills delivery.  
 
                                                  
69 As noted in the methodology chapter ‘skills delivery’ is a complex field, and the organisations involved in 
this research have many and somewhat diverse remits. 1) As strategic bodies, to advise on skills issues. 2) To 
manage or represent parts of the institutional arrangements (for example, at the time of conducting 
fieldwork the UKCES had responsibility for providing strategic leadership on skills issues and a role in 
directing, funding, and relicensing SSCs; the ASSCs was a newly formed body with a remit to represent the 
SCCs across the UK; the LSC – going through a significant period of change that ultimately lead to the 
organisation being disbanded – was responsible for planning and funding post-16 provision, whilst the AoC, 
SFCF and, to some extent, Lifelong Learning UK SSC operated as representative membership bodies for 
providers in the FE sector). 3) To deliver (albeit it in a strategic capacity) parts of the system (specifically with 
regard to qualifications: the LSC; QCA; City and Guilds; UKCES and SSCs), for example the UKCES, Lifelong 
Learning UK SSC, CfA, and UK Skills all had strategic but direct roles to work with employers - and more 
indirectly employees - with regard to their engagement with skills. Despite the diversity of their roles and 
some variations between them, my analysis (faithful, data-led and reflective) of their accounts with regard 
to the research question(s) of this thesis has found within group variation to be less than between group 
variation. 
70 The focus on skills delivery interaction with employer representatives is largely a consequence of the way 
in which the New Labour Skills Strategy treats demand-led as synonymous with employer-led on the basis of 
imagined shared and progressive skills aspirations and behaviours in responsible workplaces, and constructs 
skills delivery as ‘employer-led’ in response (Chapter 6). 
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It is very much in the accounts of the strategic skill delivery representatives, and their 
depiction of the experiences of the skill providers they manage and/or represent, that the 
effects of multiple, but entangled and collapsed, strategies for skills (the paradox at the 
heart of the New Labour Skills Strategy), and how these multiple but entangled and 
collapsed strategies are available to be interpreted, reordered and reorganised, are 
illuminated. As such what follows is a faithful portrayal of the accounts of skills delivery 
representatives much of which is set in relation to previous analysis, because in doing so 
this presentational decision accurately reflects the essence and atmosphere of the 
interviews; the sense of working within and mediating opaque muddle, multiplicity, 
tension, and frustration, which defined their role and experience at the time.  
 
The section starts with skills delivery representatives’ accounts of their distinct roles to be 
demand-led and to lead demand; their recognition of these roles as in tension, albeit 
entangled and collapsed; and their description of their attempts to accommodate both. It 
then goes on to describe and discuss skills delivery representatives’ experience of their 
roles as further complicated - disrupted, disorganised and frustrated - as a consequence of 
how representatives of workplace actors (predominantly employer representatives) 
engaged in selectively attempting to reassemble the skills strategy, and therefore 
reposition and remake the skills delivery system and its function. Firstly, the section 
discusses their experience of how the demand-led strategy/system – in relation to 
imagined shared and progressive skills aspirations and behaviours - is contested by 
representatives of workplace actors (again particularly employer representatives) who 
engage in using opacity between distinct strategies to trade responsibility for high(er) 
skills attainment. Secondly, the section discusses their experience of how the demand 
leading strategy/system – in relation to imagined inert and deviant workplaces and 
workplace actors – is contested by employer representatives, talking back tension – 
incongruence and incoherence - in terms of the relevance of state-prescribed skills targets, 
initiatives and programmes. The section concludes with skills delivery representatives 
accounts of what this all exposes about skill governance and the role of the state in skills 
policy in England under New Labour.  
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8.4.1. Narrating the Roles of Skills Delivery 
 
Skills delivery representatives recognised their role, and the role of the skills providers 
they represent, as being simultaneously required to adapt and respond to demand from 
employers and employees for higher levels of skills to empower their enlightened 
responsible aspirations for skills-led progress in the context of uncertainty-based 
complexity, and drive-up demand of employers and employees that exhibit inert or 
irresponsible demand for skills, thereby either enhancing their aspirations for skills-led 
progress or emancipating the vulnerable party from the irresponsibility of the deviant 
other. In other words they recognised the disparate, albeit entangled, collapsed and 
merged, roles they have to be demand-led; to lead demand; and to mitigate/circumvent 
lack of demand (see Table 7.1).  
 
A demand-led role: Adapting and responding to customers 
 
In interviews skills delivery representatives offered one strategic construction and 
positioning of their role  as requiring them to adapt and react in response to, and 
therefore on behalf of, both employers and employees as customers in the responsible 
workplace-led skills partnership (see Chapter 6, Figure 6.2). In recognising this role they 
articulated a ‘demand-led’ skill delivery system focused on “identifying demand in terms 
of skills needs […] and being very clear about making sure it responds to that demand” 
(SD9). Drawing on narratives of empowering ‘voice and choice’ they presented themselves 
as “talking-up the employer” and “being firmly in the employers’ camp” (SD1), but also as 
“delivering on that learner voice” (SD3); as “strongly focusing on learners needs” (SD5); 
and as seeing the learner as being at the “centre of what we do” (SD3; also SD11).  
 
A demand-leading role: Driving up the demand of subjects 
 
However, as well as needing to be ‘demand-led’, skills delivery actors recognised 
themselves as having been given an essential role to ‘lead demand’ and ‘circumvent lack 
of demand’ for more and better skills. They identified this role as requiring them to forge a 
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state-led skills partnership, driven by a state vision and ambitious framework of targets, 
with the aim to “get hold of the agenda and to drive it forwards […] a very hands-on 
approach to kick start the skills agenda” (SD8); a role that also delivers emancipation via 
skills ‘entitlements’ to vulnerable parties in deviant workplaces (SD9). As such they 
recognised an alternative construction and positioning of the skills delivery infrastructure 
in relation to workplace actors as ‘subjects’. They described their role as the “right-hand 
of government” (SD3), and their remit as “spreading the government message” (SD11) to 
businesses and worker-citizens – particularly businesses - about the challenges and 
threats of failing to embrace their responsibility and upgrade their skills aspirations and 
behaviours (SD8; SD12).  
 
Well part of [our] remit don’t forget, is also to impress on employers the importance of them 
taking responsibility for training. […] You know it’s the old thing about if you think training’s 
expensive try ignorance.” (SD1) 
 
I would say we’re absolutely an employer representative organisation, and we have to be. 
But I think part of what we also have to do is actually be slightly provocative; perhaps 
slightly challenging to those employers. […] I’m not sure if people have registered at all 
what’s going on [in the global economy], but things are changing. Are you ready? What will 
that mean to you? How does your business need to change? So that’s the provocative bit.” 
(SD7) 
 
In describing this role to drive up demand, they remade and rearticulated Train to Gain, 
the Apprenticeship offer, the Skills Pledge, and Individual Skills Accounts from instruments 
for capturing and acting on demand to “stimulus mechanisms” (SD12) for generating and 
enhancing employer and employee engagement with skills (SD1). A way to deal with 
historic market failures (lack of demand) and “stimulate market success” (SD9); a way to 
“persuade employers to do their bit” (SD8), and engage people in learning for “a step-
change in their own or the businesses circumstances” (SD10). 
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The tensions between the roles: Re-narrating opacity 
 
Although skills delivery representatives recognised the distinctions between their roles to 
be demand-led and to lead demand, they also recognised the distinctions to be in tension 
– manifesting as lack of clarity about “whether the skills strategy is for the sake of meeting 
the Government targets or really remedying the workplace situation” (SD4; also SD3; SD5; 
SD6) - and as entangled and collapsed in strategy. As a result they tended to position 
themselves (and those they represent) – somewhat uncomfortably and problematically – 
as having to either merge these roles, or find a middle position between them, in order to 
deliver on both.  
 
They merged the roles by describing themselves as attempting to “focus on getting more 
investment and getting the offer right for more employers to come in on their own terms” 
(SD2, emphasis in original). As required to “very much deliver a demand-led system to 
achieve those 2020 skills ambitions that Leitch set out” (SD9); by tackling market failure 
whilst simultaneously acting as ‘proxies’ for employers (SD3). They described the search 
for middle positions through their identification of themselves (and those they represent) 
as having to occupy a space “sitting between government and employers” (SD11); to be 
“an instrument of government”, as well as “employer representative bodies” (SD11). In 
both cases the result was that they tended to uncomfortably and problematically re-
narrate the opacity between the multiple strategies for skills and their roles in relation. 
 
Having shown how skills delivery representatives identified the disparate roles and 
positions of skills delivery actors in relation to the multiple strategies for skills, and sought 
to accommodate and reconcile tensions between them. The rest of this section goes on to 
describe and discuss how skills delivery representatives experienced the further 
complication of these roles. The disrupting, disorganising and frustrating of these roles, as 
a consequence of how representatives of workplace actors (particularly employer 
representatives) engaged in attempting to reassemble the skills strategy from within, and 
therefore reposition and remake the skills delivery system and its function. 
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8.4.2 Disrupting the Roles of Skills Delivery: Trading Responsibility and Relevance  
 
This subsection describes and discusses skills delivery representatives experience of their 
already complicated multiple roles as further disrupted, disorganised and frustrated by 
the tension between the New Labour Skills Strategy (the order and organising work of the 
state in skill governance); and the strategic reassemblage work of workplace actor 
representatives (the selective reordering and reorganising of skill governance). It 
highlights these tensions to pivot on contestation over the meaning – and associated 
practices and processes - of both demand-led and demand leading elements of policy. It 
concludes with skills delivery representatives accounts of what this all exposes about skill 
governance and the role of the state in skills policy in England under New Labour; the 
limits of state-steered voluntarism. 
 
The contested meaning of ‘demand-led’: The experience of responsibility trading 
 
In recognising part of their role to deliver a demand-led system to partner-customers, 
skills delivery representatives’ highlighted the challenges they faced in positioning 
themselves in response to the imagined consensus and coherence between ‘enlightened 
employers’ and ‘motivated employees’ responsible economic and social, and public and 
private, interests and agendas. Indeed, their experiences led them to identify the 
imagined responsible workplace-led skills partnership as having little or no “cultural 
resonance” (SD2; SD10). Instead they depicted themselves as walking a difficult line in 
needing to represent both employers and employees; as experiencing a tension between 
the economic and the social ambitions in the demand-led system (SD2; SD5) in their 
attempts to simultaneously “put the employer’s needs first while they think about the 
learner and what the learner really needs” (SD11, emphasis in original). Particularly as the 
worker-citizen – learner - was perceived to have been side-lined by a skills strategy which 
– on the basis of shared interests and agendas - treated ‘demand-led’ as synonymous with 
‘employer-led’ (SD2; SD3; SD5; SD10).  
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In walking this difficult line their accounts articulated the experience of encountering the 
ways in which employers and employees (via their representatives) engaged in 
reassembling and remaking the logic for skills, by utilising opacity between the multiple 
narrative threads of skills policy to strategically and selectively emphasise certain available 
(partial) discourses into new frameworks of policy meaning and practice. They 
experienced how employer and employee representatives twisted and tilted the essence 
of policy coherence in order to prioritise either economic or social agendas and interests 
as underscoring the ‘demand-led’ system (determining the formal dimension of ‘what is to 
be governed’); and the implications of this for the ways in which they re-imagine and re-
articulate the operational dimension of skills governance, specifically ‘who is being 
governed and how’ (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003).  
 
Put simply, with one commonly repeated example (SD2; SD4; SD6; SD11), they explained 
this reselecting and reassembling work as experienced where they encountered the 
problem of reconciling and resolving the ways in which employers and employees are able 
to draw on different narrative threads of policy to trade responsibility for engaging in 
high(er) skills attainment (sections 8.2.2 and 8.3.2). Specifically, how they trade the 
meaning of a responsible ‘other’; and the associated ways in which they remake practices 
and processes of the state and skill delivery to provide exclusively for them by managing 
the others voluntarism and ensuring the other is led to develop high(er) skills aspirations 
and behaviours.  
 
“You get the argument that employers are quite happy for employees to learn so long as 
they do it at their own cost and in their own time, and employees are quite happy to actually 
go out and learn if the employer pays the fees and also the time when their learning and 
gives them, you know, a higher paid job at the end of it. I don’t think either of those 
arguments has yet been resolved in a way that is satisfactory.” (SD10) 
 
What this point, expressed as something of a common-sense and unresolved problem, 
exposes is that a policy narrative depicting employers and employees as sharing a 
common and consensual interest in skills, is available to be, and is, dissected and distilled 
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by employer and employee representatives. With the effect that both can strategically 
select, dislocate, and use, fragments of this narrative as building blocks to elevate the 
interpretation of their own position as a provided for - enlightened or motivated - 
‘customer’. Interpretations and positions which are further strengthened by stitching 
these selected discursive fragments together with additional available narratives (or 
partial narratives) of the inertia and deviance of the ‘subject’ other.  
 
The effects of this second level of strategic selecting and assembling work was described 
as experienced by skills delivery actors as disrupting, disorganising and frustrating the 
delivery of their policy-given role in relation to being ‘demand-led’; responding to shared 
and progressive high(er) skills aspirations and behaviours. Skill delivery representatives 
described skills delivery as “playing its part” (SD3). For example, listening out for the 
‘voice and choice’ of ‘enlightened’ employers (SD3; SD8),but finding employers in return 
refusing to “do their bit”, being “quite two-faced” (SD8), with regard to their engagement 
with skills. As one skill delivery representative commented, despite the onus on employers 
to ‘get involved’ and employers claiming to be engaged “there’s still an expectation that 
people will come with all these things ready formed” (SD3); that skills will be done without 
them but for them (SD8). In short they experienced employers as still not seeing - or 
refusing to see - developing people as a fundamental part of their role in the strategy 
(SD1; SD3); especially where that developmental role extends beyond providing skills for 
immediate task competence and requires employers to develop employability skills which 
are about ‘potential’ and ‘progression’ (SD2; SD8). 
 
In summary, skills delivery representatives described experiencing this second level of 
strategic selection and reassemblage of policy meanings, practices and processes, as a 
further fundamental tension (SD2; SD6; SD10). Disrupting, disorganising and frustrating 
their required role to deliver a responsive ‘demand-led’ strategy, (that assumes 
progressive skill aspirations and behaviours of partner-customer), on both economic and 
social grounds and on the basis of imagined coherence between the interests and 
ambitions of enlightened businesses and motivated worker-citizens (Chapter 6). 
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“If you’re an employer-led organisation, supposed to be doing the right thing for people in 
work by their employers, then to suggest that actually more attention should be paid to 
work place learning culture, time off - those aspects which are there in policy-making with 
time off to train, flexible working, you know - that’s a tension.” (SD2, emphasis in original) 
 
Beyond the experience and effect of the contested meaning of ‘demand-led’ in the New 
Labour Skills Strategy, skills delivery representatives additionally identified further 
complications to the tensions associated with delivering their role in relation to the 
strategy for leading demand.  
 
The contested meaning of demand leading: The experience of relevance trading 
 
As discussed above (section 8.4.1), given their different positioning and therefore 
different roles in the multiple strategies for governing skills, skills delivery representatives 
described experiencing tensions and contradictions associated with reconciling their 
requirement to on the one hand respond to demand; and on the other to lead 
demand/circumvent lack of demand through encouragement and exhortation of changed 
skills aspirations and behaviours (SD4). However, interviews with skills delivery 
representatives additionally exposed how their efforts to manage tension/contradiction 
were further complicated by the way in which employer and employee representatives 
utilised the opaque distinctions between the strategies, to remake the demand-led 
system; and disrupt the system to lead demand or circumvent lack of demand. The way in 
which they dissect, distil, dislocate, and strategically and partially select from within 
available narratives associated with responsible workplaces – narratives about 
enlightened and motivated high(er) skills aspirations and behaviours, an empowering 
state, and a skills delivery system that responds to that demand via mechanisms of voice 
and choice – and use these to counter and attempt to close down narratives about inert 
and deviant lack of demand.  
 
What skills delivery representatives articulated is therefore more than just the problem of 
trying to reconcile a paradox. That a ‘central’ or ‘top-down’ state-led agenda (SD3; SD4; 
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SD6; SD8) - “drilling down into everything and dictating [need]” (SD5); that “isn’t really 
about what learners or employers want” (SD5); or “reactive to local demand” (SD3); or at 
least has been designed by government to solve a particular construction of the ‘public’ 
problem for which there is isn’t a corresponding and compelling ‘private’ concern (SD1; 
SD2; SD3; SD4; SD5; SD6) – cannot amount to a ‘demand-led’ or more specifically 
‘employer-led’ strategy for skills (Payne, 2008:106).  
 
Although this paradox was explicitly, and repeatedly, described as apparent and 
problematically experienced:  
 
“They [policy-makers] talk an awful lot about having a bottom-up approach and having 
demand-led, but it doesn’t feel like that at all. It feels like it’s all […] driven by government 
priorities and government stated needs […] so we pay a lot of lip service to ‘we need to meet 
demand’, but that top level feels like what drives it.” (SD5) 
 
For example, in one account a skills delivery representative explained a conversation with 
a policy-maker in which the discrepancy between what government and employers want 
in terms of a skills product was discussed, and the Ministerial view offered was that 
employers needed “leading towards an understanding of the benefits” (SD10). Resulting in 
them perceiving their role in the skills strategy as to “go out there and convert them [to] 
promote, as part of their employer focusing, the government agenda” (SD10). In other 
words, they identified their role to ‘align’ employers with the government agenda (SD3) 
and deliver “demand-led so long as it fits within this national system” (SD5; also SD6). 
 
However, beyond the experience of this paradox what they also articulated is how this 
paradox, and the contestation it produces, has come about. Specifically, they described 
the consequence and effect of entangling and collapsing multiple but distinct strategies 
for governing skills aimed at differently imagined workplaces, such that the opacity 
between the narrative threads of policy creates spaces for employer and employee 
representative to creatively reorder, reorganise, and reassemble policy meaning and the 
associated processes and practices of ‘doing skills’. For example, they highlighted how 
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policy narratives that employer and employee representatives identify and recognise as 
imagining their lack of demand are bounced back, by deploying the strategic partial 
selection of available narratives that tell of institutional barriers that enlightened and 
motivated customers experience in their attempts to engage with skills. In short they 
experienced how employer and employee representatives use – albeit very differently - 
narratives regarding the problems of prescribing skills need and the mistakes of a rigid 
supply-led system in relation to responsible workplace aspiration, in order to claim that 
targets for encouraging and exhorting higher levels of skills ambition (aimed at inert and 
irresponsible workplaces) lack relevance and recognition of their actual skills aspirations 
and behaviours; and fail to place proper responsibility on the deficiencies and deviance of 
the offending other.  
 
They articulated how employers complain that skills providers – required to meet targets 
for higher levels of qualification attainment - are misrepresenting their demand and trying 
to ‘sell a product’, by drawing on policy narratives that privilege employer ‘voice and 
choice’ in an empowering demand-led system (SD3).  
 
“The complaint I hear sometimes is: ‘you’re trying to sell us what you think we need, you’re 
not asking us what we do need” (SD2, emphasis in original) 
 
“We did a consultation on how you could best do [change to apprenticeships]. First of all 
there was massive resistance to doing it at all which was quite interesting. You know people 
say they want them but then they say ‘well look, no. You’re putting stuff artificially into my 
qualification. This is a government agenda. […] I don’t want to be paying for this’. You know 
all this kind of stuff comes out.” (SD3) 
 
They articulated how employers use the privilege afforded to their ‘need’ to resist 
measuring skill by qualification targets rather than competence to do a job (SD1). 
Strategically and selectively extracting and stretching partial policy narratives associated 
with their position as customers in the demand-led strategy, and using them to subvert 
and silence policy narratives associated with the strategy to lead demand and raise skills 
ambition.  
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In short, skills delivery representatives describe themselves as caught in the opaque space 
between the multiple strategies for skills aimed at differently imagined workplaces and 
workplace actors, which are apparent – albeit entangled and collapsed – in policy, and the 
ways in which they are reworked; in particular by employer representatives (SD1; SD3; 
SD5; SD6; SD7; SD12).  
 
“You spend an awful lot of time saying [to employers] this is the Government’s response to 
an employer driven strategy, and this has been developed over time apparently in 
collaboration with employers and by employers - that’s always the strap line isn’t it? This is 
‘with and by’ employers - and yet they’re like ‘well I’m an employer. It’s not what I need. It’s 
not what I want’.” (SD5)  
 
In summary, skills delivery representatives again described experiencing a second level of 
strategic selection and reassemblage of policy meanings, practices and processes, as 
disrupting, disorganising and frustrating their required role to deliver a demand-leading 
strategy (Chapter 7). 
 
8.4.3 Governing High(er) Skills: The limits of state-steered voluntarism  
 
As the earlier sections of this chapter (8.2 and 8.3) have shown, by collapsing distinct 
strategies for governing skills, policy creates opaque spaces for employer and employee 
representatives to engage in second level strategic selection of available policy discourses. 
Dislocating partial and fragmented narratives and stitching them back together to reorder, 
reorganise and reassemble policy logics and practices. This section has so far shown the 
ways in which skills delivery representatives experienced this as further disrupting, 
disorganising and frustrating their roles and functions to be simultaneously both demand-
led and demand-leading.   
 
In an attempt to manage the tension and disruptions of their many given and contested 
roles, they described themselves as actively engaged in negotiating, mediating and 
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attempting to reconcile between the multiple strategies as they are being discursively and 
materially reassembled. As engaged in finding ‘workarounds’, ‘fixes’, or ‘backdoors’ (SD2; 
SD5; SD10), to deliver their disparate roles by lessening the variance between the points 
on which contestation over policy meanings and practices pivot. What ‘demand’ means 
(to policy-makers and to employers and employees), and what counts as ‘demand’ (SD1; 
SD3; SD5; SD6; SD7; SD12); a term which they identify as being “flung around quite easily 
[but] quite hard work to pin down” (SD2). They describe themselves – in different 
circumstances - as either “making that argument [for the government agenda] and they 
[employers] kind of start to understand why they need it” (SD3), or as “saying [to 
employers and learners] ‘don’t worry about the fact that this has changed slightly, it 
doesn’t actually matter, you’ll still get what you need in the end” (SD5).  
 
As a result of how they experienced the strategy – its remaking by the representatives of 
employer and employees – and therefore their negotiating, mediating and reconciling 
roles and functions within it, skills delivery representatives recognised the New Labour 
Skills Strategy as falling well short of presenting a radical challenge to voluntarism. Indeed 
they described the strategy as effectively “kicking [issues with] voluntarism into the long 
grass” (SD6) - endlessly deferring deadlines and retreating from the threat to reconsider 
forms of (employer) compulsion (SD2; SD3; SD6) - and they recognised this as a political 
choice. However, their accounts did not conflate this lack of radical challenge to 
voluntarism with a straightforward identification of the strategy as non-interventionist 
‘business-as-usual’ for skills policy in England. As amounting to ‘leaving employers alone’ 
with regard to how they develop and utilise skills (see Chapter 2; also Hoque et al, 2005; 
Page & Hillage, 2006).  
 
The distinction they identified between the New Labour Skills Strategy and ‘business-as-
usual’ voluntarism hinges on the very essence of the analytical focus of this thesis. The 
identification of multiple, albeit entangled and collapsed, discursive constructions of what 
is being governed - economic and social agendas; public and private aspirations and 
behaviours; and workplace partnership (see Chapter 5) - and how, through skills. As one 
skills delivery representative expressed it, the opaque distinction between a demand-led 
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strategy and a strategy to led demand raises “interesting questions about what your level 
of intervention is as a government. […] Whether it’s only at the level of the stuff you fund 
or whether it’s much wider than that?”, going on to note “at the moment it’s a little bit 
wider than that” (SD3). In other words, skills delivery representatives recognised the New 
Labour Skills Strategy as an attempt to steer good vs. bad voluntarism of workplace actors’ 
skills aspirations and behaviours. They note the strategy as attempting this through the 
construction of favourable and unfavourable subject positions (enlightened/motivated vs. 
inert/deviant) and encouraging and nudging workplace actors towards making good skills 
choices for themselves (SD6; SD12). 
 
“Government thinks that employers should do more to invest in the skills of their workforce, 
but Government isn’t going to compel employers to do so, it’s going to encourage them.” 
(SD6) 
 
“I think [Government] believes that it should encourage, mainly by carrots but occasionally 
by sticks, the development of skills in the marketplace. […] I think it sees itself as having 
some macro policy […] I think it sees itself as putting the lines and the numbers on the 
painting for paint by numbers. So it says ‘this is where the lines are and this is the colour 
you’ll do’ and the employers have actually, you know, got the paint brush and the paint pot 
and fill in the boxes.” (SD10) 
 
There was a general sense that this constructing of good vs. bad subject positions and 
encouraging workplace actors to manoeuvre themselves accordingly, is the “way 
government acts now” (SD6). That compulsion and other strong interventions in the 
market are too far off the agenda, but that “it doesn’t mean to say you can’t nudge people 
in those sorts of directions. I mean you can send signals, can’t you, about what’s desirable, 
about what’s sensible” (SD12). 
 
The limits of this role of the state in skill policy – to steer voluntarism – has its basis in the 
contestability of the strategy. The ability – given in opacity between a demand-led system 
in relation to responsible workplace actors; a demand-leading system in relation to inert 
workplace actors; and a system to circumvent lack of demand in relation to deviant 
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workplace actors – for employer and employee representatives to strategically and 
selectively unpick and unmake the attempts to steer them. The possibilities to extract, re-
inflect, and elevate partial available narratives associated with their enlightenment and 
motivation and stitch these together with dislocated partial narratives of the deficiency 
and deviance of the other, to reassemble the skills strategy. This complicates – disrupts, 
disorganises and frustrates – skills delivery, further blurring the lines between meanings, 
practices and processes of ‘doing skills’ – the ordering and organising of skill governance - 
in perhaps unanticipated and therefore unexpected ways? 
 
“At a recent meeting a very senior civil servant said – when the discussion was going this 
way – that he found it frustrating because ideas that they’ve got, which were really quite 
simple propositions, suddenly seemed to get very complicated when they were actually 
released, and I can see things from that perspective. But I think it is [pause] if you look at […] 
the amount of stakeholders and interests that they actually have to bring into some sort of 
community, and then gain agreement, and then make progress; that’s difficult. There are 
just a lot of interests.” (SD2) 
 
8.5 Discussion and Concluding Reflections 
 
Contrary to VoC, and to some extent existing PRA informed theorisations of the 
governance of skill in England, this chapter has shown a politics of skill (struggle over ideas, 
meanings and effects for the political ordering of social relations at the workplace, and 
between the workplace, state and arrangement of the institutions of skill delivery) that is 
taking place, and is available to take place, within the parameters of the New Labour Skills 
Strategy; within the parameters of paradox between a ‘demand-led’ strategy for skills and 
a state strategy to lead demand in the context of voluntarism. The previous two chapters 
explained and accounted for this paradox by analytically explicating three distinct but 
entangled and collapsed strategies for high(er) skill governance. Firstly, the demand-led 
strategy, premised on imagined responsible workplaces, an empowering role for the state 
and a demand-led role for skill delivery adapting and responding to mechanisms of 
customer ‘voice and choice’. Secondly, a strategy to lead demand, premised on imagined 
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inert workplaces, requiring an enhancing role for the state and a skills delivery system that 
leads demand through targets to encourage and manage the skills aspirations and 
behaviours of workplace subjects. Thirdly, a strategy to mitigate and circumvent lack of 
demand, premised on imagined deviance of employers (‘the bad boss’) and employees 
(the ‘bad worker’), that requires an emancipating state to exhort changed behaviours or 
exclude deviance, and a system of skills delivery that practices exhortation through 
practice or emancipates the disempowered through support ‘behind the scenes’.  
 
This chapter has shown how employer and employee representatives interpreted and 
responded to the New Labour Skills Strategy for England. Or more specifically, how they 
interpreted and responded to the distinct but entangled and collapsed strategies to be 
demand-led, to lead demand and to circumvent lack of demand. How, given the 
entanglement of discourses about the high(er) skills project, they used the opacity 
between policy meanings, practices and processes to stretch and reshape and resist and 
restate aspects of the strategy, and the implications for the ordering and organising of 
skills delivery. Again the advantages of taking an interpretive approach to analysis - that is 
focused on meaning-making, meaning reproduction, and in this case meaning translation 
and remaking – is apparent in what it exposes about struggles over the objects of 
governance and objectives of policy.  
 
This chapter shows that when non-state skills actors (employer and employee 
representatives) engaged with policy and policy debate it was not necessarily with a 
straightforward and possibly openly antagonistic prescription of how to meet their need. 
A normative wish list which they hoped would meet with a favourable policymaking elite. 
Instead they engaged, in a rather more complex and subtle way, with what was made 
available in policy. What was rendered possible by a state strategy (or strategies) seeking 
to manage their aspirations and behaviours and steer their voluntarism, by attempting to 
construct a shared system of meaning about the logic for high(er) skills (progress in 
partnership), and how high(er) skills are to be governed in relation to this logic depending 
on how workplaces are imagined.  
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This chapter has shown how both employer and employee representatives’ engaged in 
twisting and tilting the logic of high(er) skills towards priority economic or social agendas 
respectively. How, having reemphasised and remade the priority logic, employer 
representatives used the construction of enlightened employers to resist counter-
narratives of inert or deviant business, whilst employee representatives used the 
construction of motivated employees to resist counter-narratives of inert or deviant 
worker-citizens. How they both used images of the inertia and deviance of the other (the 
‘bad boss’ or the ‘bad worker’) to restate their vulnerability and need for support from the 
state; and how they both used the ways in which policy images of the responsible 
workplace constructs employers and employees as ‘partner-customers’ of the skills 
system to resist narratives of the need for their skill demand to be led and regulated by a 
state vision and state targets. They depicted the skills delivery system as continuing to sell 
a product rather than adapting and responding to their voice and choice, and as such they 
legitimised any putative lack of voice and choice on their part as not an instance of their 
inertia or deviance but as a breakdown of shared meaning about the proper roles, 
responsibilities, and relationships between the skills actors and the institutions of delivery. 
They therefore ultimately place fault for any putative lack of demand on their part with a 
persistently supply-led skills system that lacked relevance; recognition of their actual 
demand; and the ability to address the inertia and deviance of the other parties in the 
skills project.  
 
In short this chapter shows how employer and employee representatives used entangled 
and collapsed and therefore opaque distinctions between the multiple strategies for skills 
(based on differently imagined workplaces to be acted on and governed in terms of their 
degree of responsible skills aspiration and behaviour) to disrupt, distil, dislocate and 
strategically and selectively reassemble the meanings and practices of a skills project. 
Specifically the chapter has shown this disruption, distilling and dislocating of policy 
meanings, practices and processes, by employer and employee representatives, and 
strategic reassembling of the high(er) skills project and strategy, to have taken place 
around two critical junctures or tension points.  
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o The trading (off-loading) of their members’ responsibility for high(er) skills by 
stretching and reshaping meanings, practices and processes of the demand-led 
strategy  
o The trading (off-loading) of the relevance of policy for their members by resisting 
and restating meanings, practices and processes of the strategy to lead demand  
 
In trading responsibility and relevance – stretching policy narratives of the responsibility 
for the other party to raise their demand, and resisting policy narratives of the relevance 
for them of raising their demand – employer and employee representatives utilise policy 
opacity, ‘select’ from within an available repertoire of easily disconnected and dislocated 
contradictory discourses and narrative threads, and rearticulate and reassemble the skills 
strategy from within. By drawing on the synthesis of CPE and critical governance studies 
that provide the theoretical grounding for the analytical approach of this thesis, I have 
conceptualised this activity as meaningful second level strategic selection. Whereby actors 
- using the discursively authorised positions from which to speak that they are afforded 
(are made plausible) in policy narratives of both economic and social priorities, 
enlightened employers and motivated employees - extract, re-inflect and elevate parts of 
the skills policy discourse to reorder, reorganise and reassemble meaning, practices and 
processes of both the formal and operational dimensions of skill policy. Where CPE 
theorisation of the strategic selection of meaning focuses on the macro level of regime 
ordering and policy objectives, my analysis has shown the relevance of looking below this 
level. This enabled me to capture how the actual lack of ideational unity at the macro level 
allows actors targeted by the objects of governance to engage in a second level of 
selective reassemblage of the policy project. In other words, this second level of 
meaningful (semiotic) strategic selection is made possible as a consequence of skills policy 
being, to borrow again from Clarke (2004b2) “more than one thing at once”, without being 
reducible to radical contingency. Furthermore, this selective and meaningful reordering, 
reorganising and reassembling of policy, has real (material) implications and effects for 
the delivery of skills.  
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The accounts of skills providers presented in this chapter highlights that the discursive 
struggle over policy meanings, practices and processes matters, as it - in real and felt 
(material) ways - disrupted, disorganised and frustrated skills delivery in England under 
New Labour. For example, skills delivery actors spoke of encountering the effect of 
employers distilling, dislocating and reassembling (partial) discourses and narrative 
threads in order to connect their stretched and reshaped entitlement as customers 
(within a tilted economic logic for skills) with a raised and restated responsibility on inert 
and deviant employees. A process which in turn served to reorder, reorganise and remake 
the meaning and practice of skills provision. Splitting ‘listening’ to employers from ‘raising 
their demand’ for skills, in a new narrative told by employer representatives that resisted 
their positioning as partner-subjects in relation to progressive social ambition. 
 
To some extent this point about the disruption, disorganising and frustration of skills 
delivery echoes the well-established criticisms of voluntarist systems of skill formation. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, previous analysis of the New Labour Skills Strategy in England has 
highlighted skill delivery actors as experiencing a critical source of tension and 
contradiction in their role and function associated with the extent to which a putative 
‘employer-led’ agenda amounts in practice to a ‘state-led’ agenda (Payne, 2008:106; Keep, 
2006). However, the source of this tension/contradiction remained somewhat under-
developed in this previous analysis. Largely put down to the inherent problems of 
voluntarism: that without mechanisms to effect ‘private’ skills demand and utilisation 
states are left with few levers at their disposal with which to regulate change and are 
reduced to tinkering with the supply-side (Grugulis et al, 2004; Keep, 2006; Lloyd & Payne, 
2006); and the inability of policy-makers to properly reflect on “why employers do not 
always behave in the way that they expect them to” (Payne, 2008:110). In seeking to offer 
a richer empirical and conceptual explanation of the dynamics at play that produce this 
tension/contradiction, this thesis makes the analytical claim that the ‘employer-led’ vs. 
‘state-led’ paradox can be understood as a consequence of the opaque distinction made 
by policy-makers between multiple strategies for skills. On the one hand a skills strategy – 
demand-led strategy – framed as responding to the high(er) skills aspirations and 
behaviours of imagined enlightened/motivated partner-customers; and on the other two 
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skills strategies framed as conditioning the high(er) skills aspirations and behaviours of 
imagined deficient/deviant partner-subjects.  
 
The difficultly for providers seeking to lead raised demand for skills, are two-fold. Firstly, 
demand-leading strategies remain ‘soft’ forms of discursive regulation, albeit meaningfully 
creating subject positions and subjectivities taken seriously and struggled over by skills 
actors. As shown in the way in which these subject positions and subjectivities frame the 
topics of discussion within the strategic conversation about high(er) skills set by policy. 
Secondly and perhaps more significantly, that demand-leading strategies are entangled 
and collapsed in an opaque policy that is easily contested; disconnected, dislocated and 
reassembled from within. In essence, state work to signal, encourage and nudge ‘good’ vs. 
‘bad’ voluntarism, meets employer and employee work to remake, rearticulate and jostle 
for position in the ‘good’ camp, whilst relegating the other party to the ‘bad’ camp. Skills 
delivery representatives then portray themselves and their sector as predominantly 
engaged in negotiating, mediating and attempting to reconcile/lessen the variance 
between, points over which contestation of policy meaning, practice and process pivots.  
 
In conclusion then, this thesis has shown that within what was depicted as a ‘coherent 
approach’ to skills policymaking there were three strategies for high(er) skills, 
distinguished by how workplace skills aspiration and behaviour was imagined in proximity 
to the established logic for high(er) skills in England; the object of governance as ‘progress 
in partnership’. These strategies were however entangled and collapsed, rendering the 
distinctions between them opaque. Including, and in particular, the dissimilar subject 
positions and subjectivities policy created and sought to empower, encourage or 
challenge and emancipate. It is this opacity in relation to different subjects of governance 
that can be used by skills actors - engaged in a second level of strategic selection of 
meanings, practice and processes - to ‘talk back’ and disrupt, disorganise and frustrate the 
functions of skills delivery actors. This manifests for skills delivery as a struggle to manage 
the tensions between their roles to be demand-led and to lead demand through 
encouraging and nudging high(er) skills aspirations and behaviours. Overall therefore, the 
central argument of this thesis is that the governance – ordering and organising – of skills 
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policy under New Labour can be explained and understood as an attempt at ‘state-
steered’ voluntarism to affect high(er) skills and dislodge the low skills equilibrium in 
England, and that this thesis presents the limits of such a project.  
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9. Conclusions, Contributions and Implications of the Study 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
n the beginning this thesis identified a paradox at the heart of the New Labour Skills 
Strategy for England, captured in the tension between a so-termed ‘demand-led’ 
strategy for skills, and a strategy wherein demand is to be led by the state in the context of 
voluntarism. This tension was unable to be fully accounted for as a straightforward 
continuation of the ‘chronic affliction’ that besets skills policymaking in the UK/England; 
that successive governments have constructed the role of education and training in 
service to the needs and demands of the economy, whilst privileging private (meaning 
market) managerial prerogative to make decisions regarding skills development. Such an 
analysis of continuing – ‘business-as-usual’ voluntarism - problematically writes-off the 
inflection in New Labour policy that constructs and carves out a role for the state in skills 
to lead demand.  
 
Writing this state role back in, this thesis offers an explanation of the source and cause of 
the paradox as ‘created’ by a state project seeking to discursively manage voluntarism. A 
project to retain the private prerogative of managerial and individual training and skilling 
decisions so long as they are the ‘right’ decisions, based on an ambition of ‘progress in 
partnership’. If not, a project to steer the aspirations and behaviours of skills actors 
through encouragement or exhortation or, if all else fails, through emancipation of the 
vulnerable party (support behind the scenes for those disempowered and denied 
productive or labour market competitiveness by the skills deviance of the other). In 
offering such an account of the source and cause of paradox this thesis has explained the 
governance – ordering and organising - of skills policy under New Labour as an attempt at 
‘state-steered voluntarism’.  
 
I 
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In addition this thesis has shown the limitations and limits of state-steered voluntarism. It 
has shown that in the attempt to discursively retain and regulate subjects towards ‘good’ 
voluntarism (through the coexisting demand-led and demand-leading strategies), policy 
constructed the very weapons actors needed to fight back. Simplistically speaking the 
tools to use (parts of) the demand-led system to disrupt and relocate (parts of) the 
demand-leading system; tools that afforded actors the ability to use (parts of) one 
strategy as an escape route from (parts of) the other. Therefore, in conclusion this thesis 
suggests that the tension between demand-led and demand-leading strategies produced a 
struggle for the right to define the meanings, practices, and processes of governing skills, 
from within the policy. As such, New Labour created a paradox - as a result of an attempt 
to regulate good voluntarism – which it was unable to reconcile and resolve.  
 
Having arrived at this main conclusion in response to the central research question, the 
remainder of this chapter takes a step back to recall and develop how this conclusion has 
been reached with respect to the empirical sub-questions that informed the development 
of the thesis. It does this by firstly reiterating the location of the research and research 
design, and secondly summarising the findings (section 9.2). I then present the theoretical 
and empirical contributions of the thesis and the policy implications (section 9.3), before 
reflecting on the potential for future research agendas building from, and developing, this 
study (section 9.4).  
 
9.2 Summary of the Research Aims and Findings 
 
9.2.1 Research Aims and Approach: Locating the Thesis in a Paradox Unsolved 
 
This thesis set out to explain and understand the source and cause of paradox at the heart 
of the New Labour Skills Strategy for England; the existence of both a ‘demand-led’ 
strategy, and a state strategy to lead demand  in the context of voluntarism. It was guided 
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by the following overarching research question (RQ) and three empirical sub-question 
(SRQ):  
 
RQ: How can the governance – ordering and organising – of skills policy under New 
Labour be explained and understood? 
 
SRQ1: How did New Labour establish the logic for, and give meaning to, a high(er) skills 
project in England? 
 
SRQ2: How was the logic for a high(er) skills project used to order and organise skills 
policy in England? 
 
SRQ3: How did employer and employee representatives interpret and respond to the 
New Labour high(er) skills project for England, and with what implications for the 
ordering and organising of skills delivery? 
 
The identification of these research questions came from a concern that both the existing 
analysis of New Labour’s skills policy (outlined in Chapter 1), and the underpinning 
theoretical perspectives that have sought to explain the governance of skill formation in 
the UK/England in the context of voluntarism (reviewed in Chapter 2), were seemingly 
unable to account for and explain the paradox at the heart of the New Labour Skills 
Strategy for England. As a consequence, existing analysis of New Labour’s skills policy 
tends to retreat to positions that read the New Labour Skills Strategy for England as 
suffering from a naive misunderstanding about, and/or unwillingness and/or inability to 
affect, the skills choices of private actors (especially employers) in the context of 
voluntarism. Misunderstanding, unwillingness, and inability are all conclusions about 
policy inflections that ‘demand is to be led by the state’, available to be reached through 
Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) or power and politics informed (for example PRA) analytical 
frameworks for theorising the governance of skill in the context of (liberal market) 
voluntarism. Indeed, both perspectives struggle to reach any other conclusion about this 
(historically) incongruous inflection (Chapter 2).  
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Taking an alternate approach to policy analysis by redirecting away from an investigation 
of policy outcomes that leads to explanations of ‘misunderstanding’ (approaches that 
effectively require the writing-out of policy meanings, practices and processes associated 
with the role of the state in leading demand, and which cannot therefore adequately 
explain and account for paradox), this thesis focused on the strategic and selective 
normative dimension of skill governance – the ordering and organising of ‘doing skills’ - 
and its remaking by skills actors (representatives of employers and employees), that leads 
instead to explanations of ‘understanding’. Explanations better able to account for the 
relationship between policy meanings, practices, and processes and their contestation, 
and that can better explain and account for paradox.  
 
To achieve this redirecting of analysis, the thesis draws on a synthesis of critical political 
economy (CPE) and critical governance studies, to develop the conceptual approach to 
practices and processes of state work, and policy as intersubjective meaning-making. This 
is a synthesis that enables a critical analysis of the role of semiosis in institutionalising the 
logic of the regime, as well as being able to account for ambiguity and contestation of 
meaning-making (without reducing to radical contingency). This is a synthesis that 
highlights  state work as attempts to align and assemble ill-suited meanings, practices, and 
processes - claimed to amount to a coherent agenda (Newman & Clarke, 2009a) - and the 
ability for these efforts to be undone and remade (Chapter 3).  
 
Given the ontological and epistemological commitment to understanding and explaining 
the strategic and selective realm of meaning-making in the conceptual approach, the 
research was conducted by employing a faithful and reflective interpretative policy 
analysis (Chapter 4) of key documents and interviews with elite skills actors. The 
combination of conceptual and methodological approach enabled me to address the 
research question of this study: how can the governance – ordering and organising – of 
skill policy under New Labour be explained and understood? The main findings and 
conclusions are summarised in the next section in relation to the three empirical sub-
questions.  
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9.2.2 Main Findings and Conclusions 
 
The main findings and conclusions of this thesis are presented in this section under each 
of the three empirical sub-questions that, together with the research question, guided this 
study.  
 
How did New Labour establish the logic for, and give meaning to, a high(er) skills project 
in England?? 
 
Chapter 5 presented an analysis of policy-makers narratives that identified the logic for 
high(er) skill as built on mitigating economic and social uncertainty-based complexity. By 
presenting the production and employment environment of businesses and worker-
citizens as framed by the difficulties of a particular (selected and privileged) imaginary of a 
highly competitive and technologically advanced and advancing knowledge-based 
economy and post-welfare society, policy-makers were able to construct the only possible 
meaningful remedy to be the pursuit of more and better skills (the ‘high skills rhetoric’).  
 
Specifically, the requirement for more and better skills as a coping mechanism in the 
dynamism of the global economy was intrinsically linked to the ability of businesses and 
worker-citizens to be flexible and adaptable to putatively rapid change. As such, beyond 
extolling the alchemical qualities and virtues of high(er) skills for securing on-going 
business and worker-citizen prosperity, policy-makers’ narratives declined to specify the 
actual skills needed. This decision was presented as to be taken at the workplace (by 
individual businesses or worker-citizens) to address their particular and changeable 
requirements. The implication was the establishment of a logic where high(er) skills for 
flexibility and adaptability to change were to be governed through policy – attempting to 
discursively regulate to support or shape the market toward progressive aspirations and 
behaviours - but where determining what constitutes the high(er) skills for flexibility and 
adaptability was a private (workplace or individual business/worker-citizen) decision. 
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In addition policy-makers’ narratives constructed the logic for high(er) skills as built on 
their depiction of inherent coherence between multiple interests and agendas, brought 
together in a skills partnership (government, business and worker-citizens). Specifically 
policy presented a fundamental synergy between the national economic and social skills 
ambitions of UK plc. and UK social, the public and private skills interests of government 
and businesses/worker-citizens, and the mutual skills concerns of employers and 
employees interacting at the site of the workplace. The chapter presented how the forging 
of this inherent coherence of interests involved state work to produce intersubjective 
meaning associated with an economic and social imperative, by ‘speaking out’ and 
‘speaking about’ shared agendas; again, seeking to govern (steer and manoeuvre) 
workplace actors into alignment through the attempted discursive regulation of private 
interests.  
 
In conclusion, this chapter highlighted the role of semiosis in construing and constructing 
the ‘object’ of governance (Jessop, 2008; Jessop, 2009) and the objective of skills policy in 
relation to the wider paradigm of the global knowledge-based economy and post-welfare 
society. It found that New Labour established the logic for, and gave meaning to, a 
high(er) skills project in England by meaningfully determining, and seeking to bind and fix, 
‘progress in partnership’ as the object of governance and the objective of policy. 
Constructing the logic for high(er) skill in this way involved state work to discursively set 
the terms of the conversation about skills more widely, and regulate workplace actors 
(businesses and worker-citizens) with regard to both the meaningful nature (if not the 
specifics) and degree of privately-held ‘responsible skills aspiration and behaviour’.  
 
How was the logic for a high(er) skills project used to order and organise skills policy in 
England?? 
 
This question was addressed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, and presented as the 
relationship between the ‘formal’ (‘what was to be governed’) and ‘operational’ (‘how 
skills are done’) dimensions of policy. (I borrow the terms and distinctions from Carmel & 
Papadopoulos, 2003). Taken together the analytical work of these two chapters explained 
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and accounted for the paradox at the heart of the New Labour Skills Strategy - both a 
‘demand-led’ strategy, and a state strategy to lead demand  in the context of voluntarism.  
 
This thesis showed that within what is framed as a “coherent approach” (Foreword by 
Tony Blair – PIU, 2001:3) to skills – addressed at solving the low skills problem in England - 
New Labour constructed three distinct operational strategies for governing skills. These 
distinct strategies were determined, in the first instance, by the degree to which imagined 
workplaces were perceived to have internalised the logic for high(er) skills, and exhibited 
skills aspirations and behaviours based on pursuing skills-led progress in partnership. 
These three strategies were termed: 
o The demand-led strategy 
o The strategy for leading demand 
o The strategy for circumventing lack of demand 
 
Further to this, the thesis presents how the strategies were further distinguished by the 
imagined relationship between employers and employees at the site of the workplace, the 
constructed responding form and role for the state, and the meanings, practices and 
processes underwriting the organisation of the institutions of skill delivery: 
o Demand-led strategy - responsible workplace, shared progressive enlightened/ 
motivated skills aspiration and behaviour of businesses and worker-citizens, 
empowering role for the state, demand-led system of skill delivery to respond to 
partner-customer ‘voice’ and ‘choice’ (Chapter 6, Figure 6.2) 
o Strategy to lead demand – inert workplace, shared deficient skills aspirations and 
behaviour of businesses and worker-citizens, enhancing role for the state, skills 
delivery system to lead demand by driving the state vision and targets (Chapter 7.2, 
Figure 7.1) 
o Strategy to mitigate and circumvent lack of demand – irresponsible workplaces, 
deviant lack of skills aspiration and behaviour of businesses (‘bad boss’) or worker-
citizens (‘bad worker’), emancipating role for the state, skills delivery system to 
mitigate and circumvent lack of demand through exhortation in practice and 
support for the vulnerable party ‘behind the scenes’ (Chapter 7.3, Figure 7.2) 
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In short, this thesis argues that these identified distinct skills strategies for England 
represented state work to create different images of workplaces – subject positions and 
subjectivities – that justified different governance strategies. State work that involved 
rearticulating and reassembling the component parts of the skills project into distinct 
architectures of high(er) skills governance by the state. The bringing together and 
sequencing of linked ideas, images, actors, institutions, technologies, techniques and tools 
of skill delivery, that ordered and organised the governance of skills policy in relation to 
how the problem of low skills was perceived. (I borrowed the concepts of ‘articulation’ 
and ‘assemblage’ from Newman and Clarke, 2009a).  
 
In the different strategies – which make-up and imagine different workplaces - the role of 
the state changes as the workplace is differently aligned with state projects to ‘support’, 
‘shape’ or ‘emancipate’ production and labour market competitiveness and better social 
functioning (in the context of the paradigm which frames the logic for skills, Jessop, 2002; 
Cerny, 2010a), and with it the nature of the relationship between actors and the state in 
the ‘skills partnership’. In effect partners encounter a different ‘type’ of state and state 
work. Highlighting modes of governance as discursive regulation and distributional devises, 
determining who does what, gets what, and how.  
 
The analysis provided in response to this empirical sub-question, interested in the 
relationship between the logic (meaning) and practices/process of ‘doing skills’, benefitted 
from taking an approach informed by the combination of CPE and critical governance 
studies. This approach enabled the findings to reveal the relationship between policy 
meanings, practices, and processes. It does this by highlighting the role of semiosis in 
construing and constructing the objects and subjects of governance, as well as the modes 
and mechanisms of governing (Jessop, 2009); in this case ‘demand-led’ or ‘demand-
leading’ skills strategies. Beyond this the findings show how producing meanings and 
practices/processes of governance is on-going, as well as fragile and incomplete, as a 
consequence of repeatedly (re)making, (re)producing, and disrupting discursive and 
material alignments and alliances to reframe the skills strategy and the nuances of what 
and who is being governed, and how. The findings of these two chapters end by 
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recognising that the fragility and incompleteness of state work to govern skills is 
exacerbated by the entangling and collapsing of the lines between the distinct strategies 
for high(er) skills in England. 
 
How did employer and employee representatives interpret and respond to the New 
Labour high(er) skills project for England, and with what implications for the ordering 
and organising of skills delivery?  
 
This question was addressed in Chapter 8, which starts from the recognition that although 
the analytical work of the thesis had been to explicate the distinct strategies for governing 
skill in England under New Labour in order to explain and understand the paradox - both a 
‘demand-led’ strategy and a state strategy to lead demand  in the context of voluntarism – 
the distinct strategies coexisted, were entangled and collapsed, in policy discourses and 
the narratives of policy-makers. The chapter showed how the entangling and collapsing of 
strategies creates opaque policy. Policy that is able to be treated as a repertoire of 
available, but contradictory and disconnected, narrative threads that can be strategically 
selected – dissected, distilled and dislocated – and stitched back together (assembled) into 
new skills projects and patterns for skill governance, by skills actors. Based on analysis of 
interview material and key documents, the chapter therefore showed how employer and 
employee representatives – utilising (but twisting and tilting) the authorised positions 
from which to speak that they are afforded in policy - can be understood as engaged in 
second level strategic selection to extract, re-inflect and elevate parts of the skills 
discourse, and rearticulate and reassemble the high(er) skills project from within.  
 
One key contribution of this thesis is to show this second level of strategic selection 
activity that is missed by CPE, as a consequence of it being a theory of the macro-
economic semiotic and extra-semiotic order (Jessop, 2009). By adopting an approach 
influenced by other critical governance theories, this analysis of the New Labour Skills 
Strategy for England captured the level of policymaking below the surface to reveal the 
lack of ideational unity within broad policy meanings and practices, and the nature of the 
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high(er) skills project as nuanced - “more than one thing at once” (Clarke, 2004b:2) – and 
therefore easily contested and disrupted (Newman & Clarke, 2009a; Newman, 2007). 
 
The chapter also showed the implications of this second level strategic selection work by 
skills actors (made possible by policy opacity), that sought to disrupt and remake – 
rearticulate and reassemble - policy meaning, practices and processes from within, for 
skills delivery. In highlighting the implications for skills delivery of both the ambiguity and 
opacity of policy and the struggles over meanings, practices and processes that take place 
between representatives of skills actors and the state, the chapter has shown that 
discourse matter. That discursive attempts to ‘claim truths’ (Clarke & Cochrane, 1998; 
Clarke, 2004a; Ball, 2007; Ball, 2008a), and governance as ‘political communication’ (Bang, 
2003b:7) to produce intersubjective meaning associated with socially constructed 
imperatives, has material effects (Jessop, 2004; Jessop, 2008; Jessop, 2009).  
 
Skills delivery encountered the struggle over meanings, practices, and processes of ‘doing 
skills’ as further disorganising and frustrating the tensions in their role and function to 
lead demand and be demand-led. In particular the chapter highlighted the tensions skills 
delivery experiences around the contested ‘trading’ of responsibility and relevance within 
the skills strategy. They described encountering the disruption of demand-led strategies as 
skills actor representatives sought to trade responsibility for who should be listened to, 
and whose demand should count. They described encountering the disruption of demand-
leading strategies as skills actor representatives sought to trade the relevance of the skills 
targets driven by a government vision. As a consequence they portrayed their activity as 
mainly engaged in negotiating, mediating and reconciling/lessening the variance between 
points over which contestation pivots. Essentially, as mediating between attempts by the 
state to encourage, nudge and steer skills actors towards ‘good’ voluntarism, and 
attempts by skills actor representatives to redefine such an agenda.  
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Answering the Research Question  
 
How then can governance – ordering and organising - of skills policy under New Labour be 
explained and understood? Overall, this thesis finds that within what was depicted as a 
‘coherent approach’ to skills policymaking, there were three distinct architectures of skills 
governance: the demand-led strategy; the strategy to lead demand; and the strategy to 
circumvent lack of demand. The three strategies were distinguished by how workplace 
skills aspiration and behaviour was imagined in proximity to the established logic for 
high(er) skills in England; the object of governance as ‘progress in partnership’. These 
strategies were however entangled, and collapsed in policy discourse and policy-makers’ 
narratives, rendering the distinctions between them opaque. Including, and in particular, 
the dissimilar subject positions and subjectivities policy created and sought to empower, 
encourage or challenge and emancipate. It is this opacity in relation to different subjects 
of governance that can be used by skills actors - engaged in a second level of strategic 
selection of meanings, practice and processes - to ‘talk back’ and disrupt, disorganise and 
frustrate the functions of skills delivery actors. This manifests for skills delivery as a 
struggle to manage the tensions between their roles to be demand-led, and to lead 
demand through encouraging and nudging high(er) skills aspirations and behaviours.  
 
The thesis concludes that the governance –ordering and organising - of skills policy under 
New Labour can be explained and understood as an attempt at ‘state-steered voluntarism’ 
in England, and that this analysis highlights the limits of such a project.  
 
9.3 Contributions and Implications of the Thesis 
 
Having summarised the research findings in relation to the empirical sub-questions that 
guided this thesis and answered the main research question, this section highlights the 
main theoretical and empirical contributions of the study, and discusses the implications 
that emerge for skills policymaking in England. The thesis then closes by considering 
future research agendas building on, and developing aspects of conclusions reached.  
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9.3.2 Theoretical Contributions 
 
This thesis makes a number of theoretical contributions to studying skill policymaking in 
the UK/England. Most particularly, the thesis makes a strong argument for the need to 
take an approach to the analysis and evaluation of skill governance in the UK/England 
informed by a conceptual and methodological commitment to taking the role of meaning-
making in construing and constructing the objects of governance and the objectives of 
policy seriously. An approach which this thesis argues has the advantage of being able to 
account for, and explain, the paradox at the heart of the New Labour Skills Strategy for 
England, by avoiding the pitfalls of both functionalist and PRA-informed approaches to 
theorising the governance of skill that tend to read policy intentions back in a straight-line 
from policy outcomes. The approach taken in this thesis can explain a logic for high(er) 
skills that recognises a seemingly interested state operating in complex relation to 
partisan interests.  
 
Adopting a CPE-informed conceptual framework, the thesis highlights the “performative 
force” (Jessop, 2008:20) of the strategically selected imaginary of a global knowledge-
based economy and post-welfare society, as constituting the ‘logic of possibility and 
limitation’ (Brown, 1999) that framed the New Labour high(er) skills project. Furthermore, 
by combining CPE with critical governance studies the analysis has explored below the 
surface of the macro level of regime ordering and policy objectives, to consider how 
meanings produce policy and policies (re)produce meanings. In particular meaningful 
subject positions and subjectivities authorised and validated to speak and act, or not.  
 
Taking this approach to studying governance – employed as an “analytical concept” 
(Newman, 2001:11), for exploring “changes in political practices and their implications for 
the political rules of the game” (Kjær, 2004:10) – the analysis has been able to account for 
the nuances and complexities in the iterative relationship between policy logics 
(meanings), and policy practices and processes. Specifically, the relationship between the 
‘formal’ (‘what was to be governed’) and ‘operational’ (‘the doing of skills’), dimensions of 
policy (Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003).  
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Drawing on the way that many critical governance studies scholars theorise the nuanced 
and complex relationship between formal and operational dimensions of policy is 
important. This is because more abstracted perspectives, that tend to zoom out in search 
of sweeping descriptors to account for how logics relate to policies – such as the 
state/market relationship (Brown, 1999:241), or in Jessopian terms the ‘structural 
coupling’ of the accumulation regime and the regulation regime (Jessop: 2002:3) – miss 
the ambiguity and messiness of state projects and state work (Newman & Clarke, 2009a; 
Clarke, 2005b; Clarke, 2004b; Carmel & Papadopoulos, 2003; Newman, 2001; Fairclough, 
2000).  
 
Given the scope of this thesis, it is essential not to under-theorise the ambiguity and 
messiness of state projects and state work. Indeed any endeavour to engage with New 
Labour’s contribution to skill policymaking must be understood as framed within a 
broader (party political) ideological commitment to a hybrid ‘Third Way’ and a ‘language 
of reconciliation’ (Fairclough, 2000; Newman, 2001); and open to the ways in which 
rhetorical claims of policy ‘coherence’ mask the incoherence of political rationalities 
(Newman, 2005). In short, by adopting a conceptual framework for analysis informed by 
CPE and critical governance studies, this thesis contributes a theoretical approach to 
studying skills policy in the context of successive New Labour administrations that can 
understand and explain paradox, rather than correct for it by writing it off or sorting it out. 
It offers an empirical instance of theorising state work as discursive regulation. In 
particular it offers an account of how the complex and multiple narrative threads of an 
idealised model of good aspiration and behaviour – ‘good voluntarism’ – are articulated 
and assembled into policy projects and used to contrast and dissuade bad aspiration and 
behaviour – ‘bad voluntarism’.  
 
9.3.1 Empirical Contributions  
 
By taking an interpretive approach to analysing the relationship between policy meanings, 
practices, and processes, this thesis offers several contributions to the empirical analysis 
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of skill policy in England, during the New Labour period of government. Notably, the 
findings offer an explication (from within a so-heralded ‘coherent approach’) of three 
coexisting strategies for skills, that articulated and assembled the component parts of the 
skills projects into distinct architectures of skill governance; the entangling and collapsing 
of these three coexisting strategies into an opaque policy for high(er) skills; and the 
utilisation of this policy opacity by skills actors to remake and ‘talk back’ policy meanings, 
practices and processes, disrupting and disorganising skill delivery.  
 
Of particular significance is the empirical contribution this thesis makes to understanding 
and explain how skills actors, as a consequence of policy opacity, engage in a second level 
of strategic selection of meaningful discourses. Disconnecting certain narrative threads 
within policy from their sequencing in differently assembled skills strategies and stitching 
them back together to rearticulate and reassemble the high(er) skills project into a 
remade and seemingly coherent new order and organisation. This empirical contribution 
is both a consequence of, and has implications for, the conceptual and methodological 
approach to analysis taken in this thesis.  
 
Conceptually the thesis begins to offer an explanation of how actors act in the context of 
opacity that is neither overly structurally determinist, nor reduces to radical contingency. 
That neither assumes skills actor interests (a normative and openly antagonistic wish list), 
nor ignores the more complex and subtle ways in which the normative goals of policy are 
pursued. The thesis arrives at this empirical contribution as a result of an IPA-informed 
methodological commitment to taking the voice of skills actors to be the unit of analysis. 
This methodological commitment has allowed the thesis to engage with and bring 
together skill policy (the starting point), skills actors, and the practice and process 
implications of the conjuncture of the two for skill delivery. In doing so the thesis has been 
able to take seriously, and identify how, skills actors act from within policy and with what 
implications.  
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9.3.3 Policy Implications 
 
The thesis concurs with Gleeson & Keep (2004) when they argue that one of the central 
problems of skill policy under New Labour (indeed, one of the central problems of skills 
policymaking in the UK/England in the historical context of voluntarism) is the lack of 
properly defined rights and responsibilities of employers (also employees). However, the 
thesis argues that this is not because the exercise of defining rights and responsibilities is 
omitted from policymaking, and rights and responsibilities were not inscribed in policy; 
they were. In many cases there were whole sections of policy dedicated to detailing the 
rights and responsibilities of skills (workplace) actors (DfES, 2006; Leitch, 2006; DIUS, 
2007a; DIUS, 2008b). Nor is the problem solely that these ascribed rights and 
responsibilities amount, in practice, to little more that hopeful conjectures in the context 
of ‘soft’ regulations; after all speaking rights and responsibilities is not the same as 
enacting them, and writing ‘strategy’ is not the same as achieving policy goals.  
 
Although this is a strong criticism of skills policymaking in the UK/England; one that 
belongs to a body of work that has identified the politics of skill (see Chapter 2) to favour 
the interests of employers in the capital-labour relationship as a consequence of a lack of 
‘hard’ regulation. In making this point these literatures, cannot account for inflections in 
policy that the state should lead demand, and tend therefore to retreat to the position 
that policy misunderstands, or is unable or unwilling to affect, the skills decisions of 
private actors (Avis et al, 1996; King, 1997; Gleeson & Keep, 2002; Keep, 2004; Keep, 
2005; Payne, 2008).  
 
In not reading policy intentions back in a straight-line from policy outcomes, this thesis 
makes the distinct claim that the main problem with skills policymaking under New Labour 
was that skills actor rights and responsibilities - to have demands met, or to raise demand, 
or to overcome a deviant lack of demand - were differently ascribed in the distinct 
strategies for governing skills. Furthermore, although distinct these different rights and 
responsibilities were entangled and collapsed in policy, rendered opaque, and in being so, 
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easily dislocated from their sequencing in the differently assembled governance 
architectures; contested, disrupted, and powerfully rearticulated.  
 
The implications for policy of this thesis are therefore associated with the ‘problem of 
opacity’, and in the context of policy opacity, the limits of state-steered voluntarism. This 
thesis urges the recognition that state policies to ‘support’, ‘shape’, and ‘emancipate’ 
economic competitiveness and better social functioning, firstly have many 
meanings/interpretations, even within the ‘performative paradigm’ or imaginaries (Jessop, 
2008; Jessop, 2009) of the global knowledge-based economy and post-welfare society; 
and secondly, are different projects and should be treated as such. Even if we accept the 
broad contention that high(er) skills are to be about the flexibility and adaptability to cope 
in conditions of economic and social uncertainty-based complexity; the logic of the high 
skills rhetoric (Crouch et al, 2004). An acceptance replete with all the problems of who 
and what this logic privileges, particularly given the inequality of starting positions. Then 
entangling and collapsing the normative distinction between the ‘good’, the ‘bad’, and the 
frankly ‘ugly’, skills actors (workplaces) disrupts and derails policy intentions. In terms of 
policy implications my thesis shows that this ‘really’ matters because skills providers 
experience this disruption and derailment in practice. This then is the limit and limitation 
of New Labour’s version of skills policymaking in England – ‘state-steered voluntarism’ - as 
an effective solution to the low skills problem.  
 
9.4 Future Research Agendas 
 
This thesis opens up a number of future research agendas to build on and develop the 
main contributions of the findings. Firstly, the empirical contribution of this thesis offers a 
novel conceptualisation of the way in which (state and non-state) actors act within policy, 
in conditions of policy opacity. To develop the analytical application and sharpen the 
theory here developed, research would first be extended to consider and compare the 
governance of skills under the current coalition government.  
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Since taking office the coalition have disbanded the Train to Gain initiative and promoted 
apprenticeship in ‘partnership with employers and individuals’ (BIS, 2011) as the main 
route for workforce development71. Although some of the policy tools and techniques of 
governing skill have changed, extending the application of the conceptual framework, 
which offers a sophisticated device for looking below the surface of policy to explore 
underpinning and normative dimension of meaning-making, would enable continuities or 
discontinuities with the New Labour period to be revealed. This research agenda would 
therefore be guided by the question ‘to what extent is skills governance in England under 
the coalition government continuing in the legacy of ‘state-steered voluntarism?’ In 
addition to addressing this question, applying and extending the conceptual framework 
within the field of research would enable the theory of skills actor second level strategic 
selection within policy to be further empirically tested and refined.  
 
A second future research agenda that emerges from the findings would develop on the 
theme of asymmetrical balance of power between employer and employee 
representatives influence over the ordering and organising of skill governance, that whilst 
outside the scope of this study to measure, has been flagged throughout. (For example, in 
the treatment by policy-makers of the demand-led system as synonymous with an 
employer-led system on the basis of how the workplace partnership was imagined in 
‘responsible’ workplaces.) In other words, one future research agenda would be to 
determine to what extent the New Labour Skills Strategy (or indeed the coalition skills 
strategy) functions as a ‘power resource’ for different actors. Another benefit of 
developing this line of research would be to move beyond the voice of employer and 
employee representatives, to explore what the implications of struggle over skills 
discourse, practices, and processes were at the level of the workplace (narrowed by 
region or sector or policy intervention). This research agenda would therefore be guided 
by the question(s): ‘who took up skills interventions, and why; and with what implications 
for policy as tool to pursue interests at the workplace?’ In providing the framework from 
                                                  
71 it is worth noting that these policies were established in the Conservative Party plans for education and 
training prior to them forming the government and embarking on the current programme to reduce levels of 
public spending across the board 
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which to develop this future research agenda this thesis provides the starting point from 
which to investigate a politics of skills happening inside and from within policy. A politics 
which is important, because in how the ‘doing of skills’ is ordered and organised lies what 
is at stake for both employers and employees at the workplace.  
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Appendix 1: Thematic Guide to Interviews with Elite Actors 
 
Topic 1: Role, Interests and Perspectives regarding Skills 
Questions: Probes: 
Role in Skills Strategy? What is your role? 
What does your organisation do with regard to 
skills and the Skills Strategy? 
How do you work with other stakeholders? 
Why do you work with these stakeholders: do 
you share interests or have different interests? 
In what ways do you share or have different 
interests? 
What are your interests in Skills 
and the Skills Strategy? 
What is important to you about skills and the 
Skills Strategy? 
What concerns do you have about the direction 
of strategy? 
What do you think is the purpose 
and main aims of the New 
Labour Skills Strategy? 
What do you consider to be the aim and 
purpose of government/policy-makers? 
Do you agree with the aim(s) and purpose(s)? 
Do you disagree with the aim(s) and purpose(s)? 
Do you have different aims and purposes? 
Are there any issues to do with 
skills, or more broadly labour 
market relations, which are not 
addressed within the Skills 
Strategy? 
What else would you like to see included/or 
given more priority within the Skills Strategy? 
What would you exclude or alter in terms of 
priority? 
Topic 2: Logics (principles and priorities) of the Skills Strategy 
Questions Probes 
What is driving a focus on skills? What is behind a focus on skills? 
Why is there a current focus on skills?  
Do you think the needs of the 
different stakeholders are 
addressed equally through the 
Skills Strategy? 
What does the strategy seek to do? 
How do you perceive the strategy to be meeting 
your needs/ the needs of those you represent? 
In what ways does the strategy not meet your 
needs?  
Why do you think the strategy does or does not 
meet your needs? 
The strategy mentions 
partnership working, is this 
taking place? 
Do you work in partnership with government 
and other actors? 
What is your perception of partnership 
working? 
The strategy mentions the need 
for reforms, what do you think is 
being reformed? 
What aspects of skills policy have been 
problems previously? Do you think there is 
agreement about these problems? 
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Topic 2: Logics (principles and priorities) of the Skills Strategy Cont.… 
Questions Probes 
Do you think the Skills Strategy is 
being de-politicised [Quote from 
Leitch, 2006]? 
Do you think skills are a consensus issue? 
What is the consensus?  
What are the different opinions? 
Topic 3: Rights and Responsibilities 
Questions Probes 
What do you perceive to be the 
responsibilities of employees? 
What should employee/learner being doing 
with regard to skills? 
What do you perceive to be the 
rights of employee/learners? 
Do employee/learners have a right to skills? 
Under what conditions if any? 
What should employee/learners be entitled to? 
What are the difficulties that employee/learners 
face with regard to gaining skills? 
How does the strategy seek to overcome any 
difficulties? 
What do you perceive to be the 
responsibilities of employers? 
What should employers be doing with regard to 
skills? 
What do you perceive to be the 
rights of employers? 
Do employers have rights to expect certain 
things from a Skills Strategy? 
Under what conditions if any? 
What are the difficulties faced by employers? 
Does the strategy seek to overcome these 
difficulties? 
What is the role of the state? What is the responsibility of the 
state/government? 
Does the strategy go far enough? 
Does the strategy go too far, intervene too 
much? 
What is the role of the further 
education sector/VET providers? 
What is the responsibility of providers?  
Does the strategy go far enough in addressing 
the responsibilities of providers? 
Does the strategy go too far? 
Do providers have any rights, and if so how do 
you understand the rights of providers? 
Do you think that the Skills 
Strategy addresses voluntarism? 
Can and should voluntarism be tackled? 
If yes, how? If no, why not? 
Topic 4: What is meant by Skills? 
Question  Probe 
What are the skills that are 
sought through the skills 
strategy? 
In your opinion what kind of skill do we lack 
currently? 
Does the strategy seek to address the skills 
shortages you identify? 
If not, why? What is prioritised? 
What is the aim and purpose of skills targets? 
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Topic 4: What is meant by Skills? Cont.… 
Question  Probe 
Do all stakeholder benefit from 
these types of skills? 
Do you benefit from these types of skills? 
Do others?  
What should be prioritised? 
Does the Skills Strategy focus on 
certain types of qualification 
outcome? 
What is your perspective of qualifications? 
Do you think there is enough focus on 
qualifications? 
Is there too much focus on qualifications? 
Which qualifications would you prioritise? 
Topic 5: Relationship between Skills, Employment and Welfare 
Questions Probes 
What is the purpose of skills? How do skills support business? 
How do skills support individuals? 
What is your view of a dual 
economic and social agenda? 
How does/should the Skills Strategy support 
economic agendas? 
How does/should the Skills Strategy support 
social agendas? 
Are they equal agendas?  
Which is prioritised and why? 
Should a Skills Strategy support either? 
What should a Skills Strategy do? 
What is your view of the 
statement that “the best form of 
welfare is to ensure people can 
adapt to change” [Quote Leitch 
Report]? 
Do skills support people/businesses adapt to 
change? 
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Appendix 2: Letter of Introduction 
 
  
 
 
                               
 
       Hannah Durrant  
Doctoral Candidate/Research Associate 
European Research Institute  
Department of Social & Policy Sciences 
       University of Bath 
       BATH, BA2 7AY    
        
       t. 01225 384204 
       e. h.durrant@bath.ac.uk 
 
 
        
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION – SKILLS STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
Who I am & my research interest: 
 
 
My name is Hannah Durrant and I am undertaking research for a PhD within the Department of 
Social and Policy Sciences at the University of Bath. The focus of my research is the current and on-
going development of the Skills Strategy, and specifically the perspectives and roles of different 
groups of stakeholders in policy design and delivery.  
 
Prior to commencing my PhD studies I worked for 5 years within the Further Education sector as a 
Projects Manager; my role was primarily concerned with developing innovative approaches to 
service improvement. As a result I was fortunate to work in partnership with many organisations 
from the public, private, and third sector. It was primarily this experience, the successes and 
lessons learnt, that inspired my interest in the current research project.  
 
 
My research approach & why I would like to speak with you:  
 
 
In order to conduct my research I am keen to explore how employer and employee/learner 
representatives, the Further Education sector and the Government, have interacted to define and 
implement the Skills Strategy. I would therefore welcome the opportunity to speak with you about 
your involvement with the skills agenda. I anticipate the interview lasting approximately one hour, 
to be conducted at a time and place that is most convenient to you. During the interview I will 
provide you with a short research summary, and following the interview I would be more than 
 291
happy to provide you with a copy of the transcript and a brief report covering my main research 
findings.  
 
If you feel that you would be able to assist me with this research project, or would like to know 
more about my work, please contact me, either by e-mail or telephone, (contact details above). 
Thank you for taking the time to read this letter of introduction and for any support with my 
research project you feel able to offer. 
 
I look forward to speaking with you. 
 
Kind regards 
 
 
 
 
Hannah Durrant 
Doctoral Candidate/Research Associate European Research Institute (ERI) 
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